THE

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AMERICAN

CATHOLIC QUARTERLY

REVIEW.

Bonum est homini ut eum veritas vincat volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vincat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantem sive confitentem.

S. AUG. EPIST. CCXXXVIII. AD PASCENT.

VOLUME XVI.

FROM JANUARY TO OCTOBER, 1891.

PHILADELPHIA:
HARDY & MAHONY,
PUBLISHERS AND PROPRIETORS,
505 CHESTNUT STREET.

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THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC

QUARTERLY REVIEW

VOL. XVI.—APRIL, 1891.—No. 62.

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN AS A PREACHER.

SINCE the death of Cardinal Newman, his character, the phases of his life, his genius, have been reverently and lovingly discussed by men of every shade of thought. Yet, up to the present, no criticism of any length on his place as a speaker has appeared, a fact which must serve as an excuse for this paper. It is well to remark that the term speaker is not used in the technical sense it has taken on in the schools of elocution. In them it stands for elocutionary effect—posing, curved lines of gesture, and orotund tones. That all this was wanting to Newman, need hardly be told to those who have marked the angular outlines of his gaunt figure and heard of his thin, sweet voice.

Even when we accept the word in the higher sense of oratory, we may not apply it unrestrictedly to Newman. Who would speak of him in the same breath with Lacordaire, Webster, O'Connell, or Bossuet? Without doubt, more than one gift considered as necessary to the orator, was not his. First: He could lay no claim to the orator's primal requirement, that indescribable power which takes hold of and carries away the vast multitude, learned and unlearned; which Webster compares to "the outbreaking of a fountain from the earth, or the bursting forth of volcanic fires with spontaneous, original, native force." In his Oxford days, those whom Newman influenced were the select spirits, and in the recent biography of him by Mr. Richard H. Hutton (the editor of the *Spectator*), it is noted that, "he never forgot that his special experience at Oxford indicated that he was more likely to affect deeply the cultivated than the ignorant, and everything he published from

the time of his conversion to the present day has been almost exclusively addressed to minds of the same calibre and culture as those he was familiar with at Oxford." The "something essentially reserved and reticent in him" forbade the orator's surrender "to the glory of action and passion, to embodiment in life, to glow, and emphasis and self-expansion."

Again, Newman invariably, at least in his Oxford days, read from his manuscript. This precluded anything like action—action even of the high kind, Demosthenes defined as eloquence itself; and which Webster emphasized as "noble, sublime, god-like." Mr. Gladstone, when an undergraduate, listened to Newman, and thus sums up his ways in the pulpit: "Dr. Newman's manner in the pulpit was one about which, if you considered it in its separate parts, you would arrive at very unsatisfactory conclusions. There was not very much change in the inflexion of voice; action, there was none. His sermons were read, and his eyes were always bent on his book; and all that, you will say, is against efficiency in preaching. Yes, but you must take the man as a whole; there was a solemn sweetness and music in the tone; there was a completeness of the figure, taken together with the tone and with the matter, which made even his delivery, such as I have described it, and though exclusively from written sermons, singularly attractive."

A third gift must not be overlooked. When at his best, the great orator will be a man of the moment's inspiration. The Rev. Austin Phelps, of Andover, in his "Theory of Preaching," says: "It must be conceded to the advocates of exclusively extemporaneous preaching, that the extemporaneous ideal is the true one of public speech. A perfect orator would never write; he would always speak. The mutual magnetism between speaker and hearer would bear him on, without the aid of manuscript or memory." This gift was the source of Lacordaire's effectiveness; it was incompatible with the disposition of Newman.

For the lack of these gifts, which are of the essence of oratory, sacred or profane, he may not be reckoned among the great orators. But there is a class of speakers in which he stands a chief. Orator and preacher radically differ. Savonarola or St. Augustine may not be classed with the Curé of Ars or St. John the Evangelist. Gifts and accomplishments work out the purpose of the orator; character that of the preacher. "The man preaches, not the sermon, and the sermon is as the man," says Cardinal Manning. "The Apostles," he declares, "were preachers, messengers and evangelists. They were not pulpit orators." May it not be advanced without irreverence that the Blessed Saviour had little or nothing of the sacred orator about Him, although pre-eminently the Preacher!

This radical difference between orator and preacher is illustrated by the different results the work of the one produces in contrast with that of the other. The orator may communicate his feelings to an audience, move his hearers to the high tension of passion which constrains his own soul at the moment of inspiration; and this state may be as ephemeral in his hearers as in himself. Nay, though his own aim be lofty, it is possible that the quicker pulsation of the blood, the thrill of the nerves, the play upon the feelings, the smothered mutterings of the deeply-moved crowd, that all this while drawing men to listen, may not, however, induce them to lead better lives. The preacher, on the contrary, can be listened to but for this one purpose, personal edification. "An orator of high intellectual powers," writes the Abbe Mullois, in his brochure on "The Clergy and the People," "occupies a pulpit and leaves scarcely any results behind him. He is succeeded by one of ordinary attainments, who draws wondering crowds and converts many souls. The local skeptics are amazed. 'This man's style and logic,' say they, 'are weak; how comes it he is so attractive?'" And let this genuine preacher be a man of rare endowments, then hearts are touched as they were by Peter's words on Pentecost. Even if preacher and orator be possessed of singleness of purpose and purity of intention in equal measure, yet will the results differ; because in the preacher this purpose and this intention appeal to men as they do not in the orator. The orator's holiness is cloaked by his art, which is human, and by his method; for in his phrensy he must master men, lift them by main strength out of their prejudices and narrowness, and for the time mould them as the potter does soft clay. Power to overcome, to make his will the will of others, if he has not this he feels himself frustrated and leaves the pulpit ineffectual. "I mounted the pulpit firmly, but not without emotion," wrote Lacordaire, describing his first Conference in Notre Dame, "and began my discourse with my eye fixed on the archbishop. . . . . He listened, his head a little bent down. . . . . I soon felt at home with my subject and with my audience, and as my breast *swelled under the necessity of grasping that vast assembly of men*, and the calm of the first opening sentences began to give place to *the inspiration of the orator*, one of these exclamations escaped from me which, when deep and heartfelt, never fail to move. The archbishop visibly trembled. I watched his countenance change as he raised his head and cast on me a glance of astonishment. I saw that the battle was gained in his mind, and it was so already in that of the audience." If Lacordaire had failed to master, to grasp his audience, or if the inspiration of that immortal moment had been wanting, who will answer for what might have been?

The preacher has not this compelling power, or if it be within him, he realizes on it unconsciously. Nevertheless, his word pierces through to the marrow of the bone. Its penetrating qualities are not born of the throes of delivery, "noble, sublime, godlike," as it may be, but have their source in the subtler influences of a saintly life. Preachers and sanctity are inseparably connected; sacred orators there have been and can be, who were not, will not be saints. In the orator, therefore, holiness fills a minor *rôle;* in the preacher, it is the breath of his work, the principle of its life. The orator may be absorbed in a holy mission and turn all his genius to its furtherance; but in the preacher, let him have five talents or one, the holy mission it is which stands out. Genius and all else are lost sight of in the unswerving consecration of life to, and concentration of energy in, the missionary work. The great preacher's essence, then—that which makes him what he is—consists in this: He believes that he has been sent with a gospel, the promulgation of which absorbs life, talents and labor, and the first effect of which is his own sanctification. This is the character which, like the ineffaceable stamp of Holy Orders, gives his words their peculiar value.

However, if different in concept, yet it is possible that orator and preacher merge, or rather flux in the one personality; and this, too, in such proportions that a man might be something of a preacher and very much of an orator or *vice versa.* Amalgams of this kind are found here and there in history. St. Ambrose, "in cujus, infantis, ore examen opum consedisse dicitur, quæ res divinam viri eloquentiam præmonstrabat," was of this class, one would fain believe; and in greater perfection, since they had everything of the preacher and what of the orator is worth having, St. Paul and St. John Chrysostom.

If it can be shown that the character of the great preacher, which has been insisted upon was the character of Cardinal Newman, and that like the great preacher he was entirely wrapped up in an apostolic mission, then may it be fairly claimed that he is entitled to a place in their ranks.

First, Newman *believed* himself a man with a mission. Call to mind the scene in the sick man's room at Castra Giovanni: "Towards the end of May I set off for Palermo, taking three days for the journey. Before starting from my inn on the morning of May the 26th or 27th, I sat down on my bed and began to sob bitterly. My servant, who had acted as my nurse, asked what ailed me. I could only answer: I have a work to do in England." Bound up with this belief is his confident answer, when, seemingly sick unto death, he was asked for last instructions: "I shall not die, I shall not die, for I have not sinned against the light, I have not sinned

against the light!"[1] After getting back into England from this Mediterranean trip, his entire surrender of himself to the God-appointed work was such that it begat a very fierceness in his gentlest nature, so that he would have naught to do with anybody or anything which he discerned as not in accord with the undertaking he was set to. "I would have no dealings with my brother, and I put my conduct upon a syllogism. I said, 'St. Paul bids us avoid those who cause divisions; you cause divisions, therefore I must avoid you.' I dissuaded a lady from attending the marriage of a sister who had seceded from the Anglican Church." "What is perfectly clear," writes Mr. Hutton, "to any one who can appreciate Cardinal Newman at all, is that from the beginning to the end of his career he was penetrated with . . . . a steadfast resolve to devote the whole force of a singularly powerful and even intense character to the endeavor to promote the conversion of his fellow-countrymen from their tepid and unreal profession of Christianity to a new and profound faith in it." Again he writes: "I think there is hardly any other instance in our literature of so definite and remarkable a literary genius being entirely devoted, and devoted with the full ardor of a brooding imagination, to the service of revealed religion."[2] Newman had call on the proudest place in literature, but devotion to religion so consumed his life that it is a problem whether for years he knew of his literary powers.

Secondly, this consecration of life and concentration of energy begat in him, as in every genuine preacher, personal sanctity.

Examples of men who were wrapt up in religious movements and yet could not show the credentials of self-abnegation, of holiness, are to be met with frequently enough in history. It is a theological theory that "a man may teach others to be perfect, who is not perfect himself." Newman was not an example of it. There were ascetics at Oxford in his day, but his asceticism was incomparable, and almost magical in its influence. The case of Ward may be adduced in proof. Unworldliness in an apostle was for him a first and necessary mark of the divineness of the religion he preached. "The great note which attracted him towards a religious teacher," writes Wilfred Ward of his father, "was personal sanctity. 'No mathematical axiom,' he wrote, 'is more certain than this moral one, that where the fruits of holiness show themselves there is the Holy Ghost, and there is really true doctrine.'" Again, "Holy men are the great fountains from which moral and religious truth flow to the world; if a revelation be given, they are the authorized interpreters." In Newman, Ward found this "great note": "all and more than all of that exalted ethical char-

[1] *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, p. 83.

[2] Hutton's *Life of Newman*, pp. 2–15.

acter which had won him to Dr. Arnold;" and of what he preached, "the idea of holiness as the one aim was the pervading spirit."[1] So powerfully did this element in Newman effect Ward, that the first sermon the latter heard in St. Mary's changed his whole animus towards Tractarianism. "Henceforth the movement attracted instead of," as previously, "repelling his moral nature." Professor Bonamy Price's notes, anent the incident, are pertinent to our present purpose in more ways than one. "Ward of Balliol," he wrote, "is a man of great power. He came up to Oxford a Benthamite, a believer in virtue being the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In fact, he was a Rationalist. He was a very energetic talker of great power of reasoning. . . . . His chosen field was the region between religion and skepticism. He felt little scruple in winning over converts to Rationalism by very elaborate assaults in sophistry. After awhile John Henry Newman commenced the Tractarian movement. He was vicar of St. Mary's, Oxford, the Church of the University, also. He preached regularly on Sunday afternoons, at five o'clock, from St. Mary's pulpit. His sermons, as is well known, excited an interest as widely spread as it was keen among his audience, eager to hear more, sharply stirred up by the genius, the delicacy and subtlety of thought, the intense religious feeling, and, above all, by the flashes of unspeakable mystery which pervaded his utterances. The excitement they created scattered waves of feeling far beyond the precincts of the University. Ward was often pressed to go and hear them, but he impetuously refused. 'Why should I go and listen to such myths?' What he heard of the nature and effect of these sermons revolted him. At last one of his friends laid a plot against him. He invited him to take a walk, and brought him to the door of St. Mary's Church precisely as the clock was striking five. 'Now, Ward,' said he, 'Newman is at this moment going up into his pulpit. Why should you not enter and hear him once? It can do you no harm. If you don't like the preaching, you need not go a second time, but do hear and judge what the thing is like.' By the will of God, Ward was persuaded, and he entered the church. That sermon changed his whole life." From that time until he became a Catholic, Ward's motive of faith was, "John Newman says it is so."[2] Surely, then, Newman's holiness may be described as "almost magical in its influence."

Over and above the essentials which constitute the *genus* of great preachers, each one has traits which individualize, and to

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[1] *William George Ward and the Oxford Movement*, pp. 90–73, 1880.

[2] *Ward and the Oxford Movement*, pp. 80–97.

these must we look for the explanation of a preacher's *particular* influence, *i.e.*, how it comes that he holds sway over one class of minds, or two classes, and not over a third. Nobody who hears him but will be the better for it. But as in the preacher it is "the man who preaches, not the sermon;" and as this man in the concrete is of philosophic, or metaphysical, or practical, or scientific, or apologetic, or interpretative, or historical, or poetic, or mystical turn of mind—so it comes that for those of his hearers who have mental or spiritual leanings or endowments such as his own, he has peculiar attractions, is the lodestone which keeps them pointed aright. And in this phenomenon lies the explanation of the fact that from the days of John the Baptist, and of Peter, Apollo, and Paul—each great preacher has had his own devoted adherents, his school of disciples.

The higher the intellects, the more diversified their tendencies, and the greater the number influenced, these things attest the wider range and greater power of a particular preacher's traits. It may be said without exaggeration that all choice minds have been influenced by Newman. The traits which gave him this sway as well in his writings as in his preaching, though in a special way they ministered to his pulpit success, are well worthy of consideration.

Among the first of these come his insight and fearless intellectual honesty. "I know no writings which combine as Cardinal Newman's do," says Mr. Hutton in the *Contemporary Review* for May, "so penetrating an insight into the realities of the human world around us in all its detail, with so unswerving an inwardness of standard in the estimating and judging of that world." Only such insight as his could produce that wonderful passage in the "Apologia" in which "he contrasts the moral scenery of the actual world with that which he would have expected from his knowledge of the Creator, whose holiness is to him the deepest of all certainties"[1]—a passage wherein the key mystery of all mysteries is tersely and luminously set forth in a way betokening a grasp of intellect almost angelic. And for the thoughtful, religious mind in centuries, maybe, uninspired man has not delivered a more pregnant, wider-reaching word than this:[2] "Ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt, as I understand the subject; difficulty and doubt are incommensurate . . . . . Of all points of faith, the being of a God is, to my own apprehension, encompassed with most difficulty, and borne in upon our minds with most power."

The mental honesty of Newman, which compelled him to say

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[1] Hutton's *Life of Newman*, p. 5.

[2] *Apologia*, p. 265.

things just as he saw them, never exaggerating a proof or minimizing an "objection" was also a source of strength. Everybody acknowledged this virtue of his, in favor of which strange testimony can be quoted. Skeptics headstrong in the blind faith that they monopolize truth, that no man can see as clearly as they do, and not be of them (children, too, imagine that the horizon of their own field of vision shuts in the wide, wide world), have asked whether at heart this man was not with them, and whether he was not "only saved from infidelity by the deliberate exercise of a sturdy will to believe!" Certainly this conjecture of theirs is an open acknowledgment that Cardinal Newman understood their premises, and stated them accurately and fairly. Of course his profounder intelligence fathomed the weakness of those premises, pronounced their deductions unsound, and gave reasons for the faith within himself in words which will ever be "a light for after times."

This insight and this mental honesty were fraught with weighty results:

First. A listener could not avoid his conclusions, bulwarking himself behind objections whispered to his heart, dreaming "He does not make due allowance for this fact, or fairly apply that principle; therefore, I can remain rightfully unconvinced." No! Newman realized one's position better, measured its strength more precisely than one's self, and showed up its weakness in that cogent form, which wrung from the bound-to-be-skeptical mind the contradictory apothegm "Newman's logic is the science of assumption!"

Secondly. To these qualities we can trace the specific elements of his methods of thought, which enabled him clearly to discern when he was within the lines of Logical Necessity, when he had crossed thence and entered within the boundaries of Logical Possibility. Metaphysics could not play jack-o'-lantern with him, decoy into treacherous places where the ground gives beneath a firm tread just at the moment sure-footing is badly needed. Therefore, would he accompany his logic with matter of fact, or of revelation, or of Catholic doctrine; and when logic got beyond their command he would call a halt as to the absoluteness of its deductions; a "might-be" in such a case was well and good; but never a "Therefore, this is." Though a thorough dialectician, he did not press metaphysics beyond the sphere of their certainty, or maintain, as some have, that all spheres are theirs. The hold this position gave Newman on thoughtful minds cannot easily be estimated. Many had revolted against Dogmatism and gone off into Rationalism, or Liberalism, or Utilitarianism, or Agnosticism, because they had re-discovered the strength of the old difficulties,

and the inadequacy of the old answers, and certain dogmatists by their assumption that an unanswerable difficulty meant a well-grounded doubt—"an objection" as they termed it—had got men to fancy that faith somehow or other was at stake, so that a man could not rationally believe without accepting as sufficient explanations he knew to be weak. Newman, to whom dogma was dear as the very eye of faith, would deny the assumption and preach no such necessity. Here came into play his great distinction; difficulties and doubts were not commensurate terms. Harmonies could be attempted, were praiseworthy efforts; but their values were not absolute, for

> "Thus God has willed
> That man, when fully skilled,
> Still gropes in twilight dim."

Men listening to his limpid words found in them nothing of speciousness: difficulties they knew as actual—for example, the idea of a watchful Providence, taken in connection with the overwhelming world-wide presence of sin and the narrow confines of Christianity—were not removed by being metaphysized into the non-existent. He demonstrated that the position of the strong mind, which, in more than one case, had he not thus demonstrated, would ever have been nonplussed by doubt or hardened by unbelief, was this: Such and such a truth has evidence all-sufficient to merit assent; this and that difficulty exists which I cannot meet; any explanation which I can see is not altogether satisfactory. But because of this I must not question the truth itself. So to do would be to question the ability of my reason to discern evidence. Consequently I am held to assent, admitting that for me while on earth there can only be faith. God who is in heaven knows the secret; in the eternal days when other days are run it may be that His wisdom will illumine my gloom.

Another unique source of effectiveness in, as well as out of, the pulpit was that element of Newman's thought which elevated the imagination and the feelings into an avenue of truth. Other thinkers had analyzed the union of the heart with the intellect as a merely mechanical mixture, each ingredient preserving its peculiar properties. He would have it that the union was truly chemical; its result as truly a new product as is the product of oxygen and hydrogen, when in proper proportion they are subjected to heat. Hence for him, as a preacher, feelings and imagination took on a dignity and importance he could not trifle with. In the theory of orators the imagination and feelings were merely instruments, chords to be played upon in order that the music evoked might charm the will into acceptance of what the intellect proposes.

The "appeal to the feelings" is a bit of rhetoric. Preachers have taken much the same view. Newman differed from all. Imagination and feelings had for him an addition to make to our reception of truth; in a sense they actualized the concept of it. The assent of reason, which is "rational," became through their alchemy "real." His system was not based only on what schoolmen difference as the "rational faculty." "After all," he writes in the "Grammar of Assent," on page 94, "man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal." "No one," he says again, "will die for his own calculations; he dies for realities," and reason alone too often stops at calculations or conclusions; it takes the whole man to get a reality, a conviction. With such views it is evident he would look upon the imagination and feelings of his hearers as all-important factors in the assimilation of the truth which he would have them receive; and consequently the unsparing efforts (and these produce or make up his wonderful "realism") on his part to get possession of them. Moreover, this latter he could not do by escalade or storming as can the orator; for to him they would be worthless if carried by these means; as adders to, or in themselves receivers of, truth they should be dealt with as fairly, as calmly, as methodically as reason is dealt with in a demonstration. A "real assent," as he considered a conviction which was the outcome of all these faculties, was for him of untold importance,—without such assents "we have no intellectual moorings, and are at the mercy of impulses, fancies and wandering lights, whether as regards personal conduct, social and political action, or religious." Consequently the necessity that these assents be solidly founded. Meditation will enable us to apprehend that this conception of his was certainly a "sui generis source of efficiency in his pulpit work."

When dealing with the theory of oratory, this paper noted that it was possible for the concepts of orator and preacher to merge or flux in one person. That there was a period in Newman's life when his delivery took on an oratorical aspect is a surmise not without foundation. The period was likely a brief one, confined

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[1] A rather strong estimate of the philosophic system of Newman, in which limiting metaphysics, differencing between "doctrinal and real assents," and between "doubts" and "difficulties" are salient points, was that of the elder Ward, expressed in a conversation with Professor Jowett, of Oxford: "When I last saw him (Ward)," the latter writes to his son ("Ward and the Oxford Movement," Appendix D. p. 439), ... "I asked him whether he thought there was any hope of a great Catholic revival, and in what way it might be effected. The answer was curious. He said, 'Yes!' and he thought that the change would be brought about (1) by a great outpouring of miraculous power in many parts of the world; (2) by the rise of a new Catholic philosophy, for which portions of Cardinal Newman's 'Grammar of Assent' would form a fitting basis."

to the days of his neophytism in the Church Visible. And why could it not be that, like "the literary gift which remained in him quite latent for so long a period,"[1] so also, "the innate reserve," gave way, in some degree, to "glow and life and self-expansion" in the warmth of his spiritual new birth? His first utterances, after conversion, the "Sermons Addressed to Mixed Congregations," "have a definite tone and genius of their own . . . . they . . . . contain the most eloquent and elaborate specimens of his eloquence as a preacher. . . . . They represent more adequately Dr. Newman as he was when he first felt himself 'unmuzzled' (to use the phrase used by Mr. Gladstone after the University of Oxford had rejected him, and after he was no longer bound by the special etiquettes of a university representative) than any other of his writings."[2]

In these, and his subsequent "Lectures on Anglican Difficulties," occur passages so graphic, that it is hard to imagine how a highly strung nature could deliver them without real eloquence. In such passages, Newman dramatizes—enacts the tragedy before you, and this by means of the playwright's own tools, dialogue and personification. Take, as an instance of this, a well-known passage from the sermon on "Neglect of Divine Calls and Warnings,"[3] in which "he delineates the agony of a soul which finds itself lost, and what the world is meanwhile saying of the person 'now no more.' . . . 'Impossible!' he supposes the lost one to exclaim, on hearing the judge's sentence; 'I, a lost soul! I, separated from hope and from peace forever! It is not I, of whom the judge so spake! There is a mistake somewhere; Christ, Saviour, hold Thy hand one minute to explain it! My name is Demas; I am but Demas, not Judas, or Nicholas, or Alexander, or Philetus, or Diotrephes. What! Eternal pain for me! Impossible! It shall not be!' And so he goes on till the reader drops the book in horror and sickness of heart.

"Now take the suggestion of what the world may be saying of him who is thus helplessly wrestling against unendurable anguish, and refusing to believe its reality. The man's name, perhaps, is solemnly chanted forth, and his memory decently cherished among his friends on earth. His readiness in speech, his fertility in thought, his sagacity or his wisdom, are not forgotten. Men talk of him, from time to time; they appeal to his authority; they quote his words; perhaps, they even raise a monument to his name,

[1] "It was not until after he became a Roman Catholic that Dr. Newman's literary genius showed itself adequately in his prose writings, and not until twenty years after he became a Roman Catholic, that his unique poem was written."—Hutton's *Life of Newman*, p. 11.

[2] Hutton's *Life*, p. 197.

[3] Hutton's *Life*, p. 198.

or write his history. 'So comprehensive a mind! such a power of throwing light on a perplexed subject, and bringing ideas or facts into harmony!' 'Such a speech it was he made on such and such an occasion; I happened to be present, and never shall forget it;' or, 'It was the saying of a very sensible man;' or, 'A great personage, whom some of us knew;' or, 'It was a rule with a very worthy and excellent friend of mine, now no more;' or, 'Never was his equal in society, so just in his remarks, so versatile, so unobtrusive;' or, 'I was fortunate to see him once when I was a boy;' or, 'So great a benefactor to his country and to his kind;' or, 'His discoveries so great;' or, 'His philosophy so profound.' O vanity, vanity of vanities, all is vanity! What profiteth it, what profiteth it! his soul is in hell."[1]

Yet, even in dramatic passages, in the passion of Newman there could have been "no torrent, tempest or whirlwind," or else he has been read mistakenly from the outset. So deep and intense a nature in expressing itself on the problem of life, a problem which it had solved only after years of painfullest experience, would take on a treble earnestness; but in its manner there would be a calmness—a strong control, in itself aweing as well as fascinating, and at times almost startling, while the voice in answer to the soul's call for interpretation would exhaust its gamut of sounds and modulations, but never rant nor tear the throat. All this is borne out by comparing the delivery of Newman just after his conversion with his delivery while in Oxford. Mr. Gladstone, as we have seen, wrote of him at Oxford: "There was not very much change in his voice; action, there was none." Mr. Hutton, who heard him in the "Lectures on Anglican Difficulties," in the oratory in King William Street, Strand, where Toole's theatre now stands, says: "I shall never forget the impression which his voice and manner, which opened upon me for the first time in these lectures, made upon me. Never did a voice seem better adapted to persuade without irritating. Singularly sweet, perfectly free from any dictatorial note, and yet rich in all the cadences proper to the expression of pathos, of wonder, and of ridicule, there was still nothing in it that any one could properly describe as insinuating, for its simplicity and frankness, and freedom from the half-smothered notes which express indirect purpose, was as remarkable as its sweetness, its freshness and its gentle distinctness."

The time of limited unreserve in Newman, as far as one who has not had the privilege of personal observation can judge from writings, was limited to the early days in Catholicism. This "short interval of something like passionate ardor" over Newman's pulpit

[1] Hutton's *Life, etc.*, p. 198.

work as his course of thought "reverted to its older temper,[1] the temper which discouraged anything like impulsive action, and which placed large faith in time and the gradual effect produced by the implicit action of honest and anxious reflection on an observant and vigilant mind." And in this, his normal temper, was his preaching done until the last.

A paragraph going the rounds of the papers about Newman's later preaching demands a qualifying and a dissenting word. The paragraph is as follows:

"Like many other great preachers Cardinal Newman was only strong when he used the pen. Says a careful critic in *The Expositor:* 'All his printed sermons were read from manuscript, and when the pen was out of his hand his felicity of diction quite failed him. He told me himself that he never saw the congregation he was addressing, a fact which I suppose, by itself, shows that he had no oratorical gift. But when he read with slow and musical enunciation the exquisite sentences he had penned in the privacy of his room there was something almost magical in its effect. His two volumes of Catholic sermons are in various ways better than his Protestant volumes, and these were all written and carefully corrected for publication. But the spoken sermons he used not infrequently to deliver in the church were by comparison deplorable. They were apparently unprepared, and were without plan or point. Occasionally, when he uttered some familiar phrase, he would do it with force and feeling; but throughout he was rambling and dreary, and while listening one had to stimulate one's imagination and memory to feel assured that this was the great Dr. Newman, the unrivalled classic preacher of St. Mary's, Oxford. I often used to lament that he did not write out and read something that would be half the length and yet a thousand times more effective; and while I think his attempts at spoken sermons were partly due to an idea that preaching ought not to be reading, I am bound to add that I believe indolence, and a sort of contempt for the congregation he had to address, were partly responsible for them. I can recollect his rushing up to the library a few minutes before he had to be in the pulpit, in fact while the 'Gloria in Excelsis' was being sung, to find something to talk about."

The qualifying word is, that admitting the distinction drawn between orator and preacher, it may be loosely said that "Newman had no oratorical gift." Apart from this, however, is it absolutely true that a speaker who sees not his audience is *de facto* shown to

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[1] Hence we are not surprised to read in the *Tablet* of July 5, 1851, that in the first of the series of lectures on "The State of Catholics in England," delivered in Birmingham, Dr. Newman *read his lecture and remained seated.*

have no oratorical gift? He certainly would be thus deprived if he did not *feel* them.

The word of dissent is: because Dr. Newman did not prepare his sermons in manuscript for his Birmingham congregation, it by no means follows that he held them in "a sort of contempt." A writer in the *Catholic World*, for November, 1878, recounting the incidents of a visit to Dr. Newman, says: "I well remember the day when, *inter alia*, I asked Dr. Newman if he thought he was casting his pearls before swine. . . . . 'Well,' said he, 'of course there are pearls, but I don't know about the swine. I will find you to-day as pure and noble a soul dwelling in the breast of a blacksmith as there is in the bosom of any duke.'" Contempt for anybody because of deficiency of culture would certainly have been John Henry Newman's least likely failing; and to put anything but his best, and this in the form and words he judged most useful for their nutrition, before the poor and ignorant of "the brethren in Christ," would have been for him to fail where sensitive honor (and who more sensitive of honor than he?) would not brook slightest neglect. Is not the hospital patient as sure of thorough treatment in the hands of the honorable physician as his wealth-burdened client? But could it not be feared in the case of Newman, that his *labor limæ* in manuscript-preparation, would have prepared a dish fit, indeed, for the taste of the writer in *The Expositor*, but unpalatable to his children, the factory hands and workmen? It is noticeable that at charity dinners given to poor children, they turn from the cook's *chefs d'œuvre* with disrelish and eat with zest the roast beef and plum pudding. Moreover, Cardinal Newman's "attempts at sermons" could not "be partly due to an idea that preaching ought not to be reading," since during years and years he read, but could be due to the fact that Catholic congregations, as a general rule, are not used to and do not enjoy sermons which are read. Indolence, it may be granted, could, in another man, account for lack of preparation, but not in one constituted as Newman was. Not lack of preparation, but the very limitations of his greatness, perfectly at home in Oxford, but ill at ease in Birmingham, would account for the ill-success of his spoken sermons, if unsuccessful they were.

Occasions, when up to the hour of the "Gloria in Excelsis" of the Sunday's Mass, time has not been found in the busy days of a busy life for sermon preparation, occur oftener than once in the lives of saints. Do we thence conclude that they were indolent, or held in half-contempt the souls to whose weal they consecrated laborious years?[1]

[1] Notice has been taken of the paragraph in the *Expositor*, because men at large,

One property of Newman's preaching worthy of largest comment, has been once mentioned, but not dealt with at length in this essay, namely, his realism. Others have done the subject justice; and after all, its root is the intuition and sanctity which have been expatiated on, for it is the fulness of light and fervor that "give a spiritual condition of mind which we call reality." This, his striking characteristic, therefore, brings us back to the primary one of the preacher—consecration or sacrifice of self to a holy mission, of whose truth the best credential is a holy life. His consecration was nigh perfect, his abnegation saintly; fittingly, then, may this paper conclude with a line on these, the preacher's proudest notes. The line is Newman's; his last tribute to a dearly loved friend—his own meet elegy:

"'Then the word came to him as it did to Abraham of old, to go forth from that pleasant home, and from his friends and all he held dear, and to become'—here he fairly broke down again; but at last lifting up his head, finished his sentence—'a fool for Christ's sake!'"

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not acquainted with its head and source, are apt to look upon it as a fair testimony. It is not this; it comes from one who considers himself to have a grievance against the Oratory, and especially against its late illustrious head. No one believes the faithless disciple who takes advantage of old association to throw slurs upon his master—*when the latter is dead.*

EDEN AND THE CŒNACULUM.

IT was shown in a former article[1] that the mysteries of the supernatural order can only be made known to intelligent creatures who are in the inchoate, initial state of preparation for the intuitive vision of God, through a divine revelation to be received by faith in the veracity of God. This revelation was made to the angels in a way accommodated to their sublime, intellectual nature. Their probation consisted in the exercise of faith in this revelation and a corresponding obedience to the revealed will of God. Those who made the act of submission which God required of them, were immediately elevated to the state of beatitude. It is not with them that we have to deal in the present discussion, but with man.

The supernatural order in which man has been constituted has its own remarkable peculiarities, and presents certain problems which have been found by many to be very perplexing and difficult of solution.

The Christian faith teaches that the first parents of the human race were, at their creation, constituted in a state of original integrity and righteousness. They were subjected to a trial of their faith and obedience as a condition of the permanence of this state, and of translation, without dying, to the eternal state of beatitude, after their term of natural life on the earth was finished. All their posterity were included in this gracious covenant, so that the human race would be entitled to the privileges of this original constitution, if its head and father fulfilled its conditions; but would forfeit them, in common with their first parents, if he failed to do so. He did fail and fall from grace, and consequently his posterity are conceived and born in a state of lapsed or fallen nature. The human race was not, however, left without hope of redemption and restoration. The supernatural order was not abolished. It was changed. The Son of God took on Himself the expiation of the original sin and of all the actual sins of mankind, by the suffering and death which, in due time, He underwent in His human nature. He merited the restoration to grace and the reopening of the gate of heaven, the forgiveness of sins and life everlasting for the children of Adam, and became the Redeemer and Saviour of the world.

Now, the problem which this Christian creed presents to every

[1] "The Christian Agnostic and the Christian Gnostic," January number.

thinking mind is this: How could there be this solidarity of all men under one head and representative?

This is one of those questions, which we said in our first article, can only be solved by Catholic theology and by means of a correct idea of the supernatural; but remains insoluble in every other system of professedly Christian doctrine.

Let us take the one and only system of Protestant theology which is coherent and logical, the Calvinistic.

On this theory, the state of original integrity and righteousness was merely the ideal, normal perfection of pure human nature. When Adam sinned, he lost all spiritual goodness and capacity for good works, became totally depraved, liable to the inexorable anger of God and to everlasting torments. We all sinned in him and fell with him. Either we were actually existing in Adam, and actually sinned, or we were regarded as one with him, and his sin was imputed to us as if we had really committed it. So we are conceived and born totally depraved, under a doom of everlasting sin and torment. We are incapable of doing anything except sinning, and yet bound to keep the whole law of God perfectly. Christ has become a substitute for a certain number of men, the elect, has suffered the penalty of sin and obeyed the law in their stead. All these are justified by the imputation to them of the righteousness of Christ, and immediately after death are translated to heaven. The rest of mankind are passed over and left to endure their doom without any power of escaping from it.

It is needless to waste time in proving that this doctrine is absurd and incredible. Probably, no one who reads these pages has the slightest inclination to believe it. The majority of those whose formal creed is Calvinistic have been and are trying to modify and soften its harshness. It is impossible, however, to avoid its logical conclusiveness, which is as inexorable as the embrace of the *Eiserne Jungfrau*, at Nürnberg, so long as the premises from which these conclusions are inferred remain unaltered. While the normal state and destiny of the human race is regarded as in the purely natural order, there is no alternative except to deny outright that there ever was an Eden and that man was ever banished from it. With Eden, Bethlehem and Calvary, in short, all Christianity, vanish into the region of myths.

The correct idea of the supernatural changes the whole aspect of things. As when, in the early morning, an entire landscape of mist, with mountains, valleys, lakes, streams and castles, made up of real objects exaggerated and distorted, and of vaporous clouds, all mixed together in a fantastic picture, is dissipated by the rays of the rising sun; so in this case. As the true landscape, with its real features, is disclosed in the sunlight, so the genuine Christian

creed is presented to our view in the light of this luminous idea of the supernatural.

We have already shown that the whole state of man, and his ultimate destination in a purely natural order is devoid of any exigency, capacity or aspiration for the direct, immediate, intuitive vision of God as He is in His divine essence. This natural order is one which God might have established for the whole universe in perfect consistency with His wisdom and benevolence, and might have left as the ultimate limit of His creative work, the completion of the movement of return to Himself as final cause. The elevation of intelligent beings to a higher plane, and the introduction of a higher order into the universe, ordained for the highest possible culmination of the creative act in the Incarnation and the assimilation of many adopted sons in glory to the Son of God, is a purely gratuitous act of goodness, a grace in the strict and proper sense.

The attainment of this nobility, this truly royal dignity, could justly and reasonably be made dependent on any conditions which would not violate any natural rights. The Son of God Himself underwent a humiliation, a passion, a death unparalleled by anything else in the annals of the universe, on the way to His coronation with glory. The angels had their trial and probation on the way to receive their crowns.

The human race, as being one species, having a common origin, having a common relationship of consanguinity, a solidarity of social and political development, have a constitution proportioned and accommodated to their nature. The race was instituted in one pair of first parents, from whom all individuals were to inherit their nature, with its rights, endowments, and all things springing out of human life, whether appertaining to the body or the soul. The gift of grace and the right to celestial beatitude were also made an inheritance, transmissible along with the human nature. The inheritance was not given absolutely, but conditionally. The offspring of Adam were not entitled to it simply because they received existence by natural generation from him. By virtue of this natural generation they received only human nature. The natural inheritance became a vested personal right in each individual, simply by the fact of his conception and birth. But the gifts of grace to Adam were superadded to his nature, as a gratuitous ennoblement and enrichment, which he could transmit to his descendants only in virtue of a special covenant. This covenant contained the condition that, if he transgressed a certain precept, all his supernatural gifts would be forfeited. He did transgress, and, consequently, the remote and initial right of the human race to the inheritance of the estate of nobility lapsed and was

made void. It has always been recognized as just human law that hereditary dignities and possessions, when forfeited by the crime of the actual possessor, may be forfeited for his heirs, although not accessories to his crime, or not even born. In like manner, as the special honors and endowments conferred on Adam for himself personally, and for all his race, were purely gratuitous, and not due to human nature, it was just that they should be withdrawn when the original crime was committed. There was no actual participation in the transgression of Adam by his posterity, not one of whom could sin, because not one existed. There was no imputation of his sin to this unborn multitude of future human beings, which would be not only unjust, but impossible, because purely fictitious. There was no wrong done to any individual of the human race. Adam and Eve sinned knowingly and wilfully, and were, therefore, liable to suffer in their own persons the just punishment awarded by their Creator. Their posterity were deprived of the privilege of receiving sanctifying grace with their conception, and the right to supernatural beatitude on condition of keeping the law during the time of probation. The nature of Adam was not changed by his sin; it was despoiled and denuded. The nature of Louis XVI., of Charles X., of Louis Phillippe, of the First and Third Napoleon, was not changed by their dethronement, and their offspring and relatives did not receive by natural heredity an inferior character and personal qualities. So human nature in Adam and Eve was not depraved, either totally or partially, and their descendants do not inherit a depraved nature. The pure nature of man is the nature of a rational animal. He is a spirit having intellect and will as its constituent elements, together with an exigency and a capacity for animating an organic body. Man is substantially and essentially completed by the union of an organic body with the soul, which is its form and vital principle. He has not lost anything pertaining to his essence, either in soul or body, by the fall. He retains his reason, his free-will, and his bodily organs. Everything in his nature is good, and he is capable of knowing the truth, choosing the good, and acquiring and practicing moral virtues.

Moreover, the supernatural order was not abolished, the destination to celestial beatitude was not changed, when our first parents were expelled from the Eden of their primitive state. The state of repaired nature succeeded immediately to the lapse from the state of original integrity and righteousness. In this state the destination to supernatural beatitude is the same. Sanctifying grace has the same entity. The way to the final end is by faith, hope, the love of God, acts and works which have a merit of condignity. The difference is in the method and the environment.

Each one is conceived and born in the state of privation of supernatural grace. He must be regenerated and sanctified by an act subsequent to his natural generation. The natural endowments and privileges which accompanied the state of grace in Eden and made the earthly abode and life of men Paradisiacal, have not been restored. The discipline of penance, conflict, suffering, has been substituted for the discipline of innocence. The law of death has regained its power over the human body, and until the ascension of Christ even the souls of the saints were excluded from the kingdom of heaven and detained in Hades.

Another grievous misapprehension of Christian doctrine must be corrected, and this can easily be done by applying the principles already explained to this particular instance.

It is affirmed, namely, that God requires of men, as a condition of his favor, to perform what is to them impossible. Faith is the first and indispensable condition of justification. From faith proceed hope and charity, and those good works of faith and love which alone are helpful to salvation. But man is naturally incapable of exercising these virtues and producing these acts. They can proceed only from a supernatural principle. The grace of God is absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, God requires of men, even when they are destitute of grace, to fulfil these impossible conditions, under penalty of His displeasure and of severe punishment.

Now, we must make a distinction which our previous explanation of the difference between the natural and the supernatural order enables us to make.

There is a moral law which is one of the laws of nature. To keep this law is a natural obligation. It is a rule of conduct prescribed to reason and free will. Its precepts relate to duties which arise out of the natural position of man in the world toward his Creator and his fellow-men and toward the purpose and end of his own life. This law must be known to him and recognized by his conscience before he can be held accountable for keeping it. Particular precepts must be known to him before they can bind his conscience. He is bound to keep the law just so far, and no further than he knows it, or can and ought to know it. The law cannot affect an infant, an idiot or a person who is asleep or otherwise impeded from making use of his reason. So, also, a man must be able to keep these precepts. He is bound to preserve his own life. But if he fall into the sea and have no means of escaping from drowning, he is not bound to save his life. Whenever a man is bound to keep a certain precept, he is able to do so, whether the precept requires him to do a certain good action, or to refrain from doing a bad action. It is false that man, in his lapsed state and without grace, is unable to do anything morally good, and

must necessarily sin in his every thought, word and action. If he does sin, he sins freely, with power to the contrary. If he does what is according to his reason, what his conscience dictates as right, he does a good moral act. He can love virtue and hate vice. He can abstain from murder, theft, calumny and lying. He can resolve to order his life according to reason. He can labor in the field or the workshop, pay his debts, give alms to the poor, succor the afflicted, love his neighbor, obey the laws of his country, go to battle in her defence, suffer death sooner than desert his post of duty. He can improve his mind, seek after truth, be honest, faithful and honorable. He can love God and offer to Him worship and prayer. All that God requires of him is to do what he can in keeping the commandments, and avoiding deliberate, wilful transgressions of known law.

Suppose, now, that he does not know that God has made a revelation! He is not bound to believe in it. Suppose that he knows only the Old Testament! He is not bound to believe in the New. Suppose that he does not know the true church! He is not bound to submit to it.

When the truths of faith are sufficiently proposed to him, he is bound by the natural law to receive them. When the precept to be baptized, and to fulfil the other duties of a Christian is proposed to him, he is bound to obey. Yet, to believe, to hope, and to love in the right manner, is above the faculty of human nature. Faith, hope and charity are supernatural acts. Grace is necessary to their performance. And how can one be bound to do that which does not lie in his power? It is true that it is not in the power of man to elicit these acts without grace. But he is not commanded to do this. Grace is a common gift, granted to all. It is like air and water, diffused everywhere. Every one can make the beginning of his conversion to God by the right use of reason and free-will, aided by divine grace, and if he does this, he will receive more grace which will enable him to make the acts of faith, hope and love, and ever after to keep all the commandments, and by good works merit eternal life.

Those who do not know the Christian revelation, are not deprived of sufficient grace to live up to what light they have. If they do what is in their power, God will give them, in an extraordinary way, the sanctifying grace which will make them His children and heirs of eternal life, before their souls depart out of this earthly state of existence.

This is a rapid and succinct sketch of the state of mankind after the fall. Human nature was reduced to a state substantially like that which the state of pure nature would have been. Despoiled of supernatural gifts, but not depraved, it was good, but incapable

of supernatural virtue and good works, and needing divine grace to restore it to the plane of its original destiny. This divine grace was provided for all through the redemption promised to our first parents, and given to all who were able and willing to receive it. Moreover, there was a merciful provision for all who sinned, to obtain forgiveness and recover lost grace, so long as their moral probation continued.

Now, arises to view another difficulty, from the actual history of mankind. This is, the general prevalence of moral and physical evil in the world. There is much natural and supernatural good manifest in the history of mankind from the beginning until now. Nevertheless, the ignorance and degradation, the crimes and miseries presented to view by the annals of mankind give apparent reason to those who take a dark view of human nature, and who question the universality of divine grace. According to these gloomy theologians the history of mankind proves what they assert to be the teaching of the Bible; that by the sin of Adam, human nature was plunged into wickedness and misery, that men are naturally bad and irresistibly inclined to sin and vice, which bring after them the necessary consequences of misery and punishment in the present and in the future life. The great mass of mankind, according to them, are doomed to sin and misery in this world and in the world to come. A small number only, are excepted from this general doom, and by the special mercy and grace of God are partially delivered from their evil natures, so that they become somewhat better than the rest, are in a greater or less degree made virtuous and holy, and after death are translated to a state of complete and unending holiness and happiness.

Others, again, casting away all Christian belief, or even all religious and moral ideas, make out of human history only some kind of evolution and development of nature by necessary laws, tending either to an optimistic result by a slow progress or to the final absorption in the original nothingness of the pessimists.

The question about the origin and nature of physical and moral evil now confronts the mind, the problem of all problems in all ages.

What is evil? It is not substance or being and has no essence. This is a most important and fundamental truth, and without a clear conception of it, no progress can be made in a solution of the problem of evil.

Being, truth and goodness are all one and the same thing, under different aspects. They have no positive entities opposed to them as contraries, but only negations. The Being who is the "I am Who am," who is Being existing by His essence in the

infinite plenitude of being, in One, having no other who is like Him, and no other who is unlike. He is absolute Truth. That is, He is what he is, without contradiction or inconsistency in any of His attributes. And He is the intelligible, perfectly comprehended by His infinite intelligence. He is the absolute good. That is, He is infinitely lovable, the object of His own supreme complacency. He is the archetype and source of all finite, contingent being. Everything which He has created has received from Him its actual existing essence, which is a diminished copy of Himself, and therefore, in so far as it has being, has truth and goodness in a limited measure. These finite essences lack, each one, some finite being and good which is in other essences. The inorganic bodies lack organic life, the plants lack sensation, the purely sensitive animals lack reason, pure spirits lack the qualities of bodies, and all, singly and collectively, lack the self-existence and infinite perfection which is in God. This has been called the metaphysical evil which is inherent in all creatures, and is a recession from absolute being toward nothing. It is not, properly speaking, evil, but only a possibility and liability to evil properly so called. Evil is, properly speaking, only the lack of some mode of being and some good quality in a creature which it ought to have, that it may perfectly conform to its type, and fulfil its reason of being. It is a disorder arising from some defect or excess of the constituents which make up the due and complete perfection of anything, according to its proper place and purpose in the world. A picture-frame, though made of costly stuff, is evil by excess if it is too large for the picture and the wall, evil by defect, if it is too small. One day, a witty gentleman, looking at a small dog which barked incessantly and had no tail, remarked: "That dog is an illustration of St. Thomas' definition of evil; he is evil both by excess and defect."

The consideration of merely physical evil in the world need not detain us. A plan which proceeds by way of evolution and development may be better than one of the instantaneous creation of the universe in its ultimate perfection. Such a plan, by proceeding from a state of chaos through stages of gradual reduction to order and unity, involves an incidental, partial and temporary toleration of disorder and physical evil.

The problem is the question of moral evil in rational beings. What is it, and how does it arise?

Intelligent creatures, whether they be purely intellectual or specifically rational, are essentially beings having intellect and will, the latter being dependent on the former and directed by it. The object of intellect is truth, the object of will is the good. There is no faculty which by its nature terminates in falsehood, none which has

evil for its object. Error in the intellect is an accident, a failure and deficiency in apprehending and judging according to the objective reality of things intelligible. Fault in the will is a misdirected love of the good issuing in a choice of some inferior good, not suitable to a rational nature, and thus, lacking that kind or degree of good which makes it a fit object of rational choice. This lack is what makes it to be evil and the choice is morally evil. Yet, it is an apparent good, apprehended as the true and eligible good by an error of judgment. It is judged by the intellect to be the good which is most desirable to make the person happy, and is chosen under this aspect of good and not under the aspect of evil. A being whose intellect is so perfect that it is liable to no error, cannot be deluded into this wrong choice. He is impeccable by reason of his unerring apprehension of the true object of his love and choice.

But in the inchoate, imperfect state of rational existence, there are a multitude of particular, inferior goods which attract the natural desires in various directions, and sometimes in opposite ways. The supreme good, and the relation of inferior goods to this supreme felicity, are not so clearly manifest to reason as to compel its assent and determine its judgment. It is capable of erring in its practical judgment, and the person to whom this rational faculty belongs, having free will, can determine himself to a perverse judgment and a perverse choice, which is an act morally evil, a sin. This is the source of that freedom of the will which is the liberty of choice between contraries, that is, between moral good and moral evil. The will is left undetermined and in equilibrium, because of the obscurity of the object which is the true and supreme good toward which it ought to direct its desires and efforts. The good in general, it must seek by its nature. But all the particular goods which attract it do not show their connection with the supreme good so clearly as to determine its choice. It can turn whichever way it determines itself. It is variable and flexible. And this is the condition which puts the rational creature in a state where it can become subject to a moral probation.

We are inclined to wish that God might have spared all rational beings this trial, by giving them a brighter light, so that they could not err in choosing the way to felicity. But this is a vain wish. We know, both by reason and faith, that since God has chosen to put His intelligent creatures in a way of probation, this must be consonant to His goodness, justice, and benevolence. Still more, it must be the best way, in view of the highest good of the universe, and His own greatest glory. We would gladly understand how and why this is so. Can we find the reason and the motive for choosing this way of probation, in spite of its risks, and not-

withstanding the results which have followed, viz., the inroad of moral evil, and the loss of the final and supreme good by a multitude of those who have been put into the combat in which it is won or lost? In part, we can. It is more glorious for those who win to win by victory and merit; to be enthroned, as under God, the authors of their own perfection and final felicity. This sublime and supernatural destiny was not due to their nature; it was a free, gratuitous grace. It could, therefore, be offered on any reasonable conditions, and be made a prize to be contended for on the arena of probation.

The probation of the angels was over, and their eternal state irrevocably fixed before the probation of man began. The principal arena of the conflict between good and evil is on this earth. The period of human probation has already lasted for thousands of years, and is not yet finished. The contest is chiefly between the Son of God and Lucifer, the originator and head of the rebellion; and the object contended for is the dominion of the earth and the human race. There are two standards; the standard of Christ, and the standard of Lucifer. The trial, on which salvation depends, lies in the choice between those two leaders. Lucifer, the old serpent, came into the garden of Eden; deceived, and seduced to his allegiance, Eve, and through her, Adam. Thus, paradise was lost for all mankind; and paradise can be regained only by labor, sorrow, penance, and combat. The heaviest burden in this toilsome, painful, long-continued march and warfare of mankind for the reconquest of its lost inheritance, has been laid on the shoulders of the Redeemer and King of men, Jesus Christ. But all share in it; in its dangers, labors, and sufferings; their future and final destiny depends on their loyalty, valor, and perseverance in this struggle for eternal life. The history of the world is a record of the vicissitudes of this war, whose field is co-extensive with the earth, and whose duration is coeval with time.

The wide extent, the multitudinous numbers, the long series of ages, the complex relations embraced in the history of human probation, make the subject a difficult one, and, in many respects, a perplexed and perplexing problem. The chief difficulties are summed up in the one general and comprehensive question, how to show that all men without exception are under conditions of probation which are just and benevolent.

II.

We have already seen that the kingdom of heaven has to be won by passing successfully and victoriously through a period of probation.

Also, that the first trial of humanity in the person of Adam

resulted in his defeat and fall. That by the fall the gratuitous and supernatural gifts conditionally granted to mankind in Eden were forfeited. That to the first covenant of grace immediately succeeded another with very different conditions. It was explained that the offspring of Adam, inheriting from him nothing but human nature despoiled of grace, are conceived and born in a state which, in its entity, is the same with that which would have been the state of pure nature in a purely natural order. Moreover, that through the universal grace of the Redeemer, all human individuals are capable of receiving from Him singly the supernatural endowments by which they are restored to a state in which they are able to merit eternal life.

In this state of nature lapsed and repaired, human probation is in the exercise of free-will, keeping the natural law by living virtuously, and also by the aid of divine grace, keeping the supernatural law disclosed by divine revelation, so far as that is known and sufficiently proposed to belief.

We have now to complete and finish the treatment of our general topic, the relation of the natural and supernatural orders. That is, we have to present the idea of that revelation and order of grace of which Jesus Christ is the Author and Finisher, and to define more clearly the relation between the natural order and the human kind in its native-born condition, to this order of grace and redemption.

The difficult part of the subject lies in the problem of the conditions of human probation under this new order, in view of the actual state of mankind as shown by history and experience. Those who are thrown into perplexity or even into doubt and unbelief by this difficulty, cannot see that the majority of men have any just and fair probation in this life according to Christian doctrine. It seems to them that men have not a sufficient natural ability to keep the law of nature, that they are naturally and unavoidably more or less depraved and vicious. Their imagination presents a dreadful picture of the wickedness and misery prevailing in the world in all times and places. Then, again, the religion of positive revelation with all the means of grace belonging to it, has not been universal in time and place. Therefore, it does not appear to furnish an adequate provision for the moral and spiritual needs of mankind.

A certain old school of theologians, which has still a few survivors left, thought it quite enough to explain all the moral and physical evil in the world by total depravity, and total depravity by the sin of Adam. They say that we are all made holy and happy in our first parents who were created in the Garden of Eden. We sinned and lost all, and now mankind are under a curse, and

being swept down by the tide which flows into the abyss of everlasting perdition. The elect receive infallibly the grace of faith through the divine mercy and are saved, and it is for them alone that a way of salvation through Christ has been opened. Those who revolt against this dire and dismal doctrine desire to invent some other theory, either by giving a new interpretation to Christianity, or contriving some scheme of philosophy, or lapsing into pure materialism and agnosticism.

We cannot do any of these things, or accept any kind of desperate measures for cutting the gordian knot. There is some solution of this problem, whether we are able to discover it or not. We cannot shut our eyes to moral and physical evils in the world. But it is perfectly certain that God is just and good, and that He cannot condemn any rational creature for anything except his own deliberate and wilful sins, or require of him anything which is impossible.

Men have taken extravagant views of human nature in opposite directions. Some have made out men to be gods, others demons, and others beasts. At present this last opinion is fashionable, whereas, formerly, the human intellect was almost worshipped, and was supposed to be a measure of all truth, and the human will was exalted to the position of an autocrat with its categorical imperative. Now, certain men who claim to be the leaders in the most advanced science, reduce man to the common level of animals. They assign him a bestial origin, and although they kindly allow the more perfect men a superiority over their kindred, they depress the lowest class of men below the more perfect beasts.

Now, it is an unquestionable fact that man is an animal, according to his genus. He is also rational, and his specific definition is rational animal, which places the human species at an immeasurable distance above all other species of animals. Yet, although by his rationality he is akin to purely intellectual spirits, he is the lowest of all intelligent beings. He could not be any lower than he is by nature in the scale of being, and still remain intelligent. For his mode of cognition by the instrumentality of sensitive perception of sensible objects, is the lowest that is conceivable. Moreover, he is not actually intelligent and possessed of the use of reason at the beginning of his life. His ignorance in infancy is absolute, he is but feebly rational in the early stage of his mental development. Long and arduous labor is necessary for him, that he may be educated and instructed. His mind is very dependent upon the body, and his whole nature is dependent on the physical environment which surrounds him, and subject to its laws.

By the fall of the first progenitors of the human race, and the

universal lapse from the primitive state of Eden, man has been reduced to a merely natural condition. In this condition, he is subject to those vicissitudes and disasters to which all organized beings on the earth are liable. This is in the physical order.

In the moral order, he is subject to passions by which he is inclined to the sensible good pertaining to the animal life. By his reason and the higher tendencies of his nature he is inclined to the good which is proportioned to his spirit, and pertaining to his spiritual life. He has free-will for the moderator over these opposing impulses, and his ethical task consists in their close regulation according to reason and the dictates of conscience. The task is more difficult in the actual order of things, than it is by the very nature of the case. For this actual order and environment have not been arranged in view of a state and destiny within the plane of pure nature. They have been made so as to fit in with a dispensation of grace. Left to itself, and unaided, human nature is in the condition of a weak person obliged to do too much and too heavy work. Therefore, in keeping the natural law, especially in cases of difficulty and strong temptation to the contrary, the aid of grace is morally necessary; much more, is this the case, when the regenerate man must begin and carry on to the end the life of faith, hope and charity.

Now in a state of probation of this kind, where the end to be pursued is sublime and supernatural, where the virtue required is above human capacity, what wonder that the upward road should be the more difficult and the downward path easier? Each one being left to choose for himself, the moral and physical miseries which have come upon such a great number of men who have taken the broad highway leading to death, must be ascribed to their wrong and fatal choice. The largest and worst part of the actual evils with which mankind has been afflicted, is not to be laid at the door of Adam, of original sin, or of human nature, but to the wilful, actual sins which men have committed.

It may seem to a superficial consideration, that it was rather hard on the children of Adam to make them suffer the loss of Eden without any fault on their part. When the sin of our first parents had been forgiven, when they were restored to grace, when the Redeemer was promised, and the way of salvation opened to all mankind, why should not the original covenant have been renewed, and all the privileges of the pristine state of Eden have been restored?

St. Francis of Sales, has said that the state of redemption is worth a hundred times more than the state of original righteousness. It is not always and necessarily best in the end for rational creatures on probation to be placed in the most exalted and privi-

leged position. Probably Lucifer was the most highly endowed and favored of all the angels, yet he and a multitude of other similar spirits fell from their sublime elevation. Adam and Eve sinned in Eden. Many of the most wicked men have been the most highly gifted by nature, the most favored in respect to advantages of education, and the most enriched with means of grace and opportunities of acquiring virtue and holiness.

On the other hand, many who have been placed in the most unfavorable circumstances, surrounded by the greatest temptations, have preserved their innocence and practiced heroic virtue; or, after a period of sin and vice, have repented and become models of holiness.

Falling from a low elevation is not so dangerous and hurtful as a fall from a great height. Sins against faint light are not so grievous as sins against clearer light. The weakness of human nature, the difficulties which beset the path of virtue, the struggles which men have to undergo, the many miseries with which human life is surrounded, open the way to a wonderful display of divine mercy in pardoning transgressions and reclaiming wanderers from the way of salvation. Probation is prolonged to the end of rational life. And at the close of life, when the departing soul is unconscious of everything which comes to it through the senses, it is open to the direct influence of God, and his angels, and can by the aid of extraordinary grace repair the negligence and faults of a whole life, securing in a moment by one act, its eternal well-being. Although after death there is no probation, yet there is an intermediate state of expiation, of purification, of preparation for that state of perfection and blessedness for which the soul is unfit at the moment of departing from the body.

Such a vast and complicated drama as that which is presented by the history of mankind in general, and of the thousands of millions of its single individuals, cannot be comprehended by our limited intelligence and imperfect knowledge. This world is the Waterloo of the universe. It is the great battle-field between the Prince of Light and the Prince of Darkness, with all the powers of good and evil arrayed in two contending hosts. It is the arena on which free-will is left to its fullest scope, working out the problem of human probation, in order that the heroism which human nature, especially when elevated and inspired by the grace of God, is capable of, may achieve the noblest works, gain the most splendid victories, and merit the most glorious crowns. It would be absurd to suppose that the human mind can fully understand and explain the reasons for permitting the rebellion and warfare of intelligent creatures against their Creator, which has brought on this conflict between good and evil. Vain would be the attempt to

show how each one of the human race who attains to the full use of reason has a sufficient and fair probation, in which he can form his own character and secure his own destiny. We must fall back on certain fixed principles and indubitable truths, from which we unerringly draw the conclusion that every rational creature must be treated with justice and benevolence by the Creator. Those who are placed in the conditions of moral probation have all the means and all the self-determining power necessary to pass through it successfully. If they fail through their own fault, it is just that they should be deprived of that supreme good which is not due to nature, but a boon of grace promised to those only who win it by merit.

Those who do not attain to the full use of reason are not in the way of probation at all. They are not accountable, and the pure goodness of God will provide for their final perfection and felicity without any effort on their part. No rational creature will ever forfeit any of his natural rights or suffer any penalty except in accordance with a strict rule of justice tempered with mercy, and in consequence of his deliberate wilful transgression of the law of his Sovereign Lord dictated to him by his own conscience.

In order to solve completely this great problem of the permission of moral and physical evil in the world we should be able to see the consummation of the great drama of human history; to see the final and perfect triumph of good and subjugation of evil, and the good brought out of evil by the wisdom and power of God. This we cannot do, for the end has not yet come. But we have the prediction of the Sacred Scriptures to assure us of the final result:

"He must reign until He has put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy which shall be destroyed is death; for He has subjected all things under his feet." (1 Cor., xv. 25, 26.) "God hath exalted him and given him a name above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee may bend, of those who are in the celestial and the terrestrial and the infernal regions, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father." (Phil. ii., 9–11.)

"I consider that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared to the future glory which shall be revealed in us. For the expectation of the creation awaits the revelation of the sons of God. For the creation has been subjected to vanity, not willingly but on account of him who hath subjected it in hope; for the creation itself shall be liberated from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groans in the labor of parturition even until now."—Rom. viii., 18–22.

In a recent poem entitled "The Holy Child," the author, after describing how, during the flight of the Holy Family into Egypt, an angel turned aside a vast boulder hurled upon them by a demon, makes St. Joseph exclaim:

> "Oh! how my heart within me leaps,
> As fervid fancy paints the coming time
> When the great Lord of Life and Light and Blessing,
> Now shrined in Thee—an infant's feeble form,
> Shall be the Lord supreme of Earth and Heaven;
> When evil after evil shall be crushed
> Like serpent after serpent, or rolled off
> As was that loosened crag!
> Or turned to good,
> Said the young mother, looking gently up;
> And as she did so, darkness left the sun,
> And e'en the barren ghor appeared to smile."[1]

The world which presents now such a dark aspect will then be "transformed from carbon into diamond."[2]

> "Dies venit, dies tua
> In qua reflorent omnia."

The day cometh, Thy day, in which all things shall reflourish. This is the day of which St. Peter spoke in his sermon in the Solomon Porch of the Temple of Jerusalem. "Him heaven must receive until the time of the restitution of all things ἀποκαταστασις of which God hath spoken through his holy prophets, from the beginning of the world."—Acts iii., 21.

The superb temple, in whose principal porch St. Peter preached was, after forty years, totally and finally destroyed, and within a few centuries, all the splendid fanes of heathenism throughout the Roman Empire, were razed to the ground or converted into Christian temples. Near by the temple was the cœnaculum. This was a large upper room or hall in one of the princely dwellings of the city, probably the house of Joseph of Arimathæa. It was the first Christian church; afterwards in the time of Constantine, and again under the crusaders, rebuilt and beautified.

In this cœnaculum, on the night before His crucifixion, Our Lord Jesus Christ celebrated the Passover, finishing the Jewish dispensation, and instituted the Holy Eucharist, the Sacrifice of the New Law. "Antiquum documentum novo cedat ritui." There He bade farewell to His disciples, and devoted Himself to die on Mount Calvary, "factus obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis." There, again, on the evening of Easter-Sunday,

[1] *The Holy Child*, by Thomas E Van Bibber, pp. 154-55. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 172.

and on the Sunday following, He appeared alive among His disciples. And there, on the following Pentecost, the Holy Spirit descended upon the Apostles, who went forth and preached to the people, thousands of whom were converted and baptized. Here, then, is the focus to which all the rays of grace, from the first promise of the Redeemer to the parents of the human race in Eden converge, and from which they diverge through all future time to the end of the world. The centre of light is the Person of Jesus Christ, for Whom all previous history was a preparation, and Whose action upon mankind is the theme of all subsequent history to its final consummation. In all our histories, the birth of Jesus Christ, the year of Our Lord, is the central date, and all the ages of the world are divided into those which were before and those which are after Christ. The culminating point of the natural and supernatural orders is in Him. He is the flower of human nature, the Man by excellence, free from all distinguishing peculiarities in the character of different races, and from all limitations of idiosyncracy, the ideal type and form of humanity, in infancy and manhood, in suffering and glorification. The human character of Jesus Christ is one in which the ideal makes the reality of the object of mental apprehension and admiration self-evident, aside from all extrinsic evidence. It is absolutely without its like, in history or in the creations of imagination, above the capacity of the highest human genius to conceive ideally, much more of any of the early Christian writers and preachers who have preserved and handed down memorials of their Master. If there should be discovered somewhere a masterpiece of art, the mere sight of it would show its excellence and prove that it was the work of a master. If it were far superior to the works of the greatest masters, it would be evident that an artist superior to them all had produced it. The ideal of the character of Jesus Christ, the portrait of His person, which has been handed down to us, shows that he was the living original, whose beauty was the work of the Creator. The same may be said, in due degree, of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The Creator, who made Adam and Eve in their pristine excellence, made the second Adam and Eve in their surpassing perfection. The greatest painters have found no subject equal to the Madonna and Child. And although Raphael and Murillo cannot adequately express the divine beauty of the real Jesus and Mary, yet their pictures charm the most cultivated and the rudest alike, in a way that no other representations can approach.

The living Jesus was the original of that ideal which was impressed upon the minds of His disciples.

The clearest and most vivid impression which He has made upon the minds of that first, and of all subsequent generations, is

that of His absolute sinlessness, of the moral perfection and sublimity of His character, which is unique and unapproachable. He gave the example of that high and pure morality which He taught. And it is this moral perfection of conduct and teaching, this actual exhibition of an ideal excellence and virtue in human nature, which is the evidence of His superhuman dignity, of the supernatural origin and character of his sanctity. Canon Liddon and Dr. Fisher have drawn out the argument for the divine character and mission of Jesus Christ, from his human perfection, in a way which has not been equalled by any other writers in the English language.

The disciples, and the early Christians of the primitive Church, believed in Jesus Christ as not merely a prophet of God, and a teacher of religious and moral truth, but as the Son of God, equal to the Father, Who had become incarnate by assuming a human nature, and being born of a Virgin. They preached this doctrine as the one which they had learned from their Master. Their written memoirs and records, as well as their oral tradition, related His own discourses and instructions, in which He distinctly declared Himself to be the Son of God, the Sovereign Lord and Judge of the world, Who laid down His own life by His own free will, to atone for the sins of the world, would take it again by His resurrection, ascend into heaven, and there reign over the Church and the whole earth until the consummation of His kingdom.

This profession of His own divinity would have been inconsistent with His moral purity and perfection if it had not been true. The hypothesis of those who would represent Jesus Christ as merely a perfect man, either a prophet of God or simply a moral teacher like Confucius and Socrates, will not bear a moment's investigation.

In the Cœnaculum, on the evening of Holy Thursday, we behold a divine Prophet, Priest, and King, forestalling, instituting, the sacrifice and priesthood of His New Law, legislating for the kingdom He was founding in His own name, and immediately before His own death and burial.

He was condemned to death for declaring Himself to be the Christ, the Son of the Living God. He was crucified and laid in a sepulchre, sealed and guarded by soldiers, in order to put an end to his Messianic claims, and to disperse His followers. He had openly committed Himself to rise from the dead on the third day, and had ceded the whole world to His Apostles as the heirs of His dominion.

From His crucifixion began His triumph, the victorious march of His religion to the conquest of the world. Faith in His resurrection was the animating principle which inspired the multitudinous host which rallied around His standard. The evidence

was the testimony of His Virgin Mother, the Apostles, and hundreds of other witnesses, whose loyalty, love, and courage were founded on their personal sight of His adored countenance and figure, their hearing of His words, during forty days; their view of His ascension, and their consciousness of the descent of the Holy Spirit upon them, according to His promise, on the day of Pentecost.

No possible cause can be assigned for the belief in the resurrection, and the effects which followed its public proclamation, except the fact itself. The Apostolic Church is a monument attesting all the facts of the birth, life, death, resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ, just as the Washington Monument is an attestation of the character and deeds of the Father of our country. It is a monument witnessing to the fact that from heaven He sent the Spirit of God upon the Apostles, giving them power to accomplish a superhuman work, the propagation of the Gospel of the crucified Redeemer in the world. These few men, destitute of all natural means, were utterly inadequate for such a work, in the face of the Jewish hierarchy, the Roman pagan empire and Greek philosophy. Yet, Christianity seized upon that treasure of divine revelation which Judaism had preserved, upon the wonderful political organization of Rome and upon Greek civilization, made them its subservient instruments, twisted these three strands into a golden chain which it bound around the world and brought it captive to the feet of Jesus Christ. Within seventy years, the Apostolic Church was spread through and beyond the bounds of the Roman Empire, and within a century and a half its particular dioceses with millions of the faithful under their numerous bishops were established among all nations from the Tigris to the British Islands. Before its third century closed, Christianity was so widely spread and so powerful that the Roman emperors, trembling for their idolatrous religion, which they regarded as indissolubly bound up with their political state, set all the might of their physical and moral power in motion to crush and exterminate it, only to give it the occasion of a complete and final triumph in the fourth century. This was no human but a divine work. It was the Divine Providence which had directed the destinies of the nations since their beginnings that sent Jesus Christ into the world at the critical moment to inaugurate a new epoch and a new, world-wide movement. If we consider only what He could receive from nature, from His human birth and the environment in which He lived, His character and work cannot be reasonably explained and accounted for. A simple Jewish youth of humble origin, without any other than the restricted education of the synagogue, however pure, religious and patriotic, however fer-

vent, philanthropic and self-sacrificing, however gifted with the endowments of genius and fascinating in person and speech, could never have soared into such a high atmosphere of the ideal, above all the real world known to Him, as to preach a moral doctrine and found a religion which should be world-wide, and raise humanity above all its former levels. What is true of the Founder of Christianity, is still more evident of the men who were His disciples and the apostles of His religion. They were naturally incompetent for the enterprise which they undertook, and incompetent in the most supreme degree. It was, therefore, a superhuman and supernatural power which wrought in Jesus Christ and His Apostles. The work which they accomplished was the work of God. The Messiah, the Christ, was the chief apostle or accredited messenger and ambassador of God; and His Apostles, sent by Him as His vice-gerents, were the subordinate ambassadors of God. Their teaching and precepts had a divine sanction. The perfect and unparalleled sanctity of Jesus Christ, His resurrection from the dead and ascension into heaven, the heroic sanctity of the Apostles and their associates in the missionary work and the wonderful success of their labors, were the evidences of their divine mission. The proclamation which Jesus Christ personally and through His Apostles made of His true and proper divinity, is, therefore, in the highest degree credible, and rests on the veracity of God. The motives of credibility by which the revelation of God through Jesus Christ principally, and through the prophets who preceded and the Apostles who succeeded Him, are numerous and irrefragable. But the fact of the resurrection, the foundation of the apostolic church as the pillar of testimony to this fact, and the conquest of the world through faith in the resurrection and the divinity of Jesus Christ, amply suffice. God is revealed in the Person and through the teaching of Jesus Christ, giving evidence of Himself through His resurrection, and the manifestation of His supreme power from heaven through His earthly kingdom, the Church. He is God, descending from heaven and personally teaching and redeeming mankind through His human nature.

Here is the culmination of the supernatural order, of supernatural grace and supernatural revelation. Here, also, is shown the relation of the entire natural order to the supernatural and its subordination to it. The whole course of human history in its foregoing periods is a preparation for the coming of Christ, and its subsequent course is a progress toward the consummation in His second coming. The prophecy of His first coming has been verified in His actual birth, life, death and resurrection. The prophecy which He made to His Apostles, and especially to their Prince, that they should rule the world, has been, to a great extent,

fulfilled. It is credible, therefore, that it will be completely fulfilled when the great drama of human history attains its consummation.

The obstinate incredulity of the Jews, the stubborn, hitherto insurmountable obstinacy of the Mohammedans, the vast extent of paganism, are undoubtedly an apparent objection to the universality of the redemption and the religion of Jesus Christ.

But, on the one hand, we are not obliged to regard these multitudes of non-Christians as altogether destitute of grace and left to unavoidable perdition. And, on the other hand, we cannot foresee what is to be the future extension of Christianity and how great will be its moral conquests over incredulity and heathenism.

That part of the scroll of human destiny which is yet unrolled is not legible to us, and we can only make some probable forecasts and conjectures of the closing events of the history of the world.

We have, however, the most certain ground for expecting the final triumph of Jesus Christ over all the powers of evil, and that day of the restitution of all things in which the dominion of good order shall absolutely and universally prevail.

Here let us pause upon the summit which we have gained, and contemplate the admirable harmony and unity in which the natural and supernatural are combined in one order, and the universe brought to its most perfect consummation in the Incarnation.

We began by affirming that the Incarnation is the climax and apex of the whole order of nature and grace, the meeting point of God and His creation. In the Person of Our Lord Jesus Christ, human nature in its ideal perfection, the microcosm containing all grades of being in the universal cosmos, is united with the divine nature.

He, who is the Man, *par excellence*, the representative of the human race, is, by the divinity of His person, the Sovereign and the Judge of mankind, the Arbiter of its destinies and the Supreme Lord and Disposer of the universe. The wisdom, the goodness and the power of Deity are in Him, transmitted through the medium of a perfect humanity, intellectually, morally and physically of the same essence with our own, but raised to the most sublime supernatural plane of intelligence and sanctity.

He is the Author of our spiritual and immortal being, the Light of our natural intelligence, our Law-giver, the revealed and revealing Word of God upon whose Truth our faith rests; and He is the source of all those laws which regulate the whole order of irrational and inanimate nature which is the object of the physical sciences.

Such a theme as this cannot be treated in an adequate manner in a few pages. As we are about to close, there is time only for

a brief peroration, in which to sum up and bring to a point, the principal scope I have had in view. What is this? It is to aid the *Fides quærens intellectum*, the searching of minds in which is the habit and virtue of faith, to understand the reason of belief, and to aid the inquiry of those who are seeking after a faith which is rational. It is also to aid those who are seeking for evidence of the universal love of God toward His creatures, behind the cloud of moral and physical evil which envelops the world.

The first demand is anwered by the meeting of the highest human wisdom and science with the infinite divine truth, in the mind of the Incarnate Son of God. It is Truth from its primal source which we receive from Him, and which is credible with a certitude surpassing physical, moral or metaphysical certitude, when it comes to us from His mouth. The vast boundless realm of that which is itself intelligible, is intelligible to us, only in a very limited degree, in our present state of ignorance and feeble intelligence. The greatest part of human history is unknown to us and undiscoverable. The history of the earth, of the solar system, of the physical universe, the laws of nature, the principles and facts which are investigated by the natural sciences, are unknown to a much greater extent than they are known. In the higher region of metaphysics, the human mind can take but a short flight without becoming asphyxiated by the rarity of the atmosphere. The greatest part of what we do know in all these branches, with certainty or probability, we assent to on faith in human testimony and the authority of a few men of science. Everywhere we are met by problems which cannot be solved, and surrounded by an ocean of mystery whose coast-line has never been reached. Nevertheless, rational thinkers do not abandon themselves to skepticism or withhold their assent to facts and truths which are within the scope of our faculties.

It is far more reasonable to believe in all the truth revealed by a Teacher Who knows all things and Who cannot deceive. Perfect human intelligence and science in immediate contact with the Divine Omniscience is a just measure and rule of imperfect reason and knowledge. It is to that infallible authority we submit our minds in the obedience of Christian faith. This submission is no derogation to the dignity and honor of our rational nature. On the contrary, it is an act of supreme homage to human reason raised to its highest power. The human intellect of Jesus Christ is a prism through which the pure truth of the divine essence is transmitted in refracted rays to our minds. It is an evidence that the intellectual light in our mind is a participation in the eternal divine light; and that if the power and range of our vision were adequately increased, all invisible and obscure objects in the heaven

of truth would become clearly manifest to us as they are to beatified spirits. On a cloudy day we know that above the clouds the sun is shining in full splendor. So, likewise, the cloud of unknowing which hangs over our earth is only an exhalation from the surface of ignorance within the narrow bounds of our horizon. There are no contradictions in the sun of truth, or obscurations in its light. Difficulties and objections are phantasms of our imagination. We have motives of certitude for all rational and revealed truths. If their harmony is not in all points apparent, and the solution of their problems sometimes baffles our reason, common sense, as well as conscience, dictates that we should confide with tranquillity in the primal and eternal truth in God, and in the divinised mind of Christ, and await the clearing off of the mists of ignorance.

The only alternative is to wander away and be lost in the sloppy, muddy marsh of Agnosticism.

The first demand of our intellect for a sure basis of faith in revealed truths which transcend our understanding is, therefore, satisfied by the Incarnation of the Son of God in human nature.

The second demand of the heart, as well as the mind, is for assurance of the universal love of God, and the merciful as well as just treatment of every human being.

This demand is satisfied by the wonderful manifestation of love and mercy, which the Son of God made to men by appearing and living in humility and meekness, and by dying on the Cross. The destinies of all mankind are in His hands, who drank to the dregs that chalice of bitterness of which all men taste. These destinies we can safely entrust to such hands as these. Out of death He brought life, and the ignominious Cross was transformed by Him into a standard of glory. He overcame evil by good, and brought the highest good out of that deicide which was the climax of all evil. We may, therefore, calm all our trouble in respect to the existence and extent of evil in the universe by submission to His sovereign will, which is not only power, but also essential wisdom and essential love.

THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

IS faith intellectual? Unquestionably faith is the highest exercise of the intellect, if we regard it, in a Catholic sense, as supernatural; for, if faith be supernatural, then God is its giver, and so faith is a divine guidance of the intellect. It has been objected by Rationalists that faith is only temperament, or that, at the best, it is only determined by our surroundings. Even granted, say the Rationalists, that faith is intellectual, still, it is nothing but a natural yielding of a biased will to what appears to be a balance of probabilities. This is the assuming, by the Rationalists, that faith is *not* supernatural, or, that there can be no faith which, in addition to being natural, is also blessed by the enriching grace of the Holy Spirit. Such a position on the part of the Rationalists, is, at least, intelligible; there is nothing in it which is contradictory or paradoxical. But, when we come to speak of another position which is neither the Rationalist nor the Roman Catholic, but that of all the professedly Protestant sects, without exception, we have to face a strange paradox, half Christian half Rationalist, and easily shown, as Euclid would say, to be "absurd." The Protestant idea of faith is, that it is necessarily intellectual, because it involves the exercise of private judgment, while, at the same time, it is *more* than intellectual, because it is assisted by an illumination of the Holy Spirit. With this conclusion we can have no fault to find. But, Protestants proceed to affirm that though faith must be supernatural, because no one can believe truly without God's help; yet, at the same time, the infinite variety of private beliefs in Christian doctrines forms no barrier to the Christian completeness of each man's faith. Here, then, we have a confusion, intellectually, which the Rationalists, not unnaturally, laugh to scorn. A Protestant's faith is assumed to be intellectual, and also, in real sense, supernatural, notwithstanding that it "gives the lie" to the doctrinal beliefs of *other* Protestants, who also, theoretically, have true faiths. Thus the human intellect is put in antagonism to the divine intellect, which can approve, as it can teach, but One Truth, God being made to teach innumerable differences of doctrine, which are all equally supernatural and intellectual. The Rationalist seems to have more sense, if less piety. He can say, and he does say: "If your intellect is to be guided by God's intellect, you must all necessarily believe one and the same truth; even a hair's-breadth of heresy in any doctrine would be an impossible affront to the

divine intellect; so, that you must either accept the Catholic position, which allies all doctrine with infallibility, or you must give up the supernatural altogether." And this is precisely what the Catholic, Roman Church affirms. "Intellectual" is an adjective which can only be applied to divine faith on the condition of the divine perfection of the truths believed. A truth which is only half a truth, or half lie and half truth, cannot possibly be intellectual in a divine sense, because, if so, the divine intellect would be contradictory. Hence, faith is intellectual, and is only intellectual when it is the belief in what God wills that we should believe; it is not only not intellectual, it is irrational, when it is the belief in our own ideas of divine truths.

These three positions—the Catholic, the Protestant, the Rationalist—comprehend all the attitudes of the human intellect towards the whole, or any part, of revealed truth. To state the three positions once more: The Rationalist says that faith is only natural, being the inclination of the natural mind towards religion. The Protestant says that faith is supernatural, yet, that we may believe anything we like about particular doctrines: which is affirming that different beliefs about the same doctrines are equally acceptable to the divine intellect as are true beliefs. The Catholic says, that the divine intellect, being One, unchangeable in divine will as in divine knowledge, all Christians must either accept the whole teaching of the divine intellect or must reject every part of it as not divine.

We need not here touch the question of *how* we know what is divine; that question lies outside the present argument. Our point is, that all faith, to be "intellectual," must be, necessarily, in perfect unison with the divine intellect, in regard, that is, to the human *will* to accept as true whatever the divine intellect may have revealed.

We could hardly approach the consideration of "the intellectual," as distinct from "the spiritual" life of the Catholic Church, without trying to show how the intellectual and the spiritual are harmoniously intertwined or correlative. We affirm that there is no attitude of the human mind which is so sublimely intellectual as that of faith; and that, conversely, a man who has no faith, uses his intellect without the pursuit of its First Object. Let us travel through the centuries of Catholic history, or rather, wing our way in rapid retrospect, and see if it be not true that, alike in thought and vigorous action, the Catholic Church has lived an "intellectual life?"

First, take the attitude of the Church towards heresy, from the days of Cerinthus to those of Döllinger. The whole "point" of that attitude, as we say in argument, has been that the intellect of

the Most High having revealed one thing, and all these heretics having insisted on another thing, there has been the imputation of false teaching—not on the Holy Catholic Church, but on God himself, who has guided His Church to teach wrongly. This is the special crime of heresy—that, while it professes to only condemn the Catholic Church, it really condemns the Almighty, who has misled His Church—an impossible, an inconceivable impiety. Now a true faith being a true incline of the human intellect, because it is the direct teaching of the Holy Spirit, must be, necessarily, the highest use, as it is also the highest possession, of that intellect which is "made in God's image." Therefore, heresy at once degrades the human intellect from that dignity which the Incarnation conferred upon it, and insults the intellect of God, whom it accuses of believing wrongly, or else of inspiring the Church's mind with false doctrine. Either way, the human intellect is wronged; it is misled on truths necessary to salvation; it is reduced to the same position in which it was *before* Redemption—that of *not* knowing the teaching of the Redeemer. And if the shallow answer be hazarded, "We still agree as to what is essential, what is important; we only differ as to this doctrine or that doctrine;" the answer is, that all heresies, all schisms have been grounded upon "this doctrine or that doctrine," and that the primary object of a teaching Church is to decide what *is* essential, what *is* important—the very "questions" on which private judgment must always differ. Thus the Catholic Church has been occupied for eighteen centuries in defending the intellect of the Most High from being misrepresented; from being declared to teach one thing, when He has "infallibly" taught another—"infallibly," in the sense of knowing and of imparting.

II.

But if we step outside the narrow limits of revealed truth, and wander over the wide world of human thought, we soon get into the complex questions of the "relations" of the Catholic Church to, say, philosophy, politics, science, and even commerce, as well as to the Christian family and social ethics. What furious abuse has been hurled at "Roman Catholicism," especially during the last three centuries of revolution, for its interference, its dictation, its ambition, its craftiness, its aggrandizement, its greed! All these hard words have meant simply this: That the Catholic Church, being the guardian of divine truth, is therefore, necessarily, the guardian of every one of those human interests which directly or indirectly affect that truth. We shall not put it too strongly if we say that, in the centuried struggle in which the Catholic Church has been engaged since the day of Pentecost,

her mission has been to direct the intellects of all the peoples of Christendom to a worshipful reverence for the intellect of God. "Do not," the Church has said to the world, "trust your own shifting, fleeting impressions of right or wrong. Your ideas of politics are leading you away from the Christian postulate, that the State must not interfere with the Christian conscience. In your passion for modern science, you ignore the teachings of experience, that the boastings of to-day may become the ridicule of to-morrow, and that no discovery, no new hypothesis, is likely to touch so much as the outworks of the evidence for the divine creation of the human family. In your advanced stage of domestic liberty—a glorious liberty, and essentially Christian—you are apt to forget that the Family, the State, and the Church, are all ruled by One and the same Divine Head; so that the same principles of divine allegiance should govern every member of a family that govern statesmen, and the whole hierarchy of the Catholic Church. And, finally, in your approved canons of social ethics, whether in affairs commercial or conventional, you are carried away by fashion, by popular habit, by example, so that you break the laws of God through the indolence of your conventionalism, and need to be corrected from time to time by the Holy See."

What are all such kindly counsels but the intellect of the Church in action; the perpetual appeal of the divinely-guided mistress of the truth to the higher intellect of all classes of society? The "intellectual life of the Church" is her sympathetic, affectionate reasoning with every member of every community that is Christian; and this "reasoning" is partly known by her established institutions, and partly by her varied counsels from time to time. We may take three of her institutions in chief as perpetually manifesting the intellectual side of her life, and these shall be Priesthood, Monasticism, and Education. A few words on each of them will suffice to establish the position that in the whole of the *spiritual* career of the Catholic Church the *intellectual* career is correlative.

Rome is, and has been for eighteen centuries, at once the centre and the fortress of the Catholic Church, because the Roman Pontiff is the head of the Christian priesthood, and therefore the head of all the Christians in the world. In this *fact*, lies an intellectual teaching, which is not obscured—it is made more manifest—by all Protestantism. All Protestants, from Simon Magus to Père Hyacinthe, have proved the intellectual stability of the Institution which is commonly known as the Roman Catholic Church, presided over by the Pope, who is God's vicar. Here we have the earthly enthroning of the intellect of God, so far as it has pleased the Divine Majesty to reveal It to us. "Rome, the home of the Vicar of Christ, the seat of that long line of Pontiffs who" (in the

fervid language of Louis Veuillot) "bind our erring planet to Emanuel's footstool," is at once the Capital of Christendom, the centre of civilization, the fortress of refined and cultured society, the Mount Zion of both divine and human love, the seed-sower of all (true) philosophy and science. As the author of a French pamphlet, "Rome's Place in the World," has expressed it: "Rome civilizes as Christ civilized, by sowing the seeds of civilization." In other words, the centre of Christendom has been, necessarily, the centre of society, because society, having derived its infallible *principles* from Rome has been rendered secure as to the basis of its *knowledge*. It is because of this two-fold character of Rome, Rome spiritual, Rome intellectual, that society must regard it as the mother-city of wisdom, where the divine principles of eternal truth are first formulated. And from Rome—flowing equally all over the body of the Church, as the blood flows from the heart to the utmost extremity—the divine wisdom pulsates through the priesthood and the laity, teaching every one what is essential to salvation. In the Fact, therefore, the visible Fact, of the Holy See, the Catholic Church teaches the world the Divine Fact of God's Unity, and the human duty of adoring that Unity. This is the corner-stone of Intellectualism; this is the first answer to the vagaries of Rationalism, which would divorce the human intellect from the divine intellect.

Our next point is Monasticism. What the Prayer in the Garden was to the public life of Christ, the religious life is to the priest's office in the world. At least, the similitude may suffice to express the two kinds of Devoted Life; the one, the intellectual worship of God's truth; the other, the intellectual imparting of it to others. Briefly—for we have a great deal of ground to travel over—what has the Church done for society by her religious orders, in the highest sense of the word intellectual? Well, three things which society, without the religious orders, could never have done for itself. From a literary point of view, the religious orders preserved literature, pagan and Christian, so that to them we owe the best half of our present libraries. Theologically, the religious orders have been the high schools of Christianity, without which we should have missed our best scholastic teaching. While even chivalrously, in the martial, heroic sense, the religious orders have set the example of Catholic heroism in many a time of danger to Christian nations. Let us see how these three offices work together. Thus, the Benedictines, the Chartreux, the Bernardines, defended intellectualism with the pen. The Trinitarians, the Brothers of Mary, and some of the chivalrous orders, aided the champions of intellectual liberty in these two ways—by devoting themselves to the redemption of Christian captives, and to the

emancipation of those Christians who had been made slaves. And thirdly, the Templars, the Knights of St. John, the Teutonic Orders, defended civil and religious liberty with the sword. When the tide of Moslem barbarism seemed not unlikely to inundate the West, secular chivalry offered its aid to the spiritual chivalry; the Roman Church, in her marvellous fecundity, creating those Catholic military orders in which the zeal of the monk was blended with the passion of the soldier; both reaching a pitch of heroism whose feats are scarcely paralleled in story, and leaving traces in Syria, Rhodes, Spain, and Palestine, by which we may note their work and their faith. But, to return to the monastic orders. Dominicans, Franciscans, Carmelites, Augustinians, in their preaching, both to pagans and to Christians, were putting before them the intellectual ideal of natural duties, in grounding them upon the Catholic Roman faith. Nor can even Protestants withhold their tribute of admiration from those religious orders of the thirteenth century, who contended against the Waldenses and the Manicheans; nor from the Capuchins, of the sixteenth century, who revived the primitive rule of St. Francis; nor from the Carmelite Order, whose foundress was St. Theresa; nor from the Maurist Benedictines, whose services to patristic literature are not likely to be forgotten for all time; nor from the Lazarists, who, in directing seminaries and missions, have been the pride and ornament of the Church in France; nor, later in the Church's life, from the Redemptorists, whose apostolic labors have met with such success in Italy, Germany, Belgium, and America; nor from the Ursulines, devoted to the education of women; nor, finally (to omit the mention of many others), from the Jesuits, whose services to half the world have been as intellectual as they have been spiritual, as scholastic as they have been auxiliary to civilization. "Paraguay" was a triumph of the highest science of civilization, of the combined force of spiritual energy and human culture, such as no achievement of Protestant missions has ever distantly approached, nor even so much as emulated in endeavor.

Our third point is Education. We have, already, glanced indirectly at the subject; for monasticism was at the root of education. But besides the vast bodies of religious orders to which we have made allusion, and besides the vast bodies of secular priests who spent their lives in disseminating thoughtful piety, the Catholic Church has constantly sought for new vehicles of instruction by which to promote science and art. Even Voltaire had to admit: "The sovereign Pontiffs have always been remarkable among princes for their attachment to letters." And Macaulay wrote: "In the Middle Ages the Popes were the patrons of whatever was best in education, both in the secular and the ecclesiastical groove."

When we recall such names as Clement VI., Gregory IX., Eugenius IV., Nicholas V., Pius II., we naturally think of the magnificent universities which these Popes aided in founding or endowing. Oxford, Cambridge, Padua, Naples, Vienna, Upsal, Lisbon, Salamanca, Alcala, Toulouse, Montpellier, Orleans, Nantes, Poitiers, had, most of them, their seats of learning before Protestantism was heard of, and the Popes communicated regularly with all of them. But our point is, not only that the Popes of the Middle Ages covered Europe with splendid seminaries of the higher education; what we would insist on in this argument is, the imperishable nature of the education which was cherished by Pontiffs and by priests. Even the better class of infidel thinkers have admitted that the splendid treasury of theological science—and of philosophical science in connection with it—which was evolved out of the labors of a dozen centuries, has lain at the root of most of the great discoveries which modern thought would pretend to claim as being its own. Joseph de Maistre has summed up the truth in these words: "The sceptre of science belongs to Europe only because she has been Catholic. She has reached this high degree of civilization and knowledge because she began with theology; because the universities were, from the first, schools of theology; and, because all the sciences grafted upon this divine subject have shown forth their divine sap by increased vegetation." Protestants forget, when they speak of the learning, the educatedness of some few of their notabilities in the sixteenth century, that just as the services which Bacon rendered to philosophy, or the services which Newton rendered to science, were indirectly due to that root of Catholic theology which lay at the bottom of the Church's mind for a thousand years; so the lofty philosophy of Shakespeare—himself a product of the ages of faith—was the *natural* issue of that rarified intellectualism which was the atmosphere of all taught Catholics for many centuries. And, just one word as to Protestantism itself, in its intellectual possessions or characteristics: Be it remembered, that heresy has been always blended with truth, in every sect and schism from the beginning; the truth being always Rome's, while the heresy was that person's who corrupted it. Whatever is good and true in Protestantism is of Rome; and just as Protestantism would have had no Bible but for the Catholic Council which settled its canon (and but for the Catholic monks who translated it), so, no Protestant "Churches" would ever have been formed if the great old Church had not overspread Europe. The boast of glorious possessions by the Protestant sects—and, intellectually, they have always had great possessions—is like the boast of the appropriator who has broken up stolen goods so as to prevent their identification or reclaim.

III.

We have to include in "The Intellectual" a vast sphere of acquirements, which, *prima facie*, lies outside "education." Let us speak of two subjects, now much in the mouths of men, so much so as to be almost what is called "popular." Science and philosophy are the boasts of our own age; and many persons imagine that they are almost new to this age, so wonderful has been their progress, their development. We may say, both of the one and the other, that whatever is sound in them is old. As to science—of which the enduring foundations were laid before Protestantism was heard of—we may make this remark, that whereas modern society produces its scientists independently of religion (and therefore scientists, who are perpetually giving scandal, besides propounding most untenable conceits), Catholic society has scarcely produced even one great scientist who was not more attached to the Faith than to his inventions. Just as Andrè Ampere—the illustrious *savant* in spectro-magnetism—could say with his last breath: "I know the 'Imitation of Christ' by heart;" so the Catholic testimony of, say, Cassimi, the astronomer; Hilaire, the zoölogist; Cæsar Cantu, the historian; Santarem, the geographer; Blainville, the naturalist (with a host of others); "as to the necessity of the true foundation of all science," was as ardent as the industry of the pursuit which rendered them such masters of their craft. One distinguishing characteristic of the Catholic scientists has been, that they regarded their researches as tentative; whereas, non-Catholic scientists usually regard their "discoveries" as being final for all men, and for all time. Cuvier, the naturalist, related an amusing incident which occurred in his own science-loving experience. He said, that in his youth some pious Christians were much troubled because it had been "discovered" that there could not have been water enough in the heavens to produce what was historically known as "the Flood." In a few years, another scientist proved clearly that the water in the clouds, under certain abnormal conditions, could suffice to submerge the earth up to its highest tops; so that the first scientist had to withdraw his demonstration and to bow to the second scientist as his superior. This one example is as good as a thousand. "What are your *laws*, as you confidently call them," asks a rigid reasoner, of some modern scientists, "but the deductions of your own natural reason; and, what are your *truths* but apparent truths?" This question suggests an attitude of the Catholic scientist which would be singularly offensive to some non-Catholics. Monsieur Renan would probably consider it "unscientific." That gentleman, who still occupies a chair in the highly-mixed University of Paris, is a type of that self-sufficiency, and assumed contempt for Catholic authority,

which are so often characteristic of modern scientists. In higher criticism, in philosophy, and, above all, in science, deductions are drawn, discoveries are proclaimed, which are assumed to demolish, at one stroke, a whole range of revealed truth, and to reduce poor Christianity to a myth. At one moment, we are startled by a confident denial of the exceptional privilege, as well as the exceptional priesthood of the Jewish race; at another moment, we are bid to ridicule our long-cherished belief in the descent of the human family from one pair; or, when discussing immortality, we are assured that a future state is only a morbid, if natural, craving of the human heart. "Science," more than "philosophy," does all this. Some one has dug up a fossil out of the bowels of the earth, or gathered a clue from the simian tribe in African forests, and henceforth all theology is reduced at once to a day-dream, and the Mosaic record has to blush for having deceived us. We are not allowed even to raise an objection, or to protest. Science is infallible; science rests on facts; theology is only a speculative mysticism.

Yet, even as to "discoveries," we might gaily accept the challenge which the New Philosophy is fond of throwing down to Catholics; nor, in any department of intellectual achievement, need we be afraid of "coming in second" in the great race for initiation or for development. It suffices to mention the names of the Catholic princes in science, to intimate the tone and spirit of their philosophy; and, for the sake of convenience, let us include in the compass of science all those accomplishments, as well as discoveries, of the Catholic intellect, which might, in popular sense, be termed "scientific," as well as in popular sense "artistic." Now, what we contend for is, that the Catholic science and the Catholic philosophy—using both words in popular sense— have been singularly harmonious throughout history; so much so, that some of the greatest scientists could hardly have achieved their great works had they not been inspired by Catholic philosophy; or, conversely, that some of the greatest Catholic philosophers have owed their greatness to their profound science of theology. Thus, we might put it in this way: that just as St. Thomas Aquinas could write his "Summa," because his philosophy was the logical outcome of his theology, so we might say of Raphael that his great picture which is now at Dresden, was the inspiration of his Catholic faith and piety; or, of Michel Angelo, that his "Pieta," or even his "St. Peter's," was the consistent expression of his intensely Catholic disposition; or of Dante, that he could not have written his "Divine Comedy" unless he had known that the Catholic religion was supernatural: or of Cardinal Newman, that he could not have thought out his "Gerontius," unless he had first submitted his intellect to

the Holy See. And if, putting aside the great masters of Catholic expression, we speak only of a few of the scientists who were also Catholics, it will suffice to note that, in mathematics, in astronomy, in geography, and also in mechanics, and in navigation, the Catholic pioneers, not only preceded all other people, but showed to all other people the precise road which they must follow. A philosophical dictionary of much more than ordinary dimensions would be wanted to tell of those scientists who were *first* Catholic, and only afterwards were devoted to great attainment. In astronomy, Pope Sylvester II.—and later in the centuries, Friar Bacon—preceded the illustrious Jesuits, De Vico, Secchi, and Perry, whose names are now historic, and must ever be so. It is well known that the religious orders have been fond of erecting observatories, just as it is historic that in many countries they have been called upon by civil governments to originate or to conduct "observations." If we speak of arithmetic, we are reminded that it owed its origin—that is, its origin as a science—to Gerbert, who was educated by Religious; while we also remember that the first published work on algebra was from the pen of an Italian Franciscan friar. Descartes is known to have invented the new geometry, or the application of algebra to geometry; and when we recall the history of such branches of science as mechanics, hydrostatics, hydraulics, hydro-dynamics, the names of Leonardi da Vinci, Galileo, Borsu, Castelli, Gassendi, and Viviani, with many others, come up before us, as claiming the honors of inventions, or of such systematizing as made invention to become useful. Scientists tell us, that Father Secchi constructed the automatic meterograph; and that Shyrle de Rheita invented the now familiar opera-glass, after first using a convex lens for the telescope. A hundred and fifty years before Watt, Father Lourochon composed a learned work on steam; while the first persons to attempt aërial navigation were two priests, who were named Lala and Galien. If it be asked, who first thought of the polarization of light, or who first determined its velocity; or who discovered dynamical electricity, or invented the galvanometer, the thermo-electric multiplier, or even the battery—the answer will be that the discoverers were Catholics. It is worth noting, as Mr. Fay has recently told us, that all the apparatus now in use for illustrating electro-magnetism were devised by Andrè Ampère, a French Catholic. To cut the inquiry short, it is scarcely possible to name a science which does not owe its origin, or at the very least, its utility, either directly or indirectly, to some Catholic. And, as to our every-day implements, or "useful things," a writer has well remarked that, if you took away all Catholics out of history you would have to take away, with them, your clocks, watches, spectacles, firearms, gunpowder, thermome-

ters, magic lanterns, mercurial barometers, cameræ-obscuræ, canal-locks, water-mills, water-engines, dynamo-electric machines, electric lamps, steamboats, organs, bells, banks, glass windows, mariners' compasses, the domestic enjoyment of tea and coffee—but no, we must not prolong the list, for a whole chapter would not suffice to enumerate the "necessaries" of which the suppression of Catholic intellect would leave us devoid. Finally, as to the boldness of exploration—the dauntless pluck of Catholic travellers and adventurers: our first homage is due to those Catholic missionaries who visited the unknown regions of the earth, and afterwards wrote their descriptions of what they saw. Here again, in this department of exploration, we find that the first map of China was designed by a Jesuit, just as, in the same year, the first catechism in Chinese was drawn up by a Jesuit hand. It may be mentioned, that it was in the year 1246 that Pope Innocent IV. sent Father Carpino, accompanied by a small band of Franciscan monks on a mission to the savage emperor of Tartary. And, a little later, in 1253, another monk, also a Franciscan, by command of King Louis IX. of France, was sent on an exploring mission to Asia, and succeeded in exploring more of that quarter of the world than any European before him had thought traversable. But why speak of the exploits of the travelling heroes of those dangerous times; of Marco Polo, who in the thirteenth century spent twenty-four years in Eastern wanderings; of Columbus, of Vasco di Gama, of Magellan, of Balboa, of Cortez, of Pizarro, or of De Soto, whose names are as household words to the students of ancient geography, though it is not often remembered that they were all Catholics. Nor was it a slight tribute to the reputation of the religious orders that in days when to travel was to brave death, civil governments selected *them* to do the world's hardest work, because they knew that they "feared nothing but sin."

If space permitted, we should like to trace the intellectual life in Catholic statesmanship, and in the higher walks of diplomacy, as well as in certain sections of the fine arts. It has always seemed to us—and our readers, who have travelled much in Europe, will probably bear us out in the impression—that the most wonderful of the *visible*, intellectual creations for which society is indebted to the Catholic Church, is the multitude of cathedrals, which, in countries once Catholic, speak the mind, proclaim the faith, of our forefathers. If there were no other monuments to Catholic intellect existing in the nations of the world, even pagans might exclaim: "What a profound belief these Catholics must have had to inspire their souls with these conceptions!" Such force, or finish, or refinement; such strength of conception with realization; are not seen in any monument of pagan times, nor in any modern

imitation of Catholic outlines. They were only shadowed in the wondrous temple of Jerusalem, which truthfully indicated the intellectual life of the Jewish Church, as our cathedrals do the mind and grasp of the Catholic faith. "Exquisite in their beauty, overpowering in their majesty," remarked M. de Montalembert, about a quarter of a century ago, to the present writer, "are your English cathedrals—almost all of them. Your architects were gods in the olden times!" And the same truth might be affirmed of most of the cathedrals of Europe; they suggest an inspiration by divine faith:

> The ear doth slowly to the mind supply
> The truths that flash like lightning through the eye;

and the eye that rests on Westminster or on Salisbury, on Wells, or York, or Canterbury—to speak only of the old cathedrals of England—takes in the soul of the intellectual life which is bequeathed to our apprehension by such monuments.

IV.

"By their fruits ye shall know them." We have still to notice, though in few words, the fatal results of that New Philosophy, which, begotten in the sixteenth century of the revolt from Catholic intellect, has brought a good part of the world back to mental chaos. It was by its *opposition* to the Catholic intellect that the New Philosophy proved the wisdom of its opponents; and thus we may claim it as the most practical of the demonstrators of the pure reason of the Catholic philosophy. Starting with doubt as its basis, and taking experimental investigation as its method, the New Philosophy put Individualism into the place of divine authority, and, indeed, clothed it with transcendental infallibility. In the sixteenth century a sort of Deism, plus a sentiment of Christianity, was the fashion among the educated classes in England; and, a little later, Rationalism and Pantheism pervaded much of the literature of Germany. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was much scoffing and sneering; but in the nineteenth century, the "philosophers" adopt the tone of a sort of superior ignoring of divine authority, rather treating Revelation as an interesting fable, than as a "theory" that has to be dealt with Rationistically. The reach or compass of such "philosophy" naturally differs in different countries. Let us glance at a few of the prominent characteristics. In France there is a positive hatred of the Catholic Church, because the French *know* that the Catholic religion is divine. (There is no such hatred of Christianity in England, because no Protestant ever supposed, in the wildest flights of his imagination, that there could be anything divine in the

Anglican establishment.) Hence, in France there are two schools, and two alone—the Catholic, which is intense and intellectual; the infidel, which is superficial and rationalistic. Cousin, by his Pantheistic speculations; Comte, by his "Philosophie Positive;" with the host of unbelieving doctrinaires, such as St. Hilaire, Arago, Renan, Lamarck (who first broached the comic theory that man was the descendant of an ape), have been compelled to "cry down" the Catholic believers, whom they could not reason with in patience and sobriety. It is nothing to these self-complacent rationalists, that men who were their superiors in everything, profoundly reverenced the very truths which they despise. That such men as De Cauchy, the greatest mathematician who has succeeded to Laplace, or Vinel the mechanician, or Quatremain de Quincey, the archæologist, or the Orientalists, Abel Remusart and Sylvestre de Sacy, or the Armenian scholar, St. Martin, or hosts of other great men, should have been Christians in faith and in action, no more affects the serenity of the Rationalists than the knowledge that Chateaubriand intellectually stripped the disguise off French skepticism, or that de Maistre, and de Bonald, and Montalembert, and Lacordaire—not to mention the admirable non-Catholic Guizot—were all champions of the very truths which they assailed. Guizot was, indeed, a great thinker, notwithstanding the accident of his born-Protestantism. In his "The Christian Church and Society," he told Frenchmen that they were under a delusion when they insisted on the prominence of the natural law, and denied the supernatural and the miraculous. *His* philosophy was Christian. Indeed, he was so nearly a Catholic that he protested against the usurpation of the temporal power of the Pope, maintaining that it was "only a trick of the infidel party to overthrow the dominion of the supernatural." Guizot was a grave and sober reasoner; whereas, the "philosophy" of infidel Frenchmen is simply a dressed-up natural pretext for getting rid of the responsibilities of the human soul.

Let us glance at Germany, Italy, Spain, and England. Fifty years ago, the German mind, half exhausted by metaphysical speculations, took up with politics and the physical sciences; yet continued in the same false mood of experiment founded on a skepticism which was universal. Its public press was in the hands of Jews and infidels; and in most of its universities—hardly a quarter of a century ago—the skeptic, the rationalist, and the Catholic professor taught day by day in the same halls, handling the biggest problems of the human mind from their various standpoints of belief or unbelief. It was in 1860, that Professor Clemens, who occupied the chair of Philosophy in Münster, took as his thesis for a public lecture, "Philosophy is the Handmaid of Theology."

Professor Kuhn, also a divine in the same faculty, denied this; and a warm dispute was carried on by the professors. Now, no two disputants could have chosen a better subject for the bringing out of the exact teaching of the Catholic Church. That "philosophy is the handmaid of theology" (not theology the handmaid of philosophy), is a truism which no Catholic should deny; and happily, in our own time, the German Catholic mind is too vigorous to be misled by any sophistry of the rationalists. Indeed, the Catholic intellect of Germany in these days is more robust than that of any other country.——For, Italy is fatally enfeebled by the revolution. Under the first Napoleon she was indoctrinated with the ideas of '89; and under the second Napoleon she yielded Rome to the revolutionists; nor is there that backbone of intellectual faith in the Italians which should oppose resistance to the chronic scandal of the usurpation.——Portugal was once called the Refuge of the Revolution, for it drank deep of the cup of its enchantments; yet it has long since tried to shake off the hallucination, and is now no disgrace to its Catholic neighbors.——For, Spain has been quite awakened from its moral torpor, and is a striking evidence of the vitality of Catholic principles.——As to England, the characteristics are exceptional. The English mind is either practical or sentimental; it is not, in strict sense, philosophical. The Catholic intellect in England has not to contend against speculations which are assumed to be a pure exercise of the reason, so much as against traditional prejudice, in regard to the Christian action of the Catholic Church. The prevailing form of English rationalism must be rudely called mental sloth; it is not the result of intellectual activities, but the apology for a not honorable indifference.

One other country, Belgium, might be referred to, because the question of wholly secularizing the State was fought out in Belgium to the bitter end. That question has now righted itself; but in France and Italy there is still much infidel talk about the desirableness of divorcing government from religion. We all know why the Catholic Church cannot approve of this divorce; either in regard to principle, because it is opposed to revolution, or in regard to polity, because it means "the State First, and Religion in complete subjection to the State." Lamennais, before his fall, with other writers in the *Avenir*, advocated this unnatural divorce, wholly forgetting that all society, from its cradle to the grave, is indissolubly bound up with the Christian religion, so that the State *minus* the Church is really national apostacy, not only in theory but in fact As we are thinking now of the intellectual life of the Catholic Church, it may be well to mention that there are two chief mistakes in the New Philosophy in regard to the Church's relations to civil government; the one, that all religion should

be divorced from civil government, the other, that the religious and civil authority should meet in the same power, namely, the State. We need only say thus much at the present moment: That the divorce of the State from all religion means the interference of the State *with* religion, and very soon its complete tyranny *over* religion—as is practically the case now in France, and conspicuously the case now in Italy—while the other theory, the uniting of the two powers, as exemplified in the institution called the Church of England, means that Christianity cannot possibly be supernatural, because the Parliament controls its *imperium* on every point, and that the liberty of the Christian subject is to be circumscribed by the State, as when Queen Elizabeth punished all Catholics who would not attend her Protestant service; or as—to take an instance from modern Russia—when the Czar flogs or banishes his Catholic subjects who refuse to adore his majesty's private orthodoxy. Space forbids us to dwell further on this subject; yet it was necessary to touch upon it, because it is manifest that it is mainly *through* the State's good will and co-operation that the Church can work her way in all society; in other words, that the intellectual life of the Church can permeate both all communities and their civil laws.

V.

It would need such a mind as that of the late Cardinal Newman to even present in fragmentary form the great truths we have ventured to glance at; nor is it sought here to do more than ask of non-Catholics: Are you wise in forsaking the guidance of the Church's intellect, which does not derive from private reason its first principles of what is right, but from the divine guidance of the indwelling Holy Spirit, Who, in imparting the "philosophy" which is eternal, necessarily implies the best philosophy in things temporal. There is no possibility in this world of preserving continuous harmony between the rule of God's truth and man's will, because human feebleness must be always tumbling into rebellion; yet the broad outlines of right and wrong are so clearly traced on the world's map that we are, really, without excuse in not recognizing them. The brief survey which we have just taken amounts to this—if we may recall two or three of its leading points—Faith is intellectual, *because* divine; and therefore, the "attitude" of the Catholic Church towards the world is that of paternal, because eternal, legislation. Priesthood, Monasticism, and Education have been said to be three expressions of that Catholic intellect which rests on the Divine Wisdom for its first principles. In the material order, such first principles have been "a success," as witnessed by the splendid achievements of good Catholics before the revolution

of the sixteenth century disturbed the world. As to "philosophy," so-called, all those countries which have bent the knee to the set-up image of private judgment or individualism, have suffered correspondingly "intellectually," while those countries which have kept their first love, and have insisted on the divine authority of the Holy See, have escaped the tyranny which personal caprice always engenders, and the servitude which self-worship always entails. If we turn our eyes now to Rome—to Rome usurped, and deeply secularized—we see the focusing of all the energies of rebellion against the divine institution of the Papacy. We see at a glance, intellectually, the travesty of the human intellect which, not only refuses to honor divine authority, but seeks its glory in falling down to the golden image. Rome is (for the present) "a trim-built municipal city," as Cardinal Newman said it would be when secularized; it is dishonored by the unseemly contests of mundane interests, and has lost the honor and the peace which should belong to it. And this fact is in close connection with our subject, because the fact is so profoundly *unintellectual*. The home of the Pontiffs being the home of Christian unity—and therefore, necessarily, of the intellectual harmonies—the home where education, art, and science, and the nurseries of the Catholic missions, are supposed to be cherished tranquilly and securely, the spectacle of a stolen Rome, a rebellious Rome, a Rationalist Rome, is repugnant to the first instincts of the Christian intellect. The idea of intellectual "life" is, like the idea of all healthy life, the idea of a sound and restful life-centre, from which the harmonies of the whole body may be vitalized. The New Philosophy has done well—that is, consistently—in attacking the Church's head and the Church's home; for, if you smite the source of the intellectual life, you are pretty sure to injure the limbs and the extremities. Happily, there is a divine power behind the intellectual power, which prevents the conflict from doing worse than causing scandal. Destruction, final overthrow, are impossible. "The gates of hell shall never prevail against it." Yet it is lamentable, it is humiliating, that the human family, in this nineteenth century, cannot yield its first homage to the *idea* of the intellectual life, and to the duty of intellectual justice and harmony. We said just now, that by its opposition to the Catholic intellect, the New Philosophy proved the wisdom of its opponent; and every one can see the meanness, the imbecility, the vulgarity, of the appropriation of the Pontiff's sovereignty—which is *our* freedom. Twelve centuries of that sovereignty have lain at the root of civilization, not only because the independence of the Pontiff guaranteed his free exercise of paternal rule, but because the idea and the fact of the intellectual life of the Catholic Church are primarily grounded on justice and

equity. The Father of Christendom—and therefore the Father of intellectual life—is too venerable to be subjected to worldly accidents; so that the New Philosophy (which is the most unintellectual thing in the world) is quite consistent in heaping insults upon God's Vicar. Most non-Catholics are willing to concede all this intellectually, though they stop short at a theoretical concession. It would be too troublesome to pass on to the *spiritual* duties which must follow upon the *intellectual* recognition of evident truths. Lord Macaulay was an example of the strange union of the recognition with a quiet practical disregard of the obligation. No writer ever recognized more than he did the intellectual consistencies of the Catholic philosophy. It was in his "History" that he wrote this one fragment, which was in harmony with numerous other fragments of his other writings: "The spiritual supremacy assumed by the Roman Pontiff has effected more good than harm; and the Roman Church, by uniting all men in a bond of brotherhood, and teaching all men their responsibility before God, deserves to be spoken of with respect by philosophers and philanthropists."

TRANSFORMISM.

LAMARCK—DARWIN.

FEW scientific theories, within the present century, have so stirred up men's minds, or given rise to such heated controversies, as the hypothesis known under the name of "Transformism," of which Darwinism is the best known and most popular form. It may be interesting, now that the original enthusiasm has in a certain degree subsided, to consider calmly and impartially the outcome of so many years of keen discussion and eager research, and to show at the same time how far the Christian faith is interested therein. This we purpose to do in the present paper.

I.

"Darwinism," it will be remembered, is substantially an attempt to account for the existence of the innumerable forms of life, extinct or still extant, on the face of the globe. We can conceive of them in the abstract as originated in one of two ways: either by being fashioned by the hand of the Creator directly and immediately as they are found in all their specific variety; or simply by the creation at the beginning of only a few typical forms of life, from which all other forms, from the lowest to the highest, would be slowly evolved by a power and a law similar to that which carries the individual from the simplest germ to the highly organized body of the full grown animal.

To a special conception of the latter hypothesis Darwin has attached his name. But the theory of evolution in its general features existed long before him.

We find it clearly suggested by Linnæus: "Here is a conjecture that I have long entertained," says this great naturalist. "I never dared to publish it as indubitable truth, but I will propose it simply as an hypothesis, viz.: that all the species of the same genus may have formed at the beginning only one species and may have been multiplied by hybrid generations. . . . . Whether these species came immediately from the creative power of God, or came in the course of time from nature itself as working out a divine law, it is not so easy to say."[1]

[1] "Suspicio est quam diu fovi neque jam pro veritate indubiâ venditare audeo, sed per modum hypotheseos propono: quod scilicet omnes species ejusdem generis ab initio unam constituerint speciem sed, postea per generationes hybridas propagatæ sint. . . . . Num vero hæ species per manum Omnipotentis Creatoris immediate sint exortæ in primordio, an vero per naturam, Creatoris executricem, propagatæ in tempore, non adeo facile demonstrabitur."—*Amœnitates Acad.*, vol. vi, p. 296 (Ed. 1763).

Geoffroy St. Hilaire and Goethe himself had also questioned the stability of species. But the greatest originator of that line of thought which culminated in Darwin was the naturalist Lamark.[1] This remarkable man was led to his views regarding the transmutability of species by his study of varieties, "the ever-recurring stumbling-block of systematic zoologists."[2]

The general idea which is in the minds of naturalists when they speak of "species" is expressed by the definition that a species of animals consists of *an assemblage of individuals, all resembling each other and producing their kind by generation.* Thus, for instance, all wolves resemble each other and produce young, which in turn are fertile; hence wolves constitute a single species —the *canis lupus* of Linnæus. Similarly, all the individual animals grouped under the name of lion, tiger, brown bear (and so on), resemble each other and produce fertile young, thus constituting so many species of animals.

There is, however, the obvious difficulty that the resemblance between the individuals of any species *is not complete.* They are similar in general appearance, but not in minor details. All wolves are alike, but they are not exactly alike. Besides, in many cases the differences between different groups of individuals comprised within any species may be very considerable, and, as far as observation goes, may be permanent differences. This is most conspicuously the case with our domestic animals. Thus, take the case of dogs, the mastiff, the greyhound, the bull-dog and the terrier represent such groups, known, in common parlance, as "breeds" or "races" of dogs. Some breeds are known to have existed, without notable change, from the very earliest historical times. Most species of animals include one or more of such varieties, and the same is noticed in the vegetable kingdom.

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[1] J. B. Pierre Antoine de Monet, usually known as the Chevalier de Lamark, was born on the 1st of August, 1744, at Bezantin, a small village of Picardy, France. After having served some time in the army, he gave himself to the study of natural science, and in 1778 he published his first book, *La Flore Française.* Having been appointed to a chair in the "Jardin des Plantes," he prepared there his great work, which Prof. Alleyn Nicholson calls "a gigantic and classical exposition of the special department which he had in charge." This work was the *Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres* (1815–1832, 7 vols., 8mo.) Lamark was very much more than an observer, describer and classifier of animals. He possessed a singularly original mind, prone to generalization and bold to rashness in his conceptions. The most famous of his philosophical and theoretical treatises is his *Philosophie Zoologique*, published in 1809, in 2 vols., 8vo, and the fame of this rests in great measure on the fact that it was there that he first laid down what may be regarded as the earliest definite theory of evolution as applied to living beings.

[2] Prof. Alleyn Nicholson, *Biography of Naturalists.* We wish to state here once for all that in this article we have used freely the works of Darwin, Romanes, A. Russell Wallace and Prof. Alleyn Nicholson.

Now, the question arises, do these varieties ever go so far as to form fresh species, or do they always stop before reaching this limit? In the latter case where is the limit? How can we distinguish between a species and a simple variety? As is suggested by the very definition of species given above, naturalists have been accustomed to determine this by what is called the "physiological test." When the individuals of a given assemblage of animals or plants are *fertile* among themselves, and capable of giving rise to a fertile offspring, they are usually regarded as constituting a single species, however greatly they may differ among themselves. Varieties, therefore, are supposed to be always capable of interbreeding with the type-form of species. On the other hand, if two groups of animals or plants, otherwise nearly resembling each other, are found to be incapable of producing fertile offspring by intercrossing, they are regarded as constituting two distinct species.

But *in practice* this distinction encounters many difficulties, and Lamark, deeply impressed with these, rejected the idea of the constancy of species. He maintained that those characteristics of a species which we call specific were liable to variation, and that the degree of this variation was indefinite. Accordingly, he held that the constancy of species was not *absolute* but only *relative to the circumstances* in which the individuals of a species were placed.

That species seem to us permanent, he explained upon the ground that our observations only extended over a few thousand years, and that this period had not been long enough to allow the transformation of one species into any other, especially as terrestrial changes have been quite slight and unimportant during the whole period covered by human experience.

A multitude of facts, says Lamark, teach us that in proportion as the individuals of our species change their locality, their climate, their manner of living, or their habits, in the same proportion they become subject to influences which little by little change the consistence and proportions of their parts, their form, their faculties, even their organization in such a manner that, given sufficient time, everything in them participates in the mutation to which they are exposed.[1]

Hence Lamark abandoned the view that the animals and plants now in existence had been produced *de novo*, just as we now find them.

But by what *agencies* were new species produced? According to Lamark all variation in a species is due to *change in the condi-*

[1] *Phil. Zool.*, vol. i., ch. 7, pp. 218–233, ed. 1830.

tions of life and environment. These new conditions create new needs, which in turn demand a greater and more frequent exercise of some organs and the disuse of others. The first grow larger, while the others soon become dwarfed; and this variation being transmitted through successive generations and becoming more and more pronounced, the final result is an altogether new species.

He gives as an example the giraffe. He supposed this animal to have originally had a neck no longer than that of the ordinary ruminants to which it is allied. As the climate of Africa became drier and droughts became more frequent, the ordinary ground herbage was liable to be destroyed for many months together, and the existence of the species was rendered difficult and precarious. The giraffe was compelled, under these circumstances, to stretch its neck continually to reach the higher foliage, and the result was the progressive elongation of the cervical vertebræ.

There is certainly no doctrine in physiological science better established than this, that the habitual use of an organ leads to a corresponding growth, while its disuse leads to a partial or total atrophy. "It is by just such a process," says Lamark, "that existing species have been evolved out of other more ancient forms of life." As to plants, it is the change in the conditions of their nutrition that affects them and modifies them.[1]

About thirty years after the promulgation of this theory, there was published anonymously, in England, a book bearing partly on the same subject, entitled "Vestiges of Creation." The first edition appeared in 1844, and the tenth in 1853, a sufficient proof of the popularity which it enjoyed. The author, now known to be Robert Chambers, maintained unhesitatingly that we cannot consistently accept natural causes as sufficiently explaining the phenomena of the inorganic world (*v.g.*, the evolution of the planets, especially of the earth), and at the same time invoke supernatural causes to explain the phenomena presented by living beings.

As regards the origin of species, he accepted Lamark's views in so far as to maintain that species are not invariable or constant, but he altogether rejected his theory as to the *manner* in which they were originated. He attributed to every living being two "impulses" implanted by God himself, the first advancing the various forms of life, in definite times, by reproduction, through the different grades of organization, culminating in the highest dicotyledons and vertebrata; and the second tending, in the course of generations, to modify organic structures in accordance with external circumstances, something analogous to the embryonic development of an individual animal.

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[1] *Phil. Zool.*, Ibid.

"But such tendencies or impulses," as Alleyn Nicholson remarks, "are mere metaphysical conceptions and form a scientifically inadmissible agency."

However, "this work," says Charles Darwin himself, "has done excellent service in calling attention to the subject, in removing prejudices and in thus preparing the ground for the reception of analogous views."[1] Its author was severely attacked by the clergymen of his country, but his intentions were evidently good.[2]

A little before that time, Charles Lyell had published his "Principles of Geology," in which he advocated with great force and talent the notion of the sufficiency of nature's laws to account for the present state of the earth, time only being required for it.

We may add that the very disposition of mind of many philosophers and scientists prepared them to welcome readily any system which would minimize the direct intervention of the Divinity in the world or even would permit it to be entirely ignored.

Thus, the scientific world was ready to listen to Darwin.

As we have seen, the theory that the present state of the natural world was the result of evolution from a former state, did not originate with him. Like most of the conceptions of the human intellect, this theory had undergone a slow elaboration in the minds of others before it was taken up by its most celebrated representative. Darwin's share consists in having proposed a *new mode* of evolution, by which new species may have been produced from others previously existing. He is the author of the theory of Evolution *by means of natural selection*.[3]

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[1] *Origin of Species*, 5th Amer. ed., p. 13.

[2] See *Vestiges of Creation*, 12th ed. W. & R. Chambers. 1884. p. 416.

[3] Charles Darwin was born at Shrewsbury on February 12, 1809. His father, Robert Waring Darwin, was a physician, and desiring his son to enter the same profession, sent him to Edinburgh to study medicine. But the young man showed no taste for medical studies, so that after two years he left Edinburgh and betook himself to Cambridge, with the view of studying for the ministry. It was not long before he found himself no more attracted to theology than to medicine, and becoming well acquainted with Henslow, one of the professors, spent most of his time in collecting insects for him. In 1831, Darwin graduated as a Bachelor of Arts. Just at the time an application had been made for a naturalist to accompany H. M. Ship the "Beagle" (Capt. FitzRoy) in a voyage around the world, and as young Darwin was without any profession and in independent circumstances, Henslow proposed him, and he was accepted. During that trip, which lasted five years, Darwin not only collected a vast amount of scientific material of all kind, but accumulated an endless store of observations which served ultimately as the groundwork of his *Origin of Species*. After his return to England, he settled at Down in Kent, and never left that place until his death on April 18, 1882. Among the many books which he published there, the most celebrated is undoubtedly his *Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*, in which he first gave forth to the world the theory called after his name "Darwinism."

II.

Darwinism is, as we have just said, a *system* of transformism; it presupposes that all living beings have evolved from primitive germs, and proposes an explanation of the *process*. This, it is claimed, may be found in two fundamental facts: 1. The *struggle for life* which is constantly and universally going on among living beings, and 2. *Natural Selection*, which is the consequence of it.

I. *The Struggle for Life.* Malthus has already observed that all living beings tend to increase in a geometrical ratio, much more rapidly therefore than their means of subsistence.[1] For instance a single flesh-fly (*Musca carnaria*) produces 20,000 larvæ and these grow so quickly that they reach their full size in five days. Supposing they went on increasing at this rate, after a few weeks, there would result one hundred million of millions for each fly, a number greater probably than exists at any one time in the whole world. What would it be at the end of summer? And this is only one species, while there are thousands of other species equally prolific; so that if they were unchecked the whole atmosphere would be dense with flies, and all animal food, as well as much animal life, would be destroyed by them. To prevent this tremendous increase, there must be incessant war against these insects in the larval as well as the perfect state by insectivorous birds and reptiles, as well as by other insects, by the action of the elements, in the form of rain, hail or drought, and by other unknown causes. Let us now consider a less extreme and more familiar case. We possess a considerable number of birds, as the sparrow, wren, crow, buzzard, etc. They lay, on an average, six eggs, but as several of them have two or more broods a year, ten will be below the average of the year's increase. Such birds as these often live from fifteen to twenty years in confinement, and we cannot suppose that their lives are shorter in a state of nature. Now if we start with a single pair, and these are allowed to live and breed unmolested till they die, at the end of ten years their number would amount to more than twenty millions. But we know that our bird population is no greater, on the average, than it was ten years ago. What then becomes of the enormous surplus population annually produced? It is evident that they must all die or be killed, in some way; and as the increase is, on the average, five to one, it follows that if the average number of birds in one country is taken at ten millions, and this is probably far under the mark, then about fifty million of birds, including eggs as possible birds must annually be destroyed. Yet we see very little of this tremendous slaughter.

[1] See *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, by T. R. Malthus, vol. i., book i., ch. 1: Ratios of the increase of population and food.

The same thing goes on with every species of wild animal and plant from the lowest to the highest. All breed at such a rate that in a few years the progeny of one single species would, if allowed to increase unchecked, entirely monopolize the land; but all alike are kept within bounds by various destructive agencies, so that, although the numbers of each may fluctuate, they can never permanently increase, except at the expense of some other species, which must proportionately decrease.[1]

Hence there takes place among all living beings a "struggle for existence." Each organism fills a certain place in the world of nature,—occupies a particular area, feeds on a particular kind of food, requires a particular set of conditions. As, however, every kind of animal and plant is constantly bringing into existence more young than can be accommodated, or for which suitable food can be provided, it follows that there arises among the young of each species a competition, both for proper place and for proper food.

II. *Natural Selection.*—It is observed that all living beings are subject to variation. The individuals composing a species of animals and plants are not precisely alike. They invariably differ from one another more or less in numerous points, some of the differences being extremely minute, while others may be very conspicuous.

Some of the variations are favorable to the species, and others unfavorable. That is to say, some variations will help the individual either to obtain more food, or to keep himself warm, or to avoid or to repel his natural enemies, or will otherwise help him in the struggle for existence, while, on the other hand, some variations will arise which will keep their possessors back in the race of life, and will increase the difficulty which they have in maintaining their existence.

It follows from this, that in any given species of animals or plants, those individuals which are born into the world in possession of any favorable variations are, *cæteris paribus*, "likely to be preserved, while those having unfavorable variations are likely to go to the wall and to be stamped out." This law is what Mr. Herbert Spencer has called the law of "the survival of the fittest," and Mr. Darwin, "natural selection." Nature itself, in fact, by the action of its forces, insures the selection out of the young of any species of all those individuals which are "fittest" for their surroundings; as, in the case of the giraffe, already cited, all would perish during a drought except those whose neck was naturally slightly longer than the average.

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[1] Taken from Alf. Russell Wallace—*Darwinism*, p. 25.

But the young of all animals and plants *tend to inherit* the peculiarities of their parents. Hence, favorable variations, which preserve alive certain individuals of each species, will tend to be handed down to their offspring. The general action of the law of natural selection or survival of the fittest is thus to preserve all favorable variations which may occur and to destroy all unfavorable ones. Moreover, the favorable variation will tend to become intensified in each succeeding generation so long as the conditions which render it favorable remain in existence. We know that varieties of animals are thus produced, and species and varieties pass into each other by such imperceptible gradations, that it is impossible to lay down any fixed rule for the determination of the point where a variety ends and a species begins.

If, therefore, natural selection produces varieties, it can as well produce such groups of individuals as those which naturalists call species. If this be conceded, it is an inevitable conclusion that all species may have been produced by natural selection. At any rate, the admission that any species may have originated from that cause, throws upon those who deny the universal operation of the law the burden of proof, that any particular species has not been produced by the action of the same law.

In the case of domestic animals, it is no more natural selection that governs them, but an artificial one, exercised by man himself for the purpose of producing in them such qualities as he desires. The result is, that among such animals there is a more pronounced tendency to variation than wild animals have, and that the peculiarities, which are distinctive of our domestic animals as compared with their wild congeners, are not of such a nature as to fit them better to exist in their natural environment, but are adaptations to the taste or fancy or requirements of man. These facts of artificial selection are undeniable, and are acknowledged by all. All our domesticated animals owe their numerous varieties to man. But if artificial selection in so comparatively short a time has made domesticated animals so different from the wild species from which they came, is it not reasonable to suppose that natural selection could have made new species when we consider that it has operated during an indefinitely long period?

Such is, in brief, the theory of transformism or organic evolution as proposed by its two ablest representatives, Lamark and Darwin. We will now proceed to give, as fairly as possible in a short article, the arguments proposed in its favor. They may be arranged, according to Mr. Romanes, under five heads. They may be taken, 1st, from morphology; 2d, from comparative anatomy; 3d, from geology; 4th, from geographical distribution of species; 5th, from embryology.[1]

[1] See Romanes's *Scientific Evidence of Organic Evolution.*

I. As a fact, all the species of plants and animals present among themselves structural affinities, which permit their classification and division into genera, orders, families, classes, sub-kingdoms and kingdoms, according as their affinities are more or less pronounced. Still, it has been found impossible to place all in one linear series, according to their perfection in organization, for there are many species of which it is impossible to say that one is more perfect than the other. Natural classification may better be likened to a tree. The main trunk would represent the lowest organisms. This soon separates into two main branches, the *vegetable* and the *animal* kingdoms. Each of these gives off large branches, which are *classes*, and these give off smaller, which ramify again into *orders*, *genera*, and finally into species, which may be considered the leaves of the tree. Now, in such a tree of life the height of any branch may be taken to indicate the grade of organization. There is, therefore, a general advance from below upwards, but species at the same level, though very different from each other, cannot be said to be more highly organized, one than another.

Now, this tree of life is just what would have arisen had all species come into existence by evolution. Of course, God could, in His infinite wisdom, have formed such a plan and carried it out by means of direct creation. But we should never have recourse to a preternatural explanation of the phenomena of nature when we can find a sufficient explanation of them in nature itself. For example, in the case of languages, as in that of species of animals and plants, we find strongly marked generic affinities, so that it is possible, to some extent, to construct a language-tree, the branches of which will represent the progressive divergence of a large group of languages from a common stock. Thus, Latin may be regarded as a fossil language, which has given rise to a group of living languages—Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, and, to a certain extent, English. Now, says Mr. Romanes, what should we think of a philologist who should maintain that French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian were all specially created languages, or languages separately constructed and communicated to these several nations by as many separate acts of inspiration, and that their resemblance to the fossil form Latin is to be attributed to special design? The evidence of the natural transmutation of species is as great, or even greater, the instances being vastly more numerous.

II. In a great many cases the same type of structure can be recognized as extending through very different classes of animals. For example, among the vertebrata, if we confine our attention to the arm, we find that in the whale it is modified for swimming, the bones of the shoulder, fore-arm, wrist and fingers all existing, but inclosed in a fin-shaped sack; in the bat it is modified for flying

by an enormous elongation of the fingers overspread with a fine membrane; in birds again it is modified for flight, but in a totally different manner, the fingers in this case being very short and coalescing, so that the chief expanse of the wing is formed by the shoulder and forearm. In frogs and lizards we find hands more like our own, but in an extinct species of flying reptile their modification was extreme, and in serpents both hand and arm have disappeared altogether. How shall we explain the presence of the same limb with such great modifications and performing so different functions? Easily, if we call to our aid the principles of natural selection and of variation under the influence of changed conditions of life. Otherwise, we can only say that God has ordered it so. But we do not see any reason why it should be so. It would apparently have been more simple to have created a different limb for a different function, rather than to torture the same limb in every conceivable way. The same observation holds good in regard to the other organs.

Furthermore, there are in many animals limbs that are only rudimentary and incapable of performing any function; *e.g.*, the hind legs in seals have been shortened and directed backwards, so as to be of no use for walking; and in whales the modification has gone even further than this, so that the hind legs have ceased to be apparent externally, and are only represented internally by very rudimentary remnants. The baleen whale has also rudimentary teeth, which are never destined to cut the gums. Man himself has a rudimentary tail, which is certainly of no practical use. It may be said that the design was to keep the same plan all through; but then it is incomprehensible why there are so many exceptions to it,—why in the same natural group an organ is sometimes present and sometimes absent. Thus, for instance, in nearly every one of the numerous species of snakes there are no vestiges of limbs; but the python possesses tiny rudiments of hind limbs beneath the skin.

Let us take the very interesting case of the horse. One toe appears to have become developed at the expense of the others, for the so-called knee of the horse is really the wrist or ankle, and the so-called shank the middle toe or finger very much enlarged. But on each side of this enlarged toe there are beneath the skin rudimentary bones of two other toes, the so-called splint-bones. How is the existence of these two rudimentary toes to be explained? If we seek, with the aid of palæontology, to go back to the probable ancestor of the present horse, we find, low down in the geological strata, horse-like animals with five toes on the fore feet (one rudimentary), which afterwards in later forms, of which the remains have been found, were reduced to four, then to three,

after which the two lateral toes began to become rudimentary, as we now see them in oxen, and later on still more so; so that in comparatively recent times we find fossils of a horse with simply the splint-bones, as at present.

So we have several genera standing in a linear series and leading to the horse of our own day. All this can be explained by the effects of use and disuse, change in the conditions of life, and "natural selection." If we do not recognize this it becomes an insoluble mystery.

III. The solid crust of the earth is composed of a superposition of strata, each of which contains the fossil remains of such animals and plants as lived at the time it was formed. The relative age of these strata has been pretty well established, and it is evident that there has been on the whole a progression in the degree of organization of the living forms from the first appearance of life to the present day. The fauna and flora of any particular stratum are always more perfect than those of the one immediately below it. Some types have lasted for a limited time only, as the trilobite and the ammonite; while others have existed unchanged through all periods, as *Lingula*, *Terebratulina caput serpentis* and *Foraminifera*.

Innumerable species in every age have appeared for a time, only to disappear and be replaced by new forms. If the disappearance had been general all over the world, and had extended to all living beings, it could be ascribed to a cataclysm. But some species, as has just been said, are always found passing from one period to another, and the change never affected at once all the countries of the earth. Often a species, after its disappearance from one part of the globe, is found in others in strata corresponding to a later period. All these facts point towards the same conclusion as that deduced from the consideration of the structural and morphological affinities between contemporary species.

When we come to consider the distribution of species, we find a new confirmation of the hypothesis. If specific differences are a product of natural causes, an effect of the conditions of life aided by natural selection, we would expect to find different species in countries or localities separated by a long distance from each other, or possessing marked differences in climate, soil and other natural conditions of life. This is exactly what we see to be the case. There is a great difference between the inhabitants of Australia, Africa and South America, for these regions are as isolated from one another as possible. So, too, on opposite sides of lofty and continuous mountain ranges, of great deserts, and even of large rivers, we find a divergent flora and fauna. In marine life, too, we find totally different species on

opposite sides of a continent, in different seas, and in different depths of the seas. The fossils of each country, while differing greatly according to their age, have certain characteristics in common among themselves and with the present flora and fauna.

In the case of oceanic islands situated at some distance from the continent we find plants and animals which, though often of *very different specific type* from all others in the world, nevertheless resemble in generic type those of the nearest continent. This seems to imply that the island was originally stocked with species from the continent, and that, after importation, such variations have taken place as in some cases to produce new species.

There is no island at a great distance from a continent where frogs, toads or newts can be found, because these animals and their spawn are killed by sea-water. All oceanic islands situated more than three hundred miles from the main land are destitute of any representatives of the whole class of *Mammalia*, with the exception only of those which can fly, bats, and these sometimes differ from all other bats in the world.

If then we deny the theory of evolution we must suppose that God created separately every species in accordance with the climate of its habitat, the food obtainable, and the kind of enemies with which it would have to contend; at the same time giving to the forms inhabiting each country the same general characteristics, so as to make the flora and fauna of different countries clearly distinguishable. But this is not all. These special creations must have been continued at intervals throughout all the geological periods, and there must have been as many centres of creation as there are continents and islands; in fact, as many as there are regions with marked differences in elevation and other natural conditions, separated by mountain peaks or great rivers. Lastly, special creations must have been such as to cause a divergence between different species *in a direct ratio to the distance* by which their habitats are separated.

But to give such an explanation to these remarkable facts, say the evolutionists, would be to preclude all scientific investigation. It is the same as to say, when asked for the reason of any natural phenomenon: "It is so because God made it so."

IV. The last argument in favor of the doctrine of evolution is furnished by the science of embryology. The embryos of animals belonging to nearly related groups, we are told, are very much alike. It is only when they are adult, or nearly so, that they distinctly differ, and the higher animals almost invariably pass through the same embryonic stages as the lower, up to the time when the higher animal begins to assume its peculiar characters. Thus the embryo of a mammal is first like a jelly fish, and after it begins to

show the characters of a vertebrate, it does not appear whether it is to be a fish, a snake, a bird or a beast. After a time it becomes evident that it is to be a mammal, but not till later could it be said to which order of mammals it belongs. Thus the phases of embryonic development recall the order of apparition of the different animal types upon the earth.

This otherwise inexplicable fact can be readily understood on the theory of descent from lower animals, since, in that case, it would only be natural that, by the law of inheritance, the first stages of the evolution should reappear in the embryonic development.

Such is the theory, with the arguments set forth in support of it.

III.

Before proceeding to discuss it, we may be asked, whether such a task is not superfluous for a Christian, inasmuch as the evolutionist theory would seem to be directly opposed to the teaching of the Bible, and even to lead to a denial of the presence and action of God in the work of creation. That such an impression is not unfrequently to be met with we cannot deny, but we believe it to be groundless.

To begin with the latter difficulty; a little reflection will show that the evolutionist theory of creation is not less glorious to God than the idea generally held among believers.

For, which is more glorious to God—to conceive Him as creating everything immediately, so that all that we see, whether in the inorganic realm, as the sun, the moon, the stars, and the earth itself, or, in the organic, as plants and animals, should have come directly from Him;—to conceive Him as interfering, by a special act, *every time* a substantial change had to be made in the constitution of the world, every time one of the thousands and thousands of species came to life through the long succession of the geological ages;—or, to conceive Him as creating matter in a chaotic state, foreseeing and willing that, in the course of time, all the various forms of material existence should issue from that primitive mass through the laws which he had first established and would maintain;—then, at the proper time, as life cannot come spontaneously from matter creating the primeval germs of the earliest living types, putting them likewise under certain fixed laws of development, and decreeing that all living beings, plants and animals, should, little by little, become differentiated through progressive evolutions; and, lastly, breathing into a body, taken from pre-existing matter, a soul made in His own image and likeness?

Surely, "There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few

forms, or into one, and that, while this planet has gone cycling on, according to the fixed laws of gravity, from so simple a beginning, endless forms, most beautiful and most wonderful, have been and are being evolved."[1]

But the question is not whether it is a beautiful conception; the question is, whether it is true—for, the beautiful is not a sure guide when we have to deal with a question of facts. Have we, then, any means of ascertaining whether God has really created everything in detail by His direct act, or has He created only matter, force and life, leaving to nature's own laws to finish the work under the supervision of His Providence.

To find an answer to this question, we may consult the narrative of creation, such as it is given in the Bible, or, we may interrogate Nature herself. If the Bible says anything clear and decisive on the matter, it is evidence for all Christians that further research is useless, and that every other way of answering the question must be given up as mistaken.

What, then, does the Bible say? Does it affirm that not only the world at large, but every species of plant and animal has been called into existence by a special act of creation, that, for instance, if there are thirty species of crows or a hundred species of violets, God specially created a pair of each species of crows and a first type of each species of violets, and so on for the 600,000 species that inhabit the world? Does the Sacred Book say that the species as primitively created are fixed and can never change in course of time so as to become new species?

At first sight it may seem so, but there is nothing so precise as that in the sacred text. The aim of the first chapter of Genesis is evidently to affirm that God created the world with all it contains, all the living as well as the inanimate beings. Then follows an enumeration of them, put in the most natural way. We cannot find there any trace of scientific description, and we have no right to expect it.

True, it is said, that at the command of God, the earth brought forth the herbs and the trees לְמִינֵהֶם (L'minêhem). But the word מִין (Min), which is translated by "kind" (Fr. *espece*, Germ, *Art*, etc.), cannot have the precise and scientific meaning which we now attribute to the words *species* and *genus*, and which has been settled only in this century after the works of Linnæus, Jussieu, de Candolle,

[1] These words are from Darwin himself. See *Origin of Species*, the last page. Lamark had said before: "Sans doute rien n'existe que par la volonté du sublime Auteur de toutes choses, mais pouvons-nous lui assigner des règles dans l'exécution de sa volonté et finer la mode qu'il a suivi à cet égard? Assurément, quelle qu'ait été sa volonté, l'immensité de sa puissance est toujours la même et de quelque manière que se soit exécutée cette volonté supréme, rien n'en peut déminuer la grandeur."—*Phil. Zool.*, t. i., p. 56.

Cuvier, Geoffroy St. Hilaire, Agassiz and others. It cannot be more than a popular expression meaning that God had created every plant, of every size and form, and given to all the power of reproduction for the maintenance of their kind, so that even the plants that now exist, and which have come from the first one created, came also from God as truly as did their original types. The same remark can be made concerning animals. Even when it is said of the body of man: "And the Lord formed man of the slime of the earth," it is clear that the expression is anthropomorphic, for we cannot imagine God taking a piece of red clay and giving to it the shape of a human body. It means simply that the body of the first man was formed of material elements, which, in the absence of the soul, were no more than clay and dust, "of the earth earthy," as St. Paul says.

"Darwinian Transformism," says Fr. Corluy, S. J., "is indeed contrary to the *obvious* sense of Scripture, but it cannot be said to be evidently opposed to the sacred text itself; for, Scripture is silent on the *mode* according to which the earth produced this diversity of species, whether it was suddenly or in the course of time; whether with an absolute or only with a relative fixity of species. Moreover the sense of the word מִין (Min), as used by Scripture is open to discussion."[1]

"Darwinism," says Fr. Vigouroux, S. S., is not necessarily in contradiction with the Bible. . . . . It can, therefore, be held, with the necessary restrictions, by believing scientists, as it is in fact by Mr. St. George Mivart and others."[2]

As therefore the Bible does not say anything which prevents us absolutely from accepting the theory of a *mediate* creation, such as described above, let us examine whether the theory proposed by the transformists can satisfy us that the world has come to its present state through a process of evolutionary development.

The limits of this article do not allow us to discuss each of the arguments which we have presented above. There are in them many assertions that very competent naturalists pronounce too general and therefore inexact; for instance, the last so-called proof taken from embryology, is pronounced by E. von Baer, one of

[1] "Transformismus Darwinianus," says Fr. Corluy, S. J., "dicendus est sensui Scripturæ *obvio* contradicere non tamen *aperte* textui sacro adversari; tacet enim Scriptura *modum* quo terra varietatem illam specierum produxerit, an statim an decursu temporum, an cum specierum firmitate omnimoda an cum relativa duntaxat. Sed et de sensu disputari posset quem Scriptura hic assignet nomini מִין (Min)." Jos. Corluy, S. J., *Spicilegium Dogmatico-Biblicum*, t. i., p. 198.

[2] "Le Darwinisme," says Vigouroux, "n'est pas nécessairement en contradiction avec la Bible. . . . . Il peut par conséquent être soutenu, avec les restrictions nécessaires, par des savants croyants, comme il l'est en effet par Mr. St. George Mivart et d'autres encore." F. Vigouroux, S. S, *Les Livres Saints et la Critique Rationaliste*, t. ii., p. 589 *et seq.*; ed. 1886, in 8 v.

the greatest authorities in the matter, a fanciful story "*ein volles märchen.*"[1]

We will confine ourselves to a few remarks, which we take from Prof. Nicholson.

1. It is universally admitted that in natural sciences, only such conclusions are admissible as are deduced from well-ascertained facts.

But the evolutionists who contend that species are transmutable, cannot actually furnish any indubitable case of transmutation. They answer that varieties are species in process of transformation, and that only time is required for the completion of the change. But since the earliest historic records we have no case of a variety having certainly evolved into a species; the cats, *e.g.*, that are found represented on the Egyptian monuments, are exactly like those of the present day. In six thousand years the varieties do not seem to have taken one step towards becoming new species. In a very few cases, some intermediate forms are claimed to be verifiable in historic time, but there is much uncertainty in every case.

2. As for the theory of natural selection in particular, its very essence is that the law of the struggle for existence is powerless to preserve or develop any structure except such as are useful to the individual or the species. But, according to the theory, the useful structures were not suddenly produced in a complete and perfect state; they were first rudimentary and therefore *functionally useless.* They may have been harmless, and that is about all that can be said. How then is their first preservation and development, while yet in their incipient stage, to be accounted for?

3. Unless many individuals should be similarly and instantaneously modified, there would be little chance of any useful variation being ultimately preserved and transmitted, for it would otherwise be lost by intercrossing with ordinary individuals. But it is hardly possible that the same variation would simultaneously appear in many individuals of a species, and there is no evidence to show that this ever occurs.

4. The theory of the origin of species by means of natural selection implies that a new species can only be produced by gradual modification, and therefore through the intervention of a long series of intermediate or transitional forms; and as these transitional forms must have greatly exceeded in number the individuals which are clearly recognizable as distinct species, we ought to find more abundant evidence of their existence than of the existence of the latter. Yet, as a matter of fact, very few of those forms that can be considered as intermediate have been found. Palæontology lends support to the *theory of evolution*

[1] E. von Baer, *Studien aus dem Gebiete der Naturwissenschaft*, p. 428.

understood in a very broad sense, but the theory of *natural selection* requires more than this. It requires that there should be a series of intermediate types, graduating into one another, by slight and hardly perceptible differences. Mr. Darwin meets this difficulty by pointing to the great imperfection of the palæontological record, the fossil forms known to us forming doubtless but an insignificant fraction of those which once existed. But this does not sufficiently account for the general absence of graduated intermediate forms.

5. The theory of natural selection supposes that variation is indefinite. But the evidence which has been collected since the beginning of the human period would rather support the opposite view, namely, that variation takes place only within certain comparatively narrow limits.

These objections have never been satisfactorily answered.

Conclusion.

It will be observed that in the course of the present article we have not taken into consideration those partisans of evolution who go so far as to pretend that they are or some day will be able to explain the evolution of life from inorganic matter, or of the soul from merely animal vitality; or to explain the origin or development of any form of existence without the intervention of a supreme Creative Power. Such extreme ideas are not a necessary part of the theory. The question of the existence of a Creator who produced from nothing matter and force, life and reason, is a question entirely foreign to the system itself and indeed entirely outside the domain of natural science. If a great many of the followers of Darwin are agnostics the fault is not necessarily to be ascribed to Darwinism, but to their own mental infirmity or to their imperfect philosophical training. To every unprejudiced mind it should be evident that matter must have had a beginning and therefore a cause outside itself.

The results of the most accurate experiments made by such men as Pasteur and Tyndall have also led to the conclusion that life cannot be generated spontaneously from matter. (See Tyndall: *Matter Floating in the Air*).

Again the intelligent faculty or reason in man belongs to an order entirely different from the instincts of brutes and therefore cannot be considered as a mere evolution of them.

Thus, there is no reason why transformism in general or Darwinism in particular, as long as it is kept within the limits of scientific research and seeks not to undermine truths of another order with which it has no concern, should not be made the subject of free discussion. It should be treated as a working hypothesis in natural history, as, for instance, the wave theory of heat and

light in physics. It may be that something like evolution has been taking place. As far as the *Earth* is concerned it is certain that it has become what it is only through continued changes during an extremely long period of time: this is one of the things which geology demonstrates beyond the possibility of a doubt. Perhaps the origin of species is, to a certain extent, attributable to a similar law. But what is the real process followed by nature? What is the real mode of evolution willed by the Creator, and taking place under His guidance? This question is far from being solved, even after all that has been written by the evolutionists. Climatic influences, use and disuse of organs, changes of environment, continuity of the germ-plasm[1] may contribute to it, as well as natural selection; but all these causes put together are far from furnishing a satisfactory explanation of all the various manifestations of life in the vegetable and animal kingdoms.

If scientists cannot finally solve the problem the discussion will have served as a stimulus to investigation, to the more accurate observation of the facts of nature, and will have thus been, at least indirectly an element in scientific progress.

"So-called Darwinism, or Darwin's hypothesis," says E. von Baer, "is nothing else but an attempt to furnish us with a precise explanation for the Transformation of Species. This explanation Darwin thought he could give, and it will have to be acknowledged in all future times that he has exhibited remarkable sagacity. It is undeniable that even now his work has a powerful influence on the progress of Zoology, especially in Germany. German naturalists had too much neglected the varieties, and lost sight altogether of the importance of Variability."[2]

What is said here of Germany applies in a certain degree to every country where natural sciences are cultivated.

On the other hand, as the theory is far from being demonstrated, and has not succeeded so far in winning anything beyond a very qualified assent from many of the highest representatives of science (it seems even to have lost ground in the last years), we may safely conclude that it is, at most, an open question in which each one may take sides according to his own judgment without being exposed to the reproach of remaining behind his time.

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[1] Allusion to a new theory of heredity proposed by Prof. August Weismann, of Freiburg.

[2] "Der sogennannte Darwinismus oder Darwin's hypothese," says E. von Baer, "nichts anderes ist als ein Versuch für die Transformation eine bestimmte Erklärung zu geben. Diese Erklärung nun glaubt Darwin geben zu können und den aufgebotchen Scharfsinn wird man auch in späterer Zeit anerkennen müssen, sowie es auch unleugbar ist dass shon ietzt sein Werk mächtig auf die Förderung der Zoologie gewirkt hat und am meisten in Deutschland. Die deutschen Naturforscher hatten die Varietäten, welche noch ietzt die verschiedenen Arten zeigen, zu sehr vernachlässigt und das wichtige Verhältniss der Variabilität ganz aus dem Auge verloren."—*Studien, etc.* p. 423.

THE TRANSIT OF MERCURY, MAY 9, 1891.

SO much prominence has been given to the transits of Venus of 1874 and 1882, that the transits of Mercury have been comparatively neglected. It is true, that on account of Mercury's proximity to the sun, its transits can never compete with those of Venus in determining that great base line of the heavens, the sun's distance; still, we have very high astronomical authority for asserting that too much reliance has been placed upon the transits of Venus, and that they have not yielded all the results that were claimed for them. Be this as it may, as the next transit of Venus does not take place until June 8, 2004, we have sufficient time for reflection and for devoting some of our leisure to the transits of Mercury. The last favorable transit of Mercury visible in this century will occur on May 9th of this year, and may be the key to the solution of many interesting questions. It is with this transit that the present article has to deal.

By transit we mean, in general, the passage of one celestial body before another. The use of the word is technically restricted to the case when the nearer body is the smaller. This applies in the present instance. Mercury and Venus are the only planets that circulate about the sun in orbits entirely enclosed by that of the earth, and consequently they alone can ever come between the earth and the sun in such a manner as to appear to pass directly across the face of that luminary. Our moon also has this privilege, but as she appears to be of about the same size as the sun, her transits are called eclipses, because the amount of solar light intercepted is considerable. Lastly, when the nearer body is very much larger than the farther one, we say there is an occultation; thus the moon, our nearest celestial neighbor, is continually occulting the stars in her path.

Viewed through a small telescope by the unpracticed eye, the transit of Mercury is no more than the passage of a small black spot across the sun, but to an astronomer this little object will reveal a volume of wonderful and useful information. Everything about this spot will be most carefully noted. First of all, the time of its appearance will tell the astronomer whether his tables of the planet are correct. To construct these tables many and most precise observations are necessary, but Mercury's general nearness to the sun renders such precision very difficult and often impossible, because in the sun's glare the planet, and even the brightest stars, are lost to view. When, however, the planet is in transit,

the sun's rays instead of dazzling our eyes whilst observing Mercury's tiny crescent, on the contrary throw his black disk into bolder relief.

Besides giving us this accurate determination of Mercury's own motion, the transit may solve a problem of far higher import. Every one is familiar with that greatest triumph of mathematical astronomy, which from the motions of one planet and the minute discrepancy between its observed and predicted places, proved by the sheer power of mathematics the existence of another and larger planet, a thousand million miles away, far beyond the uttermost limits of the then known solar system. Once the problem was solved for Neptune, the outermost planet, it was applied to the innermost, Mercury, by Leverrier, the same genius that had immortalized himself in the former instance. He found that Mercury's orbit also was interfered with by an unknown body revolving between it and the sun, and that the mass of the new planet must be about half that of Mercury itself. Later observations and discussions have indeed disproved the existence of Vulcan, as this newly adopted member of the solar family was called, but have replaced the one planet by a ring of smaller ones, whose existence is proved with the greatest degree of probability. The question of intra-Mercurial planets is thus a live one, and every transit well observed may bring us nearer the solution.

There are other points to be cleared up concerning the individual character of the planet itself. The celebrated Italian astronomer, Schiapparelli, the discoverer of the gemination of the canals of Mars, has lately aroused new interest in the planet whose transit is now before us. He says that just as our moon always turns the same face to the earth, so Mercury always turns the same face to the sun, and consequently, that one-half the inhabitants (if any exist,) must have perpetual day, and the other half perpetual night, whilst those that live on the borderland of light and darkness, because of the planet's libration or the apparent swinging motion of the sun, must have but one day and one night during the Mercurian year.

The existence of an atmosphere on Mercury has not yet been firmly established. When Venus enters upon the sun, a ring of light surrounding the black disk is very noticeable, but a similar ring about the disk of Mercury cannot be affirmed with certainty. The spectroscope has already given evidence of water-vapor on the planet, and thus indirectly of an atmosphere. A satellite has not yet been discovered.

The figures or diagrams accompanying this article will enable us to understand better the circumstances of the coming transit. Fig. 1 gives us the particulars of the transit as seen from the earth.

FIG. I


N
E
W
S
A
B
C
INGRESS
EGRESS
APPARENT PATH OF MERCURY
Jul 6
Apr 18
May 9
Jun. 5
May 16
Nov 10 1894
Jun 25

FIG. II


SUN
May 1
June
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R

The circle represents the disk of the sun, and N, E, S, W, are its cardinal points. At noon the north point is uppermost, and a vertical plane drawn through the sun's centre, would cut the disk along the line N S. As the sun moves away from the meridian, the disk with its cardinal points begins to turn, the point N moves to the right and the point S to the left of the vertical plane passing through the sun's centre. The uppermost point of the disk is now to be found somewhere on the circumference between the points N and E. The angle through which the disk turns varies with the time and the latitude of the place of observation, and we may say that for the United States generally, some point between A and B will be the uppermost point of the disk at the beginning of the transit If, therefore, we hold the diagram in such a way that a point midway between A and B shall be uppermost, we shall know pretty accurately at what part of the sun to expect the planet to appear. While the uppermost point of the sun is variable, the cardinal points, on the contrary, are fixed points of the disk, and are the same for all observers in the world. We can find them at any time if we draw a plane through our eye, the pole star and the centre of the sun's disk. This plane will always cut the sun along the line N S.

The double line marked "Apparent Path of Mercury," represents the track of the planet across the disk of the sun. The figures 6, 7, 8, etc., give the position of the planet at 6, 7, 8, etc., o'clock P.M., central time, and the intermediate marks subdivide its course into 10 minute spaces. We see, therefore, that the transit will begin at about 6 o'clock and end at about 10 minutes of 11. The small black dots between the lines are the relative size of Mercury compared with the sun. For the United States, the centre of the planet runs along the southern (or lower) line, and for Australia along the northern line, whilst it would appear to run midway between the two lines for an observer at the centre of the earth.

Where the line marked INGRESS cuts the circumference, the planet must be looked for when it enters upon the sun. This line makes an angle of 116 degrees with the line N C. There are two contacts of Mercury and the sun at ingress; the first is called the exterior contact and takes place at the moment when the planet's small black disk begins to enter upon the bright disk of the sun, and apparently to cut a notch into the brilliant circle. This occurs at 5 hours, 55 minutes, 29.3 seconds P.M., central time, to an observer stationed at the earth's centre. We shall see later that this time is somewhat accelerated or retarded for places on the surface of the earth. The second or interior contact takes place

when the planet has fully entered upon the sun. This happens at 6 hours, 0 minutes, 25.0 seconds, central time.

Similar contacts occur at the egress, but in inverse order, the interior contact at 10 hours, 47 minutes, 2.3 seconds, and the exterior contact, when all is over, at 10 hours, 52 minutes, 45.7 seconds, central time. We may remark here, once for all, that throughout this article, whenever time is given, central standard time is always meant, unless the exception to this rule be distinctly stated.

The middle of the transit occurs at 8 hours, 23 minutes, 54.5 seconds. At this moment the planet is at D, where the perpendicular C D cuts its path. It is then at its least distance from the sun's centre. As this time is 23 minutes past 6 o'clock, Pacific time, and as the sun sets only at 7 o'clock, California and the neighboring States will enjoy a view of more than half the transit.

This is the general appearance of the coming transit. In order to understand the causes and other interesting details, let us turn to Fig. 2. Here we have the sun in the middle, and about it are drawn three circles of different sizes. The outer or largest circle represents the orbit which the earth describes about the sun every year. The position of the earth in this orbit is marked for every fifth day, but only every tenth day is numbered. Thus we have March 2, 12, 22, April 1, 11, 21, and so on, with intermediate marks for March 7, 17, 27, April 6, 16, 26, etc. The next circle is the orbit of Venus, with which we are not now concerned. The third and smallest circle, whose centre is not the sun but the point O, is the orbit of Mercury, and gives the position of the planet for every five days from April 1st to June 25th. Everything on this diagram is drawn accurately to scale, except the sun, which has been enlarged about 10 times; its true diameter being about one-one-hundredth of the diameter of the earth's orbit.

According to Kepler's law all planets move in ellipses with the sun in one of their foci. The ellipses of Venus and the earth upon the scale of our diagram cannot be distinguished from circles, and we may call them by the one name or the other. But the case is different with Mercury. Although the curvature of his orbit resembles that of a circle, it is a circle very much out of centre, and even in our diagram the centre of the ellipse O is at a considerable distance from the sun's centre. No planet, in fact, in our solar system has a more eccentric orbit. When Mercury is at the point P, or in perihelion, as that point of the orbit is called which is nearest the sun, it is fifteen million miles nearer to the sun than when farthest away at the point A, or in aphelion, the distances being 28½ and 43½ million miles respectively. On account of this great variation of distance, it receives more than twice as much light and heat at perihelion as at aphelion; and it would be quite

an interesting and complicated problem to investigate the influence this fact has on the seasons of the planet, if what we call the wintry season, were to occur at perihelion. But how a true winter, with ice and snow, is really possible on this planet, is difficult to conceive, because its average supply of light and heat is nearly seven times the earth's allotment. The eccentricity of the orbit also causes the velocity of Mercury to vary from 35 miles a second at perihelion to 23 miles at aphelion, a difference quite sensible on our diagram, if we compare the distance run from April 1st to April 6th, with that run from May 16th to May 21st.

Mercury completes a revolution about the sun in eighty-eight days. This, therefore, is the length of his year—a pretty brief period according to our notions. As seen from the earth, his orbit appears to be a straight line, or a long and narrow ellipse, if indeed these words can adequately express his apparently most erratic wanderings. We know by observation, and an inspection of the diagram illustrates our views, that Mercury and Venus cannot depart from the sun beyond a certain distance, 28 degrees for Mercury and 46 for Venus. When Mercury is at the point C in his orbit, and the earth at the same time at D, so that the line D C points to the sun, the planet is said to be in *inferior conjunction* with the sun. This occurs May 9th. The planet then passes across the sun's face, and we have a *transit.*

If we draw a line from the earth to the sun and another from the earth to Mercury, and imagine the given lines to follow these bodies in their various movements, the angle made by these lines at the earth is called the planet's *elongation* from the sun. When the planet is at the point C, or in conjunction, this angle is zero and the two lines coincide. But as Mercury runs along in his course from C to A and K, and the earth follows more slowly from D to H, the angle between the lines is continually increasing. It is a maximum when Mercury has reached the point K of his orbit and the earth the point H. The planet is then said to be in its *greatest elongation.* This happens on June 5th. The elongation at the time is 24 degrees; it is to the right of the sun, that is, towards the west, and hence the planet rises before the sun, or is *morning star.* The line drawn from the earth to Mercury is then tangent to the planet's orbit, and any further motion on the part of the planet must cause this line to swing to the left and diminish the angle between it and the line drawn to the sun. To an observer on the earth the planet would seem to approach the sun.

As Mercury passes successively through the points K, M, P, R, his elongation is constantly decreasing, until, when he has come to R and the earth to B, the elongation is zero, the two lines coincide, and he is again in conjunction with the sun. But as he is

on the other side of the sun, he is said to be in *superior conjunction.* This is the case on July 6th.

On April 18th Mercury is in his *greatest eastern elongation* of 20 degrees. The planet is then to the left of the sun, and sets after it, and is called *evening star.* For our latitudes this is the best opportunity of the entire year to observe Mercury, because the whole angular distance from the sun is used to best advantage in raising the planet above the horizon. A keen eye will have no difficulty in finding the planet in the summer twilight. Once seen, we are surprised that we have not picked it up before. And this bright object, shining so beautifully against the purple sky, will be transformed in three weeks into a dark black body stealing across the face of the orb of day, only to be retransformed into its former brightness on the sun's western side.

We have said that at inferior conjunction on May 9th, the planet passes between us and the sun, and is visible as a small black spot upon it. Why does not this occur at every inferior conjunction? The reason is that the plane of the planet's orbit does not coincide with that of the earth's. To make this clear, let us suppose that, with a sharp penknife, we cut the paper along Mercury's orbit in all places except at the points M and N. Then, keeping the little disk attached to the page at the points mentioned, turn it round, so that F may be above the page and K below it, until the disk makes an angle of seven degrees with the plane of the page. Now as the planet moves along the edge of its little disk, it must pass through the plane of the page twice, once at N, when going down, and a second time at M, when going up. Hence only at these two points, M and N, can Mercury cross the plane of the earth's orbit and be in the same straight line that joins the earth and sun. Of course, when the planet is at or near M or N, the earth, at the same time, must be at or near L or Q respectively; that is, only about November 8th and May 7th, is a transit of Mercury possible.

There are, therefore, two classes, the May and the November transits. Of these, the May transits offer advantages not to be found in the others. First, the May transit takes place when the planet is approaching aphelion; that is, when it is farthest from the sun and nearest to the earth. The planet, therefore, appears larger —one-fifth larger than in November—and its details are more easily seen. Secondly, the planet is moving more slowly in its orbit, so much so as to prolong the May transit one and one-half times the length of the November transit. This, of course, admits of more extended observation. Thirdly, the May transit occurs in spring, when the sun is higher in the heavens for the northern hemisphere and when the day is four hours longer than in November, thus increasing the chances of our seeing the passage.

On the other hand, the May transits are about half as numerous as the November transits. There are only four of them during the present century: in 1832, 1845, 1878, 1891, while there are nine in November: 1802, 1815, 1822, 1835, 1848, 1861, 1868, 1881, 1894. Of these 13 transits of Mercury visible to the earth generally, only a fraction can really be observed at any one place or country. Some may take place when the sun is below our horizon, others may be only partially visible, whilst others may be interfered with by the weather. Thus, for example, the transit of 1881 was not at all visible in the United States. The next one, 1894, will be completely observable in this country, but, as it is a November transit, the weather is apt to be unfavorable. As regards the transit just before us, May 9, 1891, only the contacts at ingress will be visible to the Eastern States, whilst the more western States will see half the transit. However, as the most important observations consist precisely in noting the time and scanning the planet's disk at the very moments of the exterior and interior contacts, all the observatories of the United States will be enabled to secure at least this, the most useful and important part of the transit. Additional interest will be excited by the fact that the next May transit does not take place until May 7, 1924.

The small circles between diagrams I. and II. give the apparent size of Mercury at the dates affixed. The scale is exactly ten times as large as that on which Fig. 1 is drawn. The different magnitudes of these small circles are owing to Mercury's variable distance from the earth. Its true diameter is about 3000 miles. As the planet borrows all its light from the sun, it appears as a new moon, that is, a black disk at inferior conjunction; as a full moon at superior conjunction; as a moon in the quarters at the times of greatest elongation, and crescent or gibbous in intermediate positions. But as the planet is always so near the sun, it can never be seen by the naked eye except on or near the days of maximum elongation, and when the sun is some distance below the horizon. On account of this difficulty of seeing the planet, the great astronomer, Copernicus, who has given his name to our solar system, is reported never to have seen it. A telescope, however, will pick it up readily if we know where to look. On May 9th, a telescope of moderate size will have little difficulty in detecting the planet in transit. Telescopes are now so abundant in this go-ahead country of ours, that the privilege of using one in such an interesting astronomical event as the present transit of Mercury, is within easy reach of all our readers. There need be no fear of mistaking a sun-spot for the planet, because the planet presents a circular and well-defined black disk, whilst the spots are irregular in shape, and their edges are not distinct; and secondly, there are no spots on or near

FIG. III.



INGRESS.

FIG. IV



EGRESS

the planet's path. Of course, a piece of smoked glass must be used outside the eye-piece, except when the sun is near the horizon.

Figs. 3 and 4 represent the earth as seen from the sun at the times of external contact at ingress and at egress. The straight lines pass over all those lands and seas for which the ingress or egress occurs at the same moment. On Fig. 3, the line marked 5 hours, 55 minutes, 29.30 seconds, runs through the centre of the earth's disk, and all observers on that line, from the northern portion of British America down through the Pacific Ocean to near the southeast corner of Australia and through Tasmania, will see Mercury enter upon the sun at the same instant at which an astronomer at the centre of the earth would see it if observations

Fig. 5.



were possible from that spot. Below and to the right of this line the transit will begin sooner, and later on the other side, the exact times being marked on the lines, which are one minute apart. The same explanation pertains to the earth at egress. On both figures the sun is directly over head at the centre, C, and in the horizon for all places along the circumference of the disk. We can therefore see, by examining the two figures, which places on earth have the best view of the transit, which will see the whole of it, or only the beginning or only the end. Those lands and seas which appear on both figures will see the whole transit, *e.g.*, Australia, China, Japan, Siberia, Alaska, and half the Islands of the Pacific Ocean. Those which appear only on Fig. 3 will observe only the ingress, *e.g.*, the United States, Mexico and North America generally. Those which appear only on Fig. 4 will see only the egress, *e.g.*,

India, Persia, Arabia, Egypt, the eastern half of Africa, and the whole of Europe, except Spain and the west coast of Ireland. Whilst in the United States the cities of New York and Washington will be sponsors for the safe entrance of Mercury upon the sun a few moments before sunset on the evening of May 9th, in Europe London and Rome will see the planet off the sun a few moments after sunrise on the morning of May 10th.

In order to render every assistance to those of our readers who wish to observe the transit, we give also a map of the United States, from which the exact times of the external contact at ingress, and the height of the sun in the heavens, can easily be measured or estimated for every city and town in the country. The curved lines running east and west give the nearest ten seconds of central time. For those using eastern time, the transit will begin exactly one hour later, and exactly one hour and two hours sooner for those using Mountain and Pacific time respectively. The lines running north and south give the height of the sun above the horizon for every ten degrees. On the easternmost line, marked 0°, the transit begins at sunset, and east of this line after sunset, that is, the transit will not be visible at all.

We see from this map and from Fig. III., that the Lick Observatory, in California, the best equipped and best manned astronomical observatory in the world, has also very fortunately secured the best possible position in the United States for observing the coming transit. The ingress begins at 3 hours, 54 minutes, 17.99 seconds, Pacific time, which corresponds to 3 hours, 47 minutes, 43.90 seconds, Mount Hamilton time. As the sun sets at 6 hours, 55 minutes, Mercury will have to bear for the first time since its erection, the searching eye of the great telescope for 3 hours and 8 minutes. The wonderful discoveries already made by this giant instrument, lead us to hope for most promising results on this favorable occasion. Old data concerning the planet may be definitively settled, or called in question, or proved untenable; at all events, the dicta of the great telescope will be respected, and what it cannot see need not be looked for through smaller and less favorably situated instruments.

Let us hope that this and all the great observatories of the land from which the transit is visible, will be blessed with a clear sky, so that all things may conspire to make the transit of Mercury, May 9th, 1891, memorable in the annals of astronomy.

"PROFESSING THEMSELVES TO BE WISE THEY BECOME FOOLS."

THAT "extremes meet" is a proverb none the less true because it is old, and it is a proverb which has received a very startling illustration in the development of what is sometimes (in unjust depreciation no less than in boastful arrogance) called "modern thought."

The mediæval philosophy which had developed and carried on with fruitful analysis the culminating intelligence of Greece, was overborne and went out of fashion partly by the faults of its cultivators and disciples.

We are not likely, we think, to be accused of want of sympathy for the scholastic philosophy, to which we came as to a well of sweet-water in an oasis, after wandering through an arid desert of unsatisfying speculation under the guidance of the followers of Hume. Nevertheless, devoted as we have become to the teaching of St. Thomas and his immediate predecessors and successors, we think it certain that the later scholastics dealt too much in verbal subtleties, whilst, at the same time, they too much neglected to examine and interrogate the teachings of nature through the senses. Had they paid more attention to the sagacious warnings of that wonderful Friar, Roger Bacon, and to the example of their great model, Aristotle, modern science might have attained its triumphs through men who had never let go the priceless treasures of philosophical truth. The opportunity was unhappily let slip, and when that great change of taste (in art, as well as in learning) known as the "Renaissance" took place, men welcomed with avidity a new departure in philosophy by a scorner of the old ways—one who had never even studied, and therefore could not understand, the Aristotelian philosophy he despised—we mean Descartes.

Still, however philosophically mistaken and misleading that eminent French mathematician became, he was none the less a most sincere and devoted Christian.

After he had passed away, we all know how a whole school of Christian Cartesian thinkers arose in France and spread its baseless system of philosophy, and therefore necessarily inefficient apologetics for religion, far and wide beyond the limits of that country.

An analogous, and from its results, even more fatal development, took place in England through and after Locke. As Saints

Peter and Paul were the two great pillars of the foundation of the Church of Christ, so Descartes and Locke may be regarded as the two great pillars of the foundation of the modern philosophical system of anti-Christ. Nevertheless, Locke was a Christian, and many of his disciples were enthusiastic and admirable ones—as most notably, Bishop Berkeley. Their systems were erroneous and fatal, but as long as any man remained a Christian, or even a Theist, he neither drew nor sought to draw forth from Cartesianism or the sensism of Locke, the most fatal errors extant in both of these systems.

Even Voltaire (who was intellectually a child of the English philosopher) never developed the errors to which we intend in this article to refer. Indeed, however great may have been the moral enormities of that man, his intellect was too keen and logical to permit of his formulating doctrines so evidently self-stultifying as those we are about to call attention to.

Before, however, proceeding to further advert to them, there are two considerations which in this connection deserve notice: (1) The first of these is the pleasure the intellectual man derives from intellectual activity, and its relation to that love of superiority to which most men are prone. (2) The second consideration is the necessary effects of religious doctrines on minds to which they are, for one or more reasons, unwelcome doctrines.

There is no branch of knowledge that does not give pleasure to any one who will pursue it with enough energy and perseverance to overcome the difficulty or tedium which may attend the earlier stages of its prosecution. We have several times experienced how persons who have more or less unwillingly taken up some branch of learning which they felt to be uncongenial to them, none the less grew to love it and pursue it with energy for its own sake. This is eminently the case with every department of physical science, though the fact is less evident as regards psychical science, the study of the mind and philosophy. It is, nevertheless, to the science of the mind and philosophy, that our own experience (just mentioned) specially refers. But if each branch of science thus rewards its faithful votaries, it is also proverbially true that every man feels the keenest pleasure in doing that which he is specially qualified to do, and does, exceptionally well. This applies not only to the mathematician, the naturalist and the poet, but no less, or even more, to the student of mind and the investigator of the most subtle problems of metaphysics; and for the following reason; Our faculties are naturally formed for external observation. The child, or the quite uncultured man, looks hardly at all in upon himself. Our spontaneous activity is always at first directed externally, and it needs a peculiar, and to begin

with, a very arduous effort, to observe what takes place within us, to examine our own process of examination, to perceive our own perception, to reason about our own ratiocination and to think about our own thought.

But to excel in anything exceptionally difficult, must afford a special gratification to that love of superiority which most men possess, and therefore a pre-eminent gratification to those men who love superiority most keenly. This form of intellectual superiority must, then, naturally be exceptionally tempting to men who are exceptionally proud.

And what can be more gratifying to a very intellectual man, exceptionally proud, than to be able to apprehend, or to have it believed that he apprehends, a whole universe of existences to which the common herd are blind, while at the same time he perceives that those things which the vulgar regard as most certain and obvious, are but so many delusions which his superior vision enables him to recognize as such and rise superior to?

When these considerations are borne in mind by us, we need not wonder at the long succession of those rare and elaborate aërial palaces of cloudland, which have been built up by the busy brains of rival metaphysicians from Descartes, through Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Hegel and Schelling, to Schopenhauer and Hartmann. Most modern philosophers, in England no less than elsewhere, desire to build their whole structure, from its foundation-stone to its highest pinnacle, themselves; a contrast, indeed, to the persevering and synthetic labors of the patient, no less than acute, intellects of the Middle Ages, a fact we before called attention to.[1] In seeking fame as novel thinkers, these modern speculators are necessarily exposed to the temptation of sacrificing consistency to originality. In the struggle thus carried on for pre-eminent fame, nothing is too bizarre, no logical inconsistency too glaring, no paradox too extreme. Thus it is that very able, highly-gifted men, in seeking to rise in the opinion of a dazzled, non-critical audience to empyrean heights, fall into depths of absurdity which are unfathomable. Wishing to appear pre-eminently wise they become unspeakably foolish. But if the attraction of pursuing a specially difficult branch of knowledge, when combined with the desire for intellectual distinction, may alone lead to such exaggerations, the second consideration we propose to notice will show us how easily this tendency to exaggeration may become *extremely* intensified.

The doctrine that an omniscient, omnipotent and all-holy God will judge every man by a moral law, the first commandment of

[1] American Catholic Quarterly Review, July, 1881, p. 386.

which is this (most rational one), that we are, above all things, bound to adore and to serve Him, must have very different effects upon very different minds.

Inexpressible in its consolation for the good, fearful in its menace for the actively vicious, it has another effect on minds which we have no reason for classing in either one or the other of these two categories. There are not a few men, justly esteemed for many excellent qualities, to whom the above doctrine is most unwelcome. Good citizens, loving parents and brothers, true and faithful friends and fair, unmalicious opponents, they may, nevertheless, regard with extreme repugnance the command to worship and explicitly serve a supreme, invisible power, and to submit their deliberate thoughts, no less than their words and actions, to the judgment of a being who holds absolute sway over both their inmost conscience and their immortal destiny.

Now, although the will has no *direct* control over our beliefs, no one who understands what human nature is can dispute the fact that the *indirect* influence it exercises on credence is very considerable. The existence of God is not actually made manifest to us as is that of our fellow-creatures round about us. The man who claims to be our human father we can know face to face, but our Father in heaven in mercy shrouds Himself from even our most eager gaze, reserving the direct knowledge of Him, now impossible to us, as a future reward above, for our faithful service here below.

Our knowledge of God is due to inference, not to intuition, and hence our will has occasionally, by neglecting to duly consider premisses, a very decided influence on the conclusion which constitutes that knowledge. No wonder, then, if some men, who view the doctrine of God's existence and claims, the claims of a God "inquisitive and exacting," with extreme repugnance, can succeed in persuading themselves that no such claim can be established; that they do not and cannot know Him—that they are Agnostics —or even (with the late unhappy Professor Clifford), that they do know he does not in fact exist.

But when such men succeed in persuading themselves, they soon (if gifted with the art of facile expression) seek to persuade others also. Moreover, as to plain men, the evidence of God's existence appears unquestionable, a triple temptation arises; a temptation to do away with a hateful doctrine, to revel in an intellectual pleasure and at the very same time, to make their mental superiority over other men dazzlingly apparent.

And ever since the English-speaking races, in the person of Queen Elizabeth, fell away finally from the Holy See, increasing facilities for this perverse intellectual activity have been continually supplied. As long as the old and rational philosophy held general

sway, such speculative vagaries as those we in our days witness were utterly impossible. But after Descartes and Locke had, unintentionally, sapped the basis of all certainty (and therefore of certainty as to the existence of God), the way was opened for all that we now see and for anything that may yet remain in the way of negation, if anything worse than Nihilism and Pessimism should prove to be a possibility.

But an unfailing intellectual Nemesis awaits the teaching of all those who have taken up an anti-theistic position. Granted that conclusions they arrive at follow logically from the mistaken premisses with which (thanks *ultimately* to Descartes and Locke) they have been enabled to set out, it is impossible for them to maintain their own position against the very same kind of assaults. Self-stultification is for them inevitable. Their arguments may be compared to a super-excellent kind of metaphysical boomerang. Each such argument flies forward with great force, executes a series of graceful curves which charm the eyes of spectators and elicit shouts of admiration at the skill thus displayed; but at last it inevitably and fatally returns, and striking the feet from under him who launched it, prostrates him by the very force which his own act initiated. Such arguments, like uncharitable wishes, "come home to roost."

The doctrines of natural religion repose on a series of sound principles and evident truths, which, one after the other, must be denied by its opponent. Thus religion reposes largely on the principle of causation, the principle which declares a cause to be required for every new existence and for everything which has not a sufficient cause for its own being within itself.

This principle, as a self-evident necessary truth, further depends upon the fact that the human mind does possess the power of knowing such truths, and supreme amongst these necessary truths is the truth that there is such a thing as good and evil, and that we know we are bound to do good and avoid evil. But if we can know universal and necessary truths at all, we must be able to know what is external to our own minds; we must be able to know objective truth.

This knowledge of ours further depends, again, upon our power of memory; for if we cannot know anything beyond a present feeling, we cannot know what is external to that feeling; that is, we cannot know real facts concerning the world about us.

But if we know anything about our memory and its relation to the past, we must be able to know our own being as enduring, persistent and substantial; we must be able to perceive and know that we really exist; we must be absolutely aware of our own being and of our knowledge thereof. To the ordinary reader,

quite unfamiliar with modern philosophy, these simple postulates of our knowledge of God's existence would seem so plain and evident that no man in his senses could deny them.

And yet men, hostile to religion, do deny that we have any knowledge of the first of these postulates, "causation." They say, "We have often enough seen one thing succeed another, but we have never once perceived any inflow of influence of one thing into another; and yet real 'causation' implies action of that kind. Therefore there is really nothing but sequence, and the idea of the inflow of any influence is a mere mistake derived from our foolishly transferring in imagination to external things that 'feeling of effort' which we experience in our own actions, such mistake being then perpetuated by custom." This objection admits, of course, of a ready answer: It is quite true that we never see or feel physical causation itself, for the very good reason that it is invisible and intangible. But, although our *senses* cannot perceive it, our *intellect* may and does; and there is one instance at least wherein we very plainly perceive the inflow and action of causation, namely, in the inflow of the influence of motives on our own will. We have also an experience of the force of causation when anything resists our will.[1]

But the same objectors also endeavor to make short work of the all-important principle of causation thus: "that principle," they say, "you represent as a universal and necessary truth, but the human mind can know no universal and necessary truths, for all our knowledge is relative. We cannot even (as John Stuart Mill witnesses) be sure that two and two will everywhere and always make four!"

Now here we have an assertion well calculated to strike some persons with wonder and admiration. "How acute," they may exclaim, "must be the intellects of those who thus see through a fallacy which holds most men fast bound within its fetters. Because we cannot imagine things to be different from what we have universally found them, we rashly jump to the conclusion that everywhere and always they must continue to be what we have universally found them. But what right can we possibly have—insects who live for a few seconds in an obscure corner of the universe—to affirm what can or cannot be in regions and at epochs, not only beyond our knowledge, but beyond our powers of imagination? We only know what is relative to ourselves and not necessary universal truths. Therefore, the principle of causation must be a dream, and the assertion that God exists an unwarrantable assumption."

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[1] See further, *On Truth*, pp. 49–52.

In the first place, however, we would ask our readers to remark that philosophy does not appeal to an inability of the imagination; and secondly, we would call attention to two facts, which are enough to explain why some persons feel staggered on first hearing it said that they do know truths which infallibly apply to the most distant regions of space, and to times anterior to the existence of the world.

In the first place, then, philosophy does not appeal to a negative fact, to a mere impotence of imagination, but to a very positive perception. When we say, that we cannot at the same time have two eyes and only one eye, we do not mean that we cannot form a mental picture of a man with both two eyes and only one eye; we mean that we have a clear, positive perception of the impossibility of such a thing. If we are asked, "what is the disposition of the surface of the invisible side of the moon?" our imagination may suggest various possible conditions of that surface, but our intellect will see clearly that we do not know what it is. If we try to imagine the truth with respect to it, our mind becomes a blank; but we perceive very well that, were certain eventualities to arise we could and should know. If we are asked whether the total number of the heavenly bodies is odd or even, while we see clearly that we have no means of knowing, we see, even more clearly, that it must either be one or the other. In perceiving a universal and necessary truth, such as, that "no event can arise without some cause," we do not experience a mental impotence, but a positive perception. A mere inability to conceive of anything is a very different matter from a positive perception that anything cannot be because it is positively impossible.[1]

In the second place, the two reasons which indispose some persons to believe that they can know any such thing as a universal, necessary truth, are the two following facts of mental association: (1) As a rule, things which are very distant, or happened a long time ago, are known to us only in round-about ways, and we feel more or less uncertainty about them, and thus we have come to associate a feeling of uncertainty with statements about what is remote. But, nothing can be more "remote" than "the most distant regions of space," and "times anterior to the existence of the world." It is no wonder, then, if this feeling of uncertainty is called forth by any statement of a "universal" truth. (2) The other fact of mental association is the association which men are apt to form between every statement believed without proof, and believing blindly. This association has been formed because most of our knowledge is gained indirectly or by inference. We

[1] As to this, see further, *On Truth*, chapter x., "Imagination and Conception."

commonly ask for some proof with regard to any new and remarkable statement, and no truths are brought more strikingly home to our minds than those demonstrated by Euclid. Thus it is, that many men have acquired a feeling that to believe anything which cannot be proved is to believe blindly. Hence arises a certain feeling of distrust at our assertions concerning absolute and universal truths. Men forget that everything cannot be proved, and that every process of proof must stop somewhere; and they also forget, that if we do not act blindly in believing a statement on the evidence of something else, they must act yet less blindly in believing that which is directly evident in and by itself.

If we cannot be certain as to any necessary and universal truths, we cannot be certain as to the "principle of contradiction!" Let us, then, glance at the wisdom of those persons who, while enunciating their own systems of philosophy, deny our certainty as to necessary and universal truths, amongst which the "principle of contradiction" must be included.

That principle affirms that, "nothing can at one and the same time both be and not be."

If we deny or doubt this principle, we are thereby plunged into a scepticism which prevents us from being able to logically affirm anything. In that case, if we know that anything has been proved *true*, that knowledge will not suffice to convince us that it was not at the very same time proved *false*. All reasoning, and every possible observation, is thus rendered untrustworthy, and science is made logically impossible. If we look into our own minds, we shall see that what the mind declares is, that this truth is a valid truth for everything outside the mind, no less than for our own thoughts. It is thus a fundamental truth, such that even a supreme and omnipotent being could not—however different the existence of such a being may be from our own—both be, and be non-existent.

It is certainly very wonderful that we should be able to know necessary and universal truths; but, after all, it is not so exceptionally wonderful as, at first sight, it may appear to be. It is most wonderful how we are able to have any knowledge at all, yet no one doubts that we can and do know "phenomena." Phenomena are, of course, matters of experience; but necessary truths are matters of experience likewise. If we know we have been to San Francisco, we are at least as certain that we cannot both "have been there" and "not have been there," as we can be of the fact of our past visit to that city. We have a direct intuition that we see and hear, and know a man who stands before our eyes, and, speaks to us, and we have also a direct intuition that a thing cannot simultaneously both be and not be; but the latter intuition

is both the more certain and the more important. If we doubt whether we are not the victims of a delusion of the senses as to the presence of the speaking man, the whole fabric of our intellect is not thereby impaired; but, if we doubt whether there is a man who, at the same instant, is both truly speaking and really silent, the very basis of our reason is thereby overthrown.

The same result also follows from various assertions of the men, now known as "Agnostics," amongst others, their assertion that that "all our knowledge is relative."

This system of the "relativity of knowledge" evidently refutes itself. If its assertions mean anything, they must mean that it is an absolute fact that we cannot know absolute truths. But if we cannot know any absolute truth, we cannot know it to be certain that all our knowledge must be merely relative. A man, therefore, who affirms the relativity of all our knowledge, affirms what the system he adopts forbids him to affirm. But a man who does this, and who thus declares that he believes what he at the same time declares to be unbelievable, can hardly complain if he is called "foolish." No system can be true and no reasoning valid which necessarily culminates in an absurdity. To uphold any such system cannot be the mark of an exceptionally intellectual mind, but of an exceptionally foolish one.

But if we can be certain about the principle of contradiction, if we can be certain that nothing can at the same time both be and not be, why cannot we also be certain of the principle of causation and of all those other truths which our minds tell us must be true everywhere and always, such as that two and two make four, and that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another?

The remarkable way in which men, in other respects, very admirable and distinguished, make fools of themselves when they attack what is the basis of Theism, is well shown by the following example: Helmholtz and Clifford have affirmed that for creatures devoid of thickness, and living on a sphere, a straight line would not be the shortest line, while two parallel lines prolonged would enclose a space. Now putting aside the answer that the supposition is absurd because no material being could exist without thickness, any more than a square without angles, it is obvious that such creatures if they could conceive of such things as "straight" and "parallel" lines at all, would also perceive those necessary truths concerning them which we ourselves perceive. But the very men who make the supposition actually demonstrate to us that they see clearly that very objective necessity, the non-necessity of which they attempt by this illustration to make evident. If they did not see this, how could they affirm what would be the neces-

sary results of such imaginary conditions? These men have hurled one such metaphysical boomerang (as we before spoke of) very effectually; just as the asserters of the relativity of our knowledge have launched another.

Pre-eminent amongst the necessary truths perceived by us are (as we before said) those of ethics, but as they specially relate to action as distinguished from thought, we will for the present pass them by.

The modern "spirits who deny," and who have denied our power of perceiving any necessary truths, as a means of destroying the validity of the law of causation, and therefore of God's existence, are logically compelled to go further still and deny our power of knowing objective truths at all. The whole crew of Agnostics concur in this negation, Spencer saying that we have not even a knowledge of "difference," save as a modification of our own consciousness.

But if we have no knowledge of objectivity, we have no such thing as memory, for whatever is not a present feeling or state of consciousness is "objective." Yet there is, we are sure, not one of our readers who is not absolutely certain that he has an absolutely certain knowledge of something in the past—if only that he was doing something else before he began to read the present article.

Yet the power which memory possesses of lifting us, as it were, out of our present selves and showing us facts which otherwise we could never know, is certainly a most wonderful power, and the plain fact that if we admit the validity of this faculty we can no longer dispute our power of knowing objective truth, is a very bitter one for Agnostics. It is not surprising, therefore, that the original Agnostic and inventor of the name was driven to the absurdity of declaring that we may trust our memory, "because we learn its trustworthiness by experience." But how could we ever acquire experience if we did not begin by trusting our memory? Particular acts of memory may of course be confirmed by experience, if the faculty of memory be already confided in; but in every such instance it must be confided in. The teaching cited comes in fact to this, as the late Dr. Ward pointed out: We are to place confidence in our present act of memory because in past instances its truth has been experimentally confirmed, and we can only know that it has been so confirmed by trusting our present act of memory! Surely never was there a more impressive instance of what St. Paul spoke of as a consequence of men "Professing themselves to be wise."

Every one, therefore, who would affirm that we cannot rationally infer the existence of God is driven not only to deny the prin-

ciples of causation and of contradiction, together with our power of knowing any objective truth, but is forced also to discredit our faculty of memory. But pitiless logic drives the unhappy Agnostic to further extreme negation. If we cannot trust the assurance of our faculty of memory, it follows that we cannot be sure of our own substantial, continued existence; but who can doubt that certainty? The modern Agnostic, thus driven into a corner, and there standing at bay, gladly avails himself of the work of his acute and playful[1] predecessor, Hume, and not only denies that he is certain of it, but affirms that no man can have supreme and certain knowledge of his own existence.

This absurd assertion they attempt to justify by affirming that what we know primarily and ultimately are mere "states of consciousness," and not the being (ourself) who has those states. The existence of that being, they say, is an inference, and may be a mistaken one. Now we ask our readers to reflect what their own experience has been at mere moments of their lives except when they are explicitly directing their attention to their feelings? We are sure they will say that they have been always aware of doing something, or of having something done to them. They have not habitually thought "I have such and such a feeling," or that "I am now continuously existing." Such thoughts as these are only to be obtained by turning back the mind on itself and reflecting.

When so reflecting, we may either explicitly recognize our "feelings" or our "existence," but neither one nor the other are at first explicitly recognized, though both are implicitly present and perceived in that primary direct consciousness which attends us during our normal, waking lives.

To explicitly recognize a "feeling" is just as secondary, indirect and reflex an act as is the recognition of our "existence," and we believe that a greater effort is needed for the former than for the latter mental act; for we often advert to acts or sufferings as being *our own*, but it is much more exceptional for us to remark that any feelings we may have are *existing feelings*. Therefore, one of the greatest errors of our day is the error of supposing that we can know the existence of our states of consciousness more certainly, directly and infallibly, than we can know the existence of the "self" which has these states of consciousness.[2]

We say "one of the greatest errors," because there is a yet

[1] We say playful because we are now convinced that Hume did not believe his own negations. They served his turn very well, but he was too acute to be himself the dupe of them.

[2] See, further, *On Truth*, chapter ii.

further absurdity to which the despairing Agnostic has been driven in his fruitless efforts to escape the logical necessity of affirming God's existence. We may imagine him exclaiming: "Rather than that, let us cast away all our knowledge of necessary truths, all our knowledge of objectivity, our memory, nay, even our very selves; surely that will suffice?" No, replies the pitiless demon of negation, one more sacrifice of reason and consistency is necessary. You have denied the existence of the individual who thinks, you must now deny the real existence of thought itself. Not only must you boldly affirm the certainty of uncertainty, and proclaim that you know as a necessary truth, that no necessary truth can be known; not only must you declare that by the aid of the certainty of your memory, you know that memory has no certainty, and that the thought you know you have, convinces you you do not know you have it; but you must, after basing your whole system of negation on the thought in your mind, proclaim as the ultimate truth that every thought is necessarily a delusion because it has no being of its own, and is but the blind, ultimate outcome of the aimless tremors of mere physical force.

Such folly seems almost incredible, yet at a recent meeting of a metaphysical society in London "thought" was expressly declared to be "a misleading term, the use of which should be carefully avoided." But, in the name of reason, what ultimate court of appeal have we, or can we have,—some supernatural illumination apart,—save our perceptions in conscious thought? Thoughts may be, and should be, carefully examined and criticized, but our judgments about them must be due to and expressed by the aid of our thoughts.

To doubt the ultimate declarations of intellect is nothing but an act of self-stultification, and such extreme folly is part of that system of the deification of unreason, which has become an established religion, and which it is our duty to attact, if possible, to overthrow.

There is yet another folly which has also become a fashion of the day. It is the folly of thinking, not only that "thought" is "not thought," but also of denying that "not thought" is fundamentally distinct from "thought." We are absolutely certain we possess three intuitions (amongst many others), namely: (1) An intuition of intelligence; and (2) an intuition of something extended; and (3) an intuition of the absolute divergence and distinction which exists between these two modes of being. We can perceive in our own very selves, both that which thinks and gives no sign of extension, and that which does not think, but which is extended, and we can see there is a fundamental difference between the two. Fitly is the denial of "thought" an accompaniment of

the denial of that which we know as the material world whereof we form a part. A new strictly denominational periodical for the propagation of this form of unreason has recently been started in the United States under the name, "The Monist." The title needs another vowel, for the appellation "Moonist" would be the most fitting one for an organ of a faith fit only for lunatics.

The intellectual world is rapidly dividing itself into two camps; one, upholding reason and virtue, affirms the validity of thought as an ultimate test of truth; the certainty of the continuous, substantial existence of each one of us; the trustworthiness of our faculty of memory; the fact of our knowledge of objectivity; the certainty of the universal and necessary truths we perceive—amongst them that of causation with its consequence and perception of the truth of God's existence. The men of the other camp, denying all certainty as to the last-named supreme truth, are forced in consequence to stultify themselves by denying the certainty of their own system, in denying all absolute or objective knowledge and the validity of memory, of their perception of their own existence, and even and ultimately the validity of thought itself.

Surely since the world was made there was never a more complete example of that statement in the epistle to the Romans which heads this article!

But it would be a happy thing if we could accuse modern Agnostics of nothing but their portentous folly.

We have distinguished the camp of those who uphold the validity and dignity of human reason as a camp which also upholds the cause of virtue. To that cause all Agnostics are compelled, however unwillingly, to range themselves as systematic opponents —a fact we shall very shortly see.

Knowledge is valuable for its own sake, and the mind feels a natural and legitimate satisfaction in its acquisition, as well as pleasure in its pursuit. But our nature is essentially an active nature, and our actions are guided by our knowledge as well as by our feelings. The more complete our knowledge, also, the better are we able to attain the ends we seek. Knowledge, therefore, is to be sought after both for its own sake and as a guide to action. Indeed, it is to be sought rather for the latter reason than for the former. It is not in accurate knowledge but in worthy action that our true dignity and worth consist. The end and object of knowledge should in part or mainly be the guidance of human action to good results.

We may, then, after the foregoing observations, now proceed to consider further the bearing of the Agnostic system upon action. This may enable us to estimate the world's debt to the teachers

of that system. "Fools" are to be pitied if their folly is not the outcome and result of a bad will and a voluntary turning of the eyes away from light. If, however, such a voluntary apostacy has resulted in folly, foolishness of such a kind merits not sympathy but very plain-spoken admonition. It may be that "folly" is the very least of the evils attendant upon a wilful "walking in darkness."

But we are very anxious that we should not be misunderstood as to the estimate we shall here endeavor to make. There are, of course, in the world a multitude of Gallios who put serious questions on one side, content to go through life's daily round, taking what pleasure they can on the road and as much of it as they can get. But besides such Gallios, there are a number of really estimable men who, from want of time and opportunity, or from some defect of mere intellect in no way blameable, have become hopelessly puzzled. Mentally at sea, amidst the tumult of conflicting voices, and not knowing where to find a secure harbor of refuge, they have become wrecked, and drift, without sail or rudder, amidst the surging currents of conflicting opinions. For such men we have the sincerest sympathy.

It is plain that there are Agnostics and Agnostics—those who lead and those who are hopelessly led; and though in the abstract we are all responsible for our opinions, experience has abundantly convinced us that very well-meaning persons in this busy, work-a-day world have been helplessly led astray by the seductive arts of eloquent sophists. Fourteen years ago we did not hesitate to express ourselves as follows in an esteemed Catholic periodical:[1]

"I have had personal experience of, and bear willing testimony to, the self-denying philanthropy and purity of life of men whom I cannot claim as brother theists, but whom for these reasons I cannot but look up with sincere admiration."

Having made these reservations as to the rank and file of the Agnostic body, we may confine our attention to those who have voluntarily taken upon themselves the responsibilities of its advocacy and of proselytism.

The conditions of the English-speaking races of mankind are very exceptional. They have arrived at a degree of self-government, accompanied by a combination of order and freedom, which has hitherto been unknown elsewhere. The tendency to self-government is, up to the present time, a constantly increasing one in the direction of democracy. But the close connection that exists between knowledge and action, no honest man who looks into his own heart can question. In our own race, then, it must

[1] In the *Dublin Review* for October, 1876.

evidently be a matter of the most extreme importance that opinion should not be misled in matters which touch so nearly the innermost springs of morality and social life. It is supremely important that there should be no doubt as to the existence and claims of morality, and the validity of those declarations of reason upon which our moral perceptions depend. It is plainly, therefore, no less important that doubt should not be recklessly cast upon the general conviction which exists that, in spite of much we see around us, happiness cannot be finally divorced from right action. It is also surely most important that elevated ideals should be set before the minds of our citizens, and that amidst the clamorous calls of our lower nature—"the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye and the pride of life," no strength should be withdrawn from convictions which every one must admit cannot be proved false, and which aid men not to shrink from acts of abnegation and self-sacrifice which must remain unknown to, and therefore, unappreciated by, the world. Surely no lover of his country, no clear-sighted and well-meaning citizen of the United States can deny the truth and importance of what we here affirm.

We are far, indeed from denying the independence of morality. We have stated our convictions[1] that it does not ultimately depend upon God's will, or on our recognition of His existence. Nevertheless, as a climbing plant, though rooted in the soil, cannot attain to its perfection save by extraneous aid, so, we are convinced our moral aspirations need for their full fruition, theistic conceptions, even if they did not therein originate. Most strongly, indeed, do we repudiate the idea that any belief not really entertained should be simulated or fostered merely for social ends. An Atheist might without inconsistency take up such an attitude, because he has and can have no guarantee that truth must always be desirable. To every Theist, however, such a position must be utterly abhorrent. The God of such a Theist would be a devil, served by a lie; *a fortiori* must be it utterly abhorrent to every Catholic, for to us Divine teaching is the pillar and ground of the *truth*.

But because falsehood should never be supported, it does not follow that men are bound to wage war with every belief of which they do not see the truth, while they admit that it may be true, though they do not see that it is so. Yet Agnostics affirm that we have no right to act upon convictions which have been for ages the support and consolation of the noblest and most virtuous minds the world has ever known, although they admit they cannot disprove their truth. If they could demonstrate that such convictions are mistaken, they would be in a position to defend

[1] See *On Truth*, pp. 247–248.

themselves. But there is not one of them who dares affirm that his intellect is so superior to, or his knowledge so much greater than, the intellect or the knowledge of all existing Theists, that he has attained to an absolute certainty as to such Theists being in error. The most he can assert is that he doubts, and that he conceives he is right in doubting. We do not question the existence either of such doubt or of such conception; but we emphatically deny that on such miserable grounds he is justified in doing his best to take from the weak and suffering their hope and consolation, from the virtuous and self-denying their noblest ideal, from his fellow-citizens their readiest guide to virtue, and from the state the most weighty sanction of its laws.

We have no desire to refer to individuals. We judge no man; but we desire to stigmatize as adequately as we can, principles and assertions without reference to those who utter them. Now, Agnostics have authoritatively taught that it of right pertains to them to judge as to questions of religion, and they judge theism to be unjustifiable, prayer an absurdity, and a belief in rewards and chastisements hereafter to be a mere superstition. They have taught[1] that physical welfare and temporal happiness are our highest good, that aspirations after things Divine are but the dreams of hallucination, and that there is no such thing as duty; man being only able to follow his inclinations, and virtue and pleasure being synonymous. Such is the explicit and inevitable teaching of all those who affirm that there is no difference of kind between the mind of man and the faculties of a mud-fish. Such, therefore, is the inevitable teaching of all those who faithfully follow the teaching of Darwin on this question. Finally, leading Agnostics have asserted that those persons who give instruction in religion are impostors or dupes, and that it is the teachers of physical science who are the supreme exponents of all truth and the ultimate arbiters as to all actions.

What are we to think of such doctrines and such prophets as these? What are the deserts of Agnostics who, merely because they cannot see their way to accept truths which men whom they are bound to respect, nevertheless declare to be simply evident, dare to promulgate doctrines so extremely anti-social? Can we say such men are only "foolish"? Can we ever call men "good" who thus recklessly scatter poisons and fire-brands among their fellows? They are full of verbose professions of humility; but a little real modesty on the part of such Agnostics would be a great gain. Since they deny that absolute truth is attainable by them, they might surely admit the possibility of error on their part and

[1] See *Lessons from Nature*, pp. 385-396.

put themselves, in imagination, hypothetically in the position of their opponents.

Now we, their opponents, assert that in order to attain to religious truths it is sometimes necessary, as an antecedent condition, to be in a certain state of worthiness, although we no less assert that great unworthiness not unfrequently coexists with true religious belief. Now, these, Agnostics might not unreasonably entertain some misgiving as to whether, in order that they should attain to a knowledge of such truths, they were not rather in want of an increase of virtue than an increase of knowledge. But some of them, indeed, seem very strongly impressed with their own virtue, saying in effect: "There are few men so devoted to truth as we are, and so ready to accept persecution rather than to believe a lie." And they say this though they know very well that not persecution but popularity, applause and prosperity will result to them in this world from the position they have taken up. Yet we have no desire to question their good faith generally, or to represent them as ill conducted in the ordinary relations of life. We have, indeed, already proclaimed the contrary. But we have the right to expect much more from persons who stand forward, as they do, to cast discredit on all that which the best men have honored and all which has served so greatly to promote the cause of virtue. But where amongst Agnostics do we find this "much more" in the domain of ethics? Reasonably good men, ordinarily worthy citizens (save as regards their teaching) they may be; but to which of their fellows can they point as an embodiment of ideal agnostic virtue? Where is their St. Francis of Assisi, for love of the poor and suffering? Where is their St. Vincent of Paul, for devotion to helpless infancy? Where is their St. Francis Xavier, for the propagation of what they believe to be truth? Where is their Father Damien, for a life of consecration to the corporeally afflicted? Father Damien is known and honored throughout the civilized world, yet he is only one example out of hundreds of Christian men whose self-consecration to God, and His poor and suffering children, is known to their fellow-creatures and to their Father in Heaven. Such work it is the effort of Agnostics to paralyze and destroy. They may prate of morality and "altruism"; let them show us some examples of it in practice. Till then let them keep silence and cease to do the devil's work by unjustifiable negations, and by throwing doubt upon that knowledge which is the necessary antecedent and accompaniment of all rational well-doing. On the other hand, let those who are puzzled and confused by such sophistries take confidence. Agnosticism is evil to the core and full of diabolical malignity, but its wickedness all but fades from our gaze when

contrasted with its amazing, its unutterable absurdity. But, however pre-eminent in conspicuousness may be the folly of agnosticism, its evil outcome in the world of action is, nevertheless, what is specially deplorable. But in so far as bad-doing is the outcome of the foolish teaching here animadverted upon, the benefit to be derived from those who initiate or promote wise teaching must be of the most important and most practical kind.

A vast wave of emotion, made up of mingled admiration and regret, has just passed over the whole civilized world since the death of one such initiator and promoter—Cardinal Newman.

Great as his influence must be over the whole future history of this planet it seems destined to exercise a special influence in arresting such follies as those we have here called attention to. In his invaluable discourses on the scope and nature of University education, he eloquently proclaimed and forcibly illustrated the supreme necessity of inculcating sound philosophy and the position it must take in every institution deserving the name of a university. This is the more remarkable because Cardinal Newman was not a metaphysician, and had himself made no special study of philosophy. He was a divine also by his sympathies and position from his early years, and laid down in an irrefragible manner the necessary existence of sacerdotalism, and the irreversible position of the Priesthood. Nevertheless, he did not hesitate to assign to philosophy both a fundamental and supreme position in every fully organized and complete system of teaching. It was as long ago as 1852 that those remarkable chapters, entitled "General Knowledge Viewed as One Philosophy," and "Philosophical Knowledge its Own End," were first published. He thus unconsciously acted as a precursor to a greater one to follow, and helped to pave the way for the hearty acceptance of that momentous act by which our present Supreme Pontiff inculcated on all those in authority under him the great duty of promoting the study of Catholic philosophy—the most effectual antidote to the poison of Agnosticism. But Leo XIII. has since taken two further steps of a most eminently practical character, wherein the lands on both sides of the Atlantic may rejoice.

The venerable and distinguished University of Louvain has received a direct impulse from the chair of Peter towards developing a special department of higher studies, both in the empirical sciences and in philosophy. At the very same time a new university, full of promise, has also, by Pontifical favor and support, happily begun its operations in the Rome of the new world—Washington. There also philosophy will enjoy the consideration it deserves, and has begun to prepare the way for the various physical and historical sciences which are to follow. It is, of course, manifestly neces-

sary that every kind of liberal knowledge should ultimately find its home there; but it is not necessary they should take their start at the very same moment. At a Catholic university those subjects may be expected to receive especial attention, which have lately been, are, or will soon be, matters of eager controversy. A subject which has lately been so hotly contested, that it is only beginning to cease to be a bone of contention, is the science of Biology, especially the questions of evolution and transformism. A subject which is now in the very thick of the fight is that of Biblical criticism, so ably represented by Mgr. de Harlez at Louvain. The third burning subject is that of the history of the Church during the first three centuries, and on this great question of antiquity the modern school arising at Washington will doubtless throw much instructive light. These matters, however, we only glance at in passing. It is the question of philosophy which concerns us now, and we desire to record our supreme satisfaction at the circumstance that these two independent institutions (the new schools of Washington and Louvain) have been initiated to grapple with the philosophic follies of the day, the folly of those who, while opposing Theism, "profess themselves to be wise." Our main object in writing the present article is to arouse young men who will receive benefits from the Catholic University of the United States to exert themselves in two ways. Influence in the select world of thought, and therefore in that immense world made up of those whose thinking is done for them, is acquired in two ways: (1) By an unmistakable pre-eminence in some branch of empirical science, and (2) by ability to make use of a thorough knowledge of philosophy. It would not be a good thing that our clergy generally should be men devoted to the empirical sciences; but it is very desirable that a few amongst them should be universally known and esteemed as proficient experts in one or other of them, and should be appealed to as recognized scientific authorities by non-Catholics.

It is certainly much to be desired that there should be Catholic laymen in this position. Increased respect will be felt for the religious convictions of any layman who is known to be a successful, distinguished cultivator of any branch of physical science and the religious convictions of ecclesiastics are largely discounted by many non-Catholics if such ecclesiastics are known to be ignorant of the leading facts and hypotheses of the science of their day. But besides the physical sciences, much good can be done by laymen as well as clergy who can effectively wield philosophical arguments. And here we would strongly urge the need of vigorous and reiterated attacks upon all the leading forms of modern philosophical error. "Defence is much less inspiriting than attack," and success in the latter is also far more impressive on spectators than is a

merely successful defence. Moreover, the popular philosophical errors of the day, from those of Mill and Spencer to those of the younger generation, lay themselves open to attack in quite an exceptional manner. These philosophers can be often refuted out of their own mouths, and even when such is not the case the absurd logical results of the several systems they uphold are amply sufficient to overthrow them by a process of *reductio ad absurdum*, and we are profoundly convinced that the following line of argument, if ably presented, will be efficient. The opponents of Theism have been driven to deny their knowledge of their own existence and even the validity of thought, and thus have arrived at the very apogee of folly, while, from a recognition of the existence of self-conscious thought, a complete system of philosophy, including Theism, may be deduced. In recognizing the validity of thought we see that the thought we have is *our* thought, and thus we are certain of our own existence; and in being certain of that, we are certain about the past as well as the present, for if we could know nothing beyond the present moment our mind would be a blank. This shows that we can know with certainty objective truth (*i. e.*, real existence external to our present feelings), and therefore very important objective truths, such as the law of contradiction. If we could not know such necessary truths as these, we should not only be unable to gain knowledge by conversation, but we could not even follow up a train of solitary thought. We should be reduced to idiocy. It is plain, also, that there is another statement, which is as certain as the statement that nothing can, at the same time, both be and not be. This is the statement that every change needs a cause and that if any complex structure performs a certain work there must be a reason why it is formed as it is and not otherwise. Our minds also assure us that we may judge of causes to a certain extent by their effects. We may be certain that no mere donkey-engine can pull a large steamer across the ocean, as also that whatever effect is produced must have been caused by something adequate to produce it.

But, in knowing ourselves, we know that we have a certain amount of intelligence, and that we do, at least, know that some things are right and others wrong. Now, the universe is a most complex structure, which performs a great deal of work, and of that universe we form a part; and therefore we know that intelligence and moral perception do exist within it, because they exist in ourselves. Therefore, we may be certain that the cause of that universe could not, itself, be so defective as to be devoid of what even we possess—namely, intellect and morality—but must, rather, possess those qualities in the highest degree; and therefore, the universe being so caused, must be replete with design. Thus, an

analysis of our own reason suffices to make us certain that the universe is not the outcome of unreason. That a process of evolution has taken place in the world, physical science inclines us strongly to believe, but that it is designed and is the outcome of intelligence, the science of sciences (philosophy) makes us positively certain. To doubt this (when once the perceptions which guarantee it have been clearly and firmly grasped by the mind) is an act of self-stultification. To be certain of it, as reason thus logically compels us to be, is to be certain of Theism. In refuting the Agnostic systems of negation, we are far from professing ourselves to be wise. We but follow humbly in the wake of the great series of thinkers and teachers who, from Aristotle, through Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas, Duns Scotus, to Leo XIII., have upheld one philosophy essentially consentient and absolutely consistent with itself. It was the men who abandoned such solid ground to follow their own private conceits, who, by the very exceptional position they took up, and their scorn for their predecessors, necessarily professed themselves to be exceptionally "wise," and then showed their essential accord with those whom the Apostle to the Gentiles blamed, in that they also unwittingly became "fools." We confidently look forward to the delivery of many successful assaults on the Agnostic position from present or future students of the new Catholic University of Washington.

THE POPES AND THE TEMPORAL POWER—1790–1823.

Vicissitudes Politiques du Pouvoir Temporel des Papes de 1790 à nos jours; par Charles Van Duerm, S. J. Desclée, De Brouwer & Cie., Lille. 1 vol., pp. 456. 1890.

AT Valence, on the twenty-ninth of August, 1799, the pious, charitable, intellectual, patriotic Pius VI. died, a victim of the brutal foreigner. Twenty-four years of the eighty-two vouchsafed him had been spent in wisely, liberally administering the affairs of the Papal States, and in defending the Church from the hypocritical and from the daring foes, who—crowned, mitred, cassocked, breeched or *sans culottes*—had striven by the most unhallowed means to put an end to the temporal and spiritual authority of the Papacy. To plead the cause of outraged liberty, Pius had sought that pitiful despot, Joseph II., in his capital (1782), and there had borne, patiently, contempt and abuse which, eight years later, when the Belgians rose in arms against the Austrian oppressor, he was to repay by a favor wholly undeserved. Against the schismatical Leopold of Tuscany, brother of Joseph, and against Ricci, the grand-duke's Jansenistic bishop, Pius VI. had contended, with spiritual arms, for the liberty and for the law of the Church (1788). With the same smokeless but all-powerful weapons, he had fought a good fight against the tyrannical Constituent Assembly, that, not content with robbing the clergy and people of France, would have turned the rabble into a Pope, and the Pope into the slave of the mob (1791). When that cowardly mob, led by "a lot of brigands, the offscouring of the human race,"[1] assassinated the brave, innocent, helpless King Louis, Pius,—the venerable Pope, whose army could not protect his own small territory, whose person and throne were at the mercy of a Saint-Just and a Robespierre,—Pius alone, among the rulers of Christendom, had the courage to protest against the monstrous crime, and to denounce the workers of it as forever infamous and forever execrable.[2] During those awful days of the Terror, when, in the name of the Supreme Being and of Virtue, bishops and priests were banished or massacred, and when prostitution, sacrilege, fury, assumed the name and the garb of religion, Pius, firmly, steadily, defended the cause of Christianity, the rights of God and of men.

[1] Vergniaud's words.

[2] January 21, 1793.

To overturn the altar, symbol and source of justice, mercy and love, was the chief, the logical aim of the men of 1789. The idea was not wholly new. There was no scourged, thorn-crowned Christ to crucify,—only His Vicar to abase. The wisdom of the foolish has been able to devise only one efficient means of repaganizing the world, the destruction of the Papacy. In order to destroy the Papacy, the wisdom of the foolish has been able to devise only one seemingly sure means, the destruction of the Temporal Power of the Popes. Fools learn slowly in this world. The lesson they learned from Pius VI., a lesson taught them again and again through the ages, they have since unlearned.

Abuse of the Holy See did not satisfy the men of 1789. The party of action added injury to abuse. A first blow was struck at the Temporal Power by the seizure of Avignon and the Venaissin, which for nigh six hundred years had been a legitimate possession of the Papacy. Revolt, bloodshed, robbery were the only bases for the decree of the Constituent Assembly (September 14, 1791), a decree that, violating an incontestable title, abolished the Papal rights without excuse or compensation. Pius VI., both before and after this immoral decree, fearlessly asserted the right of sovereignty vested in the Holy See by a prescription of centuries, and acknowledged by Europe as legal and just.

The Directory received and followed the traditions of the Convention and of the Assembly. The guillotined King was 'the last of the Kings'; the still unguillotined Pope should be the last of the Popes. Thus spoke the *citoyens* rulers of France. Napoleon threatened, with a victorious soldiery behind him. The Pope, like many a Pope before, had attempted to unite the Italians against the invader. Failing, Pius preserved a strict neutrality, joining neither with Piedmont, Naples, Austria, Spain nor England. And yet he was not surprised when Napoleon entered Bologna and assumed the control of the Legations. The Revolution had no conscience, and Napoleon was the worthy 'son of the Revolution.' He dare not go to Rome. The Austrians were ready for a new campaign. He agreed to withdraw from a portion of the Papal Territory, while negotiations were carried on at Paris, provided he received twenty-one millions of francs, a hundred statues, vases and pictures, five hundred MSS., the fortress of Ancona, and provided that the Papal seaports were closed to all the powers at war with France (June 23, 1796). Barbarous as were these demands, they were accepted in the interest of peace, and the Papal government proceeded to satisfy them scrupulously. But when the Directory attempted to limit his spiritual rights, Pius suspended the execution of the treaty, reorganized his little army, and entered into a defensive treaty with Austria and with Naples. Once more

victorious, having parcelled out upper Italy as seemed good to him, Napoleon marched on the Papal States. The Directory insisted that he should 'destroy the centre of Catholicity, giving Rome to another power, or that, having banished Pope and cardinals, he should establish a new government.' Bonaparte wanted money. Vienna in his hands,—an Emperor at his feet,—and the temple of fame was his. Money! On the 4th of February, 1797, he was in Bologna. The Papal forces were driven back. Ancona was captured. The country was pillaged. The Virgin's shrine at Loreto, the richest in Christendom, was robbed outright; even the statue of Her who bore the God-man was sent to Paris. At Tolentino the 'son of the Revolution' halted. Vanquished, Pius sent plenipotentiaries to the conqueror. On the 19th of February they signed the stipulations of a treaty of peace, binding the Pope to revoke all treaties of alliance; to reduce his army; *to cede to France the Venaissin and Avignon*, and the Legations of Bologna, Ferrara and Ravenna; to hand over Ancona to the French until a continental peace had been signed; and to pay a "contribution" of thirty million francs. Rightly did Cardinal Consalvi call the treaty of Tolentino the work of a brigand. Why did the Pope consent to this 'great sacrifice?' The cardinal tells us. Though the injustice of the agressor was manifest, the Pope felt himself obliged to submit, 'in order to save the centre of Catholicity from an invasion fatal to religion.'[1]

Raphael's Transfiguration, the Laocoon, and other glories of the Roman collections, a Virgil of the sixth century, a Terence of the eighth, the artistic brigand despatched to France, under this remarkable treaty. The Pope was at the mercy of Bonaparte. The Corsican did not seize Rome; he did not banish the Pope and the cardinals; he did not set up a new government. He was more calculating than his masters. "It is my opinion that Rome, once deprived of Bologna, Ferrara, the Romagna, and the thirty millions we take from her, cannot last; this old machine will break up of itself."[2] Thus Napoleon wrote to the Directory on the very day of Tolentino. The Directory had another Bonaparte in its service, Joseph, who masqueraded as French ambassador to the Holy See. His instructions were plain. 'To aid, much rather than to restrain, the *good* dispositions of those who think that it is time to put an end to the reign of the Popes.' Joseph's house was a revolutionary centre. There conspirators organized "popular" demonstrations and street riots. In one of these riots, young General Duphot was killed. Duphot's death was not the

[1] *Vicissitudes Politiques du Pouvoir Temporel des Papes;* par Charles Van Duerm, S. J., pp. 30–32. Desclée, De Brouwer et Cie., Lille. 1890.

[2] *Vicissitudes Polit. du Pouvoir Temporel*, p. 33.

fault of the Papal government. It was the death which a criminal invites. Duphot was a suitor for the hand of a sister of Bonaparte's. The occasion served Joseph. Demanding his passports, he left Rome. The Directory imprisoned the Papal envoy at Paris, and ordered Berthier to march on the Eternal City. Berthier had an army of 30,000 men. Resistance would have been useless. To save the shedding of blood, the Papal troops retreated —at the Pope's command. Without opposition the revolutionary army entered Rome (February 15, 1798). They planted a tree of "liberty"—the hypocrites!—talked lunatic nonsense about Brutus and Cato—God 'a mercy on their souls!—and abolished tyranny. Hence our restful century! The people 'resumed their stolen rights.' You who love the antique comedy may smile. We shall, perhaps, see it on the boards once again before death comes to us.

Cervoni, now a general of the Directory, formerly a Papal soldier, took Berthier's place, and informed the Pope that Rome was a republic, and that the Temporal Power was at an end. Pius refused to abdicate. To the traitor who, impudently and ignorantly, assured him that his spiritual power would not be impeded, Pius suggested that, as the Pope held this power from God, no man could well take it away. Forthwith they ordered the venerable ruler of Christendom to retire into Tuscany. "Pius VI. entreated his enemies to let him die where he had lived; he was already eighty years old. They replied that he could die anywhere. The room he was seated in was plundered before his eyes—they deprived him even of the trifles required for his personal comfort, and drew the ring he wore from his finger."[1] Pius, rudely driven out of the Vatican on a stormy night, found a temporary refuge at Siena. "These indignities," he said to Manfredini, "make me hope that I am not an unworthy vicar of Christ. They recall to me the first years of the Church—and those were the years of her triumph."[2]

The Brutuses and Catos robbed as cleanly as Bonaparte—robbed churches, libraries, palaces, tabernacles and kitchens. The men of 'good disposition,' in search of things, made no distinction between places. They carried away sacred vessels; burned vestments for the gold in them; levied contributions on an artist, a banker,—on any one every one; stole statues and paintings, not merely for the National collection, but for private uses. And, of course, they suppressed the Propaganda. The indignities borne by the aged Pontiff—how they stir a man when he thinks of these

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[1] Ranke, *History of the Popes*, p. 459. London, 1886.
[2] Cantu, *Hist. des Italiens*, vol. xi., p. 105.

infamous burglars and bandits! From Siena Pius was removed to Florence. The Italians were fighting for life and home against the foreign invader. In Tuscany the cry of "Long live the Pope!" was not uncommon. Farther from Rome this man of eighty-one would be less dangerous. He was weakly and ill. The Catos had as lief he were a corpse. They brought him to Parma, to Turin, across the Alps to Briançon, and then to Valence. They would have taken him to Dijon, were he not dying. Within six weeks 'the last Pope' was dead. So the philosophers said. The prophet of theophilanthropy wrote to Bonaparte, advising him to prevent the election of another Pope, and to establish a government at Rome and thus relieve Europe of the Papal supremacy.[1] "It might, in fact, have now seemed that the Papal power had been brought to a final close," are the words of Ranke.[2]

Pius VI. gave his life to the Revolution, but his oath, his honor, his rights, the rights of Catholic Christendom, he did not sacrifice. In exile, as when seated on the Fisherman's throne, he protested against the violent invasion and seizure of the Patrimony. Every government in Europe heard and listened to his voice. The Coalition moved; and the oft victorious French went down before Russian and Austrian and Englishman—and Turk. Within three months from the death of 'the last Pope,' the Directory had fallen and the Conclave had opened at Venice. On March 14, 1800, Cardinal Barnabas Chiaramonti took the name of Pius VII.; on July 3d the Pope-King entered Rome, amid the most enthusiastic demonstrations of the people. His progress through his territory had been one continued triumph.

Pius VII. made his peaceable move on Rome, not without opposition. Austria, fighting the French revolutionaries, was the Austria of old. From her rulers the Papacy had to fear what, for ten centuries, it has had to fear from the most "Christian" of governments. An attempt was made to manage the Conclave from Vienna, and to assure the election of a Pope who would cede a portion of the States of the Church to the Empire. When Chiaramonti was chosen, Austria delayed his coronation; and lest the effect of this public act should, by its splendor, arouse the people, and thus interfere with the imperial schemes, the Pope was not crowned in St. Mark's. Hoping to force him to sacrifice the rights of the Church to their ambitions, many devices were used to lure Pius VII. to Vienna. Failing in this, the diplomatists sought from him an acknowledgment of the treaty of Tolentino. Had he conceded, they would have robbed him of the Legations with as little conscience as that of a Directory or of a Napoleon.

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[1] Cantu, *loc. cit.*, p. 143.

[2] *Hist. of Popes*, vol. ii., p. 459.

The successor of the 'last of the Popes' was, like his Master, a friend of the people. Speaking to his flock, when Bishop of Imola, he had demonstrated the harmony of the Gospel with democracy. "Follow the Gospel," said Chiaramonti, "and you will be the joy of the republic; be good Christians and you will be excellent democrats."[1] Strong in the cause of justice, which is the people's cause, Pius VII. refused any concessions to Austria. Bonaparte, nominal Consul and real Dictator, victor at Marengo, was once more master of Italy. By the peace of Luneville (February 9, 1801), he regained possession of the coveted Legations. Pius VII. promptly protested, enunciating once more the Papal rights over these territories, and over Avignon and the Venaissin. At this very time Napoleon, 'persuaded that the Catholic religion is the only one that can confer true happiness on a well-ordered society,' was negotiating with the Pope for a re-establishment of religion in France. Napoleon's end was purely political. The Pope's aim was altogether spiritual. In order to gain his end the Consul tried to intimidate Pius VII. He was threatened with the loss of the Temporal Power.[2] The Pope made 'extraordinary concessions. He consented to the alienation of church property, a loss of four hundred millions of francs in real estate'—'feeling disposed to yield on all points where he could do so without offence to religion.'[3] On July 17, 1801, the famous Concordat was signed. Amid salvos of artillery, on Easter day, 1802, for the first time since 1789, a Christian feast was celebrated in Paris. "The Pope was transported with joy,[4] "that the churches were purified from profanation, the altars raised anew, the banner of the Cross once more unfurled, legitimate pastors set over the people, and so many souls that had strayed from the right way restored to the unity of the Church and reconciled to themselves and to God." "

True 'son of the Revolution,' Bonaparte was a trickster, a hypocrite, a bully. To have the benefit of the moral arm of the Church, —without which no government can hope to last,—he recognized the Pope as the Vicar of Christ; to ensure his own autocracy, he falsified the record of his agreement and attached to the Concordat the Gallican "Organic Articles." Audacious is not the word to qualify Napoleon's fraud, but we have no stronger word. 'Disposed to yield on all points, where he could do so without offence to Religion,' Pius VII. had signed the Concordat, though the Consul refused to let go his hold on the Legations. Having gained a religion, which to him was only an inexpensive system of police,

[1] *Hist. Universelle, Cantu.*, vol. xviii., p. 183.
[2] *Vicissitudes Polit.*, etc., Chas Van Duerm, S. J., p. 56.
[3] Ranke, *loc. cit.*, p. 460.
[4] Ranke, p. 460.

he sought to use the ministers of religion as a Fouché or a Savary handled their pawns. The Consul had not learned the lessons taught by the history of the Church—lessons open to all men, and plain to read. Pius VII. protested and protested, nor did he cease to insist on the rights of the Papacy in the Legations and in the Venaissin. Bonaparte was deaf, and the 'restorer of religion in France' proceeded calculatingly to undo the Church in Germany. "The complete and final ruin of that stately fabric was attributable chiefly to his agency; the transfer of its possessions and sovereign powers to secular princes, indifferent whether Catholic or Protestant, was effected by his means."[1]

Napoleon did not strangle the French Republic; he smothered it. Consul for life in 1802, he made himself Emperor within two years thereafter (May 18, 1804). The *sans culottes* that were, now gloried in their Charlemagne. Bonaparte took them at their word. A Charlemagne he would be,—a crowned Emperor, and King of Italy,—crowned not like Charlemagne, at Rome, but in the capital of France. To him the Pope must come—to him, greater warrior and ruler than Charlemagne. And the Pope went to him. To preserve religion, to assure the peace, morality, happiness not of France alone, but of Europe, Pius VII., in his sixty-second year, journeyed to Paris, and there anointed the splendid adventurer who had treated him so unjustly, contemptuously, and who, as he knelt in Notre Dame, at the Pope's feet, was devising in his crooked, subtle mind, indignities even greater than any he had committed. At Paris the Pope would have pleaded with the new Emperor for the return of the Legations, as well as of Avignon and the Venaissin. Napoleon avoided his guest. To the written memorial of Pius he answered in words of double meaning. 'He would assure the Pontiff of his veneration, of his desire that the ceremonies of the Catholic religion should be magnificently celebrated, of his intention to protect the Pope in his present dominions and in the enjoyment of the property that remained to him.' To the Legate of the Pope he had generously donated the corpse of the venerable Pius VI. and the statue stolen from Loreto. The rare jewels had been removed from the statue. A second Charlemagne!

The Italians have always delighted in the rule of an usurper. Napoleon had dealt with them much as an Arab handles a slave-gang. When he was ready he invited them to submit to his kingship. They submitted graciously, and never have they shown a more beautiful enthusiasm than on the May day that he placed the iron crown on his head in the Milan Cathedral. As city after city

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[1] Ranke, *loc. cit.*, p. 461.

begged him to exercise an unlimited mastery, he consented with all the courtesy of an emperor, and forthwith levied heavily upon empty treasuries, generously permitting them to improve their finances by "secularizing" the property of monasteries, convents, brotherhoods, chapters, pious associations. Victor Emmanuel, King of Piedmont, resided in Sardinia at this time. Piedmont was known, in France, as the twenty-seventh military division.

Russians, Prussians, Austrians, English, had once more united. Ulm had capitulated. The campaign in North Italy was a fortunate one for the French. At Rome, the Pope maintained a strict neutrality. Suddenly, without excuse, violating the law of nations, and spoken and written promise, the French seized Ancona (Oct., 1805). On the 13th of November, Pius VII. sent to the Emperor a dignified and courageous letter, charging him with invading the Papal rights, rights respected by every other power; accusing him of adding to the Pope's trials instead of relieving them; demanding the evacuation of Ancona; and notifying him that, in case of refusal, the French minister must remove from Rome.[1] The outcome of the war with Russia and Austria was uncertain. Napoleon kept silence. When the victory of Austerlitz and the peace of Pressburg made him the arbiter of Europe, he answered the Pope's letter. One of the world's greatest tragedians, Bonaparte played comedy with an art equalled by no diplomatist before or since. Recalling the third Napoleon and Cavour, this is a high tribute, but deserved. The answer, dated Münich, Jan. 7, 1806, informs the "Very Holy Father" that 'the occupation of Ancona *is* an immediate and necessary result of the bad organization of the Papal Army.' Furthermore, it is much better for His Holiness that his fortress should be in Napoleon's hands than in the hands of the English or of the Turks. "I consider myself," writes the Emperor, with a straight face, "the protector of the Holy See, and, as the protector, I occupied Ancona. Like my predecessors of the second and of the third race, I have considered myself as the elder son of the Church, as alone having the sword to protect her and to shield her from the defiling touch of Greek or Mussulman." "I will be the friend of your Holiness whenever you consult only your own heart and the true friends of religion." 'If your Holiness desire to send away my minister, you are free to do so, and to receive instead the English and the Caliph of Constantinople.' "God is the judge, who, among all the reigning princes, has done the more for religion."[2]

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[1] See the document in P. Van Duerm's *Les Vicissitudes Politiques*, pp. 68–70.

[2] See the document in P. Van Duerm's *Les Vicissitudes Politiques*, pp. 70–71.

Insulting, specious, threatening as this letter was, the self-appointed 'protector of the Holy See' wrote under restraint. On the same day he addressed his minister at Rome, Cardinal Fesch, qualifying the Papal advisers as imbeciles, madmen, egoists; threatening to send a Protestant Minister to Rome;[1] ordering Consalvi to do his bidding or resign. "For the Pope," said he, "I am Charlemagne, because, like Charlemagne, I reunite the crown of France to that of the Lombards." "I mean that he shall regulate his conduct with me from this point of view. If they behave well, I will not alter appearances; otherwise, I will reduce the Pope to be bishop of Rome." 'Tell Consalvi that Constantine separated the civil power from the military, and I, too, can name a Senator to command at Rome in my name.'[2]

Fesch conveyed these reproaches and menaces to Pius VII., who heard them unmoved. On the 29th of January he answered Constantine Charlemagne, demanding the evacuation of Ancona, payment of the many advances made to the French troops, and restitution of the Legations of Bologna, Ferrara and Ravenna. To this letter Napoleon replied on February 13th: 'All Italy shall be submissive to my law. I will not touch *in the least* the independence of the Holy See;' 'but our conditions must be that your Holiness shall have for me, in the temporal, the same consideration that I have for you in the spiritual, and that you cease useless relations with heretical enemies of the Church and with powers that can do you no good. Your Holiness is sovereign of Rome, but I am its Emperor. All my enemies should be yours.' To Fesch he wrote on the same day, ordering him 'to expel the English, Russians, Swedes and Sardinians from Rome and from the Roman State, and to interdict the ports to vessels of these powers. Tell them that I am Charlemagne, the sword of the Church, their Emperor; that as such I should be treated; that they should not know that there is an empire of Russia. I shall make my intentions known to the Pope in few words. If he does not acquiesce I will reduce him to the condition that existed before Charlemagne.'[3]

To the demand here made, and often repeated, that the Pope should 'consider the antagonists of another as his own enemies,' Pius replied: "That he was the universal pastor, the father of all, the servant of peace, and that the very mention of such a demand inspired him with horror." It was his part to be Aaron, the

[1] He sent one—Alquier.

[2] See the document in P. Van Duerm, *loc. cit.*, pp. 72–73. We cannot forget De Maistre's happy exclamation, after quoting a passage from Voltaire: "The Mountebank! Where did he learn all these fine things!"

[3] P. Van Duerm, *loc. cit.*, p. 75.

prophet of God—not Ishmael, whose hand was against every man, and every man's hand against him.'[1] "Your Majesty establishes in principle that you are the Emperor of Rome," said Pius. "We answer with apostolic frankness that the Sovereign Pontiff, who is such, for so great a number of centuries that no reigning prince can point to a like antiquity, the Pontiff become, in addition, sovereign of Rome, does not recognize, and has never recognized in his states, a power greater than his own; and that no emperor has any right over Rome. You are immensely great; but you were chosen, consecrated, crowned, recognized Emperor of the French and not of Rome. There is no Emperor of Rome, there can be none, unless the Sovereign Pontiff be deprived of the absolute domain and of the empire that he alone exercises at Rome."[2] Whatever weaknesses the Popes have had, they never quailed before a tyrant. The Temporal Power, each one of them has defended against all comers. Pius, mild and irresolute as he was by nature, though less warlike, was no less loyal to his oath than the valiant Julius.

To consolidate his power in Italy, and to round the great empire he had conceived, Napoleon, in February, 1806, sent a force into the Kingdom of Naples. Her army beaten, Queen Caroline fled; and on the 13th of the month the French took possession of the capital. 'By right of conquest,' Napoleon, on the 31st of March, declared the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies a part of the Empire, and his brother, Joseph, King and grand Elector. The Papal court was notified of this event; and, on the 26th of April, Consalvi called the French Minister's attention to the fact that over the Kings of Naples the Papacy held and exercised rights as over a vassal. Enraged at this independent and prudent act of the Pope, Bonaparte, through Talleyrand, presented a note to Cardinal Caprara, ambassador of the Holy See at Paris, more contradictory and more threatening than any of the previous communications. In this note he reiterates his equality with Charlemagne, and demands the recognition of the new King of Naples, unless the Pope desires that he should be treated merely as a spiritual head.[3] Without further correspondence with the Holy See, he took possession of a considerable part of the Papal territory. To each new act of violence and of robbery, Pius VII. opposed a protest. Prussia went down before the Emperor's victorious arms at Jena, and Russia at Eylau and Friedland. By the peace of Tilsit (July 9, 1807), his great Empire of the West gained the recognition of the Czar Alexander, who was content with

[1] Ranke, *History of Popes*, vol. ii., pp. 463–464.
[2] P. Van Duerm, *loc. cit.*, p. 76.
[3] P. Van Duerm, *loc cit*, p. 77.

being Emperor of the East, and Bonaparte felt that he dare now attack openly the aged ecclesiastic in the Vatican. Thirteen days after Tilsit, he demanded that the cardinals should be selected according to his will; and, on the same day, he wrote to Prince Eugene, his viceroy in Italy, a letter that would have shamed Garibaldi, filled with abuse of the Pope and of the Papacy, and repeating his former threats. In this letter it is that he used a sentence oft quoted since: "What does Pius VII. wish in denouncing me to Christendom? To interdict my thrones, to excommunicate me? Does he think that the arms will fall from the hands of my soldiers?" To God, the Judge, Bonaparte had previously appealed. In his case, the judgment of God was made visible.

Within three months Urbino, Macerata, Fermo, Spoleto were occupied by French troops. From the Pope protest followed protest. At the beginning of the year 1808, Bonaparte seized the rest of the Papal States, excepting only Rome. On the 2d of February the tri-color floated over the Castle of Sant Angelo. General Miollis was the hero who captured the Holy City without bloodshed. The *régime*, it is presumed, was that of the days before Charlemagne. "The batallions should '*traverser*' the Vatican. There should be a parade on the *grande place* without troubling yourself about the Pope. The French troops should mount guard at the gates of the Pope's palace, as Italian troops; and the troops of the Pope should be gathered in Ancona." Such were the instructions of the Emperor to the military representative of the "temporal power."[1] Pius VII. did not flinch. The written protest, that ever-accusing witness against usurpers, and that safeguard of lawful rights, was promptly issued. Meantime the invaders heaped indignities on the Pope. The commander of the Papal forces was imprisoned, the Pontifical Guard was dismissed, and twenty-two cardinals were expelled from the city. On April 2, 1808, the States of the Church were *irrevocably* united to the Kingdom of Italy, by an imperial decree, because 'the Pope had constantly refused to make war on the English'; because 'it was necessary that the communications between the armies of Italy and of Naples should not be interrupted by an enemy,' and because 'the donation of Charlemagne, Bonaparte's illustrious predecessor, was made to benefit Christendom and not to advantage the enemies of Religion.'[2] Popular education must have been very backward in Europe in 1808; otherwise this decree would never have been edited. And yet it is as intelligent and as logical a document on which to base a title to the possession of the States of the

[1] P. Van Duerm, *loc. cit.*, p. 83.

[2] P. Van Duerm, *loc. cit.*, p. 83.

Church as any decree or proclamation issued, or any law adopted, under the Piedmontese King, that, following in the footsteps of the new Charlemagne who made a French military department of Victor Emmanuel's quondam Kingdom, temporarily lords it in Rome to-day.

A despot—such the little corporal had made himself, and such he claimed to be. "*Le peuple, c'est moi*" were his words, travestying those of the *Grand Monarque;* "and the people can have no interest distinct from mine. To contradict me is to attack in me the whole public interest."[1] The twenty-two year old Jerome ruled Westphalia. Louis, twenty-eight, was King of Holland. Italy poured millions into the imperial treasury. Europe was blockaded, in order that England might be ruined. Murat was in Madrid, Joseph, the conspirator, now King of Spain. At Erfurt (September, 1808) the Czar, 'four kings, twenty-seven princes, two grand-dukes, seven dukes, and an infinity of counts, barons, marshals' took Bonaparte's orders subserviently. Austria rose in arms once more, was once more humiliated at Eckmühl, and yielded up even Vienna. The conqueror could now complete the ruin of the Papacy. From Schönbrunn, on May 17, 1809, fifteen days after the capture of Vienna, he dated the famous decree by which he assumed to abolish the Temporal Power. "Considering that when Charlemagne, emperor of the French and our august predecessor, donated several counties to the bishops of Rome, he gave them only as fiefs and for the advantage of his States, and that by this donation Rome did not cease to be a part of his Empire . . . . we decree: That the States of the Pope are reunited to the French Empire, and that the city of Rome, so celebrated on account of the great memorials with which it is filled, and the first See of Christendom, is declared an imperial and free city."[2] Bonaparte had most fully vindicated his claim to the honored title of 'son of the revolution;' but he meant to deserve from posterity the title that his contemporaries dared not refuse him. The new Charlemagne—Brutus Charlemagne, would surpass the Assembly and the Directory in the attempt to 'destroy the centre of Christendom,' and to 'put an end to the reign of the Popes.'

When Miollis entered Rome, from each church door there came a voice of condemnation. "Not to fail in the essential obligation of guarding the rights of his sovereignty, the Pope formally protests in his own name and in that of his successors, against any usurpation of his domain, it being his will that the rights of the Holy

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[1] Cantu, *Hist. Universelle*, tome xviii., p. 231.

[2] The document in P. Van Duerm, *loc. cit.*, pp. 85, 86.

See be, and remain, perfectly untouched." Thus Pius, in the face of force, conserved the rights of the Church. And now, when the usurpation was completed, the dumb doors spoke once more, excommunicating 'all those who, in Rome or in the territories of the Church, have been guilty of sacrilegious attempts upon the temporal rights of the Holy See.' Long before Napoleon's day, and many a time since, the terrible force of a Papal excommunication has been recognized. The mightiest human power cannot hope, with common shot and shell, to bear up against that superhuman weapon of consuming flame.

The scenes in the tragedy Bonaparte had studiously prepared. From his correspondence we can ourselves anticipate what is to follow. On the 17th of June he wrote to Murat, who had been imposed on the two Sicilies in the place of Joseph, promoted to the crown of Spain: 'From my decrees you will see that I have done much good to the Pope; but it is on condition that he keep quiet. If he wishes to form a union of caballers, like Cardinal Pacca, it will not be suffered, and you must act at Rome as I would act with the Archbishop of Paris.' Two days later, Miollis heard from the Emperor: "To you I have confided the duty of maintaining tranquility in my Roman States. You should suffer no obstacle. Bring before a military commission every one that commits an act against the security of the army; arrest, even in the Pope's house, all those who plot against public tranquility and the security of my soldiers. A priest abuses his office, and merits less indulgence than another, when he preaches war and disobedience to the temporal power (*puissance*), and when he sacrifices the spiritual to the interests of this world, which the Gospel says are not his."[1] We have read this letter often. German emperors have written it; French kings, too; and mountebanks of every nationality. The late Mr. Crispi elaborated it into a code. Truth is one. Measured by the measure of originality, error is not one per cent. of one. Is it any wonder that it should not prevail?

On the same day the Emperor gave Murat another delicate hint: 'I have advised that affairs at Rome must move rapidly.' "No asylum should be respected if they do not submit to my decree, and no resistance should be borne with under any pretext. If the Pope, contrary to the spirit of his calling and of the Gospel, preaches revolt, and if he would use the immunity of his house to print circulars, he should be arrested. The time for these scenes has passed. Philippe le Bel arrested Boniface, and Charles V. kept Clement VII. in prison for a long time; and they did much less. A priest who preaches discord and war to the temporal

[1] P. Van Duerm, *loc cit.*, p. 89.

powers, instead of peace, abuses his office.[1] Some well-meaning historians[2] have kindly relieved Napoleon of any responsibility for the shameful, dishonorable, unmanly outrages to which Pius VII. was subjected. And yet it is he who convicts himself of the great crime. Philippe le Bel was a crowned ruffian. Napoleon knew where to look for a model.

Murat obeyed orders. On the night of the 6th of July, 1809, the Pope and Cardinal Pacca were forcibly removed from the Quirinal, placed in a close carriage, and driven out of the Holy City. To Florence, Turin, Grenoble, Savona, they carried Pius. At Grenoble the Pope was separated from the Cardinal, whom they confined in the fortress of Fenestrelle. "Courage, my children, and pray!" were the words ever on the lips of the Pontiff as the people gathered about him. The Pope was prepared for the worst. Every Pope is. Cardinal Pacca exposes the secret of the calmness with which the Popes of this century have borne their tribulations. "Providence permits this in order to confirm more and more the Divine lesson given to the Popes and to the ministers of the Church, often repeated in the Holy Scriptures, not to put their confidence in the princes of this world." Having no faith in princes, and well advised as to the purposes of Napoleon, Pius girded his loins. "My predecessor," he said, "in his prosperous days was as impetuous as a lion, and he died like a lamb. I have lived like a lamb, but I shall know how to defend myself and to die like a lion." The Pope was strong in his sense of right and in his confidence in Christ. To the despot who was persecuting him he wrote words of warning—prophetic words, that passed unheeded: "Remember that God is over kings, that he excepts no person, and spares no grandeur. Soon he will show himself with a terrible aspect, and the powerful shall be judged with rigor."

At Savona, Pius was a prisoner until June, 1812. There he was surrounded by intriguers, clerical and lay, cardinals as well as bishops; for the Emperor was a master of every wile, and, as a last resource, was ever ready to threaten. The French Senate had, February 17, 1810, declared the States of the Church a part of the Empire; the city of Rome the second city of the Empire; the Prince Imperial the King of Rome. A foreign sovereignty was incompatible with the exercise of spiritual authority, the Senate announced. However, the Pope should have a revenue of two millions. This Napoleonic decree, uttered through the lips of a slavish Senate, undoubtedly served as a model for the more

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[1] P. Van Duerm, *loc. cit.*, p. 89.

[2] See Cardinal Wiseman's *Last Four Popes*, p. 76.

recent "Law of Guarantees," with which the Piedmontese government sought to bolster up its attempt to 'destroy the centre of Catholicity.' The Emperor was persistent in his efforts to obtain from the Pope a recognition of this decree. The Austrians, who, as we have seen, had but little respect for the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, endeavored to influence Pius to accept the Imperial demands. He was inflexible. "When opinions are founded on the voice of conscience and the sentiment of duty, they become irrevocable. And, believe me, there is no physical force in the world that can long contend against a moral force of this nature. What we have said concerning the sad events that have affected our Apostolic See has been dictated by such sentiments, and, consequently, can suffer no variation, however frequently we may express our views."[1] Thus Pius answered the Austrian diplomat, Lebzelteru. Napoleon knew the power of this moral force. He was fully conscious of the superiority of the Papal office and authority. "Alexander," said he, to M. de Fontanes, "could call himself the son of Jupiter without contradiction from any one. I find a priest more powerful than I, because he reigns over minds and I only over matter." He wished to be a Sultan—and he took the means.[2]

An ordinary prisoner, on an allowance of three francs a day, separated from his advisers, spied, persecuted, Pius VII. was as courageous at Savona as at Rome. He refused canonical institution to the bishops appointed by the Emperor; he refused to acknowledge the marriage to Maria Louisa; he re-excommunicated his crowned jailor. The Emperor imprisoned priests, bishops, cardinals; others he swayed. He was determined to control 'the canons, the morals, the discipline, the sacraments, and the dogma of the Catholic Church.' He found docile instruments among the cardinals and the bishops. Even the Pope's confessor was his willing servant. Urged by their selfish and wicked master, these men made the Pontiff's life a life of torture. His age, his feebleness, the perplexity of a half-distracted mind, they used to make a victim of him and of the Church. They had a so-called Council—the Council of Paris—to aid them. 'The worthy old man was at length prevailed on, though not without bitter grief and after violent conflicts with himself, to renounce the right of institution,'[3] and to accept an imperial decree, skilfully worded,

[1] P. Van Duerm, *loc. cit.*, p. 93.

[2] In 1884–85, and again in 1887, Vte. De Mayol de Lupé, published in *Le Correspondant*, under the title: *Un Pape Prisonnier*, a series of historical studies on the Roman seizure and the imprisonment at Savona. Based as they are on original documents, these articles will serve the reader who desires an acquaintance with all the facts connected with a monstrous conspiracy.

[3] Ranke, *loc. cit.*, p. 465.

which implied, on the Pope's part, a renunciation of the temporal Sovereignty that he had so long and so valiantly defended. (September 20, 1811.)[1] To read of cardinals, archbishops and bishops scheming to induce a Pope to sacrifice the Patrimony of the Church, is to re-learn the lesson of human weakness. Cardinal Pacca relieves his 'colleagues' of 'evil intention,' but he does say that their action imprinted on their reputation '*une véritable tache*.'

Providence had not forsaken Pius. Quickly he saw the far-reaching effect of his concessions; quickly he assumed anew his former position of defence. "The resistance of the Pope made Napoleon furious. He used every form of intimidation, but his august captive remained unshaken.[2] On the very eve of the Russian campaign Pius was removed to Fontainebleau. There he could not hope for rescue; there he could be even more persistently harassed. Again the cardinals appeared on the scene; again they laid siege to his impressionable heart, picturing to him, in moving words, the sufferings of his flock. Meantime, God showed himself with a terrible aspect and judged the mighty one. Beaten as few soldiers ever have been beaten, Napoleon returned from the Russian expedition (December 18, 1812). In defeat, as in victory, his malice could be fully gratified only by mean persecution of the Vicar of Christ. As yet the Emperor's plans had not been wholly successful. Unmoved stood the Rock. Pius refused to cede the coveted Temporal Power. To attain his end, Napoleon adopted a conscienceless means, one that his guile had taught him the value of,—the physical shock,—a means by which sensitive men have been often wronged. Suddenly he presented himself to his worn, excited captive; smirked, embraced, stormed—and won. The Pope signed the Concordat of Fontainebleau (January 25, 1813). There were cardinals present, time-serving, timid, aiding the astute tyrant. The Emperor disappeared; the bells rang out; the loud Te Deum filled vault of cathedral and of humble village church, and throughout the Empire the Concordat was made public.

Conceived in fraud, executed under false representations, fraudulently published, the Concordat of Fontainebleau was null and void. The articles to which Pius had affixed his name were, by the agreement, to be kept secret, and to serve only as 'the basis of a definitive arrangement, to be elaborated when the Pope could consult the cardinals.'[3] Cheated by the treacherous Emperor,—

[1] Comte d'Haussonville, in *L'Eglise Romaine et le Premier Empire*, has given the details of the moral, or rather immoral, pressure to which Pius was subjected during this period. See also P. Van Duerm, *loc. cit.*, pp. 94–98.

[2] P. Van Duerm, *loc. cit.*, p. 99.

[3] P. Van Duerm, *loc. cit.*, pp. 103–104.

as shortsighted as treacherous,—Pius was at first overcome by grief. The wrong done himself he could have borne. The wrong done the Church he would not bear. Now the lamb was indeed turned into a lion. Publicly the Pope retracted the preliminary agreement of Fontainebleau, and boldly did he affirm his sacred rights as Supreme Head of the Church, and as temporal Sovereign of the Ecclesiastical States (March 24, 1813). The 'impostor' threatened him with death, but henceforward Pius was neither to know nor to show fear. On the ninth of May he condemned the various decrees by which Napoleon had undermined the spiritual and temporal authority of the Holy See, and annulled all acts committed under the deceitful forms of imperial law. Then came Murat's treachery, Moreau's revenge, the coalition, and the Congress of Prague, that offered terms to him who was accustomed to dictate. From Europe Pius demanded 'the restitution of that State of which he had been deprived for refusing to enter into a league purely offensive, and because he had sought to conserve that condition of neutrality which his quality of common Father of the faithful, and the interest of the Religion professed in the States of so many Sovereigns, exacted of him.' "Far from renouncing Our Temporal Sovereignty, we have, on the contrary, at all times and in all places, loudly proclaimed Our rights, all the more legitimate that they are founded on a possession of more than ten centuries, the longest perhaps that can be cited."[1] The prisoner was still a Pope in the full sense of the word. And Napoleon? Whipped,—at Kulm, Katzbach, Gross-Beeren, Dennewitz, Leipzig. Then the despot knelt, offering to recognize the Temporal Sovereignty, and to replace the Pope at Rome, *provided he would recognize the Concordat of Fontainebleau.* The offer was rejected. At length, on January 18, 1814, he wrote to Pius, proposing a treaty without any exactions. Articles I. and II. of this treaty read as follows: "His Majesty, the Emperor and King, recognizes His Holiness Pope Pius VII. as temporal Sovereign of Rome and of the countries forming, up to this, the Roman States, and actually annexed to the French Empire. In consequence, His Majesty, Emperor and King, will remit, as quickly as possible, into the hands of Pope Pius VII., or of his agents, these countries and their fortresses."[2] The Pope's heart had grown more lion-like. He answered "that he could lend himself to no negotiation because the restitution of his States, being an act of justice, could not become the object of a treaty, and that, besides, whatever he might do outside of his States, would seem to be the effect of

[1] P. Van Duerm, *loc. cit.*, p. 110.
[2] P. Van Duerm, *loc. cit.*, p. 113.

violence, and would be an occasion of scandal to the Catholic world."

Lord Lyons once said that, "it was very difficult to deal diplomatically with the Holy Spirit." The truth of this saying is greater even than its wit. Four days after the Emperor's proposal of a treaty, the Pope was informed that he was free to enter Italy. He doubted the imperial honesty; he feared a new imprisonment and new attacks. The Cardinals he warned to avoid all negotiations about temporal or spiritual affairs, and the doing of any act that would have 'the appearance of recognizing, even tacitly, the pretended sovereignty of the Emperor and of his successors over the domains of the Church.' Pius was only nominally free. Up to the 10th of March a French convoy shifted him back and forth on the confines of Italy. Hopelessly, Napoleon was hoping that he might escape destruction. Had he won a battle or a diplomatic advantage, there is no telling what might have been the Pope's fate. But he won no battles. His kingdoms had tumbled down. Jerome and Joseph were fugitives. Murat turned traitor, held Rome and Ancona, and was denouncing his former master as the representative of 'persecution, artifice, violence, tyranny and consternation.' With an army of 360,000 men, Napoleon was as if he were alone. At Chatillon sur Seine the allies were designing a new map. Well might the ruined Emperor set the Pope free. And this he did, on March 10, 1814.

By the end of the month Pius had crossed the border. As he marched joyously, amid the acclamations of his subjects, the allies entered Paris (April 2d), and in that palace of Fontainebleau which had been the Pope's prison, Charlemagne Bonaparte abdicated his temporal and spiritual sovereignty (April 11th). "On his way to the port from which he was to embark for Elba, he was compelled to disguise himself in order to escape the fury of the people."[1] The prisoner whom he had so terribly abused, did he enter Rome in disguise? No! But in solemn procession, amid the most remarkable expressions of affection.[2] "The world then commenced a new age, and a new era opened for the Roman See."[3] (May 24, 1814.)

Pius VII. did not wait until he reached Rome to exercise his sovereignty. On May 20th he protested once more against the treaty of Tolentino; and, in the person of Consalvi, he sent an envoy to Louis XVIII., the new ruler of France. As Murat still occupied a portion of the Papal territory and greedy Austria

[1] Cantu, *Hist. Univ.*, vol. xviii., p. 303.

[2] Cantu, *Hist. des Italiens*, vol. xi., p. 253.

[3] Ranke, *loc. cit.*, p. 467. By the way, the King of Elba's allowance was just two millions.

maintained possession of the Legations, the Pope, through Consalvi, addressed a note to the Powers, demanding that he should be placed in control of every foot of territory that of right belonged to him, including Avignon and the Venaissin. At the Congress of Vienna (Nov., 1814), Consalvi presented the case of the Papacy. Before a decision had been formulated, Napoleon re-entered France. Once more Murat joined hands with him. When he violated the Papal territory, Pius protested and withdrew to Florence. Waterloo made an end of Bonaparte. Murat was shot on the rock of Pizzo. (Oct. 13, 1815.) Thus, two of the greater conspirators against the rightful authority of the Holy See testified to the power, the goodness of God and to the ever-watchful and active Providence that guards 'the centre of Catholicity' and the Temporal Power of the Popes.

The Congress of Vienna repudiated the treaty of Tolentino and restored the Legations to the Holy See. (June 9, 1815.) Austria maintained a garrison at Ferrara and at Commachio for her own 'protection.' Parma and Piacenza, which the Popes rightfully claimed, were not returned, nor were Avignon and the Venaissin. In good fortune, as in ill, the Papacy is consistent. Consalvi protested against the 'iniquitous alienation, of the Apostolic domain; and Pius, in a public allocution, reiterated the Papal rights to Avignon, the Venaissin and Ferrara.[1] (Sept. 4, 1815.)

Before the last Pope dies the map of Europe will have changed more than once. The Papal claims will, however, stand unchanged until they have been satisfied, conscientiously, justly. Founded in right, the Church must support them in the interest of order, law, equity. Not only every state, but each individual, owes her an incalculable debt for the patience, courage, tenacity, with which she has defended right as against might.

Returning to Rome, Pius VII. had to do what Pope after Pope had done before him—reorganize the government, repair churches, bridges, roads; re-adorn the city; re-endow charities; encourage devotion; revive art and literature; repress the immoral and the disorderly. The task was heavy, but in the *Curia* they have the traditions of good government and a strong sense of their mission as renovators. The burden of administration did not prevent the Pope from giving due attention to the question of the Temporal Power. From Kings the Popes have learned that they need expect no more justice than from despots, Sultans, Directories, Assemblies or the mob. In this new Europe, Pius was determined to conserve the rights that the Papacy had maintained through all the revolutions that slowly or suddenly had formed

[1] P. Van Duerm, *loc. cit.*, 128.

and reformed the world. No Pope can do otherwise. If there be a Church, and a Head of that Church, there must be a centre of Christendom. To recognize this logical conclusion, one need not be either a Constantine or a Charlemange, a Voltaire, a Lépaux or a Napoleon. Peter's seat, Peter's tomb, has been, is, will be, that centre; and wheresoever the last Pope rules, guides, encourages, instructs the Christian world, whether he be a Boniface, Pius, Sixtus, Julius or Leo, in life, to death, he will, for the sake of the religion of Jesus Christ, protect, defend, protest, denounce, that the spiritual may be preserved, extended, by means of a Temporal independence, assured by sovereignty. The successors of the "King of the Jews" will be rulers forever and by the divinest of rights.

In order that the Bourbons might learn the mind of the Papacy —and the Bourbons were undoubtedly slow—Pius delicately conveyed to Louis XVIII. that the Popes had rights in Avignon and the Venaissin, and that the reigning Pope desired their recognition, by cession or by compensation. This was done in 1816. Nor did the Pope allow the Bourbons at Naples to forget their dutiful obligations to the Holy See. In France he received polite words without other pay. At Naples they answered him with an answer that was first given before a Bourbon had reigned there—an attempt to seize a portion of the Papal territory. Ferdinand IV. was a Bourbon Murat. A King who is not a thief, especially in his dealings with a Pope—deserves canonization; not for keeping one commandment, but because the keeping of this one by kings, is, seemingly, a grace granted only to those who have learned to respect all the ten commandments. However, the Pope, gaining nothing, lost nothing by the action of France or of Naples. Austria would have gladly 'protected' the Pope more efficiently than the Papacy desired; but Austria had enough to do in the territory guaranteed her by the Congress. Indeed, Europe, and more especially Italy, was in a condition of unrest. The allies, to serve the purpose of overturning Napoleon, had everywhere fostered a spirit of revolt. And this spirit they had kept alive, excited, inflamed, by a generous use of the idea of "liberty" and of "nationality." Imagine England, in 1812, propagating a spirit of liberty! It was England—Castlereagh, whose not ill-natured epitaph the liberal Byron wrote—that, more than any other power, tried to upset the 'imperial' throne by a most dangerous appeal to the aspirations of the intelligent and to the passions of the untrained crowd. The attempt to undo the revolution by revolutionary means, is felt over the whole world to this day. To credit France with the full sum of the evil, is to do injus-

tice to the 'mother country.' The Kings and the Emperors deserve their share of the blame—and their share is not small.

Napoleon had won his way in Italy by appealing to the spirit of nationality. He made slaves of the Italians. By appealing to the spirit of liberty, the English rallied the people against the conqueror. The Congress of Vienna could not create a people with the conservative ideas in vogue before Napoleon's day; nor could it moderate the passions, or correct the false notions that had been studiously developed. The country was divided 'among rulers, old, new, some merely temporary, and all with a patriarchal government.'[1] The Italians had the traditions of free government, and before Bonaparte came, enjoyed liberty through representative bodies, the growth of ages, knowing how to protect, organized to protect, the rights of the people. These institutions the French despot had subverted. When he was driven out the people found themselves under a rule they could not bear—the rule of absolutism.[2] During the Napoleonic sway the Carbonari had taken root. Murat was not the only prince that, for selfish purposes, encouraged the secret political societies. The name of our Lord has been made use of by many men, in and out of the Church, to counteract the beneficent work of His doctrine. Vanity, pride, malice, foolishness, have found in His loved name a resource found not elsewhere. The Carbonari, in the beginning, were vowed to 'avenge the death of Christ and to re-establish His kingdom.'[3] Vengeance is the Lord's, and His alone; and yet good, ignorant men might well be misled by the formula of the Carbonari. To trace the development of this association is not our purpose. From it various secret societies took their being. The idea of Christ and of Christianity was speedily lost; and the devil himself has, in time, become the ideal of a considerable class of reckless men in Italy. When Pius VII. returned to Rome the number of secret associations, revolutionary in aim and immoral in their teaching, was already notable. Each year the number grew. In Austria, Naples, Piedmont, they were active—the Socialists of that day. Though the Papal rule was mild, conciliatory, liberal and enterprising, it escaped the attacks of the Carbonari no more than the harsh, illiberal governments that misruled the greater part of Italy and the whole of the rest of the world. From the Neapolitan sectaries the Papal States had most to fear; but the Pope was able to maintain his independent sovereignty until his death, on August 20, 1823.

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[1] Cantu, *Hist. des Italiens*, vol. xi., p. 285.
[2] Cantu, *Hist. des Italiens*, vol. xi., p. 286.
[3] Cantu, *Hist. des Italiens*, vol. xi., p. 285.

Truly is it a noble prerogative of Rome, Cardinal Wiseman writes, "to be a place where enmities are forgotten and injuries buried in oblivion."[1] When the family of the Emperor was proscribed, where did mother, sisters, brother, seek an asylum? In Rome; in the territory of the Pope who had been so persecuted, so maltreated by the haughty Emperor. There "they were allowed to have their palaces, their estates, their titles, and their position not only unmolested, but fully recognized." Remembering all that this family did 'to destroy the centre of Catholicity,' Catholicity could boast of a noble revenge.

The study of history as a mere catalogue of dates and of facts is a vain study. As a guide in forming wise opinions and judgments in the present and for the future; as a stay and support of the eternal principles of right and justice; as a teacher of the practical value of longanimity, of the uncertainty of the most-carefully devised schemes of contriving, crooked men, and of the hidden, certain, inevitable action of Him who scattereth the proud in the imagination of their heart, putteth down the mighty from their seat, and exalteth them of low degree, the study of history is invaluable.

From the history of these thirty-three years of the Papacy what lesson may we learn? what opinions and judgments should we form in the present and for the future, wisely? The lessons are many; lessons to be learned from a review of the history of the Papacy year after year, century after century. The Church and the world are not one. The world is the enemy of the Church—has been, will be. Of the world, the Church is the one true, unselfish friend. Of all things that men rightly value,—peace, justice, liberty, truth, happiness,—she alone has the secret-guardian, leader, defender, teacher. The empire she would found is not that of a Charlemagne, but that of the Christ. Call to mind the rulers of Europe during the third of a century that we have glanced at; compare one, all, with Pius VI. and Pius VII. The comparison will not be a more telling argument in our favor than a comparison made between the princes and the Popes at any other period, but it will make the beneficent action of the Papacy on mankind as visible, as dazzling, as the noon-day sun. On every page of history read with honest, open eyes, we read, clearly written, with pens dipped in heart's blood, in salt tears, the lesson that Christ came to teach: "without Christianity, no general liberty; and without the Pope, no true Christianity—in other words, no operating, powerful, converting, regenerating, conquering, improving Christianity."[2]

[1] *The Last Four Popes*, Boston, 1858, p. 186.

[2] De Maistre: *The Pope*, London, 1850, p. 243.

From the record of these thirty-three years we are forced to draw still another lesson, one that should guide us in forming a *wise* judgment in the present and on the future. Rome has been, will be a battle-ground. Seat of the Papacy, of that wondrous power, directly instituted by the Saviour, a power that, as Napoleon recognized at the height of his glory, rules the spirit and not matter alone, Rome will be coveted as long as the world is not truly Christian. To possess it without right, is to be dishonored. Kings will dishonor themselves. To seize it is to invite the ruin that is not to be avoided. Kings will be ruined; peoples too. But the Popes—prisoners in Rome or out of Rome, threatened with death, wheedled, forced, from within or without—will never cede their rights as Sovereigns. The independence of the Papacy means the sovereignty of the Papacy. Canonists, compromisers with the controlling ideas of an immediate present, ambitious clerics, time-serving diplomatists, maddened mobs, victorious Emperors, shall argue, distinguish, negotiate, betray, fawn, kill, but the Papal *Non possumus* will baffle one and all. 'The voice of conscience and the sentiment of duty' compel the Popes, will ever compel them, to defend their sovereignty. 'Against a moral force of this nature no physical force in the world can long contend.' Pius VI., Pius VII. fought for no dynasty. They fought for religion, for the centre of Christianity, for the salvation of mankind. They could not do otherwise. No Pope until the end of time can do otherwise. Humanly speaking, the end of the Papacy, as a temporal power, will, from time to time, seem to be assured. Students of history will know that the end is not yet. And the Popes! They refresh their confidence daily, calling to mind the words of the Psalmist: The Lord will not suffer the rod of the wicked to rest upon the lot of the righteous.

MR. LECKY ON IRISH HOME RULE.

IN the January number of the *North American Review*, Mr. Lecky, the well known historian, has given to the public of this country an article on "Ireland in the Light of History." Under this very inoffensive title a bitter attack is made by the writer on the Irish Home Rule movement and its leaders. Mr. Lecky, by his "History of England in the Eighteenth Century," and other works, has won himself a high reputation for both research and impartiality which makes it impossible to pass over his assertions as we would do were they not sanctioned by the weight of his name. The editor of the *Review* in his preface says that "every scholar will admit that there is no higher authority on the relations of England and Ireland, no other historian who has investigated the subject with equal patience and thoroughness or measured the testimony before him with so much impartiality." This high character, we are forced to say, is not in any way borne out by the *Review* article. In it Mr. Lecky drops the character of the historian and assumes that of the partisan. He uses his knowledge of historical facts not to bring out the truth but to forward the interests of a party, and that a discredited and ignoble one, by palpable special pleading and even direct misstatements. These are hard words to use of a man of Mr. Lecky's reputation, but they are fully justified by the nature of his article in the *Review*, as we believe we shall show conclusively in the following pages.

The history of Ireland, Mr. Lecky tells us at the opening of his article, is chiefly valuable as "a study of morbid anatomy." As a historian we should have thought that the vitality which has kept the Irish race alive through eight centuries of oppression might furnish other causes for study than can be described as morbid anatomy, but we can let that pass as a matter of taste. We cannot do the same with his stout assertion that "the idea that Ireland before the arrival of the Normans was a single and independent nation is wholly false," and that it was not a nation but a "collection of separate tribes and kingdoms engaged in almost constant warfare." The latter assertion, even if true, no more proves that Ireland was not a single and independent nation than the existence of warring feudal nobles in France, Germany or England would warrant the assertion that there was no French nation before Louis XI. or no German nation before Barbarossa.

Ireland in the eleventh and twelfth centuries had a national

sovereign as well recognized as Hugh Capet was in France or Lothaire or Wenceslas in Germany. Mr. Lecky, in almost the next sentence, admits as much, and that had Ireland not been impeded by extraneous influences she would have followed the same path as England or France. The assertion, however, that Ireland was not an independent nation because she happened to be in the same condition as other nations at the same period, is characteristic of the Unionist style of attack. The common faults and errors of human nature, when they occur in Ireland, are spoken of by her assailants as if they were peculiar to Ireland. It is a trick to which we are used in the *London Times* and its fellow-journals, but one which is wholly unworthy of a historian like Mr. Lecky.

Another strange inaccuracy is the statement that the colonies of English and Scotch settlers, which it became the policy of the English Government to introduce into Ireland after the Reformation, were placed on "the land that was confiscated in consequence of rebellion." Mr. Lecky knows Irish history well enough to be aware that the six counties of Ulster on which the plantation of James was made were not confiscated in consequence of rebellion, but seized by the crown on the flight of the Earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnel to France to escape the plot laid against them by Sir John Chichester somewhat on the lines of the recent *Times* plot against the characters of the Irish national leaders. The Connaught plantation of Strafford was based on "defective titles," supposed to be found by the crown lawyers in the estates of the native Irish owners of the land. The error is not a very important one, but it is surprising in a writer of Mr. Lecky's usual accuracy. Taken in connection with his subsequent strictures on recent legislation for limiting the powers of the landlord class over their tenants, it would seem to imply that he can occasionally distort historical facts to serve the theories of modern partisanship.

Mr. Lecky's treatment of the Penal Code in the *Review* is a good deal milder than we would have expected from his chapters on the same subject in "England in the Eighteenth Century." It is strange to find a writer who has won reputation as a moralist putting forward with much consideration a plea in defence of the infamous Penal Laws on the grounds that "at the close of a long period of savage civil war it was absolutely necessary for a small minority who *found themselves in possession* of the government and land of the country to deprive the conquered and hostile majority of every element of political and military strength." This plea would warrant any system of tyranny that the world has ever seen. It would justify the Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria, the exterminations of the Sciotes or Suliotes by former sultans, or the butcheries

of Nadis Shah or Genghis Khan. It is an explanation of the reason of the Code, not a defence of it. It is true Mr. Lecky puts this remarkable apology in the mouths of Protestant Irishmen of the last century, but as he adds that "there is much truth in these considerations," he gives it to a certain extent his own endorsement. The curious historical misstatement that the Code followed a long period of savage civil war, when in fact the war preceding it was the two years' struggle of the Catholic population of Ireland against the foreign army of William the Third is also deserving of note.

We may pass over the remark that a union between Ireland and England at the time of the Scotch union might have changed the whole current of Irish history. Mr. Lecky gives no reasons why such a change would have been for the good of Ireland. He gives no reason whatever to make us imagine that such would have been the case, though he speaks of it as "a golden opportunity lost." His assertion that seventy years of quiet followed the rejection of the proposed union, and in another place that the Penal Code produced eighty years of the most profound tranquility is a different matter. It is directly contradicted by Mr. Lecky's own "History of England in the Eighteenth Century," in which the reader will find long accounts of the various disturbances and secret societies that convulsed Ireland under the Penal Laws. He follows up with the further assertion that under the Penal Code "there was no tendency to throw taxation unduly on the poor." This is not only untrue but Mr. Lecky admits its falsehood in the following sentence, in which he says that "the practical evil most severely felt was the system of tithes, and it was aggravated by a very unfair exemption of pasture lands." This exemption, as every reader of Irish history is well aware, was made in favor of the rich landowners who preferred to keep their land in sheep-runs to letting it to the agricultural population. The poor cultivators in fact had to pay the whole burthen of the tithes, while the landlords, if they chose to keep their land in pasture, were wholly exempt from this the chief land-tax. It is true that the average American reader may not be aware of the real meaning of the very unfair exemption of pasture lands, while he would accept at once Mr. Lecky's positive statement that there was no tendency to throw taxation unduly on the poor. Mr. Lecky himself is well aware that the two statements are in direct contradiction and that the first is untrue; still he deliberately makes it, apparently trusting to the ignorance of his readers not to detect the contradiction. It seems to us that he simply lends the weight of his name to a direct falsehood, and it certainly jus-

tifies us in requiring other proofs than his mere assertion for the other statements in his article.

In his palliation of the Penal Code, however, he does not confine himself to distorting the facts about the tithes. He boldly asserts not only that "it produced the most perfect tranquility during eighty years," but that "there was not much real oppression or religious bigotry during the same period." To this astounding assertion it is enough to oppose the testimony of a witness frequently quoted by Mr. Lecky, with approval both in his history and in the *Review*, Arthur Young, who travelled in Ireland in 1776 and 1779, and who refers both to that time and the state of affairs preceding it for one or two generations. Young was an Englishman and a Protestant, and had no tendency to any special sympathy with the Irish peasantry. Speaking under the express head of oppression, he says, in 1776:

"The age has improved so much in humanity that even the poor Irish have experienced its influence, and are every day treated better and better (than through Mr. Lecky's eighty years of tranquility). Still, the remnant of the old manners, the abominable distinction of religion united with the oppressive conduct of the little country gentleman, or, rather, vermin of the kingdom, altogether bear very heavy on the poor people. The landlord of an Irish estate inhabited by Roman Catholics is a sort of despot who yields obedience in whatever concerns the poor to no law but that of his will. . . . . A landlord in Ireland can scarcely invent an order which a servant, laborer, or cotter dares to refuse to execute. Disrespect or anything tending towards sauciness he may punish with his cane or horsewhip with the most perfect security. A poor man would have his bones broke if he ventured to lift his hands in his own defence. Nay, I have heard anecdotes of the lives of people being made free with without any apprehension of the justice of a jury. *Formerly, it happened every day*, but law gains ground. It must strike the most careless traveller to see whole strings of cars whipped into a ditch by a gentleman's footman, to make way for his carriage; if they are overturned or broken in pieces, no matter, it is taken in patience; were they to complain, they would, perhaps, be horsewhipped. It is a fact that a poor man having a contest with a gentleman, must—but I am talking nonsense, they know their situation too well to think of it. They can have no defence, but by means of protection from one gentleman against another who probably protects his vassal as he would the sheep he intends to eat."

Such was the state of things which Mr. Lecky has briefly summed up by the statement that "there was not much real oppression." Let us see what the same authority has to say of his "eighty years of the most perfect tranquility."

Mr. Young continues:

"Consequences have flowed from these oppressions which ought long ago to have put a stop to them. In England we have heard much of White Boys, Steel Boys, Oak Boys, Peep of Day Boys, etc. *These various insurgents* are not to be confounded, for they are very different. All but the White Boys were among the manufacturing Protestants in the North; the White Boys were Catholic laborers in the South. The case was different with the White Boys who, being laboring Catholics, met all those oppressions I have described, and would probably have continued in full submission had not

very severe treatment in regard to tithes, united with a great speculative rise of rent about the same time, blown up the flame of resistance. The atrocious acts they were guilty of made them the object of general indignation; acts were passed for their punishment which seemed calculated for the meridian of Barbary.

"By one they were to be hanged under circumstances without the common formalities of a trial, which, though repealed the following session, marks the spirit of punishment, while others remain yet the law of the land that would, if executed, tend more to raise than quell an insurrection. From all which, it is manifest, that the gentlemen of Ireland never thought of a radical cure from overlooking the real cause of the disease which, in fact, lay in themselves, *not* in the wretches they doomed to the gallows. Let them change their own conduct entirely and the poor will not long riot."

If this was the "most perfect tranquility," as Mr. Lecky assures his readers it was, then we do not know what he would call disorder. The reader can judge from the foregoing what amount of credit Mr. Lecky's statements on historical matters are worth where the interests of his own class are involved.

The account which is given of the emancipation of the Irish Parliament is correct in its main features, though it is untrue to say that among the Irish Catholics there was absolutely no sympathy with the American cause. The names of Commodore Barry, Moylan, Sullivan and numerous others in the Revolutionary War are sufficient proof of the incorrectness of Mr. Lecky's assertion. His uncertainty as to whether the Constitution of Grattan's Parliament could last, is somewhat strange in its arguments at the present day. We thought it had been pretty well solved that federations of States with different legislatures can exist, though a hundred years ago there may have been doubts on the subject. Mr. Lecky insists on the fact that the Irish Parliament, from 1782 to 1800, was a purely Protestant and landlord body, and also that it was devoted to the English throne and merciless in its dealings with what he calls anarchy and sedition. All these characteristics were shared by the English Parliament of the day and have passed away never to return, we hope. The most bigoted Unionist will hardly contend that a Protestant oligarchy is the only form of rule suited to Ireland, even if he thinks so.

The sketch which Mr. Lecky gives his American readers of the insurrection of "'98," and the measures used by the Government to bring about the Legislative Union, is widely different indeed from the account of the same period which he gives in his history. In the *Review* article he suppresses nearly all mention of the misdeeds of the Government, while he exaggerates those committed by the insurgent peasantry. During the Wexford insurrection there were two massacres of prisoners committed by the insurgents, one in Wexford town and another at Scullabogue, where a barn containing a number of prisoners was burned by the camp followers after the battle of New Ross. In both cases these mas-

sacres were committed by the hangers-on and runaways in the absence of the main rebel army, and they were at once repudiated by the leaders without exception. On the other hand, before the Wexford insurrection broke out, there were wholesale massacres of untried prisoners committed by the loyalists at Carnew, at Dunlavin Green and other places, which were openly approved by the Government. The butchery at the Curragh by the troops under Sir James Duff was peculiarly infamous. The Kildare insurgents were promised pardon if they would surrender their arms, and, when that had been done, the cavalry were let loose on the unarmed crowd, and between three and four hundred (three times the number of victims at Scullabogue) men murdered in cold blood. For this dastardly murder the loyalist majority in Parliament passed a vote of thanks to General Duff, thus identifying themselves fully with its disgrace. These facts can be found fully told in Mr. Lecky's history, but the American reader will get no suspicion of them from the *Review* article. There they will only learn that there were massacres of Protestants by the rebels, and that it was that which checked the patriotic tendencies of the Ulster Presbyterians.

Both of those latter assertions are direct untruths. Bad as the Scullabogue tragedy was, it had not a religious character, as both Catholics and Protestants were included in the victims. The Ulster Presbyterians did make a rising in Down and Antrim, and it was two weeks after the men of Wexford had swept the British troops out of their country. There were sharp engagements at Saintfield and Ballynahinch, in Down, and at the town of Antrim, and in each case Presbyterians were the leaders on the patriotic side as well as the majority of the followers.

The only reason that we can find for these strange misstatements is that Mr. Lecky wishes to make his readers believe that Home Rule in Ireland would be the signal for a general persecution of all creeds except the Catholic. Absurd as this proposition is to any intelligent man, it has been gravely repeated from hundreds of platforms by the paid orators of the Tory party in England. Mr. Lecky's brief remarks on the Wexford insurrection are calculated skilfully to impress his readers with the spirit of religious intolerance that he supposes to exist among the Irish Catholics. In his "History of England" he remarks that it was an extraordinary fact that the Wexford insurgents, though nearly all Catholics, chose as their commander-in-chief a Protestant gentleman, Baginal Harvey, and made another Protestant, Captain Keough, governor of the town. In the *Review*, the way this is stated by Mr. Lecky is thus:

"In Wexford, priests put themselves at the head of the movement, and turned it into a religious war, deriving its main force from religious fanaticism, and waged with desperate courage. The massacre of Protestants on Vinegar Hill, in Scullabogue, and in Wexford, and the general character the rebellion in Leinster assumed, at once checked all the tendency to rebellion among the Protestants of Ulster."

The reader may judge how much reliance is to be placed on the statements of Mr. Lecky from this extract. Mr. Lecky informs us that "it will dispel many illusions if the reader will remember that the Irish rebellion was directed mainly against the Irish Parliament, and that it received its death-blow from Irish loyalists before any assistance arrived from England. The conspiracy began among Protestants and Deists, who aimed at a union of sects for the purpose of obtaining a democratic republic. It turned into a war, which was scarcely less essentially religious than the war of the Cevennes."

In point of fact, the original object of the United Irishmen was to reform the Irish Parliament so that it should really represent the nation, and not be controlled by the nominees of the English Government. Its ultimate purpose was to separate Ireland from England when it was found that the British Government was determined to make a free Irish representation impossible. As to the statement that it was put down by Irish loyalists before any assistance arrived from England, how does Mr. Lecky reconcile it with the fact that everywhere the rebellion assumed formidable proportions? At Vinegar Hill, at Ballenamuck, and at Ballynahinch, the insurgents were put down by the regular troops of England, under General Lake in the first two, and Nugent in the third. The number of British regulars stationed in Ireland in the end of 1797 is usually given at fifty thousand men, which was increased to eighty thousand during the progress of the rebellion, exclusive of the local militia. Mr. Lecky himself admits that the troops stationed in the country after the rebellion were too numerous for armed opposition to be possible. How can he reconcile this with his assertion that the rebellion received its death-blow from Irish loyalists. We have already seen how he has distorted facts in seeking to make the Wexford insurrection a religious war. There was, indeed, a violently anti-Catholic character given to the suppression of the rebellion by the Government. Some sixty-five Catholic churches were burned by the yeomanry and troops, most of them after the cessation of hostilities, but only one Protestant place of worship met a similar fate in spite of the exasperation of the people. The English ministry, which was all-powerful in the corrupt Irish Parliament during the last three years of its existence, simply revived the practices of the old penal days to strike terror into the Catholic masses. Mr. Lecky,

in his "History," makes no secret of these facts, but the interpretation he gives of them in his article does not give the slightest hint of their nature to his readers.

The picture which Mr. Lecky draws of the changed condition of Ireland to-day is a striking example of how half a truth can be made to pass for a whole lie:

> "Ninety years have passed since the Union, 'we are told,' and the conditions of Ireland are completely changed. The whole system of religious disqualification and commercial disability has long since passed away. Every path has been thrown open—the Established Church no longer exists; representation has been placed on a democratic basis. Finally, an attempt has been made to put down agrarian agitation by legislation, to which there is no real parallel in English history. Landlords who possessed the clearest title known to English law—the most absolute ownership of their estates—have been converted into mere rent-chargers."

To read these statements, one unacquainted with the real condition of Ireland would suppose that it was enjoying a condition of ideal prosperity and good government, and that nothing but a spirit of unnatural perverseness could account for the continued agitation for Home Rule which Mr. Lecky admits to exist. A brief filling in of the other side of the picture with facts too notorious to be disputed will give a rather different solution of the Irish struggle for Home Rule.

It is quite true that the letter of the law no longer excludes the Catholics of Ireland from a share in the government of their country or from Parliament. It is, however, equally true that the whole administration of the law and nearly the whole local government and the possession of nearly all the land are still in the hands of the class which a few years ago was known as the "Protestant Ascendancy," and is now more correctly described as the official and landlord class. A body not exceeding ten thousand in number, the descendants, for the most part, of the oligarchy of the last century, who, as Mr. Lecky so neatly puts it, "found themselves in possession of the land and government of the country" when the treaty of Limerick was broken, still holds five-sixths of the land of Ireland, and considers itself entitled to deal with it and its cultivators as it pleases. To fix a limit on the rents which this body may exact from the six hundred thousand families who make up the farming class and form nearly two-thirds of the whole Irish population is, in the judgment of this class, a dishonest interference with the "rights of property." Those rights have been fixed by themselves during their long control of the Irish government on the policy of "self-defence justified by necessity," which Mr. Lecky gives as the plea of their representatives in the last century for depriving the majority of the population of all military and political strength. The Irish oligarchy, even under the Penal

Laws, had, indeed, little of religious feeling or fanaticism. The establishment of a State Church, which the mass of the population refused, for conscience' sake, to accept, was found a convenient means of separating the dominant caste from the bulk of the nation. The small number of Catholic landlords and lawyers that were willing to barter their conscience for their material interests were too few (be it said to the honor of the Irish race) to inspire any fear to the dominant oligarchy. The Presbyterians in the North were excluded by the Test Act from all share in political power as well as the Catholics, and it is a curious fact that in Ireland the term Protestant is confined entirely to the members of the late Established Church. As Sir William Petty put it, they were the only legal Protestants, and political power, not religious teaching, was the main object of the Established Church in Ireland. The class which once constituted the oligarchy still lives, with the same spirit of caste, insolence, and dislike of the mass of the Irish people as it had last century, and it still continues to control the local administration. The grand juries, the sheriffs, the great majority of the boards which govern Irish affairs, education, poor laws, public works, and police are drawn almost exclusively from this class, which also furnishes four-fifths, at least, of the magistrates of the country, and has a preponderating influence in every branch of the administration of the law. Catholics may occupy seats on the bench, but they can only reach them by the favor of the Government, which makes itself perfectly sure that only such shall be appointed as are ready to identify themselves with the interests of the dominant class. National sympathies, if openly expressed, are as effectual a bar to-day to high office in Ireland as was the profession of the Catholic faith before emancipation. Indeed, since the Union, the decay of all spirit of Irish patriotism among the dominant class has made them, as a body, far more hostile to the interests of the Irish people at large than they were during the Penal Laws. Such, in simple fact, is the change of which Mr. Lecky speaks, and its results can be gathered from the present material condition of Ireland.

At the beginning of the century the population of Ireland was about three-fifths that of England. To-day it is one-fifth. Within the last forty-five years, from the combined effects of preventable famine and anti-national misgovernment, it has fallen from eight and a half to less than five millions. In this respect Ireland is absolutely alone among the nations of Europe, and the decrease still goes on. The wealth of the country has decreased in like proportions. The cultivated land to-day is just half of what it was fifty years ago. And every branch of the national resources—fisheries, manufactures, and commerce—has shared in the decline. When the Union

was enacted the value of Irish property was estimated at two-seventeenths of that of the Empire. To-day the first authorities say it is less than one-twentieth, yet the taxation for imperial purposes has been increased nearly seventy-five per cent. during the past thirty-five years, while that of England has not increased much over ten. It is this state of affairs as much as the abstract principle of love of native land that makes the great mass of Irishmen—Celtic, Norman, or Saxon in origin and Catholic or non-Catholic in creed—continue the struggle for Home Rule, which has never been abandoned during eight long centuries of good or evil fortune.

The description which Mr. Lecky lays before his readers of the Anti-Home Rule party in Ireland is at once the most audacious and the most comic part of his article. "About a third of the population of Ireland," he gravely informs us, "regard Home Rule as the greatest catastrophe that could befall themselves, their country or the empire; and it is worthy of note that they include almost all the descendants of Grattan's Parliament, of the volunteers and of those classes who, in the eighteenth century, sustained the spirit of nationality in Ireland." If, by the latter, he means the gentlemen whose plea for maintaining the Penal Code he has so naively given, or the corrupt majority of placemen who sold away the parliament of their native land, he is probably correct; but we are not aware that any descendant of the men who won the freedom of Ireland, in 1782, in spite of the corrupt majority of a packed legislature, is to be found among the little band of Irish Unionists. A descendant of Grattan, Sir Thomas Grattan Esmonde, fills a seat in the imperial parliament to-day, but he is to be found on the Home Rule benches. The Chancellor of the Irish Exchequer who forfeited his office sooner than sell his country, has also left a representative, to-day in public life, but even Mr. Lecky will hardly make Americans believe Mr. Parnell an opponent of Home Rule.

As to the statement that a third of the Irish population, including, in Mr. Lecky's words, "almost all the Protestants, almost all the Catholic gentry, the decided preponderance of Catholics in the lay professions and a *great and guiding section* of the Catholic middle-class," a very simple consideration will suffice to show its falsehood. Belfast is the stronghold of the Unionists as well as of the Orangemen. Its Catholic population is about one-fourth of the whole and is mainly composed of the working classes; yet one of the most distinguished Home Rule speakers finds his constituency in Belfast. The whole representation of Ulster numbers thirty-three; sixteen of these are returned by the Unionists who have at their disposal the entire government patronage, both imperial and

local, the administration of the law and the support of the whole landlord class. The Home Rulers return a clear majority of seventeen members, and in at least three, if not more of the Unionist seats, they have almost the assurance of success were an election held to-morrow. Throughout the other three provinces, the Unionists have not secured the return of a single member except in the close corporation of Trinity College. In not more than half a dozen do they even venture to contest a seat when vacant, and in several the proportion of Nationalist votes recorded at the last election was from twenty to forty to one. If Mr. Lecky expects Americans to believe that a third of the population with the whole machinery of government and landlord influence at its back is unable to return one-sixth of the popular representatives, his confidence in their credulity is sadly misplaced. His array of Unionists is strikingly suggestive of Falstaff's men in buckram and just as worthy of credence.

The tirade against the Home Rule leaders, which concludes the article, is hardly worth replying to after the evidence already given of its author's want of good faith. The men whom he assails have never put forward the plea of "self-defence justified by necessity" for plundering and crushing any section of their fellow-countrymen, which Mr. Lecky finds so natural in the representatives of his own class. They do hold that the well-being of the whole country requires the abolition of the privileges of a class and of the rule of foreign officials, but neither they nor any impartial thinker in any land believes that such an abolition is dishonest in any sense though it may undoubtedly bear hard on individuals. Crimes undoubtedly have been committed by individuals during the progress of the land struggle, but they are far fewer than occur in the adjoining country of England or in most of the States of this Union, even in the most tranquil times. To compare them for a moment with the atrocities of the ascendancy class during its tenure of power in 1798, as told by Mr. Lecky himself, the burning of houses and churches, the butcheries of unarmed men by hundreds, the half hangings and floggings and pitchcaps of the savage yeomanry, would be as reasonable as to compare one of our railroad or labor strikes with the Turkish massacres in Bulgaria or Greece.

As to Mr. Lecky's references to the late special commission on the *Times*' charges against the Home Rulers, we can assure him that it is well known in America. The details of the plot laid by the *London Times* and the Tory Government to blast the character of Mr. Parnell and his colleagues by forged documents and evidence culled from the convict prisons by the promise of liberty in exchange for perjury are known in every American community. The chief wonder that his allusion to them will cause, is at the

audacity with which he brings them forward now as evidence against the Home Rule movement. The names of Pigott, the forger and suicide, of his employer, Houston, the Secretary of the "Loyal and Patriotic" Unionist League, who bought the forgeries and pledged himself for their correctness while refusing to tell the particulars of their origin, the scandal of the Attorney-General of England lending his services and official position to the conspiracy while claiming afterwards to know nothing of its origin—all these are as well known in America as in Ireland itself. The conclusions which every impartial American has drawn from them are in direct contradiction to the assertions of Mr. Lecky, whose fame as a truthful historian is irretrievably damaged by this his latest essay on "Ireland in the Light of History."

"PROMISE OF THE SECOND SPRING IN ENGLAND."

Life of Father Ignatius of St. Paul; by Rev. Father Pius à Spiritu Sancto. Dublin: Duffy. 1866.

Paper read by His Lordship, the Bishop of Salford, at the Catholic Conference at Birmingham, July, 1890.

Sermon of His Eminence, the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminister, at the Brompton Oratory, August 20, 1890.

Memories of Fifty Years; Sermons preached by the Very Rev. Canon Lochart at St. Ethelreda's, Holborn, August, 1890.

EVEN to think of the eighteenth century is to an English Catholic like struggling through a weary oppressive dream. That dissolute, vain, dreary, hopeless, godless era, when the faithful remnant hid their heads in obscurity and obloquy, and the religion of the nation at large was like the dry unblest sands of a desert, whence the water-courses have retired forever, is, thank heaven, a hundred years distant, and it has taken us a hundred years to recover from its deadly effects.

Yet, if only because of thankfulness, let us cast back our looks over that dead level of irreligion and iniquity, into which the Reformation had succeeded in transforming the dower-land of the Virgin-Mother. Let us contemplate the dusty, whitewashed country churches, where the bewigged parson, worldly and sensual

as he of Hogarth's pictures if rich, cringing and beggarly if poor, Sunday by Sunday declaimed a lifeless service which nobody heeded, to a congregation of sleepy, careless, God-bereft peasants, and to a few painted ladies and port-sodden, duel-fighting gentlemen in the squire's pew. Let us look into the town churches as they were in that odious century, great dreary St. Paul's, enlivened by a ray of real heartiness and reverence only when some hero of earthly battles was laid to his rest in its cold solitudes; venerable Westminster, and all the old shrines in the city, where once the Pure Oblation was wont to be daily offered, but where now the mouthing of the parson and strident amens of the clerk, with at best some burning abuse of Papists (for that at least was earnest) constituted public worship week by week. Most heart-rending of all, let us think of cathedrals raised by our ancestors to honor the Divine Presence, glorious temples not often matched even in Catholic countries, reduced to be the rendezvous of drowsy, unspiritual canons whose knowledge of music was their only title to perform a religious function, and sheltering the throne of worldly bishops appointed by worldly statesmen, perhaps even by women of evil influence at court. Let us call to mind the few remaining faithful who still trimmed the lamp in hidden places amid the gloom of the surrounding heathendom, trodden down, impoverished, debarred from every calling, and unfitted by their very isolation for the championship of their cause. Persecution now was slow, passive, grinding, common-place. In the two previous centuries there had been the glory of martyrs seeing heaven from the scaffold, the ecstasy of confessors, consoled by angels, on the rack; but in the eighteenth century there only remained the lifelong irksomeness of being hated, feared, misrepresented, and deprived of intellectual no less than physical weapons of self defence.

But all this was the Reformation *in extremis*. This was the dark, foggy winter, preferable to the autumn of the seventeenth century, inasmuch as it was nearer to the spring of the nineteenth. Slight signs that warmth and light might again return, were not altogether absent. The English, once a highly religious people, who had given numerous saints to the Church, began to weary of the hopeless want of God. They had been led to hate the faith of their fathers as something foreign and wicked, something utterly unlike its real self, which they no longer had any means of seeing as it was. Formal and ignorant as the nation generally had become, there were many whose souls craved for communion with their Creator more wearily than their bodies craved for food in the frequent dearths which checkered the national glory and prosperity. Such souls were to be found mostly among the lower

classes in the towns. The bulk of the rural population were sunk in that state of indifference and want of religious comprehension which, alas! stupefies them still.

John Wesley fought blindly, though with good intent, against the prevailing dull heathendom, and his followers soon constituted a new and fervent form of dissent. Naturally dissent had existed ever since the days of Henry VIII., for the Church of England no sooner raised the standard of mutiny, than her own troops turned her own engines of war against herself. But the kind of dissent which queened it in the days of the parliament was even more worldly, gloomy, cold and repellent, than the schism from which it had separated. Wesleyan Methodism, on the other hand, was warm, ardent and attractive to excitable minds; the party nearest to it in the Established Church imbibed something of its ill-regulated fervor. Wesley had sown seed destined to come to a very different blossom from what he hoped or wished. He had prepared many souls to imbibe that "intense conviction of God" which, as Father Lochart tells us in one of his sermons at Ely Place, was the ruling, abiding motive power with our great departed cardinal from the time of his boyhood in an evangelical family. A profound devotion to the great primary truth of revelation, no matter by whom implanted, was sure to work in pure and honest souls till their eyes opened on a scene of unexpected light.

Grace, then, had not been extinct even in the darkest, chilliest time; and towards the end of the eighteenth century the pitiful spirits, whether of angels or men, who mourned over this land

> "After that unheard of coldness,
> That intolerable winter,
> Saw the first flower of the spring-time."

It might be said that such a flower was the hospitality extended by England to exiled French priests. France had revolted against the Church with a more sudden, rapid, and infuriated movement than was the case with England; she had thrown down the altar, and had not even erected a table in its place; she had gone to logical extremities, and denied the existence of God, together with His revelation. All this was shocking to the more staid and reverent heterodoxy of the English, who chose to believe in God, even though they preferred Him at a distance. Therefore they received, fed, even welcomed the French priests as sufferers in the cause of religion, law and order. It was the first time for two hundred and fifty years that England had shown charity; nay, aught but bitter enmity to the Catholic priesthood; yet did she in no wise lose her reward.

She was on the brink of the century which, as we hope and

trust, will be illustrious throughout all succeeding ages, as the time when the reconversion of the English was begun. The worst of the Penal Laws had been relaxed in 1778 and 1791; and now another sign of spring arose in the person of John Milner. Inspired by the ancient Catholic memories of Winchester, where he served the small chapel which the present bishop of the diocese seeks to enlarge; and endowed with a clear and fluent style, he entered the field single-handed against a host of bitterly Protestant controversialists. Bishop Milner's attitude, both as a writer and a public character, was a bold one for those days, when, as he himself observes, English Catholics were "just emerging from a storm of almost three hundred years," and when, in spite of some alleviations, "the abuse of popery" was still "almost every Sunday, in numberless Protestant pulpits, the standing subject with which zeal enlightened ignorance . . . . with all the low buffoonery of holy ridicule." (Letters to a Prebendary, p. 127, *et seq.*) Little could Milner then foresee that in less than a century every pulpit in England would ring with the praises of one who, from an Anglican clergyman, became a Catholic priest and a cardinal of the Roman Church! Yet Milner was himself a factor in this change. His "End of Controversy" has nobly earned its title by terminating the doubts and troubles of many an English soul; it was the "short cut" by which some even of Newman's disciples at Littlemore found their way to the truth before their great master.

Milner's work was to force on the attention of Protestants the true nature of doctrines and practices which they were accustomed ignorantly to condemn. A little later arose one who began to carry the position by enlisting Catholics everywhere in the cause of England's conversion by means of prayer. A great mystery it is that the Omnipotent God should have hung His purposes on our prayers; a mystery which it belongs to theologians to sound, and which even they cannot fathom; but we see by evident results, that as well might one expect a crop without sowing the seed, as spiritual good without prayer. It was when united supplication went up for England that the breath of May began to thaw "the winter of our discontent." And this was the work in particular of one ardent soul.

From the unlikeliest quarter, from a noble, worldly, wealthy, Protestant house, the old Norman family of the Spencers, came the man destined to reconquer by prayer the land which his ancestors had conquered by the sword.

A youth of fashion, naturally in the best society, dressing like a dandy of the regency, frequenting balls and fond of cards, George Spencer was all the while a pure elect soul, who "loved justice"

and hated iniquity from his childhood onward. He himself tells us, in his own humble, self-doubting way, how he struggled against the "dark iniquity" prevalent, at Eton and Cambridge in his day. "Life," pp. 8–36. When he became a clergyman, though he seems to have taken the step rather because it was suitable to a younger son than from religious motives, he threw himself loyally into his work. The time was a dull one for the poor, dry and dusty Church of England, going on for two hundred and fifty years, old yet not in the least venerable. Spencer took her as she was; he had no ambition to Catholicize her; no thought of tracing in her any resemblance to the old faith whose place she had usurped, and whom it was a law of her being to hate. At first he adopted "High Church" ways, which then consisted in persuading people (much against the grain, apparently) to have their children baptized and to attend the "Lord's Supper," and in calling Dissenters "schismatics." But Dr. Elmesley demolished Spencer's High Church principles by pointing out that they were "very convenient doctrines, if we could make use of them, but . . . . available only for Roman Catholics." He then became a fervent Evangelical, believed in a "new birth," lectured his ecclesiastical superiors, and fraternized with all kinds of sects.

Yet now it was, just when he seemed furthest from what was to be his vocation, that he took the narrow path which leadeth unto life, the path of bodily mortification. As rector of Brighton, he adopted the practice of rigorous fasting; he gave all his goods to the poor, denying himself even necessaries for their sakes. Then suddenly his eyes were opened, and he saw light.

His acquaintance with Ambrose Lisle Phillips threw him in the way of learning what Catholic doctrine really was, and his mind was matured by purity and self-denial to receive the good seed. At one step he strode from evangelicalism to the Catholic Church. Now, at last, he was unchangeably settled; but his warm, earnest character naturally found its life-work in a great effort for the conversion of his country. He was ordained priest in Rome in 1830, in the Church of St. Gregory the Great; and from those very cloisters, whence St. Augustine went forth to convert the Anglo-Saxons, stepped the missionary priest on his way to recall them to St. Augustine's faith. The task before him was more than herculean, it was hopeless, it was impossible. He was face to face with an absolutely anti-Catholic nation. Probably we, who have known England in better days, and who reap in ease where others sowed in toil, cannot conceive the spiritual darkness of that time, prior to the "Oxford Movement;" the sedate worldliness of the High Clergy, the dark imaginings and deadly *odium theologicum* of the Low, love of God the fee-simple of the ignorant Dissenter,

blind hatred of Rome the one common heritage of all. And out of this religious pandemonium Father Spencer proposed to make a Catholic nation.

Not a great preacher or a great writer, his lovable character and his linguistic talents were curiously suitable to his peculiar work of uniting Catholic nations in prayer for the conversion of England. Intercession was his abiding hope. In Rome he had formed acquaintance with Father Dominic, the Passionist, who, like St. Paul of the Cross himself, had all his life, for no external reason whatever, desired the conversion of England; and they prayed and said Mass with this intention. They, themselves, could not but look on the Tractarian movement, which almost immediately followed, as an answer to their prayers.

Nothing in the history of the Church in England, if we except the lives and deaths of the martyrs, is more exquisitely fascinating than the history of the Oxford movement. That group of scholarly, refined, religious, manly men, the very flower of once Catholic but long apostate Oxford, must ever stand out in clear, soft light to the backward-gazing eye of future times. Their story, if an old one now, is unchangeably new; and within the last few weeks all the interest of it has revived around the grave of him who was the central figure of the group. Those born after the movement have been translated back to olden days at Oriel and Littlemore; those who took part in it have lived through it again. Who could hear the clear accents of the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, recalling the days when, as a lad, he first saw John Henry Newman in the University church at Oxford, and not picture in a moment the long by-gone scene, where not one among the dons and doctors and undergraduates guessed that the young preacher, and a yet younger listener, would one day be great princes of the Catholic Church, far more highly honored, even by their Protestant countrymen, than any prelate as "by law established?"

How was it possible to be present when the Cardinal, who yet works for us on earth, spoke of him who pleads for us in heaven, as "My friend and brother of sixty years," or recalled Newman's prophecy of the "Second Spring," in presence of the newly established hierarchy, and not feel that only some great backsliding on our own part can render the work of two such spirits and their glorious compeers of no avail?

Deeply interesting, too, were the "Memories of Fifty Years," recorded by the venerable Superior of the Order of Charity, in that ancient church of St. Ethelreda, which, now restored to Catholic worship, seems a kind of first-fruits of other English shrines. Father Lockhart was one of those who followed Newman to Littlemore, and has described the self-denying life led by that band

who may truly be called angelic, since their one desire was to fulfil the will of God. At midnight they rose to say Matins and Lauds, "rejoicing to think that they were uniting in worship with the religious of the whole Catholic world;" their fast was never broken till noon, and in Lent not till 5 P.M., the one meal of the day. They "brought their bodies into subjection," they lived in brotherly charity and the observance of the counsels; they served the poor. One thing alone was wanting, and that was peace of mind; but this gift could not long be withheld from hearts so emptied of self. Lockhart and some others found it through Milner's "End of Controversy," and left "Littlemore for Rome" before their teacher; how he followed, we know. In his own gracious language, like unto the language of an unfallen soul that had been accidentally placed far from God, but had infallibly found its way to Him, Newman has told us all. No one can be scandalized; we know the reason of the delay, and the end of the delay also, on that historic autumn night, which was brighter for England than the fairest morn of May, the rainy October midnight when Father Dominic came to Littlemore and received into the Church John Henry Newman.

Surely it is all a wonderful harmony, of which the keynote is prayer, while the dominant is bodily austerity. First, we see St. Paul of the Cross, that great ascetic, conceiving a most ardent desire for the conversion of England, in his time surely the most hopeless-looking nation under the sun. Then we see his spiritual son, Dominic, full of the same desire, an interior voice which warned him that he had a great work to do in England; a similar warning was given to John Henry Newman, while yet a young man and a Protestant clergyman, apparently on his deathbed in Sicily, in 1827. In 1830, George Spencer, the fervent evangelical, became a Catholic, and at Rome joined Father Dominic in ardent prayer for the conversion of England. In 1844, Dominic, after many years of patient work in other lands, was sent by his superiors to England; in 1845 he received Newman into the Church; in 1847 he clothed Spencer as a novice in the Order of the Passion. These three men, marked out for the salvation of a nation, were exceedingly diverse in many respects, in birth, training, mental and even spiritual gifts; but they had three qualities in common, without which all their labor had been in vain—love of souls, perseverance in prayer, contempt of bodily comfort. And although George Spencer, as a Low Churchman, and John Henry Newman, as a Tractarian, carried mortification to an excess, far beyond what Catholic direction would permit, it seems as if, like St. Ignatius in his three days' total fast at Manresa, they thereby won large blessings which were not to be confined to themselves

alone. We may well thank heaven "for England's sake," that they had a strong old-fashioned courage, enabling them, not for ambition, but in a worthier cause, to "scorn delights and live laborious days."

There was great joy in Catholic Europe over the sudden vivification of the dry bones. Prayer had seldom been more swiftly answered. Faith was almost lost in sight. It was in 1838 that Father Spencer had established his Association of Prayer for the Conversion of England, and within twelve years all that was best and greatest, most learned and most lovable, in the Establishment had been won, and the Catholic hierarchy was re-established after a lapse of almost three centuries.

The consequent unavoidable explosion of Protestant anger passed off like a puff of smoke (fortunately it evoked one of Newman's most benignly satirical works *en passant*) and showed a strange transformation in a portion, at least, of the poor old Establishment herself; veneration for the Sacraments, which were tending to be seven again instead of two, a tendency to meditation and fasting, a travesty of Catholic ritual and of monastic life. There was also a continual secession to real Catholicism of those who found travesties unsatisfactory. And much more would doubtless have followed, had not prayer for England begun to languish in England herself.

It seemed as if the work of Father Ignatius died with him in 1864. His Association of Prayer, somehow dropped out of sight in the land he loved, and for whose benefit it existed. For twenty years the bulk of English Catholics forgot to pray for England. Some declined outright. England was too hopeless, they said. They would pray for France, for Italy, for China, for Polynesia, for any other country with pleasure, but their own poor separated brethren were quite too clearly beyond the pale of redemption to merit any interest in the prayers of those devout far-seeing ladies and energetic philosophizing gentlemen. Anything foreign was charming, but the wealth and splendor and horrible poverty of England, the cleanliness and order and law, and hidden dirt and abomination of English cities, offered no field for religious hope, were not worth a thought or an intercession.[1] Well was it that foreigners themselves, successors to those canvassed by Father Ignatius, continued to pray as, no doubt, did many devout but isolated souls in England itself. There was progress—the increasing number of churches and priests proved it—but it was not such as to excite much of that wild alarm which we cannot but love to

[1] Father Spencer, in his lifetime noted and ridiculed this ant'-patriotic affectation, as especially inexcusable in those who are themselves converts.—*Life*, pp. 450, 451.

witness in the honest, dwindling old No-Popery party. About 1884, the need of combined intercession again began to be felt, and to this end the Oblate Fathers of St. Charles established the "Confraternity of St. Augustine."

At last dawned a great year, in which an unprecedented impetus was given to the work of the conversion of England. In 1886 the heart's desire of the choicer spirits among English Catholics was gratified by the beatification of the Fifty-Four Martyrs. The thrill of spiritual joy which this event aroused was indescribable. Now, could Blessed John Fisher, Blessed Thomas More, and many others whose sufferings equalled those of the martyrs depicted on the walls of Santo Stefano, be publicly honored in their own country; and immediately, simultaneously in marvellous yet hidden connection with this new honor, like a vast wave raised by an earthquake in some distant region, the tide of spiritual conquest came hurrying in.

That very year saw the commencement of two great works destined, as we may humbly trust, to complete the re-conquest of England to the faith. One of these was the Guild of our Lady of Ransom, of which the Bishop of Salford has just spoken in high commendation at the Catholic Conference. Indeed, the Guild is one of those institutions which, supplying as they do some crying need, carry all before them. It was founded by the Rev. Philip Fletcher, a graduate of Exeter College, Oxford, and for six years a clergyman and curate of St. Bartholomew's, Brighton. Dr. Newman's writings, and most of all the "Apologia," filled him with doubts as to the validity of Anglicanism; and a letter from the great oratorian himself (published in the current number of the organ of the Guild) seems to have brought about his decision to purchase the pearl of great price at any and every cost. He was received into the Church in March, 1878, and subsequently ordained priest, and appointed Catholic rector of Uchfield, in Sussex.

Like George Spencer, more than forty years before, Father Fletcher conceived an ardent desire to share the blessings of the faith with all his countrymen, and the Guild of Our Lady of Ransom was the result. He first started the Union of Intercession with only two dozen names on the roll; but these increased, and in about a year's time, in the autumn of 1887, the society took its present status with the sanction of Episcopal authority. How marvellous was its growth will be seen when we record the sum-total of "Ransomers" to-day as 14,412.[1] They are divided into

[1] The September number of the Magazine gives 14,259, but a private letter from Father Fletcher informs us that since the Magazine went to press members have already increased to the above figures.

three classes, consisting of White Cross Ransomers, priests who undertake to say Mass at least once a year for the objects of the Guild, and who now number 805.[1] Red Cross Ransomers, who, besides saying the daily prayer, enrol others, lecture or distribute tracts, if desired to do so by the parish priest, and make themselves generally useful (1007); and Blue Cross Ransomers, for whom the prayer is the only obligation (12,600). This consists of the dying petition of Venerable Henry Heath, at Tyburn, in 1643, "Jesus, convert England; Jesus, have mercy on this country;" one Hail Mary, and invocations of the patrons of the Guild, *i.e.*, Our Blessed Lady, St. Gregory and the English Martyrs.

No doubt organization contributes greatly to the success of the Guild. The master is, naturally, the Reverend Philip Fletcher, who founded the Guild; there are also a lay secretary and a treasurer who conducts business matters. In neighborhoods where several Red Cross Ransomers reside, one of their number is placed at their head as District Ransomer, to hold meetings and direct work. Four funds have been established out of voluntary donations: a "Tract Fund," for buying tracts to be distributed *gratis;* a "Mass Fund," for masses for the dead who have been robbed of their suffrages, the alms being sent to priests in charge of poor missions; a "Ransom Church Fund," for building churches in country places; and a "Reserve Fund," for furthering the work of the Guild. Every two months a little magazine is published, under the title of "Faith of our Fathers," borrowed, by the kind permission of His Eminence, from Cardinal Gibbons' great work. The object of this publication is to keep before the eyes of Ransomers the three ends of their association; the conversion of England and of individuals, the salvation of apostates, and the deliverance of the forgotten dead.

Ecclesiastical authority, with its quick intuition of the good of souls, has generously encouraged Father Fletcher's work. The Bishop of Southwark from the first promoted the interests of the Guild, and it was owing to the *imprimatur* of His Lordship that it met with favor at Rome. Leo XIII. accorded his hearty approbation to the undertaking, enriched the Guild with indulgences, and erected it canonically in the church of St. George and the English Saints; and further marks of good will from Rome have now been promised. The Cardinal Vicar is himself a White Cross Ransomer. The Guild has struck its roots deep and wide, and though the bulk of its members are English-speaking people who do not refuse to pray for England, nay, cannot refuse in face of their

[1] The number of Masses per annum now promised for the Conversion of England is 2373.

bishop's express command,[1] yet Ransomers belong to all countries, and Scotland and Switzerland are now affiliated in their own interests.

If ever, therefore, a continuous prayer for England can be secured, the Guild secures it. "An apostolic work which depends for its life and continuity on one individual is doomed to decay," observes the Bishop of Salford. "To carry it on a corporation, an organization, which does not die, is required." Thus we have seen with admiration the recent establishment of the Guild of Our Lady of Ransom. Then, in addition to prayer, the Guild does much active work. One branch of this, highly recommended by the cardinal archbishop and the bishops, is the distribution of the controversial tracts now printed in immense numbers by the Catholic Truth Society. The more shy and retiring kind of Ransomers, and those living in small missions where personal tract giving is not considered desirable, leave these behind them in railway carriages and cabs; but in the thick of a large town they have been very successfully distributed by hand. A report in the magazine of the Guild, by Mr. Lister Drummond, lay-secretary, and District Ransomer for Hampstead, has given most encouraging details of this work as carried through in that neighborhood. "On every occasion," he writes, "that tracts have been distributed, the Ransomers have invariably met with the utmost courtesy, and in one or two cases the tracts have been accepted eagerly. Several instances have occurred to my knowledge in which, when the tract has been at first refused, the recipient on being told it was 'a Catholic tract' has taken it and asked for more."[2] This incident indicates one of the most hopeful signs of the times. After all there is nothing that people take so much interest in as religion. Of the refined and the intellectual this is especially true; and let them but once have a glimpse of the strength and beauty and perfection of Catholicism, and they will adhere to the realization of what before seemed to them a hopelessly glorious ideal. There is an increasing tendency among Protestants to look up to Catholicism as a "high religion," holding out an almost unattainable standard of virtue, and demanding of its children a singular saintliness of life. Of course this tendency imposes a very grave responsibility on the professors of the true religion in England, a responsibility which they must, for the sake both of their Church and their country, brace themselves to meet becomingly. The practical English nature loudly demands that a good tree should bring forth good fruit; if indeed this be the tree of life, let her show the

[1] Their Lordships, the Bishops of England, have ordered that Benediction be offered up every second Sunday in the month for that intention.

[2] *Faith of Our Fathers*, July, 1889.

fruits of the Holy Ghost, longanimity, meekness, temperance. While a small and ever dwindling section of ultra-Protestants decry us as immeasurably wicked, the large majority of such English people as consider the matter at all, expect us to be almost above human weakness. Both are wrong; but at least Catholics should make it their earnest endeavor to disappoint the former more than the latter.

The revival of pilgrimages, due to the Guild of Our Lady of Ransom, has not only found favor with Catholics, but has been "patted on the back" by several of those great powers, the London daily newspapers. In May last, a large and orderly crowd of pilgrims visited the scenes of the captivity of Blessed John Fisher and Blessed Thomas More at the Tower, ending the day with what might be called a triumphal service at the Church of the English Martyrs; and in July a most successful pilgrimage to Canterbury took place, when the dean and other cathedral magnates showed the greatest courtesy to the Ransomers and their friends.

These two pilgrimages are but the beginnings, we may devoutly hope, of a great renewal of public religious practices such as England rejoiced in of old. It is almost impossible, in the present state of the national mind, that the remnants of penal laws can long remain on the statute-book. Were but these repealed, there is no doubt that in the neighborhood of London and other large towns at least, the Holy Viaticum might be carried to the sick with due attendance and state and without the smallest fear of insult.

We may hope, too, that great as has been the work done in the few years of its existence by the Guild of Our Lady of Ransom, greater things yet are in store for its future. The Hand of God seems to be visibly with it. Blessed by the Pope, encouraged by the bishops, spreading rapidly among Catholics, interceding for England generally and for nearly 7000 individuals particularly, it is an institution formed to meet the utmost need of a nation on the threshold of the Church.

The other great work to which we alluded as having taken its rise contemporarily with the beatification of the martyrs, is yet as hidden as were the privations of the Child Jesus in the cave at Bethlehem, or the secret sufferings of the saints in hidden cell and quiet cloister. In a quiet street of historic Chelsea, on the very spot where Blessed Thomas More once lived and wrote and worked, dwells a little community of priests. Their home is poor, their rule is austere, their possessions are few, their aims are bound-

[1] Their names are entered in an "Intercession Book."

less; they have given themselves to the work of expiation for the excessive sin of the world, but more especially for sacrileges committed against the Blessed Sacrament in this country, whence the Eucharistic Presence was for two centuries banished by law.

On Christmas Day, 1885, the "House of Expiation," as it is called, under the patronage of Jeremias the Prophet, was solemnly opened by the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. The Very Rev. Canon Keens is the Rector. Sanctity breathes around that tranquil dwelling-place. Beautiful and precious things are there, and wonderful works of Catholic art, but they are all grouped either in the little chapel around the Divine Presence, or in the museum, which is a kind of object lesson in Scriptural history, and also contains a most precious relic of our own days of persecution, an altar-stone used for Holy Mass in the house of Venerable Margaret Clitheroe. Behind the chapel is the garden, a portion of that garden whence Blessed Thomas More was taken to be rowed down the quiet river to the scene of his captivity and martyrdom. His own vine hangs heavy on his own brick wall.[1] An aged mulberry tree, perhaps contemporary with the vine, puts forth abundant branches. Memories of bygone greatness and glory and heroic sanctity mingle with vivid hope for England's future as we tread that secluded spot.

Hope, because here, in the very place where a martyr lived a life of hidden austerity in the midst of worldly prosperity, is being worked out that divine enigma of mortification as the condition of fruitful work for souls. We have already touched on this mystery as far as is allowable to non-theologians, in speaking of the austerities practiced by those to whom mainly, under God, the revival of faith in England is due. Suffice it to say that the priests of the House of Expiation are convinced of the hopelessness of expecting to complete that revival without more or less of mortification as a factor in the work. They have established a confraternity, the one obligation of which is to offer up some mortification, either voluntary or involuntary, "in union with our Divine Lord, as Victim in the Blessed Sacrament," and with the intention of expiation for the sins of the world.[2]

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[1] The wall is built of the old "Tudor brick," and Canon Keens has been assured by persons learned in the culture of vines that his tree is obviously between three and four hundred years old. Its shoots are most vigorous, but, curiously enough, the grapes do not ripen.

[2] The sins of our ancestors are especially to be remembered. The Fathers of Expiation are all White Cross Ransomers. Their devotion to the Conversion of England naturally takes its color from the spirit of their institute; in their beautiful manual of devotion are four prayers in reparation for the principal sins of the Reformation.

Thus does this small brotherhood of priests endeavor to set up a breakwater against that muddy encroaching flood of luxury and effeminacy, which sometimes seems as though it would engulf all that is strong and pure and lovely and of good report. Who but Catholics can be expected to have any appreciation of the mysterious value of suffering, and who abhor mortification more than they? Pious men and women love Thabor, but they will none of Calvary; and yet it was on Calvary that the redemption of the world was accomplished. They wish to share in the ecstasies and delicious tears and final glory of the saints; in church they are admirable; they really are able to make meditation, a most difficult thing to do well, and sometimes (after a very strong cup of coffee, perhaps) they almost think that they are getting into the unitive way. They never passed through the purgative way—they did not require it. But as to refraining from one dainty dish, or from one extra glass of their favorite wine, or from a clever little speech (often a rather uncharitable one, too!), or any other thing that their soul loveth, that is quite too much to expect. They all have such delicate health, and their relatives would be vexed if they did not eat meat three times a day, and take Burgundy or champagne; and they have so much brain-work to do, and think it wrong to shorten their lives and bring on premature decay. And yet they need only look round to see examples of men who have practiced very much bodily self denial, and have not only seen long days, but preserved a keen intellect at an age when the self-indulgent, if they reach it at all, are in their dotage and their invalid chairs. Will the fashion of gross living ever pass away? And if it does not, will England ever be converted?

We hope so. We hope that our animalism will not prove a bar to the common spiritual benefits of God. But we may be sure that nothing great will ever be done by pamperers of the flesh, however devout they may be, and however fervent their meditations; they will not be the Spencers, or Newmans, or Mannings of the battle, and though they may, themselves, by a sort of miracle, persevere in a low state of grace, they will hardly win another soul to renounce so much as one mortal sin.

And now, with all these pros and cons, where do we stand? Thanks to our leaders, and in spite of our faults and effeminacy, we stand high; not so high as we should do, considering our intrinsic strength, but still high. The name of our chief Pastor is venerated by all classes and all creeds; that of our great deceased teacher is in such honor that the question is mooted of a monument in Westminster Abbey to him who "rejected the whole Tudor settlement in religion" in favor of that Faith to which Westminster Abbey owes its existence. Generously, if blindly, Anglicans chant

the death-song of this same "Tudor settlement," while raising a pæan to one who tried it to the utmost, and found it wanting. Their inconsistency, let us hope, will turn to their own great profit. In the poor Anglican Church all is confusion, out of which there is but one way, which many sincere souls are taking now. The Ritualists, while copying us more than ever closely in their practices, and abusing us more than ever scurrilously in the *Church Times*, are come to a crisis in which neither imitation nor abuse will avail; when the one solitary bishop who really cast in his lot with them, is put on his trial in an ecclesiastical court for that offence, and kept waiting for his sentence because their *primus inter pares* is afraid of driving Anglicans out of the Church of England! His delay is doing as much in this direction as his sentence is likely to do; the honest and the earnest, clerical and lay, are climbing out of the troubled waters into the barque of St. Peter. So far as the educated, the refined, and the earnest are concerned, we may feel sure that before long they will all turn into the narrow way; but one problem we have yet to face, the problem of the rural population.

The rural population! Alas, poor souls, the heathen have more religion, more sense of the nearness of Divinity than they! Some dim, vague idea that there is a God constitutes their faith; perhaps they may have some equally vague notion of a heaven after death, just because their lives here are dull and sad, and they would fain think that something better, they know not what, lies beyond. They hardly seem to have heard of the Incarnation of the Son of God. Of course, they *have* heard of it in Sunday-school, or while half asleep in the village church; but the minds of these people are most strangely impervious to religious teaching as it comes to them from their Protestant pastors. Preternaturally acute about a pennyworth of wordly advantage, they are densely stupid about the unseen, the spiritual, the future, and the past. They will, perhaps, say the creed all their lives on a Sunday, leaving out some of the words, and mispronouncing nearly all, without a thought of the meaning, as if it were a sort of *alcabala*. "I believe in the holy Catholic Church," but what "holy" means, or "Catholic," or "Church," they neither know nor care. Few of them are aware that England was once all Catholic, or "Roman," as they say, if they say anything on the subject at all; this ignorance partly arises from the apparent oblivion of the poor that they ever had any ancestors at all. One of the complaints made by Dr. Jessup in his "Troubles of a Country Parson," is the utter indifference of rustics to the past; they cannot understand that anything existed prior to their grand-parents, and they hardly believe even in their grand-parents if these happened to die before they were born.

Their views are narrow, their lives are sordid, their unconsciousness of better things is complete.

But, "How shall they know, unless they be taught?" The dense, dogged worldliness of these scantily-favored children of the world is not to be laid to their own account. Rulers took away the grand and lovely Church which taught their forefathers, and gave them cold, bare preaching and a few prayers instead; threw down the altars where of old the Lord dwelt among His Saxon children, and reared "an oyster-table" in its place. The people lost their old religion but they did not take to the new preaching or to the "oyster-table;" these things were too unattractive; the village church was good to doze in on a weary Sunday afternoon, and it looked decent to go; but they never understood the sermon, nor took a real part in the service, and could with difficulty only be driven to "the Lord's Supper."

And yet these people gladly take in Catholic doctrine, when it is offered and explained to them; a task requiring much patience, but well rewarded if even one poor English peasant may thereby be led to believe in a personal God.

There is one ground for hope in these latter days, which is, perhaps, not much taken into account; it is the valid administration of baptism introduced by the High Church party. Little doubt can be entertained, that during the last century and the first half of this, the majority of attempted baptisms in England were irregularly performed, and therefore invalid, which, perhaps, accounts for the dense stupidity on spiritual subjects so long prevalent. The reform in this respect following on the High Church movement has gradually permeated even to Low Church and dissenting ministers, and now that the grace of baptism is widely spread among the nation, we may well hope that it may prove to them what it always ought to be—the gate of the other sacraments. A baptized person must have a leaning to the church of his baptism, and this, perhaps, is why we sometimes see a strange attraction to Catholicism even in children who have no means of weighing differences in doctrine. A people baptized, and, as Newman, always maintained, not in wilful heresy, cannot be far away from the Catholic Church. They only want to see and to know her, and it is now pre-eminently the will of her rulers here that she should be so seen and known. They would have the eyes of Protestants drawn upon her ever more and more. The old days of hiding in corners, and minimizing doctrine, and standing on the defensive, are over, and Catholicism comes out on the open field, "terrible as an army set in battle array," but an army whose weapons are and must be "kindly word and virtuous life." Nothing is more striking than the change of tactics adopted of late

years by the leaders of the force, and consequently by those also who fight obediently in the ranks. Formerly it was deemed undesirable to shed a ray of light on a Protestant (unless at his own request) lest his invincible ignorance, that one hope of his safety, should thereby be imperilled. Now his ignorance is to be carried by storm; tracts written by our ablest controversialists inundate it with light, sermons preached at it Sunday evening by Sunday evening leave it not an inch of standing-ground, and Catholics will not be to blame if there is an ounce of it left in England by the middle of the next century for any Protestant to be saved by. This conquering spirit seems to have arisen simultaneously with the work of intercessory prayer, and certainly such a spirit is the first essential of a conqueror. But the warfare must be such as to make Catholics more acceptable to their fellow-countrymen on the field of conflict than ever they were behind the bulwarks of coldness and reserve. "The Church of Rome is making a great combined effort to reconquer this country," said the relics of old-fashioned Protestantism at a May meeting this year; and so it is. Let us not falsify their expectations. Let us above all remember that our own conversion is the first step to the conversion of England.

It cannot, must not be denied, that there are counter-influences, blight, as it were, upon our second spring, frosts which may retard and diminish the glory of the summer. These counter-influences are within ourselves. There lies the danger. We alluded before to want of mortification, but that is a neglect of counsels rather than of precepts; now we allude to actual sin, widespread, scandalous sin. We are not afraid of the *Church Times*, or of May meetings, or of antiquated No-Popery Petitions to Parliament, or of any power on the earth or under the earth, except evil in ourselves. Canon Murnane struck a minor chord to our song of hope in his terrible but undeniable indictment at the Catholic Conference on the subject of drink and its attendant train of vices. It would be heartrending, and it is unnecessary, to repeat those words here; suffice it to say, that they were solemnly endorsed by Cardinal Manning at the Crystal Palace when the League of the Cross held its annual assembly, and that they opened up an awful vista of responsibilities, past, present and future, to the Catholic inhabitants of Great Britain.

Then another counter-influence lurks amid those more refined circles where there is but little question of drink and gross offence. It consists in the want of union, the internecine antagonism which results from that habit of *cliquism* inherent in the English. So much of the work of conversion must be done by the laity, and even by the female portion of the laity, that this supineness, this

uncharitableness, which would sacrifice any good work to jealousy of "another set," is nothing short of a national calamity at the present time. It is odious to have to speak of anything so small and contemptible, as influencing a great spiritual enterprise; it is like trying, and trying in vain, to clear away the barnacles which impede the course of some majestic ship. Cliquism is none the less a real because it is a ridiculous impediment. Certainly nothing could be more unChristlike than cliquism, both in its want of charity and its want of dignity, yet it has attached itself very noticeably to certain forms of Christianity. Any large, well-attended Anglican church, for instance, is sure to be a *rendezvous* for three or four jarring *cliques;* but alas, that Catholic women, a mere handful even now in the great multitude that has to be won, should copy their Protestant sisters in this thing, and that some little Catholic Church, the only shrine of the Divine Presence, perhaps, for miles around, should also turn out its miniature quota of miniature sets, in miserable imitation of the larger and more fashionable world, which, for its own part, would repay the compliment with scorn, to whisper and intrigue in the very precincts of the Sanctuary. There could not be a more effectual check to the influence of the laity for good than this small, insect-like, pestering, evil spirit, ever standing in the way of united effort.

What would not be the results if Catholics, living among a "separated" majority, kept their responsibilities ever before their eyes! Individually, each will soon pass away, but not without having done something to retard or to advance the cause of conversion, and the hoped-for union with the Church of all English-speaking races. America is making giant strides; Europe, even Protestant Europe, looking on from afar, cannot but foresee the day when the United States will be a great Catholic nation. There is a subject of noble rivalry, a rivalry which will endear and not estrange; the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race must keep pace with each other in their return march to the Faith of their Fathers. If those who already possess that faith will but be true to the duties which so hopeful a time as ours imposes, another century may see the North Atlantic bounded on both sides by Catholic countries, none the less temporally great because spiritually subject to the mild, secure rule of St. Peter.

THE EULOGIA, OR BLESSED BREAD.

AN English priest, travelling in France some years ago, chanced one Sunday morning to meet a fellow-countryman with whom he was acquainted. In the course of conversation, the newcomer, who was a Protestant, said that he had been to the High Mass, and also, he added, to the sacrament. At this an incredulous smile passed over his companion's countenance, and the speaker, observing it, continued: "Indeed, what I say is quite true. They offered the communion to me like all the rest, and I took it. I brought it away with me; here it is in my book." The Book of Common Prayer was forthwith produced, and there, between the pages, was a morsel of the holy bread, or *pain bénit;* it is distributed on Sundays in French churches after the parochial Mass. Though intended exclusively for the faithful, it had, on this occasion, through inadvertence, been given to a heretic, and the resemblance it bore to the small squares of bread administered at the Lord's Supper of the Protestants had led him to conclude that he was receiving the communion in one kind of the Catholic Church. This mistake is not uncommon among non-Catholics who are unacquainted with the custom.

Almost every Catholic knows that this ancient rite still forms a part of the liturgy of the Eastern Church, the *eulogia*, or blessed bread, being distributed by the Greeks whenever the Holy Eucharist is celebrated. All may not, however, be aware that, although it now survives among the French alone of all the nations of Western Catholicism, it formerly prevailed throughout the length and breadth of Christendom, and was especially dear to the hearts of our Anglo-Saxon forefathers.

The custom originated in the Eastern Church as early as the commencement of the third century. When the faithful no longer communicated, as a matter of course, at the daily Mass, the need was felt of showing, by some outward sign, that all who were present at the Holy Mysteries were in full ecclesiastical unity. It therefore became customary for the celebrant only to consecrate as much of the bread offered upon the altar as was needed for the use of the communicants; the remainder, which was simply blessed, being distributed at the conclusion of the mass to those who had not received it sacramentally. At first it was dispensed only to the clerics, subdeacons and lectors engaged on the altar, according to their rank; later on the laity also were allowed to partici-

pate in it. Thus, the blessed bread became, to a certain extent, a substitute for Holy Communion, as the Greek name denotes, *antidoron*, something given instead ; a vicarious gift. It was generally, if not invariably, taken fasting and consumed in the church ; it was received with great reverence and devotion, even emperors and persons of high rank leaving their seats and going to receive it from the priest's hand, which they piously kissed, for the reason that it had so recently touched the body of Christ. Excommunicate persons, penitents and catechumens were excluded from partaking of the eulogia. In the biography of Albinus, Bishop of Angers, we read that, having denied the blessed bread to an excommunicate person of position, he was urged by the other bishops assembled in the synod to give it him. Albinus replied that he would yield to their desire, but if they would not preserve holy things from sacrilege God would avenge Himself. So it was, for before the excommunicate man could take the eulogia from the Bishop's hand he fell dead. From notorious sinners not only the kiss of peace, but the holy bread was to be withheld. *Interdicto eis primo pacis osculo et pane benedicto in ecclesia* (Wilkins, Concil., i., 635). That catechumens were permitted to participate in the eulogia in the Latin Church, is by some inferred from the words of St. Augustine, who speaks of them as receiving something which, although not the body of Christ, was a holy thing, more holy than ordinary bread. *Quod accipiunt, quamvis non sit Corpus Christi, sanctum est tamen, et sanctius quam cibi quibus alimur* (De pecc. merit, ii., 26). He must, however, have referred to something else, since catechumens were dismissed after the offertory and the bread was not distributed until after Mass was ended. At any rate, the rule in the Greek Church is explicit. A canon of Theophilus, patriarch of Alexandria (385), says: " Let the clergy divide those things that are offered on account of the sacrifice (that are less) after those that are consumed for the use of the mysteries, and let not a catechumen eat or drink of them, but rather the clergy and the faithful brethren with them. *Quæ in sacrificii rationem offeruntur postea, quæ in sanctorum usum consumuntur clerici et qui ex eis sunt, fideles fratres.* The faithful were also exhorted not to receive the eulogiæ from a priest who was suspected of heresy, lest they should prove to them a curse, not a blessing.

In the early ages, it was customary in Rome for the bishop to consecrate the Holy Eucharist on Sundays in the principal church, and send it thence by the hands of deacons to the Presbyters of the *tituli* or lesser churches throughout the city. It was also sent to confessors in prison, and to Christians residing at a great distance. At Easter it was even sent into other dioceses, bishops

being in the habit of sending the consecrated host to each other as a mark of intercommunion, of brotherhood and amity. To the sacred host, on these occasions, the name of *eulogia* was given, and thus until the fifth century the word *eulogia* appears to have been synonymous with *eucharistia*, and used interchangeably with it to designate the sacrament of the altar, the chalice and bread of benediction spoken of by St. Paul (1 Cor., x., 6). When the reciprocal sending of the blessed sacrament was absolutely forbidden by the council of Laodicea (365), probably to prevent the chance of desecration, blessed bread was exchanged instead of it, and the word eulogia was used specifically and exclusively to denote the blessed bread distributed in the church, or substituted for the sacred host as a sign of friendship. At Easter, round cakes of unleavened bread stamped with a cross or sacred symbol, were specially provided *dona vicaria.* Passages abound in early writers to show that the exchange of these cakes of bread, in testimony of fellowship and union in the faith, was a very common practice. Paulinus, Bishop of Nola, seems to have been very fond of sending them. We hear of his sending them into Africa to St. Augustine, to Severus, to Romanianus, and others. To the last mentioned he writes: That I may not be wanting in the duties of brotherly love, I send you five pieces of bread, of the ammunition of the warfare of Jesus Christ, under whose standard we fight (Paulin, Ep. vii., p. 27). From these offerings of bread sent with the episcopal blessing, the word grew, as time went on, to include gifts of any kind transmitted by friends to one another in token of amity and esteem. The *eulogiæ salutis* of which Gregory of Tours, speaks, were, perhaps, portions of the holy bread distributed in the church, which had been carried home, to be sent to absent friends in proof of fellowship, or to be administered to the sick by way of medicine. St. Gregory Nazianzen relates a dream of his sister Gorgonia, who, when confined to her bed with sickness, thought that he stood by her one night with a basket containing loaves of the purest flour, with which he fed her, after having prayed over them, and signed them with the sign of the cross. The blessed bread was besides given at Easter to children under five years of age, instead of holy communion (Martene, De Art. Rit., Eccl. vi., p. 470). A clause in the canons of Bordeaux (1255) forbids priests on any account to give consecrated hosts to children at Easter, but to give common, blessed bread.

In early times, the *panis benedictus* distributed to the faithful after Mass was considered to be sufficiently hallowed by the blessing pronounced over the elements before consecration, and by the touch of the priest's hand. In the Greek Church it has been for many ages, and still is, the custom to cut off the upper part of the

Eucharistic loaf marked with a seal, and use that only for consecration. The remainder is dispensed after the Mass as *antidoron*, without being expressly blessed, as the prayers said over it before the seal is cut off are deemed enough. Bishop Hefele is of opinion that the sign of the cross made in the canon of the Mass at the words: *Per quem haec omnia, Domine*, etc., was meant to be made over the bread placed upon the altar to be simply blessed and subsequently distributed, not over the Sacred Host. Otherwise, he considers it would be difficult to explain the meaning of the sign of the cross in that place, why it should be made over the body and blood of Christ, or how the words, *bona creas, sanctificas, vivificas*, could be applied to the already consecrated elements, since no further sanctification could be possible.

We learn from ecclesiastical records that the unleavened bread was laid, with the other offerings of the faithful, upon the *mensa diaconica*, now called the credence table, which stood near the altar on the epistle side, and on which the deacon placed in readiness the vessels and vestments required for the Holy Sacrifice. After being blessed with a special formula (introduced into the Latin Church[1]), the bread was divided with a knife exclusively reserved for the purpose, denominated a lance by the Greeks, and *culter eucharisticus* by the Latin Church. The ceremonial accompanying the use of this knife, of which the blade was in the shape of a lance, the handle elongated and terminated by a cross, was, in the Greek Church, rather elaborate. The portion intended for consecration was cut off and set aside, and the remainder placed in a suitable receptacle—among the Anglo-Saxons a maund or skeppe, a wicker basket, that is, open and with handles, being used for this purpose—until the time of distribution at the conclusion of Mass. Martigny ("Dict. Ant. Chr.," p. 409) gives an engraving of a very curious knife of Anglo-Saxon workmanship, which is said to have belonged to St. Thomas of Canterbury. It is preserved in the treasure house of the monks of St. Andrew at Vercelli, Cardinal Guala, who came to England as legate in 1216, having given it to the Church. The blade is double-edged, somewhat in the form of a lyre, with open-work in the centre. The

[1] The form of blessing in the Mozarabic missal before the Canon of the Mass, given by Martene, *De Ant. Rit. Eccl.*, v. i., p. 270, is as follows:

Benedictio panis.

V. Adjutorium nostrum in nomine Domini. R. Qui fecit coelum et terram.

V. Sit nomen Domini benedictum. R. Ex hoc nunc usque in sæculum.

Bene†dic, Domine, creaturam istam panis sicut benedixisti quinque panes in deserto, ut omnes gustantes ex eo recipiant sanitatem tam animæ quam corporis. Per Christum, etc.

Bene†dictio Dei omnipotentis, et Filii, et Spiritus sancti descendat super hunc panem et super omnes ex eo comedentes.

handle is of box- or myrtle-wood, carved with the occupations of each month in the year. Dr. Rock ("Church of Our Fathers," v. i., p. 136) mentions that among the sacred ornaments belonging to the church of St. Regnier in the early part of the ninth century, was a knife described as *cultellus auro et margaritis paratus.* There can be little doubt, he says, that this highly ornamented knife must have been for cutting the holy loaf.

With regard to the nature of the bread made use of for the eulogia, it is evident that on the first introduction of the custom it was in nothing different from that employed for the Eucharist, since, as we have seen, it consisted of what remained over after the portion required for the communion of the priest and people had been taken from oblations offered at the altar. In St. Chrysostom's time the bread for consecration is known to have been a piece cut out of a large cake, which formed part of the offerings of the people. Whether it was leavened or unleavened in the primitive church is a point upon which opinions are divided. Dr. Döllinger enumerates the use of unleavened bread for the Eucharist as one of the peculiarities of the British Church, one of the points in which it differed from the rest of Christendom. In this he is not quite correct, as unleavened bread was used not only in the early Celtic Church, but also in the African Church in St. Cyprian's time, in Spain, in the ninth century, and in the Anglo-Saxon Church in Alcuin's time. For the first seven centuries there appears to have been no rule on this point, as it is certain that in many places the use of leavened bread was permitted, and that it was taken from the offerings of the people, which, in the early ages of Christianity, were both in money and kind. The poor offered what they could; for, to bring a gift, small or great, was incumbent upon all, even upon penitents and catechumens. These gifts were for the maintenance of the clergy and for the relief of the poor, as well as for the altar. St. Cyprian thus reproves a rich woman who offered little or nothing: "Thou art wealthy and rich, and dost thou believe thyself to celebrate the ordinance of the Lord, who dost not at all regard the offering? who comes to the Lord's house without a sacrifice; who takes a part of the sacrifice which a poor person has offered?" St. Cesarius, a century and a half later, says in a sermon: "Give alms to the poor according to your ability, offer offerings to be consecrated on the altar. A man with means ought to blush if he has communicated at the offering of another." But although all Christians were exhorted to bring gifts to the Church, such only were to be offered at the altar which related to the sacrifice. These included wheat in grain, grapes, oil for the lamp, incense. Hincmar of Rheims, in the ninth century, orders that the gifts in kind and money for the clergy and

poor—obligatory at Christmas, Easter and Pentecost—should be made before or after the service. The special oblation of bread and wine at the offertorium on Sundays was only to be offered by persons in full communion with the Church.

About the ninth century we find indisputable evidence that the bread distributed as eulogia was in the Latin Church, no longer of the same form and material as that used for the Holy Sacrifice. It is easy to understand that as the communicants became fewer in number, more was wanted for the non-communicants, consequently a special provision was made for the eulogia. How the change was made, and the exact time when the use of wafer bread was generally introduced is not determined. Cardinal Bona's conjecture seems probable, that it crept in on the people ceasing to make offering of bread of a suitable description. This occasioned the clergy to provide, or themselves to prepare the wheaten bread destined for the Holy mysteries, as may be inferred from the name it acquired, the oblation of priests. The bread for consecration differed from the blessed bread in that it was unleavened, without salt, of the best wheaten flour, fashioned in a round form —as large at first as a plate, to be divided for communicants, but afterwards of the size of a penny-piece—and stamped with a sacred emblem, or letters forming the name of Christ, whereas the holy loaf was ordinary household bread, made of flour in which salt was mingled, and raised by leaven. It was baked in the oven in the usual manner, in the same shape as the daily food of the people. Dr. Rock (Hiurgia v. 1., 293) thinks that the custom of forming the Eucharistic bread flat and circular may be traced to the remotest periods of Christian antiquity. He quotes the words of the Holy Pontiff, St. Zephyrinus, in the third century, denominating the sacred bread a crown, or oblation of spherical figure (*corona sive oblata sphericæ figuræ*). He also appeals to mediæval Celtic literature, wherein are plentiful allusions to wafer bread. The design in the Book of Kells, depicting the consecrated wafer between two animals who apparently shrink from destroying it, is taken to prove that circular breads, stamped with a cross, were in use in Ireland in the sixth century. The figure of the host is also found on the sculptured-stones of Scotland. A passage in the history of Bede (Hist. Angl. Eccl., L. 2. c 5) proves that bread of a special kind was used for the Eucharist. He relates that the sons of King Sibert, who were still heathens, having been present at Mass, afterwards asked Bishop Mellitus why he had not reached forth to them also the fine white bread he gave to their father? The council of Toledo (693), has an injunction to the effect that a special preparation of unleavened bread, whole wafers about the size of a penny (denarius), not por-

tions of a loaf, was to be provided for consecration. The enactments of the bishops in the eleventh and twelfth centuries enjoin great care in the making of altar-breads and ofletes. Archbishop Lanfranc in revising the statutes of the Benedictine Order, gives minute directions for the baking of the "obleys." Gillebert, Bishop of Limerick in 1090, enumerates among the things every priest should, have, a box with altar-breads, and irons for baking them. Ernulf, Bishop of Rochester, in the commencement of the twelfth century mentions the ofletes in his time as heavy round, thin, flat, and like a piece of money, stamped with an impress. Honorius of Autun, a few years later says that the hosts for the Eucharist were made in the shape of money. *Panis in modum denarii formatum*, and Durandus, 1286, speaks of the circular form of the host, assigning to it a mystic signification.

From all this it is evident that about the tenth century the bread consecrated in the Mass was everywhere distinct from and different from that which was blessed and distributed when the Mass was ended. It was specially prepared by the hands of priests or religious, and bore no resemblance whatever to the bread that was cut up for the eulogia. This continued to be invariably provided by the faithful, even when gifts of money began to take the place of offerings in hand. The parishioners usually took it in turn, if their means allowed, to furnish the holy loaf on Sundays, unless one of them, more wealthy than the rest, undertook to provide it every week. It is probable that the Sunday doles of bread to the poor, still existing in some country places, originated in a provision by will to supply the holy loaf in perpetuity.

As after this change of which we have been speaking, the bread for the eulogia no longer formed part of the oblations offered at the altar, so it was no longer blessed in the liturgy, but at the end of the Mass. A special formula was prescribed by the Council of Nantes, 896. A Canon of this Council ordains that the loaves brought by the faithful to the Church, should be properly cut and placed in a neat and fitting vessel, and after the solemn rites of the Mass, should be received by those who had not communicated, as eulogias, after they had been blessed. Then follows a form of prayer to be used in the benediction:

Domine sancte, Pater omnipotens, æterne Deus, benedicere digneris hunc panem tua sancta et spirtuale benedictione, ut sit omnibus salus mentis et corporis, atque contra morbos et universas inimicorum insidias tutamentum. Per Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum Filium tuum, panem vitae qui de cælo descendit et dat vitam et salutem mundo. Qui tecum, etc.

(Vouchsafe, Holy Lord, Almighty Father, Eternal God, to bless this bread with thy holy and spiritual benediction, that it may be to all health of mind and body, and a safeguard against sickness and all the snares of the enemy. Through Jesus Christ Thy Son, our Lord, the Bread of life that came down from heaven and gives life and salvation to the world, who liveth, etc.

In the Sarum missal a form of blessing bread on the Lord's day, is found almost exactly similar to that taken from the Mozarabic missal. After the reading of the Gospel, *In principio*, the Priest says:

V. Sit nomen Domini benedictum. R. Ex hoc nunc usque in saeculum.
V. Benedicamus Domino. R. Deo gratias.
Dominus vobiscum. Oremus.

Bene†dic Domine, creaturam istam panis sicut benedixisti quinque panes in deserto, ut omnes ex eo gustantes tam corporis quam animæ accipiunt sanitatem. In nomine Pa†tris, Fi†lii, et Spi†ritus sancti. Amen.

(V. Blessed be the name of the Lord. R. From this time forth for ever more.
Let us bless the Lord. R. Thanks be to God.
The Lord be with you. Let us pray.

Bless O Lord, this creature of bread, as Thou didst bless the five loaves in the wilderness, that all who taste thereof may receive health both of soul and of body. In the name of the Fa†ther, of the Son †, and of the Holy † Ghost. Amen.

The bread was then to be sprinkled with holy water, and distributed to all who had been present at the Mass.

In religious houses, especially Celtic foundations, it appears to have been customary to distribute the eulogiæ on Sundays and festivals, if not daily, but to monks, who had not received Holy Communion, in the refectory before their principal meal, instead of in the church after Mass. Adaman, the biographer of St. Columban, states that in the Monastery of Aghahoe, in Ireland, there was a table in the refectory, whereon the blessed bread was cut up for distribution at the midday meal. The same practice is known to have existed at Iona in Scotland, and in many continental monasteries. The Monastic Council of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 817, expressly orders that the eulogiæ be given to the brothers by presbyters in the refectory. It is recorded of the saintly Ermenfried, who presided over the Columban Monastery of Cusance (625–670) that he used to kiss the hands of the lowliest of the brethren when he dispensed the blessed bread.

The question may naturally arise, wherefore was the distribution of holy bread continued when the religion of Christ was everywhere professed and the Catholic Church dominant throughout Europe. It is easy to understand that while Christians formed a small minority in the Pagan world; while they were a despised and scattered sect in the midst of heathen, an external sign of fellowship in the faith was required to sustain the spirit of unity, which is the essence of the Catholic Church. For those who were not prepared to receive very frequently sacramental communion, a rite was needful wherein they should break bread with their brethren, to remind them that they were all members of one family, children of one Father, servants of one Lord. But a custom, desirable if not indispensable at a period when Christians were

surrounded with spies and traitors, exposed to persecution on account of their creed, and sorely tempted to deny Christ, might seem almost superfluous and useless in Catholic countries, where both prince and peasant, learned and unlearned, acknowledged one Lord, held one faith, were baptized with one baptism, and the propagation of heresy was a crime punishable by the law of the land. Nay, more; might not this relic of antiquity become undesirable, not to say harmful, since it was liable to be degraded to a superstitious usage, the blessed bread being employed as a charm or considered as a substitute for the Bread of Angels, and habitually received in the place of the Sacrament of the Altar? It is, indeed, true, that in the course of time, when the early fervor had subsided, and sacramental communion became less frequent, the people began to content themselves with receiving the holy bread as a kind of substitute, the more so, as no special preparation was needed before partaking of it, as was the case with the Holy Mysteries. This was, of course, an abuse to be deplored; but where will not abuses creep in? The eulogiæ were never intended to supersede the Holy Eucharist, and this fact was constantly impressed upon the people, the tendency to regard them as such being carefully guarded against. Indeed, those who were not willing to receive Holy Communion at the proper times were forbidden to take the holy bread from the priest's hand. The Anglo-Saxons,[1] in speaking of the blessed bread, were careful to distinguish it from the Sacrament of the Altar by the words employed in designating each. The former is called *gehalgadne hlaf*, the hallowed loaf, the latter is *husle*, the housell. Moreover, the holy bread is called the "creature," the housell is the "sacrifice," to remind the faithful that the Eucharist is not a creature, but Christ Himself, who with the Father and the Holy Ghost, is the Creator of all things. A proclamation issued in the commencement of the sixteenth century, speaking of the blessed bread, says it was not intended to supersede but to put us in mind of "the housell, which, in the beginning of Christ's Church, men did more often receive than they are now wont to do." In a *Rationale* or ritual,[2] drawn up about 1543, to which Cramner, who was soon after to speak of the holy bread in the most contemptuous terms, gave his authorization, it was declared to be a godly ceremony, to put us in remembrance that all Christian men are one mystical body in Christ, as the bread made of many grains is yet one loaf, and to put us in remembrance also of receiving the sacred Body of Christ in right charity.

The holy loaf, though only "a creature," was, however, to be

[1] *Vide* Rock, *Church of Our Fathers*, v. I., p. 139.

[2] Scudamore, *Notitia Eucharistica*, p. 793.

honored, and because it had been blessed, he who lost his portion of it was punished by the discipline of the Anglo-Saxon Church with a penance of four days' length. It was, moreover, regarded as conveying grace to the recipient *ex opere operato*. A twofold use is ascribed to it by Catalani ("Rit. Rom. Comm.," t. 2., 60. Quoted by Mashell, "Mon. Rit. Eccl. Angl.," v. l., cccviii). He thus explains the spiritual benefit conferred by it:

"The second use is in the salvation of the soul, when, by the intention of the Church, bread is distributed to the faithful, not only as a symbol of fraternal followship, but also as a memorial of the Eucharist, through which the faithful are stirred up to desire to receive the sacrament of the Eucharist itself; and by reason of this, by this wish or desire, that sacrament is spiritually eaten, and the effect of it, which is union with Christ by faith and charity, is perceived; and, therefore, this manner of receiving the Eucharist in will or desire, is called spiritual communion."

The first use he ascribes to the blessed bread is the beneficial effect it produces in cases of illness. We have seen that it was not uncommonly carried home from the church to be given to sick friends. Marvellous efficacy and virtue as a remedy were attached to it when administered by the hand of a priest. Instances are frequently met with, in which persons suffering from divers diseases derived relief, or were suddenly cured by partaking of it. In the lives of the saints many miracles are recorded which were wrought by means of the *panis benedictus*. A cup of water, in which was a morsel of a holy loaf blessed by St. Cuthbert, having been given to an officer of King Erfried's court, confined to his bed by a mortal sickness, he was released from pain and speedily restored to health. Two miracles of a similar nature are recorded of St. Bernard. Brompton, in his chronicle, tells us of people being preserved from pestilence in the eleventh century by partaking of the holy bread. Small portions of blessed bread used also to be carried by pilgrims and other pious individuals on their person, as a safeguard from misfortune on a journey, or in order that they might consume it as a viaticum in danger of sudden death. A mediæval romance,[1] in recording the exploits of Count William, of Orange, in the ninth century, mentions this use of the blessed bread. After the battle of Arleschans, finding his nephew dying, he asks if he received the sacrament on the previous Sunday. On the wounded man replying in the negative, William tells him he has some hallowed bread in his wallet, and asks him to eat of it. Vivian answers that he has greatly desired it. He then confesses what sins he can remember, and after taking the bread and beating his mea culpa, ceases to speak and presently expires. This custom of carrying short pieces of blessed bread as a kind of Chris-

[1] Ludlow, *Epics of the Middle Ages*, p. 217.

tian charm, seems to have been very usual in England. In one of the injunctions issued in the name of the young king, Edward VI., in 1547, priests are ordered to discourage the habit, and teach their flocks that "there is danger to the health of a man's soul in bearing about with him holy bread or St. John's Gospel." This is classed with "casting holy water upon his bed, or upon images," as if it were an equally common practice, one of the popish superstitions, to be swept away by the Reformers.

There is no lack of testimony to show that the distribution of the holy bread on Sundays and holy days was, from the earliest times, the invariable usage of the English Church. The incidental mention of it, so frequently made by chroniclers and poets of the olden time, prove it to have been an ancient, time-honored institution. One of the earliest allusions to it in the ecclesiastical annals of the country is found in a canon of the year 960, which decrees that "no hallowed thing be neglected, as holy water, salt, frankincense, bread, or anything that is holy."[1] In 1236 a constitution of Edmund Rich orders the kiss of peace and the bread blessed in church to be refused to women living in open sin. Hence we see that it was customary for all whose lives were not absolutely scandalous to partake of it; indeed, this seems to have been considered as the bounden duty of every Christian. One of the questions given by Myre in his "Instructions for Parish Priests" (1457), for the examination of penitents in the confessional, is: *Hast thou eten any Sonday withoute haly-bread? Say ye or nay.* A writer in the "Antiquarian" ("Notes on the Blessed Bread," vol. xvii., n. 101), from whom some of the instances given here of the mention of holy bread in the literature of the middle ages are taken, quotes an extract from an old chronicler, speaking with reprobation of a man who made irreverent use of the blessed bread by crumbling it into his porridge. This can hardly refer to the fragment received after Mass, but probably to a larger piece—a portion, perhaps, of the eulogia distributed in the refectory of some monastery, which had been begged from the monks. The records preserved in parish churches and monastic institutions contain many details concerning the holy bread. A charter granted to Heston Hospital, Yorkshire, in the reign of Henry VI., ordered the priest who said Mass there, after the Mass to bless bread and water. These were to be respectively distributed to and sprinkled upon the faithful who were present. A curious document kept in the vestry of Trinity Church, Coventry, detailing the duties of a deacon attached to the church, has this passage: "Also ye said dekyn schall see ye holy cake every Sonday be kyte (cut) according for every man's degree, and he

[1] Scudamore: *Notitia Eucharistica*, ch. xvi., sec. 2, pp. 774–780.

schall beyr ye holy brede to serve ye pepyll in ye north side of ye church." The arrangements for the regular supply of the bread for the eulogia are set forth at full in the church-warden's account book of Stanford-in-the-Vale, Berkshire, published in the "Antiquarian" (vol. xvii., n. 98). They begin by stating that, in the time of schism, when this realm was divided from the Catholic Church, in the second year of King Edward VI., all godly ceremonies and usages were taken out of the Church within this realm, and the money bestowed on the holy bread turned to the use of providing bread and wine for the Communion. It then gives the order for providing the loaves required for the holy bread, beginning at a piece of ground called Ganders, in the tenure of one Thomas Collins.

"Then dos all the cottags in the towne give in ordre with the other groundds and housses rownd abowte untyl it come to the said grownde agaynge caulid Ganders, and there levyth."

At the second "going aboute the towne" it was to begin at the house next the vicarage and go on till the same ground was reached, so that the poorer inhabitants should only have to give every second time of going about. Some houses were altogether excluded from taking their turn; the parsonage, the vicarage, a farm called the Manor House, with a few others. This order of going through the whole township was, it is alleged, for the purpose of avoiding variance amongst the parishioners as to when their turn to give the holy loaf should come. The cost of it amounted to twopence, a very different sum, be it remembered, in those days to what it is at present. This twopennyworth of bread, with a halfpenny candle or a halfpenny in lieu thereof, was to be presented at the high altar, but not all to be cut up for distribution. A halfpenny loaf was to be preserved whole, to be delivered to the next in turn, whose duty was to provide the bread, to serve as a reminder that he was to prepare against the Sunday following.

The lord of the manor, or principal inhabitant of the place, often took upon himself to provide the bread on special days or for a fixed time. This we gather from the Bedding Prayer, in use for two centuries previous to the rejection of the Pope's supremacy, in which the following clause occurs: "Also, ye shall pray for the good man and woman that this day giveth the bread to make the holy loaf; for all those who first began it and them that longest continued." In Smyth's "Lives of the Berkeleys," it is recorded that the head of the house, on Palm Sunday, 1361, offered, in Berkeley Church, pure wax for candles and a bushel of wheat, *pro pane benedicto*. This yearly gift was continued for many generations. It is probable that at Boston, in Lincolnshire, land had been bequeathed for supplying the bread, as formerly there was

there a plot of ground that went by the name of Halibreddale. The custom for one of the parishioners to provide the loaf for weekly distribution in the parish church seems to have continued down to the time of the Reformation. One of the rubrics at the end of the Communion service in the first Prayer Book of Edward VI. mentions the holy bread having been furnished by the people, and enjoins on them to give money in its stead.

"In such chapel annexes, where the people hath not been accustomed to pay any holy bread, there they must make some charitable provision for the bearing of the charges of the communion, or else resort to their parish church. . . . . And forasmuch as the pastors and curates within the realm shall continually find, at their cost and charges, in their cures sufficient bread and wine for the Holy Communion, it is therefore ordered that, in recompense of such costs and charges the parishioners of every parish shall offer every Sunday at the time of the offertory, the just value and price of the holy loaf, with all such money and things as were wont to be given with the same, to the use of their pastors and curates, and that in such order and course as they were wont to find and pay."—Prayer Book of 1549.

The observance of this rite naturally ceased after the Reformation, when, to say Mass, was an offence subject to the most terrible penalties. Blessing bread was reckoned among the popish practices to be ruthlessly abolished. The people, were, however, attached to the custom, and consequently, Cranmer proceeded somewhat cautiously in its removal. In his Visitation Articles of 1547, he contented himself with declaring the receiving of the blessed bread to be no longer obligatory, and prohibiting persons from carrying it about with them. Two years later, under the First Book of Edward VI., the blessing of the bread was done away with. Its restoration is one of the demands made by the Devonshire and Cornwall commons, who, in the same year, rose in rebellion, partly on political grounds, but chiefly on account of the "laying aside of the old religion, which, because it was old, and the way their forefathers worshipped God, they were very fond of." One of the fifteen articles of complaint drawn up by them ran thus: "We will have holy bread and holy water every Sunday, palms and ashes at the times accustomed; images to be set up again in every church; and all other ancient old ceremonies used heretofore by our Mother Holy Church." This demand was answered at length by Archbishop Cranmer, in a strain, as his chronicler[1] informs us, "of happy perspicuity and easiness," his design being "to expose the abuses and corruptions of popery; what need there was that such matters should be abolished, as the Pope's decrees, solitary Masses, Latin service, hanging the Host over the altar, sacrament in one kind, holy bread and holy water, palms, ashes, images, the old service book, praying for souls in purgatory." In his answer, he reproaches the petitioners for "re-

[1] Strype, *Mem. of Archbishop Cranmer*, v. ii., p. 117.

fusing the true heavenly Bread of Life except at Easter, and utterly refusing the cup of the most Holy Blood, and, instead of these, desiring to eat often of the unsavory poisonous bread of the Bishop of Rome, and drink of his stinking puddles, which he nameth holy bread and holy water." Even if allowance is made on account of the different times in which he lived, one can hardly think this language becoming to Cranmer's position, or the nature of the petition of the rebels. On another occasion, he spoke of the holy bread and holy water as "conjured bread and water."

Even after the radical changes in faith and ritual which were made throughout the realm, the use of holy bread was retained for a time in some parts of England. Latimer appears to have been obliged to tolerate it in his diocese. His historian[1] seeks to explain this by urging as an apology that, "he could not do all things as he would," owing to the dangers of the times. Although he could not utterly extinguish all the "sparkling relics of old superstition, yet he so wrought that they should be used with as little harm and with as much profit as might be." Consequently, the clergy, under his authority, were instructed to pronounce these words before dealing out the holy bread:

> "Of Christ's body this is a token,
> Which on the cross for your sins was broken:
> Wherefore, if of Christ's death you would be partakers,
> Of vice and sin you must be forsakers."

In London, the work of Protestantizing proceeded more rapidly. In 1550, Ridley, issuing his Diocesan Injunctions, forbids the maintenance of the obnoxious holy bread, and classes it with palms, ashes, candles, and many other "superstitious things now taken away by the king's grace's most godly proceeding." Hence, it appears probable; if not quite certain, that the use of holy bread was completely discontinued in the latter part of Edward the Sixth's reign. It was temporarily restored, with other Catholic rites, under Mary. In 1554, we find Bishop Bonner inquiring at his Visitation: "Whether there be, every Sunday, holy bread and holy water made and distributed among the parishioners?" Under Elizabeth, it was finally abolished. About the last definite mention to be found of the custom is in the list of articles destroyed or removed from a church in Lincolnshire in 1566; one of these was the *holy bread skeppe*, which was sold, as the records state, to a certain Mr. Allen, "who maketh it a baskett to carrie fishe in." The memory of it, however, lingered long in the minds of the people, and allusions to it are occasionally found in popular dramas of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

[1] Foxe, *Acts and Mon.*, ed. 1861, v. 7., p. 46.

AMERICAN CATHOLICITY.

UNDER a name often many errors are concealed. It is not true that a name is of little consequence; for while the name may be perfectly good, and, properly understood, may embrace no error, still, improperly understood, it may encourage grave errors or lead to consequences which are seriously injurious to the best interests of mankind. We Americans are naturally proud of our country and its institutions. We are proud of its material success, and we who are Catholics have the most devoted love for our fatherland. We yield to no one in patriotism and love of country. We are thankful every day for the privileges which we enjoy in the freedom which our institutions give us in many respects. We are also thankful to God that our government does not in many things attempt to interfere with the freedom of worship or the best interests of our divine religion. Catholics are ever ready, and are among the first, to give their talents, and even their lives, in the service of their country. There is, perhaps, a boastful spirit which is contagious among us, leading many to exaggerate when comparing our own nation with the other nations of the earth. This spirit, when not carried to an undue excess, so as to violate truth or equity, is pardonable and even praiseworthy. We do not easily see defects in those we love or in institutions to which we are attached.

Nevertheless, our love for the country must not in any way blind us to errors which are serious; which, although they be widely circulated and have many adherents, are contrary to the law of God, and, therefore, to the best interests of society. Our first duty is to God and our divine religion. Our faith comes to us from God. It cannot be changed by any condition of man or by any kind of social progress. In discharging our duty faithfully towards God, in maintaining, as we are bound to do, the truths which He has revealed, and the integrity of faith, we subserve in the best possible manner the interests of our country, the preservation of true liberty and the perpetuity of our free institutions.

God is true, if every man be a liar. No one can doubt, who believes in the existence of God, that our first obligations are to Him, and no one can doubt that obedience to His law is the source, and the only source, of all true happiness.

"A nation and a kingdom that will not serve Him shall be destroyed."

To revert to our first remark in regard to the use of a name, we have heard in some quarters the term American Catholicity covering a multitude of errors, and falsely representing that one true religion which we are bound to defend and profess. It has been said that in this country there is a peculiar kind of Catholicity which is in advance of the old nations of the world, which has taken to itself the wings of progress, which is more consonant with the spirit of the age, less hostile to those who differ from us in faith or morals, which puts upon itself a mantle of expediency, and loses the stern attributes of our unflinching creed. We have heard it said, as a mark of the peculiarities of American Catholicity, that we do not pretend to judge between error and falsehood as far as others are concerned; that we embrace them all, no matter what they believe or profess, as really *one* with us in the profession of a conservative Christianity. It is also said that our differences are not so great as has been supposed; that we are willing to meet all our fellow-citizens on an open platform of a wide Christian belief; that we are willing to yield to the majority, or even to the State, the education of our children, provided we are allowed the liberty of teaching them privately the principles of our faith. It is also maintained that the rights of the Sovereign Pontiff, especially in his temporal principality, may in this country be waived, and that those Catholics are more truly American in their sympathies who look upon the temporal power of the Supreme Pontiff as a thing of the past; who are willing to let it die, and feel no obligation to do anything in their power to restore it.

According to the prevailing doctrine in the world, "Might makes right. The Holy Father, as a matter of fact, has lost his temporal principality. Such is the providence of God, and we are not bound either to maintain its necessity or to do anything actively for its restoration. We will simply let it go as a thing that once was, and which is now dead."

Another feature of American Catholicity, as we have seen it in some quarters, is to maintain "that our form of government is the best possible, and most suited to our religion; that in respect of government we are far beyond the nations of the old world."

Undoubtedly, our own form of government is the best for us and most suited to our people. Nevertheless, it belongs to the Americanism of which we are speaking, to seek to propagate it elsewhere; to deny the rights of those who rule by the providence of God; to justify rebellion without proper cause; to forget that he who rules, rules by the ordinance of God; that God is the supreme king among the nations of the earth, and that "he who resisteth the ordinance resisteth the power of God." In other words, it is sometimes held as a principle of *true Americanism* that "power

comes from the people and ascends to the ruler; that the people make their own government and their own ruler, and therefore, without any cause except their own will, they have a right to change them or to destroy them." Now, we humbly submit that such Americanism is not the true spirit of our institutions, that it is not Catholicity in any sense of the word, and cannot usurp for a single moment, justly, the title which we have placed at the head of this article.

For the illustration of all that we have said we shall proceed to prove that the errors which we have indicated, which are sometimes classed under the term of American Catholicity, are contrary to our faith, and therefore cannot be held by Catholics.

In the first place, the doctrine that "all religions are good, and may conduce to the salvation of men, while the Catholic religion is only better and more complete," is liberalism, condemned by the Holy See.

Reason teaches us that there is one God, and as God is the Author, and the only Author, of His divine religion, creeds which contradict each other cannot all be true. While we are bound in charity to judge no man—not to enter into the supreme tribunal where each one stands alone before God, and will be judged for all his deeds and all his intelligent acts—we are bound to judge his errors, and also to condemn them, and this for the love of God and for true charity toward our neighbor. The proposition that every man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, by the light of his own reason, he shall have considered to be the true one, is condemned by the Catholic Church. As far as Protestantism is concerned in all its various and contradictory forms, it cannot be a species of the true Christian religion. We quote from the syllabus of Pius IX.

"Every man is free to embrace and profess that religion which by the light of reason he shall consider true."[1]

"Protestantism is nothing else than a different form of the same Christian religion in which equally as in the Catholic Church one can please God."[2]

"Man in the observance of any religion can find the way of eternal salvation and also attain it."[3]

These propositions have been condemned by the supreme authority of the Church, and the doctrine contained in them cannot

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[1] "Liberum cuique homini est eam amplecti ac profiteri religionem, quam rationis lumine quis ductus veram putaverit.

[2] "Protestantismus non aliud est quam diversa verae eiusdem christianæ religionis forma, in qua aeque ac in Ecclesia Catholica Deo placere datum est.

[3] "Homines in cuiusvis religionis cultu viam æternae salutis reperire aeternamque salutem assequi possunt."

be held by any one who calls himself a Catholic. A man is *not* free to follow any religion which his reason may teach him to be true. Men cannot obtain eternal salvation and find out the way of life by virtue of any false religion. If they do find salvation through invincible ignorance, or through any truths which may be taught them, mixed with many errors, they find their salvation by graces which come to them, entirely independent of the system which they follow. Their system of religion, if followed, would lead them astray. Protestantism, which, as we all know, embraces all kinds of contradictory errors, cannot be held to be a form of the true religion in which equally, as in the Catholic Church, one can please God. We are not denying here, that there are those out of the visible fold of the Church who will be saved by virtue of invincible ignorance or their obedience to the law of God, as far as they know it. But it is a very grave error, condemned by the Church, to hold that those outside of the pale of the Church are in a *safe* way, and still more so, that in some respects, they are better off than Catholics. We do not believe that this is true Americanism. We know it is not Catholicity. Americans love consistency. They are generally in earnest, and feel the power of sincerity. We shall never lead our erring brethren to a knowledge of the truth by making light of the differences which exist between them and ourselves, or by mitigating the doctrine that out of the Church there is no salvation. Almighty God, having instituted a way of salvation, has instituted no other.

Another grave error, which sometimes takes to itself the shield of the name of Catholicity, is what may be called the doctrine of intellectual or social progress. We make progress in many things; in material affairs; in the discoveries of science; in the application of these discoveries to the needs of mankind. But we can make no progress whatever in the faith which God has revealed to us and which comes to us perfect from His hands. We may study it and understand it better, and learn better to apply it to our daily life, and to the life of nations; but we cannot make any progress in the matter of the divine revelation. The doctrine, that we have greater light in our age; that we better understand the truths of our revelation than the ages before us; that we have theologically taken upon ourselves the wings of human progress, is not simply an empty boast, it is a serious error. By it we are led to look down upon the masters of theology, the great teachers of the Church, the doctors of the spiritual life; to think that in our age we have made such advance that we can get loose from the restraints which the great doctors of the Church, following the instincts of the faith, have placed upon the human reason. This doctrine of progress, applied to matters of faith, has been distinctly condemned by the

Holy See, and therefore cannot be considered to be the teaching of any kind of Catholicity.

We quote again the propositions condemned by Pius IX. in the Syllabus:

"The decrees of the Apostolic See and of the Roman Congregations impede the true progress of science."[1]

"The methods and the principles by which the scholastic doctors of former ages cultivated theology do not at all agree with the necessities of our time and the progress of the sciences."[2]

The decrees of the Apostolic See and of the Roman Congregations must be observed by every Catholic, and they do not impede any true human progress. Disobedience to them is the reverse of human progress. It is returning into the darkness, instead of going forward into the light. We can never sufficiently value the ancient doctors of the Church, and especially the schoolmen, whose teachings are adapted to all times, and especially to this rationalistic age which, following the doctrines of human pride rather than those of reason, would lead to independence in matters revealed, and therefore to liberalism and latitudinarianism.

There is always in every age a species of socialism or communism which threatens the best interests of society. It is the denial of the Catholic faith and its teachings which allows men to be blinded by such errors.

The holy Church, anxious in all things to preserve the best welfare of society, and to mitigate as far as in her power the sufferings of the poor, has often declared that socialism, while contrary to the law of God, is the enemy of the very poor whom it seeks to benefit. The following is the language of Pius IX. in his allocution to the consistory of April 20, 1849: "Evil men foment agitation among the people in order that all the principles of justice, of virtue, of honesty, of religion, may be utterly destroyed, and that the horrid and grievous system of socialism—or even of communism, as they call it—may everywhere be propagated and reign to the greatest evil and even the destruction of all human society."

We cannot, therefore, in any way countenance the principles which destroy the rights of property and which overturn the foundations of civilized society. Such errors, in any form, are too grave to be trifled with, and they are not the fruit of what may be properly so-called Americanism, while they are distinctly contrary to the Catholic faith. The Roman Pontiff cannot reconcile him-

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[1] Apostolicæ Sedis, Romanarumque Congregationum decreta liberum scientiæ progressum impediunt.

[2] Methodus et principia, quibus antiqui doctores scholastici theologiam excoluerunt, temporum nostrorum necessitatibus scientiarumque progressui minime congruunt.

self nor compromise with progress, with liberalism, with socialism or with what may be called recent civilization. The doctrine that our republican form of government—good in itself, fitted to our state of society, and, in reality, having its source in the application of the principles of our religion—is the best form of government for all the nations of the earth, or the only correct form of government, cannot be held by any Catholics, whether they be Americans or of another nationality. We yield to no one in devotion to our own country; nevertheless, we cannot hold that the best form of government is that in which the Church is entirely separated from the State and the State from the Church. Such a proposition is condemned by the Holy See in the Syllabus of Pius IX., Proposition 55 declares:

"The Church should be separated from the State and the State from the Church."[1]

Undoubtedly, that form of government which does not interfere with the Church in any way is better than the form which persecutes the Church, which deprives it of its rightful liberty, which imprisons its priests and its ministers; but this does not make it the very best form of government. The governing authorities in any nation are as much bound to obey the Catholic religion as any individual. And nations, as such, are as much under the obedience of God as are individuals. The best form of government is that where all believe in the true religion, or where the government supports the Church in the discharge of its high office, in leading men to their salvation. This, although perhaps at the present time existing nowhere, is, nevertheless the best form, and although we do not ask a government like our own to interfere in any ecclesiastical matters—while, on the contrary, we deny its right to interfere in matters purely religious—nevertheless we cannot hold, as Catholics, that a Christian or a Catholic State should not work in harmony with the Church of God, to which are committed the highest interests of man. We cannot call our own form of government religious in any sense. There is a bare recognition of God and also an implicit recognition of many precepts of the natural law; still, we cannot call it a Christian government in the true sense of the word.

And it leads to a grave error to say that the State should always be separated from the Church and the Church from the State, as if they were different bodies, each one moving in its different sphere, and the spiritual having no authority, even indirectly, over the temporal.

The State has already, not only here but in the old world, inter-

[1] "Ecclesia a Statu, Statusque ab Ecclesia sejungendus est."

fered with the observance of the law of God, and has sanctioned that which, according to the divine law, is positively wrong. For example, the State has sanctioned divorce, thereby destroying the sacred character of Christian matrimony and allowing parties properly married to be separated, so as to annul the bond of matrimony. The Christian law teaches us, on the word of our Lord Himself, that the tie of matrimony, properly contracted, can only be severed by death. When the State undertakes in any way to favor the liberty of human passion and sin, to separate that which God has bound together, to assume the authority it has no power to assume, the very act is invalid before God. For God, at least, is the Supreme Ruler of the universe. The evils which follow, and which will follow to a much greater extent, in the disregard of Christian marriage are too great to escape the notice of any fair-minded and intelligent person. The sacredness of the family depends upon the sacredness of Christian marriage, and the perpetuity of the State depends on Christian families, of which, to a great extent, the State is composed. It is not always wise to attack the evils of society openly, although sometimes it is our duty; but it is a sin to compromise with them or to allow them to pass as if they were indifferent matters.

Another most grave error which concerns the very foundation of Christianity is that which, unfortunately, is widespread, the error that religion and education can be separated without vital injury to the Commonwealth. It is a prevalent doctrine now in our country that the State has the right to take to itself the whole question of education, to disregard the rights of parents and guardians to whom, by God's providence, children are committed. And inasmuch as the State is made up of those who hold widely diverse and contradictory beliefs, it is said to be the American system that no religion whatever must be taught in the popular schools. These popular schools, which are free to every one—in which, consistently, no principles of Christian ethics can be taught—have been called "the *palladium* of our civil liberties."

To a Catholic mind, to one who believes in Christianity, and to one who has studied at all the lessons of history, it is evident that education without religion is the source of infidelity, and therefore is destructive of human liberty, properly so-called. Catholics cannot approve of any system of education which is separated from religion or from the strict teaching of the principles of their faith. We are not by any means willing to hold that Americanism is infidelity, so therefore we do not understand why any of our fellow-citizens favor the separation entirely of religion from common education.

Protestants, who are bigoted in their notions, may find that

such a system of education leads Catholic children to forget or deny their religion, and in this sense they may approve of such a system of popular education; but we deny that it is Americanism, or that it is in any sense a feature of our peculiar form of government. The Holy See has distinctly condemned the separation of education from religion, and no Catholic can for a moment defend or permit it.

We quote from the Syllabus, propositions 47 and 48:

"The best constitution of civil society demands that popular schools which are open to all children of whatever class, and public institutions which are destined to more severe studies and to the education of youth, should be free from all the authority of the Church, from its moderating and governing power, and subjected wholly to the civil and political authority according to the pleasure of the rulers and the general opinions of the age."[1]

"The plan of instructing youth which is separated entirely from the Church and which primarily regards only the ends of earthly social life and the knowledge of natural things may be approved by Catholics."[2]

The teaching of our own Councils and of our own Prelates in union with the Holy See, has distinctly defined the Catholic doctrine on this subject. We are obliged, therefore, in conscience, to establish our own schools, inasmuch as we have no right to ask permission to teach our doctrines in the popular schools. The right to have our own schools is permitted to us by our government; nevertheless, scarcely a year passes without some proposition in some legislature, or in the Congress of the United States, tending to abridge our rights and to deprive us of the full liberty of Christian worship which we have under the Constitution. And in all the States, so far as we know, every man is taxed for the support of the popular schools, although in conscience he can make no use of them. If this be the highest form of civil liberty, we have not the power to see it.

In almost every country of Europe, denominational schools are not only permitted, but are even maintained at the expense of the State, and the denominational system, while it satisfies the conscience of every one, is much less expensive to the State, and pro-

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[1] Postulat optima civilis societatis ratio, ut populares scholæ, quæ patent omnibus cuiusque e populo classis pueris, ac publica universim instituta, quæ litteris severioribusque disciplinis tradendis et educationi juventutis curandæ sunt destinata, eximantur ab omni Ecclesiæ auctoritate, moderatrice vi et ingerentia, plenoque civilis ac politicæ auctoritatis arbitrio subiiciantur ad imperantium placita et ad communium ætatis opinionum amussim."

[2] "Catholicis viris probari potest ea juventutis instituendæ ratio, quæ sit a Catholica fide et ab Ecclesiæ potestate sejuncta quæque rerum dumtaxat naturalium scientiam ac terrenæ socialis vitæ fines tantummodo vel saltem primario spectet."

duces harmony and peace according to the testimony of Protestants as well as Catholics. On this subject there can be surely no difference of opinion among American Catholics. No one worthy of the name of Catholic can so far compromise himself as to look with favor upon popular schools in which no principles of morals or religion can be taught.

A most important question in our day, which deeply concerns the interests of our religion, is that of the temporal principality of the Supreme Pontiff. All Catholics are bound to believe that he is the supreme pastor, teacher and infallible doctor of the universal Church; that in matters spiritual and moral there is no appeal from his decision. His temporal principality is not an open question. It cannot be looked upon as a thing of the past. Catholics, and especially American Catholics, who are free at least to think and say what they will, can never agree to look upon it as a question which has passed out of our day. They can never consent to hold that the temporal power of the popes has been taken from them by justice, or that the principality of the Supreme Pontiff has not conduced to religion and is not necessary to the free exercise of his high office. Much less can it be held that it is an open question in regard to which Catholics may differ, or that the abrogation of this principality is sanctioned by the observance of ages, or would conduce to the liberty and happiness of the Church. We have heard of some Catholics saying, that "the Pope is much better off without his temporal power; that at all events it is no question of ours, and that we are not called upon to say or to do anything in regard to it." Such views are not Catholicity, and we do not think that they are American Catholicity. Indeed we are certain that the majority of American Catholics believe in the necessity of the temporal principality of the Pope, and will always be found in the front ranks for the maintenance of his rights, both civil and spiritual. We quote the false opinions condemned in the Syllabus in regard to this matter, propositions 76 and 80.

"The abrogation of the civil power which the Apostolic See possesses would greatly conduce to the happiness and liberty of the Church."[1]

"The Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile himself with progress, with liberalism and with modern civilization."[2]

The Supreme Pontiff, who in this, as in all other matters, is our teacher and guide, has never consented to the unjust usurpation of his temporal rights, nor has he ceased to warn the faithful by

[1] "Abrogatio civilis imperii quo Apostolica Sedes potitur, ad Ecclesiæ libertatem felicitatemque vel maxime conduceret."

[2] "Romanus Pontifex potest ac debet cum progressu, cum liberalismo et cum recenti civilitate sese reconciliare et componere."

his protests against the injustice which, although tolerated for a short time, can never be accepted by the Catholic Church nor regarded as just. The present Pontiff, Leo XIII., has more than once spoken to the Christian world on this subject, and in a letter of the Cardinal Prefect of the Congregation of bishops and regulars, July 18, 1889, warned all patriarchs, archbishops and bishops, and other superiors of Catholic people, that the injury done to the Holy See should be kept before their minds. They are directed to warn their flocks of the obligation by which they are bound to avoid the snares of secret societies and other enemies of the Holy See, to defend the faith, and by every legitimate means to maintain the rights of the Roman Pontiff, understanding that with his liberty is closely bound the liberty of all states and all peoples. In this connection we quote the words of a pastoral of the Most Rev. Archbishop of New York, addressed to the clergy and faithful of his diocese on October 2, 1889.

"Now it is the common teaching of theologians that when the Vicar of Christ and the Episcopate throughout the world unite in teaching a doctrine which regards the universal government of the Church, then they have that special assistance promised them by Jesus Christ, and their doctrine is to be received by the faithful as undoubtedly true and certain. Again and again, in Encyclicals and Allocutions, the Sovereign Pontiff has declared the temporal independence of the Holy See to be necessary for the good and free government of the Church, and this same truth is proclaimed by the whole Catholic Episcopate. As good children of the Church it is our duty to incline our ears to the teaching of Christ's Vicar, and to give it the homage of our minds and our hearts."

While, therefore, no one is allowed to attack the rights of the Holy See, or to defend the usurpation of his temporal power, every good Catholic is bound by every legitimate means to labor for its restoration. Many times during the history of the Church have the Supreme Pontiffs been placed in a worse position than that which now imprisons our Holy Father. Popular opinion has with many great weight, but we contend that such an opinion, if popular among those outside the bosom of the Catholic Church, can never be popular with sincere Catholics. They cannot even be silent in regard to the matter when time and opportunity permit them to speak plainly, and all their influence, whatever it is, must always be cast on the side of truth and right and justice.

From our knowledge of the American people we are inclined to believe that those grave errors to which we have alluded, which cannot be favored by any true Catholic, are not consistent with

the honesty, the sincerity and earnestness which distinguish our race.

True American Catholicity is honest, sincere and earnest. We have always been distinguished for our devotion to the Holy See. We believe the Supreme Pontiff to be the Vicar of our Lord, to represent Him to us and to speak with His voice to us in all questions of faith and morals. Therefore we are united, those of us who are sincere Catholics, in loyalty to Him, in devotion to his interests and in defence of all his rights. The rights of the Holy See are really the rights of the Church, and they are our rights. In every land devout Catholics are the best citizens, those most loyal to the government under which they live; and naturally so, because the principles which sustain the true Catholic are essentially principles of justice and equity, which are the only firm foundation of any commonwealth. When the rights of the Holy See are violated and disregarded, where shall we look for any foundation on which may rest a well-ordered civil society? "By Me," says the Holy Ghost, "kings reign and princes decree justice." Might does not make right, nor does the lapse of time make the evil a good. The points upon which we have touched so briefly seem to us of the very highest importance. They concern the true progress of our religion in this country, and therefore the perpetuity of our institutions. We maintain in their integrity the only principles upon which Christian society can rest. There is no enemy which we have to fear so much as liberalism in politics, and especially in religion. Liberalism in religion is a contradiction, inasmuch as religion depends upon a revealed faith which must be maintained in its entirety as it comes to us from God. With the divine law it is true that he who sins in one point implicitly breaks the whole law, since all precepts of the law are equally binding, and the disposition to break one precept leads directly to the transgression of all God's commandments. The same principle applies to our creed. The whole creed rests on the veracity of God, and infidelity in one point involves, implicitly at least, disbelief in the whole creed. The great danger to which our country is exposed is infidelity, which is advancing every day, denying, point by point, the precepts of the Christian religion, and even boldly advancing to the denial of the existence and government of God. Nothing can stay the tide of infidelity in our land except our divine faith. We Catholics are the best friends of our free institutions, since we are the only conservatives who maintain the principles of justice and equity on which alone they can securely rest. It is our duty always to protest against every kind of infidelity. Right is always right, and wrong is always wrong, under whatever specious appearance it may be seen. The foes of the

Catholic Church are really the foes of true liberty and of real progress. Knowing full well that the Catholic Church alone is able to stand against the arts of the adversary of man, they attack our religion consciously or unconsciously, knowing that thereby they advance in the surest way the denial of God, of His revelation and of His reign upon earth. Various are these attacks—sometimes under the appearance of progress in things material, sometimes under the false claims of freedom, and sometimes with an open and avowed purpose of destroying the only creed which stands on immovable foundations, because it is divine.

Well-meaning men, who would disavow atheism or infidelity, who call themselves Christians in some sense, are often the dupes of the one great enemy of religion and society. The adversary of man, who is wiser than those whom he deceives, bids them in various ways to attempt to deprive Catholics of their rights before the State, in public meetings, in the legislatures of different States, and even in the United States Congress, to propose laws which, while they deprive us of our equal liberties, strike deadly blows at the order of society. They treat us as if we were a foreign colony in the land, where, to say the least, we are their equals in the land which is our earthly home, and for which we have given our talents and our lives. Nothing could be so suicidal to our faith or to true progress as to compromise with such enemies in any point of faith or morals. The moment we compromise, the moment we yield in any particular where our divine religion and its teachings are concerned, we give up the whole ground to the enemies of society.

We sacrifice the trust reposed in our hands, and under the plea of liberty, we reatly turn traitor to God and to our country. Not for our merits did God give us the priceless treasure of Christian faith. He has reposed it in our hands that we may maintain it, and well discharge our duty to the good of man and to His glory. We can make no admission to what is falsely called progress. We cannot admit that there is any difference between the creed of the Catholic Church of this day and its creed in former ages. We must maintain that the laws which were binding upon the ages preceding us, which have been properly called the Ages of Faith, are binding upon us; and while the admission of any compromise in the teaching of our religion would really be the sacrifice of our whole creed, we shall gain nothing from our Protestant fellow-citizens in return for such a sacrifice. They who are sincere, respect only those whom they believe to be sincere. They will lose their regard for us, and we shall lose our influence among our fellow-men. The restrictions which Almighty God has imposed on His one way of salvation cannot be removed by man, and if in our intercourse with our fellow-citizens we allow them to think

that we do not fully believe that the Catholic Church is necessary for the salvation of men and of nations, they will never be drawn to embrace it, nor to make the sacrifices which are necessary for its profession. We speak feelingly on this subject, but we speak from knowledge and experience. While we are bound, according to the true spirit of our religion, to be courteous and kind and gentle in all the relations of life, while we do not approve of any unnecessarily offensive word or action, we shall best subserve the interests of those who differ from us, and surely best discharge our duty to God, by maintaining, without compromise, the precepts of our religion. There is no more dangerous disposition, if it should ever become popular, than the belief that there is an American Catholicity which is in advance of past times, which differs materially from the faith once delivered to the Church and always preserved by her, which boasts of a freedom from restrictions which bind the ages of the past. Let us, then, in our humble sphere, wherever God has placed us, be true to the faith which He has revealed to us. The perpetuity of our government depends entirely, according to our mind, on the perpetuity and the progress of the Catholic religion. If our religion fails in this country, true Americanism will fall with it; and we believe that those are the only true American Catholics who, while they maintain the rights and the liberties which our constitution guarantees to us, are obedient to the divine voice which speaks to man through the Catholic Church.

Scientific Chronicle.

DR. KOCH AND THE CONSUMPTION CURE.

For several months past considerable commotion has been stirred up, not only in the medical world, but among all classes of people, concerning the discovery of a reputed infallible, or almost infallible cure for consumption. Nor is this to be wondered at, for, whoever has consulted, however cursorily, the statistics of mortality, issued officially or otherwise, in all parts of the world, must have been convinced that a cure, a *real* cure, for consumption is sorely needed in this suffering world of ours. Not to go into lengthy and unnecessary details, it may suffice to state that the annual number of deaths from consumption throughout the world is estimated at from three to four millions. This represents an annual loss of something like a hundred million of years of human life to the world, and of years that should have been, and naturally would have been, the strongest and brightest and best years of life. The germs of the disease, perhaps transmitted directly from parent to offspring, perhaps admitted later on from without, slowly at first it may be, but none the less surely, undermine the constitution, sap the very foundations of life, and send the victim, generally, to an early, always to an untimely grave. Of the vast number of those on whom consumption has once fixed his grasp few ever escape.

Is there is no remedy for this? The human race has been asking this question for centuries, and the answer has ever been unsatisfactory and delusive. We are asking it now again, and we begin to flatter ourselves that we see the first breaking of the dawn of hope. Is this riddle to be solved in our day, or must it be left for future generations to unravel?

It would seem that there ought to be a solution possible. Other scourges of human life have been practically stamped out of the civilized world by some far-reaching discoveries in the domain of medicine. The small-pox is a case in point. Not so very long ago, it was a thing of terror the world over. Jenner gave us vaccination, and to-day we have no real fear of the disease. True, it is not dead, but when we take the proper precautions, well known as they are to-day, there is no reason to dread any general recurrence of its ravages. In former times, whole towns and cities were often decimated, and savage tribes obliterated by it. To-day, we heed it not. Just in proportion as vaccination is vigorously enforced, small-pox disappears. Thus, in 1886, throughout the whole empire of Germany, there were but 225 deaths from small-pox; the next year, 168, and in 1888, only 110. In England, on the contrary, where a rabid anti-vaccination sect has made its influence felt, the deaths have been about sixteen times as many; while in anti-vaccination Austria there have been one hundred and thirty-six times as many. Of the fol-

lowers of Stanley, in his African explorations, quite a large number died of small-pox; but of those who died thus, not a single one had been vaccinated.

The question recurs, then, may it not be possible to find, in like manner, some simple yet efficacious cure for consumption? It would be an endless task to recount all the remedies that have been proposed and tried by the most renowned medical men of ancient and modern times, by numberless others of lesser note, by the vast army of consumptives themselves, as well as by the horde of unmitigated quacks. The record, take it all in all, has been a record of defeat and failure. Is it any wonder, then, that when a new candidate steps forth with a new cure, we hesitate a little, and ask a good deal of strong proof before being required to make an act of medical faith in the matter? This new candidate is Dr. Koch.

Dr. Koch was born at Clausthal, a small town of Hanover, December 11, 1843. Having finished the ordinary school and college studies, he took up medicine, which he pursued with ardor from the age of nineteen to that of twenty-three. Having received his degrees, he practiced a few years at Posen, after which he accepted a professorship, and then began his life-work, that is, the study of infectious diseases. His labors have been rewarded with a large measure of success. It is related that having labored long and perseveringly on certain new investigations, he believed he had discovered something, and accordingly presented himself before the learned professors to let them know what he had found. The wise ones assembled as a matter of routine, and when Koch appeared asked each other, in a lofty way: "Who is that young fellow, anyhow? What is he going to bore us about now?" It took them but a short time, however, to realize that the young man was not of the ordinary stamp. He spoke with such earnestness, explained with such clearness, and withal went to such depths, that they saw he had a mission to the world, and would not fail to fulfil it. He is but forty-seven years old, just in the vigor of manhood, a hard student, an enthusiastic worker, persevering, fearless, yet retiring and modest. Such is the stuff of which great men are made. Up to the present time he has accomplished two things, either of which would be sufficient to render his name illustrious for all time to come. He has discovered the true cause of the Asiatic cholera, and, most probably, the sure remedy. He has discovered the true cause of consumption, and, very likely, its cure. Moreover, he believes that in following out the lines which he has opened up, cures will be found for many of the worst forms of disease, such as diphtheria, erysipelas, and leprosy. Is it only a beautiful dream? We know that some eminent physicians think so. We know, too, that others equally eminent have a firm belief that, the way having been opened by the Pasteurs and Kochs of to-day, the work will be pushed to a glorious conclusion, if not by them, at least by their immediate successors.

Let us now try to get a general idea, first of the cause, and next of the newly-proposed cure for consumption. We may state, without much fear of contradiction, that Dr. Koch has finally proved that consump-

tion is caused by what are called microbes, which either exist in the body at birth, or enter from without later on, and finding in the lungs the requisite conditions of moisture and temperature, and the food suited for their development, prey upon the substance of the lung itself, or else produce within it a poison which causes the derangement called pulmonary tuberculosis, phthisis, or more commonly consumption. *Microbes* or *bacteria* are living microscopic animals which had, long ago, been observed occasionally in the bodies of the higher animals, and whose presence was thought to be merely accidental, and of no special import. A few years ago, however, it began to be noticed that, in certain diseases they were present in extraordinary numbers, and hence the suspicion arose that there might be some essential connection between them and the diseases. It took time and patience to prove this satisfactorily. There were serious difficulties in the way, both of a positive and a negative kind. Among others, the microscope was not as perfect as it is now; neither was it so well known, and few physicians of the old school made any scientific use of it. Besides, most of them were travelling continually in the same old ruts, and, either through lack of time for study could not, or through prejudice would not, get out of them. Again, in the animal body, even in health, there are usually great numbers of living germs which seem to exert no deleterious influence whatever, and some that, if seemingly injurious in some species of animals, are perfectly innocuous in others. Microscopic examinations have proved that there are, pretty much always, multitudes of living animalculæ in the air we breathe, in the food we eat, and in the liquids we drink. And yet we contrive to live on. Evidently, these cannot be exceedingly poisonous.

To prove, therefore, that a given disease, say in man, is due to the action of micro-organisms, it would be necessary to show, at the very least, that some special kind is always present in that disease, and also that whenever this kind is present, that disease exists. All these difficulties, and a number of others, seem to have been fairly met. The microscope is no longer the toy we knew it some years back, but an instrument of wonderful perfection. In the hands of men who have become skilful in its use, who have learned its value and capabilities, as well as its limitations, it has settled down to honest, hard work. By its aid, as we have said, the existence of numberless minute forms of animal life has been demonstrated around and within us. The task still remained to discover what relation, if any, they bore to the higher forms of animal life, and especially whether any of them were pathogenic, that is, disease-producing germs, and if so, how and under what conditions.

This could not be satisfactorily accomplished by mere observations, however accurate. The scientist must not only observe and classify the bare facts which nature spontaneously throws out to him; he must go a step further, and by well-chosen, crucial experiments, compel her to answer his questions. In the matter in hand, it was not only necessary to see the germs, to describe them, and give them a local habitation and

a *name*, but also to produce them at will, to isolate each species from all the others, and then try their effects on the lower animals, and with due precautions, even on the human subject itself. Let us see how this production and isolation of the germs is brought about. The general method is about the same for all the species; but experience has shown that different food-substances are required for the different kinds.

For the microbe of consumption the process is briefly as follows: We take an ordinary test-tube, and heat it over the fire till we are satisfied that any living germs it may have contained are destroyed. This process is called *sterilizing*. Then a *bouillon* (broth) of agar-agar, a kind of gelatine, is prepared, sterilized and placed in the tube. If the tube be now closed with a plug of sterilized cotton, it may be left an indefinite time, under any conditions, without showing the least sign of change. The cotton allows free access of air, but hinders the entrance of germs from without. This tube is intended as a means of comparison. Another tube, prepared at the same time, is treated in precisely the same way, except that before plugging, a few microbes, taken directly from the mucus of a consumptive, are added to the contents of the tube. Both tubes are now placed in a sort of oven, where a constant temperature of about 100° F. is maintained. After some time the contents of the second tube begin to show signs of change. The *bouillon*, from being clear and bright, begins to grow cloudy in spots; this increases more or less rapidly until the whole substance in the tube is invaded. The few microbes originally placed in it have multiplied to millions. The contents of the tube, in this condition, has been named *culture*. It may contain many other microbes besides the ones peculiar to consumption. To eliminate them, the same process is repeated in fresh test-tubes by taking a little of what was developed in the first culture to start the next, and so on, until the consumption microbe is complete master of the field, and the tube contains no other species. This point is, of course, determined by the microscope, and it may require upwards of a hundred successive cultivations to reach this result. This is called the *pure culture*. This microbe, which, as we shall see, does really cause consumption, has, under the microscope, the appearance of a little rod, and has hence been named *bacillus tuberculosus*. Experiments without number have been made on healthy animals with these particular *bacilli*. The animals found by experience most suitable for this purpose are the guinea-pig and the rabbit. The injection of a minute portion of the pure culture invariably brings on the disease, just as does the injection of the mucus of a consumptive, while the injection of other microbes has either no effect, or else causes some other disease.

The moral law steps in here now, and, as a general rule, forbids us to try this experiment on human beings, but since consumption in the brute shows precisely the same symptoms in detail as in man, it is without doubt the same disease in both cases, and it therefore follows that the bacillus tuberculosus is the real cause of consumption in the human subject.

The next step was to find some means of destroying the bacilli without

serious injury to the sufferer. Dr. Koch made a long series of experiments, with chemical reagents, upon his pure cultures in the test-tubes. He tried acids and alkalies, oils and ethers, naphthaline and fuschine, aniline colors, salts of many of the metals, and an infinity of other substances. He found the most energetic of all to be the chloro-cyanide of gold, of which one part in a million is enough to completely arrest all development of the bacilli in the pure culture. He next tried these reagents upon his guinea-pigs in consumption, but it was a total failure; they all died of the disease. This was enough to discourage most men; not so Dr. Koch. He went to work again at a new series of experiments, and seems to think he may be successful. Want of space prevents us from following him through all the stages of his work. Suffice it to say that up to date his process appears to be this: He takes the bacilli of the pure culture, kills them by heat or by chemical reagents, and makes an extract of them in 50 per cent. glycerine. This is the *lymph* about which such excessively good and bad things have been said, and about which opinions appear just now to be more widely divergent than ever. This lymph is injected hypodermically in infinitesimal doses, and the dose repeated at longer or shorter intervals, according to indications furnished by the state of the patient. The reason given by Dr. Koch for the action of the lymph may or may not be the correct one. It is certainly a very curious one, but he places no particular stress upon it. He holds, anyhow, that consumption has been cured by it, and will be again, but warns us that it is an exceedingly powerful agent, and must be used with the utmost caution. He holds, also, that on account of its very different action on consumptives and on non-consumptives, it is a sure means of determining whether or not there is latent consumption in a given case.

The pith of his explanation seems to be that the presence of the lymph in the lungs, brought there, after inoculation, by the circulation of the blood, produces in the tissues a condition so unfavorable to the living bacilli that they soon die, and are rejected as effete matter by the natural reaction of the system. This condition is, strange enough, a sort of disease itself, which, however, is not severe, and which quickly passes away. The dead bacilli are set to kill the living, and nature is to take the office of undertaker when the slaughter is over.

Now, what is the outcome of all this? As might have been easily predicted, the announcement of a cure for consumption was hailed with extravagant acclamations on all hands. Sensational articles from the *enlightened* press were the order of the day. Dr. Koch was made to say more than he ever dreamt of saying, and then the inevitable reaction came, in which the whole business, from first to last, is criticized, condemned and denounced as untrustworthy and dangerous to the last degree.

It is too early yet to give a final judgment. We who have not got consumption can afford to wait till the effervescence subsides and a sufficient trial has been made. It will then probably turn out that the sobér truth will ultimately be found between the two extremes, and that when

the action of the lymph is more thoroughly known, and the conditions of its use better understood, it will prove of very great value in the treatment of consumption. But our chief consolation is in this, that we believe it is a magnificent stride forward on the road to something infinitely better, which we still hope will reach us before the millennium.

THREE OR FOUR—WHICH IS IT?

About a decade ago one of the most eminent among English physicists and chemists, Prof. William Crookes, of London, proposed a rather startling theory concerning the existence of a fourth state of matter. Faraday, as we shall see, had hinted at it as a possibility long years before, but Crookes, while studying the action of electricity in the Geissler tubes, was the first to believe he had laid his hand upon it. He followed up the idea by the means of many long and patient investigations, to carry out which he contrived a large number of very beautiful, not to say brilliant, experiments, which have been the wonder of physicists ever since. The facts were there, numerous and varied, but the theory proposed, although admitted by some, has been called in doubt by others. Yet, as far as we know, no one has offered anything to replace it. For a long time very little appears to have been said about the matter one way or another. Quite lately, however, Prof. Crookes has taken it up again, under a different name, and devised new experiments, equally as beautiful as the former ones, and which seem to add new strength to his theory.

As many of the readers of the Catholic Quarterly may have had occasion to hear but little about this subject, we intend, in this and a subsequent article, to review it briefly from the beginning up to the present time.

The theory which Prof. Crookes puts forth is, that besides the solid, liquid and gaseous conditions, or states, of matter, there is a fourth condition, higher yet, which he calls the ultra-gaseous or radiant condition of matter, or simply *Radiant Matter*. The name itself, however, is due to Faraday.

In order to render clear what we intend to say about this ultra-gaseous or fourth state of matter, it seems very necessary to give a faint outline, at least, of the modern theory concerning the three other states already admitted by all. We have all been dealing with solids, liquids and gases from childhood up, and we may imagine that what we don't know about them is not worth knowing. Still, there is one strange phenomenon which men of study, deep thinkers, often encounter. It is that, however familiar we may be with many things, yet when we are called upon to give an exact definition of any one of them, we often find it a very difficult, if not an impossible, feat. So just here, who will give us an exact definition of the solid, the liquid, the gaseous conditions of matter?

Many ancient theories have passed away; it is with the most modern one that we are concerned now.

We merely intend to *state* the theory at present; to attempt to give the proofs upon which it is supposed to rest would lead us too far beyond the bounds of a magazine article.

The modern theory about matter and its three states is something like this:

Bodies—by which we mean limited portions of matter—are made up of molecules. Molecules are made up of atoms. Take, for example, a crystal of common salt. Divide it into two parts; each part will be salt. Divide each of these parts again, and so on; or, to expedite matters, *grind* them down to fine dust. Each particle of that dust will be salt. But there must be a limit somewhere. Take what means you will, sooner or later a degree of *fineness* must be reached beyond which it will be impossible to go by any mere physical process. The particles thus obtained are what we call *molecules*. They are, in brief, the smallest particles into which a compound substance can be divided without losing its characteristic properties.

The physicist, purely as such, halts here, and allows the chemist to step in. The latter will take the molecules of salt and divide them still further—tear, as it were, each of them asunder, not, indeed, by physical, but by chemical means. The salt will have disappeared, and in place thereof there will now be found *two* substances, each totally different from salt and totally different from each other. They have been named *sodium* and *chlorine*. Now, that quantity of sodium which, in combination with chlorine, constituted a single molecule of salt, is called an *atom* of sodium, and, in like manner, the quantity of chlorine in a single molecule of salt is called an *atom* of chlorine. All *compound* molecules are composed of a greater or less number of two or more kinds of atoms. In the case of bodies which we call *simple* or *elementary*, the molecule is composed of two or more atoms of the same kind. Thus, a molecule of sodium is composed of two atoms of sodium, a molecule of phosphorus of four atoms of phosphorus, etc. There are, however, two or three exceptional cases in which the atom and molecule are said to be identical. The atom, then, of a given substance is defined as the smallest particle of that substance which can exist in a chemical combination.

At this point natural science instinctively feels that it has reached the end of its tether, and leaves to metaphysics to tell us of what *principles*, as they are called, the atom is composed. With this question we have nothing to do just now, and we will lay it reverently aside. We will also lay aside the atoms, as such, and let the chemist take care of *them* while we will take a look after the molecules.

The modern theory, which we are endeavoring to outline, goes on to state that the number of molecules of which a body is composed is fearfully great. For example, Mr. Johnston Storey has estimated that a cubic inch of air, at the ordinary pressure of the atmosphere, is composed of *at least* sixteen sextillions (16,000,000,000,000,000,000,000)

of molecules. This number may be very much too small, but it will do for the present. Suppose we try now to realize what it means. Let us sit down calmly and count it, say at the rate of one per second. How long would it take us to get through? A day? A month? A year? No, but 500 trillions (500,000,000,000,000) of years! And yet air is so *thin* that, had it never been put in motion, we would perhaps never have been aware of its existence. If, now, there are so many molecules as that in one cubic inch of air, how many are there in all the solid, liquid and gaseous matter of the earth, of the sun, of the universe? That's a problem for some one whose time hangs heavy on his hands.

Another point of our modern theory is that not only are the molecules of which a body is made up not in actual contact with one another, but that they are even, relatively to their size, very far apart. Some have conjectured that the molecular structure of bodies may be likened to the starry structure of the visible universe. Verily, it is hard to believe this. At any rate, it follows, from what has been said above, that the molecule must be almost inconceivably small.

"A thing so small, 'twixt it and nothing naught remains,"

except the atom, which, paradoxical as it may appear, is smaller still.

The third part of the theory, and the part which most nearly concerns us now, is that the molecules of bodies are not in a state of rest; that, on the contrary, they are in a state of continual motion, rapid and violent, and that *the difference between the solid, the liquid and the gaseous states depends mainly on the amount and character of this molecular movement.*

Let us examine this a little more in detail. In a solid body—a lump of ice, for example—each molecule oscillates in every conceivable direction *about a fixed position*, up and down, right and left, back and forth, millions of times in a second. If, however, the body be subjected to some external force, the relative positions of a greater or less portion of the molecules may become permanently changed.

In the same body, when brought to the liquid state (we call it water now), the molecules have no fixed positions. They oscillate more violently than before, make longer excursions, forgetting to return, but yet, as a whole, remain within certain fixed limits.

In the same body, again, when brought to the gaseous state (we call it steam now), the molecules oscillate still more violently; the average distance between them has been enormously increased and the swing has been vastly augmented, and, if unimpeded, they fly off in straight lines to immense distances.

What has been said of the solid (ice), of the liquid (water), of the gas (steam) is equally true of all other solid, liquid and gaseous bodies.

The molecules of a body, even when a solid, impinge upon one another, and those that form the outer layer impinge upon the nearest

molecules of contiguous bodies, and to these impacts are due the impressions which matter makes on our sense of touch.

The rate and amplitude of the vibrations, and the number of encounters per second, of the molecules, may be augmented by the addition, and diminished by the subtraction of heat. Moreover, it is clear that if, in a given volume of matter, we diminish the number of molecules, those that are left in the same space will encounter each other less often, and being less impeded, their swing will be longer between consecutive collisions.

Now let us go back again to our piece of ice, and suppose its temperature is 32° Fahrenheit. The molecules, as we have said, are oscillating, each about a fixed position. We will apply heat. The effect of this will be to loosen the molecules from their fixed positions and to make them vibrate more rapidly—in a word, to convert the solid ice into liquid water. Keep on heating. One effect of this will be to increase the energy with which the molecules buffet each other; that is, the temperature of the water increases. Another effect will be to increase the amplitude of the oscillations; that is, the water expands. And this goes on till the thermometer marks 212° F. At this point the energy of the molecules is great enough to overcome the ordinary pressure of the atmosphere, and little by little the molecules burst away from each other and disappear in the gaseous condition which we call steam. However, we are not done with it yet; so we will close the vessel betimes, and imprison a remnant for further experiment.

The steam is now at a temperature of 212° F. and a tension of about fifteen pounds to the square inch. The molecules are hammering away at each other and against the sides of the vessel. The result of all these blows is what we call precisely the pressure or tension of the steam, *i.e.*, its tendency to escape. Still keep on heating. The energy of the molecules becomes a very frenzy now. The temperature of the steam rises yet higher, and the tension becomes alarmingly great.

But the blows of the molecules of the gas against the molecules of the vessel have put these latter into a state of more rapid and vigorous motion, so that it too becomes hotter and expands to a slight extent. Nor does the action stop here, for the molecules of the vessel impinge upon the molecules of the surrounding air, and in like manner heat it and cause it to expand. We might continue this heating up through some hundreds of degrees until the solid walls of the vessel would no longer be able to withstand the bombardment of the molecules, and then it would give way at its weakest point, and an explosion would ensue.

But supposing we remove the source of heat before the catastrophe takes place, what will happen? The molecules will keep on for a time in their mad drivings against one another and against the sides of the vessel, but the blows will gradually become more feeble; for the molecular motion communicated to the vessel is lost to the molecules of the gas that gave it, and the molecular motion communicated to the air is lost to the molecules of the vessel that gave it, and the molecular motion

which was communicated to the air will be transmitted to the ether, and will continue on, we know not how far, perhaps to be lost in space—if that means anything—perhaps, rather, to nestle for a moment in some far-off nook of any one of the giant worlds of God's mighty universe, and then to speed on again to another, and another, and another, and so on, and then, perhaps after millions of ages, to come quivering back again to its childhood's home, always seeking rest, but finding none.

However this may be, the additional molecular motion which we had set up in the gas, by means of heat, sooner or later dies out, and we have our gas back again at a temperature of 212° F. and a pressure of fifteen pounds. Now comes the critical moment. The swing of the molecules is about at its shortest for this particular state of the substance with which we are dealing. Yet lessen it must, unless we supply what is being lost, which we are *not* doing, and so our steam begins to change to a liquid. The longer vibrations, appropriate to a gaseous condition, are being changed to the shorter ones which indicate a liquid, and being shorter, they are more rapid for a time (just as a shorter pendulum vibrates more rapidly than a longer one), and hence reveal themselves as heat. This is why a body in passing from the gaseous to the liquid state gives out such a quantity of so-called *latent* heat, and this heat keeps the temperature of the whole mass of steam up to 212° F. until it has been all changed to a liquid. It now occupies about one sixteen-hundredth of the space originally occupied by the steam.

But the battle is not over yet, for although their blows grow weaker, and ultimately slower, not a molecule has deserted the ranks. Each one strikes his blow, loses a little of his strength in so doing, makes a shorter excursion next time, and soon begins to take more time to do it—which, being interpreted, means that the water grows colder—and at the same time contracts in volume until our thermometer only marks 39.1° F. The ranks are so serried now that they absolutely refuse to close in any further—the water is at its densest; for the temperature still descending, the molecules begin to spread out again and to group themselves in six-sided figures. They seem to feel that some dire change is impending, and wish to make a gallant stand, or, at least, not to be found with disordered ranks when the change does come. The temperature of the most exposed portions goes down to 32° F., and a few of the outside battalions fall, and are changed, where they fall, into transparent hexagonal crystals of ice. And now others, and others, share the same fate, each company giving up the molecular motion which kept it liquid to its still unconquered companions, thus helping to keep *their* temperature up to 32° F. and retarding their fate a little longer. But one by one they all fall, until you, who are looking on, would say that the iron grip of death was fastened on all.

But it is not so. The mass of ice is not cold *absolutely*, and therefore is not dead. The molecules are still vibrating; there is some heat in that ice yet, and the proof of this is that it can be cooled still further. But how far? Can the vibrations, which we call heat, be ever entirely

stilled? There is a calculation intended to show that at about 491° F. below the freezing temperature of water all molecular motion would cease. This has been named the *absolute zero* of temperature. It is very hard to pass a judgment on this matter, and harder still to form any conception of the condition of matter whose molecules would be devoid of all vibration.

To sum up what has already been said. From all ages matter has been known to exist in the solid and liquid conditions. It is only within the last one hundred and fifty years that the gaseous state has been recognized and understood. The modern theory concerning these three states is that matter is made up of molecules, which are not in contact with each other; that they are always in a state of vibratory motion; that this motion is either heat or the effect of heat, and finally, that on the character and extent of this motion, the solid, the liquid and the gaseous conditions of matter respectively depend.

In a subsequent article we propose to speak of a possible *fourth* state, and to describe the experiments which are relied upon to prove its existence.

THE PACIFIC CABLE.

TIME was when every country thought its peculiar duty was to love its own and hate all the world besides. Assyria, Greece and Rome testify to this on every page of their history. Modern nations have scarcely improved on their ancestors. From the days of Nimrod to darkest Sedan, the world has been full of wars, conflicts and revolutions. Some of the wise ones of the world hold that these things must be, and that so long as men are men, they will quarrel, and that war will be the only arbitrator of their quarrels. We Americans have not quite escaped the thralldom of this idea. A blind hate for the mother country was, not so very long ago, considered almost an essential part of every true American's patriotism. On the other hand, there are those, and we cannot believe them entirely visionaries, who think that the time is coming when the lamb and the lion may lie down in peace together, without the lamb being necessarily inside of the lion; and that all the arts of war are justifiable only on the grounds of being an advance towards the reign of peace. At the same time, the cultivation of the true arts of peace is one of the surest ways of diverting minds from the pursuit of war. To follow up this theme would lead us a long way from our title, so we will stop moralizing.

A little over thirty years ago, the first telegraph cable was laid between America and Europe. Since then many others have been put down under the Atlantic ocean as well as in other parts of the world. The good they have done, from a purely commercial point of view, has been very great, but we believe that the good of another kind, indirectly

brought about by their means, has been far greater. The quest of gain may appear selfish, yet underneath it there is something more noble, which, if not primarily intended by men, is nevertheless brought about by the providence of God in His own gentle ways. The ocean telegraphs have thus served to bind many peoples together in closer bonds of good will and brotherhood the world over. We have learned to feel that we are much less strangers to one another than we ever realized before; that the human race is, after all, *one;* that our interests are the common interests of all mankind, and that by mutually helping one another, we are in reality benefiting ourselves. Hence, every new bridge, every new railroad, every new line of telegraph, that crosses the boundaries between two countries, every ship that spreads her sails or starts her engines for a foreign port is for us a good omen. As we learn to know more about distant peoples, we get to understand better that they are not, perhaps, so much worse than we thought ourselves.

For these reasons among others, we hail with pleasure the project now on foot of a telegraph cable across the Pacific ocean. The subject was discussed as far back, at least, at 1876, and a charter was granted by Congress in that year. The difficulties, however, seemed so great that the capitalists were afraid to venture, lest the returns should prove unsatisfactory. As nothing was done at the end of three years, the charter lapsed. More recently, another project was started; this time to lay a cable from California to the Hawaiian Islands, a distance of about 2000 miles. The company asked Congress for a subsidy of $250,000 a year to help them along. The matter was discussed in Congress, but the request looked so exorbitant that the sum was cut down in conference 40 per cent.; yet even in this amended form the bill failed to pass. Leaving out the question as to the right of the government to grant subsidies to private corporations from the money of the people, it is, perhaps, all the better that this scheme fell through. We do not want any halfway work. We have no use for a cable with one end in San Francisco and the other on a buoy in the Pacific. We do want a cable to go from shore to shore and get there; to reach from California to China. That is only 6500 miles; and then, to make it reasonably sure financially, you have but to take in all the important islands on the route. Our long experience with Atlantic cables demonstrates that there are no insurmountable difficulties, either mechanical or electrical. We are, therefore glad to learn that the old company is coming to life again. Mr. C. C. Moreno, who was at its head fifteen years ago, is ready again, and thinks the time ripe, and only asks a renewal of the defunct charter to go ahead. He has made his calculations and finds that the work can be done cheaper and better now than it could have been done in 1876. Besides, the need of it is more pressing. Our relations with the whole world have deepened and broadened since then, and we ought not to neglect to embrace our opportunity now. Mr. Moreno asks no subsidy, only the formality of a charter, and believes he has plenty of backing to put the business through.

Besides, we are hankering for a good long talk with our brothers of

the pig-tail and are quite willing to have it at a distance, for the present at least. We think we could tell them some things that would be good for them; perhaps they could tell us some things that would be good for us. We want to civilize them. By all means, then, let us have the Pacific cable, and don't keep us waiting too long.

ELECTRICITY DIRECT FROM COAL.

THE traditions of the human race as they have been handed down from remote ages, have always possessed, and without doubt always will possess for us all a peculiarly weird interest. At one period of our life we believed them all, and even in mature years, we still find it hard to thrust aside the dreamy tales that were fed to us in our youth. Thus, we were told that the world began with a golden age which soon degenerated into an age of silver, and then again into a brazen age to be finally succeeded by an age of iron. The expressions of the ancient poets should doubtlessly be taken in a metaphorical rather than in a literal sense; yet, we have long felt that whatever may have been the state of things in the dim, distant twilight of pre-historic fable, *we* at least are literally living in an age of iron, from which we are but beginning slowly to emerge. While still remaining an age of iron, it seems however to be taking on another character over and above, and which is now causing it be styled by some, the age of electricity.

Twenty years ago electricity was scarcely spoken of, except in connection with Franklin's kite and the electric telegraph, outside of the laboratories of a few scientific workers. Now, what with the electric telephone, the electric light, the electric motor and its application to all kinds of work, electric alarms, pulls, pushes, buttons and wires, electric heating, cooking, welding, electric *vision*, or seeing at a distance by electricity, and a thousand others springing up every day, we begin to get confused and ask if this earth is after all only a vast dynamo, with its poles a little awkwardly placed, the meridians serving for wires, and men only specks of dust held on by electrical attraction. Whatever may be thought about all this, one thing is certain, and that is, that many of the inventions for the application of electricity have come to stay and to supplant forever other older appliances. View it which way we will, there can be no doubt that, a very few years hence, electricity will be the prime mover of the world. However, before reaching the true electrical Utopia, there is one grave difficulty to be surmounted. The minor obstacles, such as the danger to life and property attending its use, the mechanical defects in the instruments employed, its waywardness and beautiful uncertainty, are being rapidly and successfully overcome.

The most formidable obstacle, in fact, the only formidable obstacle is, to put it prosaically, its relatively high cost. It may be a surprise to many to be told that the trouble here does not come from electricity itself, but from entirely different causes.

There are two sources of electricity at present available; the primary battery and the dynamo. In the former the energy of certain chemical actions is converted into electrical energy, at the expense of the materials used up. These materials, so far as tried, are all too dear to allow the electricity generated by their means to enter into competition with other sources of energy. It is the cost of zinc and acids and other chemicals which prohibits the use of the primary battery on anything like a large scale. The whole range of known substances has been pretty well worked over, with results that are entirely unsatisfactory. The battery has its uses, but only in a small way, for very light work, where larger sources of energy would be cumbersome and unwieldy. It is true that more energy can be got out of the same materials in the electric battery than in any other way, but those materials, as we have said, cost too much, so that, unless their price can be reduced to a mere fraction of what it is now, or some hitherto unknown substance comes to the front, it is simply useless to think of the primary battery as a source of energy either for light, or heat, or power, or for any other practical purpose of any magnitude.

The other source of electrical energy that we named is the dynamo. Ah, well, so it is often called, but it is hardly correct to call the dynamo a *source* of energy; it is indeed totally incorrect to do so; for the dynamo gives out only the energy put into it, and not even quite all of that. It must be driven by a steam-engine, or a gas-engine, or a water-motor, wheel or turbine, or an equivalent of some kind. Neither again is the steam-engine, nor any one of the others, a *source* of energy. They too give out merely what is put into them, or rather a part of it, and never create anything. The real *terrestrial source of energy*, in either case, is the coal, or the gas, or the water of an elevated reservoir. In these cases the energy is slumbering, and we call it *potential* energy; but a touch will awaken it; the touch of a match to the fuel, the touch of a tiny hand to the water gate, and the giant shakes his mane, puts forth his strength, and, if properly harnessed and guided, makes the wheels of industry to revolve. We said "*terrestrial source of energy*," because we may go farther back yet, and find that the energy of the coal or gas, and of the store of water was put into them by the heat and light of the sun, and, in an infinitesimal degree, by the heat and light of the fixed stars. Boilers, engines, water-wheels, are but the means of turning the energy of the burning coal or gas, or of the falling water into other channels, or of transforming it into other kinds of energy, for various uses, according to the will of him who, in a certain way, presides by right of sovereignty over it all, the master, man. The energy of a thing in motion is called *kinetic* energy. When now this energy is put into the armature of a dynamo, so as to cause it to revolve, if other things are properly arranged, the form of energy known as electricity results; and, waiving some little unavoidable losses which can fairly be accounted for, the electrical output follows very closely on the amount of mechanical energy put in. Thus, a good dynamo at its best, has been made to render back 99 per cent. of the energy it received from the

steam-engine. A good practical result, if kept up steadily and that can be done under fairly favorable conditions, is a return of 90 per cent. With this we have serious reason to be dissatisfied. Were it possible to find an unfailing natural supply of water at a sufficient elevation, within easy distance of the points where needed, we could have our electrical energy at very reasonable rates. This, except in rare cases, is manifestly out of the question, especially so in cities where precisely it is most needed.

We turn, therefore, to the steam-engine, under which term, in the remainder of this article, we include the whole steam-plant from the fire-door to the exhaust-pipe. And now our troubles begin. True, we look on with wonder when we see a locomotive weighing, say twenty-five tons, hauling a train of perhaps a thousand tons at the rate of forty, sixty, sometimes seventy-five miles an hour, and think that all this energy comes from a few shovels of coal. We look on with a sensation akin to awe when we see the engines of a great ocean steamer (capable, as they are, of putting forth an energy of more than six hundred million foot-pounds, that is, capable of raising that many pounds of matter one foot per minute steadily) breathing, and panting, and heaving, like a leviathan at his work, and reflect that all its energy is due to the combustion of a few tons of coal. Surely, 'tis a magnificent machine. And yet, those engines are a stupendous fraud. We know the value, for mechanical work, of every pound of coal we burn, and we know that the most perfect combination of boilers and engines ever made gives us back but twenty per cent., at most, of the energy of the coal, while the common, every-day types often fail to give us ten. All the rest, from eighty to ninety per cent., is sheer loss, just the reverse of the figures given by the dynamo. If the engine wasted only ten per cent., and the dynamo ten per cent., of what was left, then, coupling them together, we would still have eighty-one per cent of the coal-energy returned to us. But when the engine wastes, on an average, eighty-five per cent., and the dynamo ten per cent. of what is left, the consequence is, that we get back from the coal only thirteen and five-tenths per cent., of its real value. This is a very poor showing.

What, then, is to be done? Why, improve the engine till it gives back as fair a percentage of the energy put into it as the dynamo does. Well, yes, that's just the rub. Try it a little, and send us word of your successes. They won't occupy much space on paper. The best engineers of the world, from the days of Watts, have attacked that problem from every side, and have got no further that what we have stated above. There seem to be inherent defects, so nicely adjusted, that if you cure one you make the others worse.

The only other course that seems possible is to throw boiler, engine, and dynamo into the scrap heap, and get our electrical energy *directly from the coal.* How to do this is the problem before the electrical world now. Other problems there are, but this is the most important one. Only think of it. We get now, out of our coal, about 13.5 per cent of its energy. We ought to get at least seven times as much in the form of

electrical energy; and with electrical energy, of which we would then have plenty, we could run the world. Heat, light, and motive power in abundance; what more do you ask? From a purely material standpoint that, surely, ought to satisfy us. Instead of three hundred and twenty tons of coal a day, the grand Teutonic could run on forty-five, and have all the greater carrying capacity. A much higher speed could be maintained, both by land and sea, and the risks of accident diminished rather than increased; this, especially on railroads, on which, by well-known means, collisions would become simply impossible. Some writers have indulged in a good deal of rhapsody about running a steamship across the Atlantic on a wheelbarrow of coal and a glass of water. The sober truth will probably turn out to be about what we have stated above.

Now, we do not want merely to get electricity directly from coal; that has been done, among others, by Edison. It is useless to describe the apparatus employed, since it does not do what we want, viz., convert *all*, or nearly all, the stored-up energy of the coal into electrical energy, and that directly, without wasting, as we do now, nearly nine-tenths of it in the process. The project is a baby yet; will it ever grow up to manhood? We believe it will. We know of no reason why it should not. Electricity direct from coal. It looks far more promising than did many problems that have been settled during the last decade. Electric motors were playthings ten years ago. Now, there are hundreds of electric railroads all over the land. Greater discoveries have been made, over and over again. All we want is another Faraday, and a couple of new Edisons, and the discovery will be on hand to discover the man, not the man to make the discovery. Step up, gentlemen, and try your luck; some of you will, some of you must, sooner or later, succeed, and be crowned with no end of glory and renown.

RAIN ON TAP.

> "Streams never flow in vain; where streams abound,
> How laughs the land, with various plenty crowned!"
> —COWPER.

WHERE rain falls frequently and in sufficiency, there streams will abound, and the "plenty" of the poet will naturally follow. There are many places on the earth, some quite extensive ones in our own country, where the rainfall is far from being sufficient for the purposes of agriculture. Such, for example, are parts of eastern Iowa, Colorado and western Kansas. Irrigation is about impossible on account of the large extent of country to be covered and the great distance of the water supplies. If, now, rain could be produced by artificial means, and they did not prove too costly, it would be a boon indeed. The experiment is about to be tried. How? There has been a tradition current from time immemorial that great battles have usually been followed by rain-

storms, more or less severe. Taking this cue, Mr. Francis Powers investigated the history of the case as far as possible, and in 1871 published a work entitled "War and the Weather, or the Artificial Production of Rain." He cites many examples of rain speedily following on great battles. In the Mexican war of 1846 and 1847, he finds six cases. In the first year of our civil rebellion (1861), nine cases; in 1862, forty; in 1863, thirty; in 1864, twenty-eight; in 1865, six: thus making, in this war of four years, one hundred and thirteen battles, or heavy skirmishes, followed pretty closely by rain. Eighteen cases are noted in Europe during the past century, making in all one hundred and thirty-seven well attested examples. Mr. Powers argues that there must be a relation of cause and effect, whatever the mode of action of the cause may be. He thinks that the particles of smoke may serve as the *nuclei* for rain-drops, around which the concussion of the air causes the moisture to condense. Objections have been raised to this theory, notably by the "American Journal of Science," in which it is contended that the cases cited above were probably mere coincidences; that it rains pretty frequently in the places mentioned anyhow, and would probably have rained, battle or no battle. Moreover, the observations were not taken with sufficient care as to the exact time between the beginning of a battle and the beginning of rain, nor of the state of the weather immediately before (in other words, Old Probabilities was not consulted), nor of the general rainfall of the locality. At a time when men are putting forth their best energies, physical and mental, to murder each other from the face of the earth, they would not be likely to busy themselves much about what was going on in the sky.

On the other hand, there have not been wanting cases which seem to speak in more definite tones. At the siege of Valenciennes, June, 1793, the weather was hot and dry; shortly after the cannonading began, rain fell as violently as unexpectedly. About three hundred pieces of cannon were in action at the same time. Again, at the battle of Dresden, August, 1813, the weather, serene and hot, changed suddenly during the battle, and rain fell in torrents. "At Waterloo, June 17, 1815, the weather," according to the historian Siborne, "had been excessively hot during the morning. It was a dead calm, not a leaf stirred, the atmosphere was close to an intolerable degree, while a dark, heavy, dense cloud impended over the combatants. . . . . The moment the brigade guns commenced firing, the concussion seemed to rebound through the still atmosphere, and communicate like an electric spark with the heavily-charged mass above. A violent thunder-clap burst forth, which was immediately followed by a rain which has never probably been exceeded even in the tropics."

Humbolt says that when a volcano bursts out in South America, even during the *dry* season, it sometimes changes it to a rainy one. Moreover, in very hot weather, forest fires are generally followed by heavy floods of rain. This has been noticed so often that it seems reasonable to suppose there is some connection between the columns of smoke and the rainfall. Also, Senator Farwell, of Illinois, says that during the con-

struction of the Central Pacific Railroad through the arid regions east of the Rocky Mountains, where a great deal of blasting was necessary, it rained every day there was blasting.

So far as records and deductions from them are concerned, no conclusion seems to be within reach. The only means to settle the question is to test it experimentally, not indeed by fighting the battles over again, but in a more peaceful way; and this is what is going to be done.

Senator Farwell has obtained an appropriation of $2000 from Congress for the purpose of carrying on experiments of this kind. This sum will not be sufficient, but the Senator intends to supplement it from his own resources, and make a thorough test. Smoky and smokeless explosives, powder, nitroglycerine, dynamite, etc., and smoke without explosions will be tried. The circumstances of time and place and state of the atmosphere thermometrically, barometrically and hygrometrically will be carefully noted and weighed. Everything will be tried that can be suspected of having any influence on the result. There will be explosions at sea-level, on the hill-tops, in captive balloons; in dry weather, in damp weather, in hot weather, in cool weather. The result will be awaited with much interest on all sides.

FOUR GREAT TOWERS.

THE first great tower of which we have any record was built in the plain of Sennaar. It was of brick and is believed to have been of monstrous proportions. It can hardly be said to have been a success, never having been finished according to the plans, nor ever having served for the purpose for which it was intended. It came to confusion and was therefore called Babel. Beyond this, little can be said of it, except what has been supplied by the imagination.

When we were preparing for our Centennial Exhibition, of 1876, it was proposed to build a grand tower on the grounds at Philadelphia. The designer, whose name escapes us just now, boasted that he would eclipse the Tower of Babel. He did not do so, for, in a few weeks, they built a wooden box for him, and he was laid away with his unseemly boast. The Tower of Philadelphia came to confusion even earlier in its history than its prototype of Babel, and so it does not count in the list. Neither does the Washington monument count; it has become a mere pigmy in the race skyward.

Next comes the Eiffel Tower, so named after its designer, Mr. Gustavo Eiffel, of Paris. It is a magnificent structure, 984 feet high, not including the great lightning-rod. It is built entirely of cast and wrought iron and weighs nearly eight thousand tons. It has proved a success in every way, financially, artistically and scientifically, and unless destroyed by some soulless enemy or the earth give way beneath, it

will be there to greet, with its majestic smile, the famous future traveller from New Zealand.

Not to be behindhand, our English cousins propose to build a tower in London town, taller than anything yet, so tall, indeed, that you might stand Bunker Hill Monument on the top of the Eiffel Tower and still fall far short of the London one; in fact, a tower of the stupendous height of 1250 feet. The designs are the work of Mr. Henry Davey. It is to be hexagonal in form, built of steel tubes, and the total weight, notwithstanding the great difference in height (266 feet), will not much exceed that of the Eiffel Tower. The lower portion will be closed in, enclosing a floor space of 70,000 square feet, while a basement will afford room for the steam-plant necessary for the elevators, the electric lights, the fountain pumps and for heating purposes.

The design, showing as it does, two different curves, surmounted by a long taper shaft, with another shaft of a somewhat different style above the last, can scarcely be called elegant, and in this respect falls far short of its neighbor across the channel. Perhaps, however, this was to be expected.

The fourth great tower is likewise, as yet, a "thing on paper." Mr. Proctor has promised us, and, we believe, made all arrangements to erect a tower for the Columbian Fair to he held in Chicago. But, alas, we feel humbled, for it is to be *only* 1100 feet high, not quite twice the height of the Washington Monument, and falling short of its London companion by 150 feet. There is one consolation, however, which is that, as far as can be judged by drawings, it will be the most graceful of them all. Light and airy as a bird-cage, with one beautiful curve from the foundation to the lookout, 1000 feet above. The last 100 feet consist of a straight shaft, surmounted by a dome, both shaft and dome in perfect keeping with the main body of the tower below, and a tall flagstaff to crown the whole. The height of the flagstaff is not included in the 1100 feet. The elevators will be capable of taking up and down 8000 passengers per hour. This is about all the details that have been made public up to date; but the plans are in the hands of the architects and engineers, and we have no doubt that Chicago will see the work put through with her usual vigor. When it is completed, we only ask that we may be there to see.

Book Notices.

La Republique Americaine États-Unis. Avec une carte de la Formation Politique et Territoriale des États-Unis. Par *Auguste Carlier*. Paris Librairie: Guillaumin et Cie. 1890. 4 vols.

From an enemy we can learn something; from a friend still more. And about our country, its history and institutions, a foreign friend will best instruct us, provided that he be an experienced, a learned, a studious and an intelligent friend. To the foreigner we Americans owe a considerable debt. With much care, without prejudice, disinterestedly, the foreigner has studied our history, our institutions, with a thoroughness and a perspicacity that we have not brought—probably could not bring—to the work. National pride, local vanity, political prejudice, are so many mists that rise up spontaneously between us and the truth whenever we would see ourselves as we have been and as we are.

The benefit we have gained from foreign study and criticism has been freely acknowledged. De Tocqueville we have quoted as if he were a whole bible of authority on our past and our future. To Von Holst we turn when we would be certain just why and how we were constituted. Mr. Bryce is the last judge and seer whose words we repeat as if they were the words of one who has a larger, sounder, knowledge of the American polity than our publicists have thus far shown.

The interest of foreigners in our history and institutions grows apace. Windthorst, the great leader of the German *Centrum*, only echoes a sentiment common to the world of European politics. To the ideas on which our system of government is based, to the development and to the practical application of those ideas, the attention of all thoughtful politicians has been more than ever turned of late. In the near future the ideas and institutions which we have formulated and developed here will win from foreign politicians more than attention and respect. The world, taking a new shape, enlarging men's liberty, diminishing the authority of the paternal State, aiming at a more secure personal independence, and determined to be relieved of the foolish, the intolerable burdens, to which society has been subjected by princes more taken with dynastic ambitions than with the true interest of the people—the world will, of necessity, Americanize itself in good time. Among the politicians, those who quickly pass from a study of our institutions and ideas to a prudent adaptation of them to other civilizations, will be, deservedly, the leaders and the makers of the men and of the nations to come.

In France, we note a more general recognition of the important part we are to play in the solution of the problems that many nations have before them. Within a twelve-month several thoughtful works on our past and present have come to us from French writers of reputation. Evidently these men have been working, not vainly, not fancifully, whimsically, but to supply the growing demand of reflecting men for a fuller acquaintance with the political history of the United States. Among these works the most complete, the most able, the most instructive, is M. Auguste Carlier's "La République Américaine." Readers of Mr. Bryce will find, in the important volumes of M. Carlier, a more scholarly study of the principles upon which our government has been founded; of the growth of all our institutions, step by step; of our failings, failures, contradictions, attainments, dangers; and of the various

factors that, from time to time, have modified our social life. M. Carlier's book was ready for the press before Mr. Bryce's book appeared, but a serious illness prevented the learned Frenchman from attending to the details of publication. Meantime, he had a chance to compare the work of the English author with his own, and he has fairly stated, in a short preface, the many subjects which he has patiently explicated, and which, on the other hand, Mr. Bryce wholly neglected. M. Carlier's plan was much broader than Mr. Bryce's. The English writer was more than all interested in comparing American with English institutions, in showing agreements and differences. The French writer does not weaken his study by any distracting comparisons. His subject is the American Republic, pure and simple, as it was and is. He omits no period of our history; he omits no portion of our country; he omits no addition, modification, change, resulting from our rapid growth; he omits none of the problems that have been forced upon the general government and upon the States. Mr. Bryce puts aside the colonial institutions from which our present institutions evolved. About the District of Columbia; about the public domain; about the army, the navy, the militia; about our unfortunate wards, the Indians, he is silent. An incomplete study on any subject may have a value. How much more valuable a thorough study is, readers of M. Carlier's work will fully acknowledge.

Though Auguste Carlier is not unknown to students of American history, a short sketch of his life, making him better known, will be a most fitting introduction to a review of his book. Born at Chauny, in 1803, he was educated for the law, took his degree at Paris, and there practised until his forty-third year. At this age, poor health, a good income, and studious tastes, all influenced him to adopt a new career,—the study of mankind. For several years he travelled, visiting Italy, Austria, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, England, not a mere sight-seer, but a student of history, art, literature, philosophy and religion. Then, in 1855, he determined to know something more positive about the United States than could be learned from books. Here he came, and here he remained several years, passing from city to city, North, East, West, South, inquiring, noting everywhere. The temper in which he pursued his American studies we learn from his own written words: "Among modern nations, the North Americans are, perhaps, better placed, and in better condition, to exercise a great influence on the future of the world. From whatever point of view America be surveyed, the philosopher and the historian will discover a vast range of studies, daily expanding more and more." With men like Benton, Benjamin, Everett, Sumner, Ticknor, Carey, Quincy, Longfellow, he formed lasting friendships, and was thus enabled to study America and Americans more closely, more intelligently, and to reach all the sources of our history. M. Carlier's mind was original, strong. Habits of study, a scientific spirit, the experience gained by travel and comparison, made him precise, exact. How thorough he was, is proven on every page of these four volumes. The detail he mastered testifies not only to his patience, but also to his talent and to his honesty.

After his return to France he published, in 1860, a most instructive volume on "Marriage in the United States." In this country M. Carlier's book attracted notice, and made a considerable impression. Frankly he called the attention of American statesmen to a grave danger —the increasing number of divorces. Seven years after the appearance of the French edition, Dr. Joy Jeffries, of Boston, published a translation of M. Carlier's book. This translation was widely read and noticed,

and is invaluable to all those who would inform themselves about a question of interest to every patriot, a moral question that is at the same time political, in the highest sense of the word. In 1862 a second volume, evidencing the extent of Auguste Carlier's studies, and his grasp of American problems and interests, was offered to the public: "*L'Esclavage dans ses Rapports avec l'Union Américaine.*" This work merited more attention than it received on this side of the water. M. Claudio Jannet, than whom none is more competent to judge, says that, in this work, M. Carlier displayed "a knowledge of history and an acquaintance with contemporaneous facts possessed by no other European in the same degree." Two years later, M. Carlier issued a third work: "*L'Histoire du Peuple Américain depuis la Fondation des Colonies Anglaises jusquá la Révolution de* 1776." In this original study, based wholly on documents, the learned author narrated the history of the American colonies with a completeness hitherto unknown. He was the first one to study, in detail, the varying relations of the colonies with the Indians. Inquirers who have been satisfied with a reading of American writers on this period of our history may be tempted to enlarge their course after hearing M. Claudio Jannet's statement: 'All the authors who have since written on the history of the United States have largely borrowed from M. Carlier's work.'

At the ripe age of eighty-six, M. Carlier's studies were ended by death. The last twenty years of his life he gave wholly to the great work whose title heads this inadequate review. 'To the United States his thoughts were constantly turned. He lived amid the books and journals of that country.' 'He wished to go to the bottom of things, and to expose the institutions of the United States as they are in themselves, and in their application to the real life of the country.' In order to do this faithfully, he patiently retraced the history of every branch of our government, 'following their development step by step, from the records of the legislatures and of the courts, and from the no less valuable records of events.' The labor was enormous; the result is a fitting recompense; for these four volumes will not only place the name of Auguste Carlier high on the roll of the historians of our century, but will also render invaluable aid to jurists, economists, legislators, American as well as foreign, who, now or in the future, seek to have an intelligent notion of one of the most wonderful and promising movements the world has witnessed.

In 1887, before his work had gone through the press, M. Carlier was prostrated by a severe illness. "Were it not," he graciously says, "for the sincere friendship and the devotion of M. Claudio Jannet, one of the most distinguished economists of our day, it would have been impossible for me to correct the proofs, or to supervise the publication of my book." Indeed it is to M. Jannet's pen that we are indebted for the twelfth and thirteenth books of the third volume; in which the author intended to survey, as M. Jannet does, knowingly and suggestively, the place of religion in our American institutions, and the systems of public instruction that have been and are current in the United States.

The first volume of M. Carlier's work (pp. 14 and 588) is devoted to a history of the formation of the colonies and of the changes brought about by the war of Independence and by the Confederation. In colony after colony he traces social conditions, moral and political principles, methods of government, as each one of these factors was influenced by the home government, or by the restless men that Providence led to the new land of promise. A careful reading of M. Carlier's pages will surprise and advantage the many who have been taught to believe that our

forefathers were all filled with high ideals, and worked, fought, bled under the influence of a pure and passionate love for sweet liberty—and especially for liberty of conscience. Magazine writers on these subjects, and on the ever popular subject of the Free School, will be saved many blunders and be helped to a clearer insight into the minds of the colonial Puritan, Anglican and Quaker, by an unprejudiced reading of M. Carlier's first volume.

Writing a true history, M. Carlier has done something more; he has corrected false historians. It is not alone in France that de Tocqueville and Laboulaye are still quoted as authorities. M. Carlier notes their many misstatements, their imperfect acquaintance with our history, their contradictions, and thus assists two clever men to the modest place to which they are entitled among writers on American democracy and American politics.

With the War of Independence the colonial gave way to the State governments. Out of great trials, great mistakes, great sacrifices, a new order is evolved. Skilfully M. Carlier traces the various steps by which the country acquired its independence; critically he judges actions and policies, ideas and men. Had we space we would reproduce here a page in which he handles Jefferson and his 'demoralizing ideas' with a deserved severity. If we learn from a Frenchman rightly to estimate this able demagogue and bad philosopher, we, and those who come after us, will be relieved of many dangers that threaten our progress, thanks to the "popularity" of the infidel Virginia politician.

In the second volume of his important work (pp. 615), M. Carlier studies in detail the new system of government which was finally formulated in the Constitution. The powers of each branch of the Administration, the problems to be surmounted in defining these powers, the different theories prevalent at the time, the clashings, the compromises, are here discussed in a masterly way, succinctly, clearly. Every addition to the system originally adopted, every modification introduced up to the time of the publication of this volume, is explained to the reader.

Among the most interesting chapters of the second volume are the three treating of "the human races in the United States." The problem we have been so anxious to make difficult for ourselves—the problem of assimilating all the peoples of the world—M. Carlier fully appreciated. Under a greater division, by races, he sketches our treatment of the white man, the black, the yellow and the red men; our naturalization laws, their effect and their defects. Legislators who deserve the name will find in these chapters practical hints that might well be turned to our country's benefit. The Sixth Book, which M. Carlier devotes to that curious structure 'which is neither a State, nor a fragment of a State, nor a Territory,'—the District of Columbia,—is full of interest. In little, one may here learn the variableness, the restlessness, the vices of men, and the vast difficulties that the rulers of great kingdoms and empires have to contend with. But it is in the following forty chapters, on the Territories and on the National Domain, that M. Carlier's patience, knowledge, labor, and judgment are most effectively shown. His review of legislation on these two important subjects is complete; not a detail of any value is omitted. The reader who would inform himself about the formation of the Territories may turn to M. Carlier's book for a satisfactory summary; the reader who desires to know how the National Domain has been managed, or how much of a National Domain there is just now, or what part the General Government played in the construction of the trans-continental railroads, or the details of legislation affecting inter-State commerce, will find M. Carlier a safe and honest guide.

In Volume III. (p. 597), we have an historical sketch of the organization and regulation of the army, of the navy, and of the militia, to which even specialists will refer with profit. To review this volume in the space of a page would be to do it an injustice. We hope to see some of our public men review at length the chapters on "The State, its Sovereignty and its Government," and the following chapters on "Local Government." Here M. Carlier analyzes our whole State system—its structure, the division of power, the prerogatives and limits of legislature and executive, the duties of officials, citizenship, elections, the domain of law, vested rights, taxation, and police, the corporation (municipal and private), the "township" in the different States, the county system, the municipal system. Even American politicians may be still further enlightened about the States they so wisely rule, by a study of M. Carlier's admirable third volume. Nor does the value or the interest of the volume end with the chapters on State and local government. The subject of religious liberty, the relations of Church and State under the Constitution of the United States and of the States, and the subject of "Public Instruction," are presented by M. Claudio Jannet with equal detail and a like understanding of the spirit of our Constitution, of the genius of our people, of our legislation, and of the varying views that influence the present generation. M. Jannet, as we saw, paid a high compliment to M. Carlier. To say of M. Jannet that no European knows the United States better than he, is to pay M. Jannet no compliment. We commend the chapters on "Religion" and on "Public Instruction" to men of all creeds who honestly desire the permanence of good government in North America.

A trained jurist, M. Carlier displays his remarkable learning, and his scholarly application, in the last volume (pp. 408), where he reviews the "Judiciary System of the Union and of the States." After some general considerations on the judiciary of the United States, and a survey of the sources of American law, the learned author analyzes the methods adopted in applying those written and unwritten codes that make up the body of the law. He explains the distribution of judicial power between the States and the general Government, the organization of the several courts, the modes of nomination and election of judges, the jurisdiction and competence of each several court, the rules of procedure, the origin and *rôle* of grand and petit juries, the rights and obligations of witnesses, the value of verdicts, the question of appeal, the function of courts of impeachment, the reason and jurisdiction of the "Court of Claims." M. Carlier's method is most exacting, costly to himself, and immeasurably helpful to his reader. There are few of our jurists who could have written with the knowledge and insight he evidences; there are few lawyers, and no laymen, who will not find in his volume an instructive "short course" in American Jurisprudence.

The subject of American Justice forms a happy introduction to the subject of the American Indians; and it is with a history of our relations with the Indians, and of our treatment of them, from the colonial days down to the present time, that M. Carlier closes his fourth and last volume. Fighting with and against them, protecting them, massacreing them, treating with them, parleying with them, robbing them, confederating them, reservating them, bureaucratizing them, schooling them, and yet never civilizing them, the history of our relations with the Indians is not creditable to American politics or to American morals. A more familiar acquaintance with our past doings may lead this generation to seek to remove the blot that our forefathers have fixed on the fair fame of a Christian nation, and may inspire the living to do to the Indians

as white men would be done by. To M. Carlier we owe a debt for telling us the story of our own misdoings. Could we but hope that all our young men would read the last half of his last volume, we could have no doubt as to the future of the Indian. Honest, just government,—give this to the Indian! The white man knows that where this is lacking, the word "civilization" is meaningless.

French scholarship has long compelled the respect of the world. How fresh its traditions are, at the end of this century, M. Carlier's work plainly shows. The votaries of archæology, of the study of mummies, broken monuments, dead civilizations, dead languages, press their pursuits and results upon us with a commendable use of the most modern systems of advertising. Their patience, their ingenuity, we admire; but what real value, what practical use, have their pursuits, compared with the value and use of studies of living men, of living institutions, and of a living civilization, great not by its buried memorials, but by its living, active forces, its splendid realizations, and more splendid promise? To the scholar who devotes the better portion of a lifetime, unselfishly, to these larger, more thoughtful, more beneficial studies, we cannot too often or too loudly express our gratitude. Time will but increase Auguste Carlier's reputation among the students of American history. The wise will prove his value by promptly making use of this learning and of the experience treasured in the four volumes of "La République Américaine."

IPSE, IPSA; IPSE, IPSA, IPSUM. WHICH?—Controversial letters in answer to the above question, and in vindication of the position assigned by the Catholic Church to the Ever-Blessed Mother of the World's Redeemer in the Divine Economy of Man's Salvation. In reply to the Rt. Rev. Dr. Kingdon, Coadjutor Anglican Bishop of Fredericton, New Brunswick, and John M. Davenport, Ritualist Minister, St. John, New Brunswick. By *Richard F. Quigley*, L.L.B. Fr. Pustet & Co. New York and Cincinnati.

The origin of this large volume of 471 pages was as follows: In November, 1887, Bishop Kingdon delivered a lecture in Trinity Church School-house, St. John, New Brunswick, on "Misprints," in the course of which he said, according to the *Globe* report: "Sometimes the substitution of one letter for another made a vast difference, and as an illustration of this he referred to the words IPSE and IPSA, the latter word, in an important passage in the Douay Bible, being the foundation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception."

Mr. Quigley, a barrister-at-law of St. John, was present at that lecture, and on the spot, immediately after the lecture, he protested to the Secretary of the Lecture Committee against the incorrectness and unfairness of the Bishop's statement. He then wrote to the *Globe* newspaper a long letter, declaring that statement incorrect and baseless; that the question was not whether the true reading is *ipse* or *ipsa*, but rather *ipse*, *ipsa* or *ipsum*, and that whatever reading be preferred, that the text in question, *ipse*, *ipsa* or *ipsum conteret caput tuum*, "he, she or it shall crush thy head," has never been quoted as the foundation for the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

The Bishop did not deign to reply, but in his stead Rev. Mr. Davenport, a Ritualist Minister of St. John, undertook the Bishop's defence. The result was a long series of letters which Mr. Quigley has here gathered together in book form under three heads: a Résumé, a Rejoinder, a Rebutter. We are glad that these letters have thus been permanently preserved; for they deserve it. We would have wished that the author had imitated the patient and kindly courtesy of Dr. Newman's answer to Pusey's "Eirenicon" and avoided all personalities and

severe and uncharitable expressions. He seems to have felt it to be a mistake, and towards the end of his letters strives to vindicate his conduct in this regard; but we feel his work would have been far more convincing and more effective had he kept under control all display of feeling. Again, we would have wished to see at least a general index of the letters, and, better still, an index of the exceedingly valuable information, his deep and critical knowledge has thus given to the public. Mr. Davenport did not allow the author to confine the controversy to the two questions brought forward by the Bishop, but made it embrace the whole subject of Catholic devotion to the Blessed Mother of God. Mr. Quigley first took up the various readings, *ipse*, *ipsa*, *ipsum*, and vindicated the reading of the Vulgate *ipsa* (not of the Douay!) It is wonderful what an amount of critical learning he here displays: Hebrew, Greek and Latin texts, manuscripts, versions, Fathers, scriptural critics—all are summoned to bear witness to the reading "she" or "it." We do not know where our readers could find this question treated more exhaustively or with greater critical power. The author then shows from the Bull "Ineffabilis Deus" the dogmatic constitution of the Immaculate Conception, that only the first part of the text is quoted in support of the dogma, and that no mention at all is made, textually, of the words, "she shall crush thy head." He demonstrates from Catholic theologians that all agree, no matter which of the three readings be adopted, the dogma can be proved as well from either. He then follows the Ritualistic Vicar and answers his objections taken from the "Glories of Mary" and the Raccolta. Here the author is at his best and his vast erudition is displayed—devotion to Mary in all ages, the intercession of the Saints, the Rule of St. Vincent of Lerins, Littledale's "Plain Reasons," Pusey's "Eirenicon"—are all thoroughly and critically examined.

Not only are Wiseman, Newman, Manning, Harper, Passaglia, Ward and Brownson called to his aid, but leading Anglican theologians and Bishops as well. He passes over no difficulty, and this part of his work is invaluable to the Catholic reader; for it is a veritable arsenal, richly furnished with weapons of every kind to overthrow the enemies of our heavenly Queen. We have read the whole volume, not only with pleasure and edification, but we have found it one of the very best we have thus far seen. Mr. Quigley deserves the gratitude of every Catholic, and we hope his publishers will find that his labors are appreciated. We recommend the book cordially to all our readers. In his preface the author says: "What I desiderate in Protestant teachers is a knowledge of the Catholic doctrines they attack. In the conscientious discharge of their duties from their standpoint, they may feel themselves obliged to point out errors (so-called) in the doctrines of the Catholic Church. Of this no reasonable man can complain, but for heaven's sake let them first learn exactly what these doctrines are. We will then have less of the wild figments of hysterical imaginations and pandemonium caricatures of beliefs, in defence of which the mightiest intellects that ever adorned our race have found their highest sphere, and of which genius allied with sanctity have ever been the most persuasive and enthusiastic exponents." "More Light." This is what those outside the Church need. It was this spurred our author on in writing his letters. He wished his Protestant friends to understand the Catholic doctrine of devotion to Mary, the Mother of God. We hope God has blessed his writings with abundant fruit in New Brunswick. He has sown good seed and the Lord will see that it brings forth abundant fruit. We hope Mr. Quigley will not allow his pen to remain idle, but that he

will often use it for the defence of the Church and Catholic truth. He has the talents, the education, the deep reading. We need such laymen.

MANUAL OF CHURCH HISTORY. By the *Rev. T. Gilmartin*, Professor of Ecclesiastical History, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. Vol. I. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son; London: Burns & Oates. 1890.

"Very few words are required to explain the purpose and plan of this work. It is intended as a class-book for ecclesiastical students who have to read a course of Church History in a comparatively short time." Thus writes the Reverend Professor of Ecclesiastical History of St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, in the short Preface with which the book opens. After reading Vol. I. of the "Manual," we have no hesitation in saying that he has done something more than write a good "class-book for ecclesiastical students who have to read a course of Church History in a comparatively short time." He has written a very good summary of the history of the Church from the time of the Apostles down to the Pontificate of Gregory VII.—a summary useful not only to ecclesiastical students who *have* to take a short course, but useful also to the crowd of "college" men who are supposed to absorb a sufficient knowledge of Church History without any course whatsoever. Intelligent and inquiring laymen will be thankful to the Reverend T. Gilmartin for a work that, within reasonable compass, permits them to do, of themselves, what no college professors seem to think it worth while doing with them.

The author's plan is well conceived, and he writes most agreeably, with a style notable for simplicity and clearness—a style not common in or out of manuals. A system of marginal notes and an alphabetical index are helps whose convenience will be recognized by the unprofessional reader as well as by the seminarian. Details that are properly narrated and discussed at length in learned critical works are summarily disposed of here; and yet no important detail is sacrificed. There is a pleasing absence of foreign words from the text. Of references there are enough to guide the reader who would form an acquaintance with the best sources, and not enough to confuse the beginner, or to make him imagine that, in the notes of a Manual, he has acquired an exhaustive knowledge of Church History and historians.

The chapters on the Early Christian Apologists, on the Catechetical Schools of Alexandria, on Christian Monachism, on the Sacraments, and Feasts and Fasts in the Early Church, and on the Nicene Fathers, are exceptionally good. In the explanation of the character of the greater heresies of the first seven centuries, and in the sketches of the persons who devised and practiced these heresies, as well as in the account of the actions of Popes and Councils in defence of the Faith, the Reverend Professor at Maynooth shows no less judgment and skill. We have compared his work with that of other highly reputed scholars whose manuals have been translated into English, and, in our humble opinion, he has handled these various subjects better than they; with a more exact measure of the requirements of young men "who have to read a course of Church History in a comparatively short time."

The story of the introduction of Christianity into Ireland and Scotland, and of the conversion of the Teutonic nations is well told, and told in few words. About St. Patrick's birth-place, the Reverend author has a view which he expresses very modestly. We quote his words: "According to what appears to be the more generally received opinion,

St. Patrick was a native of Scotland, and was born probably at Kilpatrick, near Dumbarton, about the year 372." We prefer Father William Morris's position, as stated in the preface to his valuable "Life of St. Patrick": "The mystery of St. Patrick's birth-place still remains a mystery. Boulogne, Tours, Dumbarton, Kilpatrick, Baunave, Bristol, Paisley, Cornwall, Glastonbury, Rosnatt Valley, Perpediac, Carlisle, Carleon, and Bath, still contend for the distinction, like the seven rival cities which laid claim to Homer." Without more contemporary testimony than we now have, the opinions of moderns, however learned or acute, will not be generally received.

In that portion of Vol. I. dealing with the "Second Period," A.D. 692 to A.D. 1517, the Reverend author has offered students a number of studies on the Papacy, worthy of especial notice for their correctness and perspicuity. The chapters on the Temporal Sovereignty of the Popes, and on the Papacy from A.D. 888 to A.D. 1046, resume, in small space, the results of much inquiry and thought, and show the talent and the spirit of a true historian. Nor can we say less of the chapters dealing with the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, and with the secular clergy and Monasticism during this epoch. Always fair in his judgments, and frank in his statement of facts, Professor Gilmartin is a rarely safe guide as a historian and as a Churchman. We commend his Manual to the attention of our Seminaries, and of our laity of either sex.

"I hope," writes the author, "on some future occasion, to supplement the present volume by the addition of a second." We should have preferred reading an "I promise," rather than "I hope;" and a fixed date would have been more encouraging than the vague "on some future occasion." We hope that the Reverend Maynooth professor will not halt, but will speedily announce his second volume. Something may depend on the favor shown by the public to this first volume. The book once known, there can be little doubt of a considerable demand. It is too good to be passed over. If it should not circulate widely, there will be none to blame but the publisher. The type is good, very good, the printer's work middling, but the binding is disgraceful. How any one can be so supremely dead to all sense of consideration for a learned author, and an intelligent public largely made up of ecclesiastical students, it is hard to conceive. The evil of slop-work binding is such a crying evil now-a-days, especially among Catholic publishers—whatever their nationality—that it behooves all writers and readers to unite in a loud protest. And we know few who have more right to protest than the able author of this Manual of Church History.

Die Katakombengemälde und ihre Alten Copien, eine Ikonographische Studie von Joseph Wilpert, mit 28 Tafeln in Lichtdruck. Herder'she Verlagshandlung, Freiburg im Breisgau. 1891. B. Herder, St. Louis, Mo. $6.75.

Wilpert is a young German scholar who for some years past has made a special study of the Roman catacombs under the direction of that prince of Christian archæologists, Commendatore de Rossi. He is already known by his work, "Fundamental Principles of Christian Archæology in Relation to the Investigations of Von Schultze, Hasenclever and Achelis."

His present work is a critical examination of the old copies of the paintings of the catacombs found in the works of Ciacconio, Bosio, and De Winge.

The work of Ciacconio is the first on the subject, and contains copies taken from the catacombs of Jordani, St. Priscilla, Novella, St. Calix-

tus, St. Domitilla, the Vigna Massimi, Via Latina, and the Crypt of St. Valentine. Bosio's work, "Roma Soterranea," goes over the same ground, and was published in 1632. Our author's object is to show the more striking errors that are to be found in the copies of the mural paintings of the catacombs contained in these early works, and which have been reproduced uninterruptedly in almost all works on the Roman catacombs. The copyist for Bosio was a painter named Giovanni Angelo Santini Toccafondi, of Sienna, to whose artistic taste our author ascribes most of the fanciful changes that have been introduced.

Following in the footsteps of Bosio, came Arringhi, with his two folio volumes; Boldetti, with his observations on the cemeteries of the holy martyrs and ancient Christians of Rome (1720); Bottari, "Sculpture and Pictures Taken from the Cemeteries of Rome," three volumes, 1738–1754; Marangoni, "Appendix on the Cemetery of Saints Thraso and Saturninus, with the Acts of St. Victorinus," Rome, 1740; the great Jesuit, Father Marchi, and, in our own day, the grand works of Garrucci and De Rossi. The work is gotten up in sumptuous style, and contains twenty-eight plates in phototype. Any library having a copy of Bosio needs this work of Wilpert, and whoever wishes to have a fair idea of the mural paintings of the catacombs and who cannot purchase the regal edition of De Rossi, will be glad to know of this publication of Wilpert.

It is well known that the early Christians of Rome, out of reverence for the dead, did away with the pagan custom of cremating their bodies. From the very beginning they buried the dead. In the early Church there existed a distinct sacred order of ministers known as *fossores*. These were the men who designed that veritable necropolis which exists all around Rome, under ground; which extends, with its innumerable galleries hewn out of the soft rock, for miles on miles; and which, in the days of persecution, served both as a resting-place for the dead and a place of worship for the living. When peace was restored to the Church by Constantine, in the beginning of the fourth century, the Christians came forth to the light of day, and temples sprang up all over the empire, but for many years after the catacombs were still used for interments. Gradually as other cemeteries were established, the catacombs fell into disuse, but for some centuries they continued to be visited as holy and venerated sanctuaries on account of the martyrs and saintly pontiffs interred there. In the catacombs of St. Sebastian and St. Calixtus, which are now united, there were buried, according to an inscription at St. Sebastian's, 147,000 martyrs and faithful Christians and 46 of the early Roman Pontiffs, most of them also martyrs. With the incursion of the barbarians, but especially of the Lombards, the catacombs were devastated and finally filled up with rubbish, so that by the end of the ninth century all traces of them had apparently disappeared. It was on May 31, 1578, whilst digging in the puzzolano beds on the Via Salaria Nova, the workmen came across the opening to the Catacombs of the Jordani. The most precious discoveries of epitaphs, fragments of sarcophagi with reliefs of all kinds, and mural paintings of sacred and doctrinal subjects were the results of the excavations. The whole Christian world rejoiced in the magnificent revelations which were constantly made, and from that day to this the work has been carried on, and has always claimed the attention and study of the lovers of Christian antiquity and of Christian art. We have here in stone and painting, in epitaphs and inscriptions, the faith and worship of the early Church brought clearly home to our minds. Devotion to the Blessed Mother of God, the martyrs and Saints; their intercession for us, and our invocation of them; the seven

Sacraments, the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, the Good Shepherd, the Primacy of St. Peter, Sts. Peter and Paul as founders of the Roman Church, the resurrection of our Lord and our own, prayer for the dead—these are only some of the doctrines clearly manifested to have been the faith of the Christians of the catacombs. If our readers have not as yet made a study of this delightful and most instructive subject, we would recommend them to procure Northcote and Brownlow's "Roman Catacombs," an English work which has been published with the cordial approval of De Rossi.

LIFE OF JOHN BOYLE O'REILLY. By *James Jeffrey Roche*. Together with his Complete Poems and Speeches. Edited by Mrs. John Boyle O'Reilly. Introduction by His Eminence, James Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore. New York: Cassell Publishing Company.

It is not an exaggeration to say that no man of our own times and country was more admired and loved by those who knew or intimately knew of him, than was John Boyle O'Reilly, and none whose death was more widely and sincerely lamented. He was emphatically a man, the like of whom we rarely see. Those who were nearest to him and had best opportunities of thoroughly knowing him, unite in testifying with accordant voice to the heroism, generosity, tenderness and beauty of his character. In this estimate, those who have had no previous knowledge of him will join, after they shall have read the volume before us.

It opens with a brief and exquisitely beautiful introduction by His Eminence, Cardinal Gibbons; then follows an admirable biographical sketch of the life of John Boyle O'Reilly by James Jeffrey Roche, who, in addition to the advantages resulting from a close personal friendship of twenty years, had access to all the papers of the deceased, whether printed or private. The task undertaken by Mr. Roche was evidently a labor of love, yet we do not think that the writer has permitted his feelings to overpower his judgment. He has written with a full heart, but we find no signs in what he has written of any effort or intention to exaggerate the admirable traits of character the deceased possessed. On the contrary, the author's intention seems to have been to simply depict him as he actually and really was. To us, the chief charm of the narrative is its simplicity, naturalness and sincerity.

The biographer describes in successive chapters O'Reilly's birthplace, childhood, apprenticeship in a printing-office, first in Ireland and then in England, and his speedy advancement from the printer's case to the reporter's desk; his going over to Ireland and enlisting when nineteen years of age in the Tenth Hussars, a cavalry regiment of picked men; his joining the Fenians and his arrest. In the next chapter his trial by court-martial is graphically described, and the testimony of the witnesses, and their cross-examination by the accused, are given in full detail.

The verdict of the court-martial was "guilty," and O'Reilly was sentenced to death, but the sentence was immediately commuted to that of imprisonment for life. Just here comes in an incident showing O'Reilly's magnanimity. Some six or seven years afterwards O'Reilly (having escaped from Australia) was called on by one of the informers whose testimony had convicted him. The wretch found himself so shunned and despised by all his fellow-soldiers, English as well as Irish, that he had deserted the army and fled to America. But the story of his treachery had preceded him, and he was starving in the streets of Boston. He called on O'Reilly and appealed to him for assistance. O'Reilly generously forgave him, and provided him with money to supply his imme-

diate wants and pay his way to some place where he would be unknown and might obtain employment.

The author then, in successive chapters, describes O'Reilly's life in prison, first at Pentonville, then, in succession, at Millbank, in the prison brickyards at Chatham, at Dartmoor, and then his transfer to Portland, preparatory to his transportation to Australia. The horrors of these British prisons are told in simple, graphic language without any effort at rhetorical exaggeration; and none, indeed, is needed to impress the reader; the simple statement of the naked facts is all-sufficient. The story of the horrors of the prison-ship, the life of O'Reilly in Australia, his wonderful escape, his landing in Philadelphia, and arrival in Boston, the place of his future residence, on the 2d of January, 1870, is told in like simple manner, partly in the author's own words, and partly by extracts from O'Reilly's letters and papers.

In subsequent chapters the author narrates the chief incidents in John Boyle O'Reilly's subsequent life in Boston, as journalist, poet, literateur, lecturer, the part he took in movements to free Ireland from British misrule, and the part he took also in all that concerned the country of his adoption. O'Reilly's character, too, in private life, in the bosom of his family, in the social and literary clubs of which he was a member; his geniality, courtesy, warmth of heart, unselfishness, are clearly brought to view.

The second part of the volume consists of John Boyle O'Reilly's Poems and Speeches, edited by his bereaved wife. In referring to his poems, we cannot do better than to adopt the words of Cardinal Gibbons: "Few men have felt so powerfully the *divine afflatus* of poesy; few natures have been so fitted to give it worthy response. . . . . Such a nature needed an environment of romance, and romantic, indeed, was his career throughout. . . . . With surroundings and a career like these, a man of his make could not but be a poet, and a poet he became of truest mould."

Following the poems are a number of speeches on different subjects, all of which are worthy of the man who delivered them and worthy of the occasions that called them forth.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE PHILADELPHIA THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF ST. CHARLES BORROMEO. 1832–1890. Hardy & Mahony: Philadelphia. 1891.

It was a happy thought of Rev. Augustin J. Schulte, Disciplinarian and Professor of St. Charles Seminary, to gather together the necessary materials for the composition of this historical sketch whilst some few of the very old priests still lived to give him much needed information, and to settle doubts when such arose in his investigations. It was a happy thought, and most beautifully and even thoroughly, as far as documents and persons allowed, has he fulfilled his task. No one except those who encouraged him in his work can understand how much labor this historical pamphlet of sixty-nine pages has entailed. He had to go over the complete files of the *Catholic Herald and Visitor* and *Catholic Standard* from 1832 to 1890, to consult all the Catholic directories and the annual reports of the seminary, the minutes of the seminary board, to write numerous letters to priests both secular and religious, to make certain of the dates and places of ordination of the many priests who have been educated within the walls of this venerable institution, and the result is one which must be a joy to every priest of the diocese, and is a valuable addition to the historical records of the Church in these United States. We hope that what Father Schulte has

done for St. Charles Seminary will stimulate the rectors of our other seminaries to do or to have done the same for their own, that thus gradually we may be able to furnish a complete history of the ecclesiastical pædagogy of the Church in this country.

The book gives a complete list of all the lay trustees of the seminary, its charter, its present faculty, a short introduction concerning the training of seminarians from the time of the Apostles to the Council of Trent, and the history of St. Charles Seminary. Before 1832 there were only four theological seminaries in the United States, viz., Baltimore, Bardstown, Charleston and St. Louis.

Rt. Rev. Francis Patrick Kenrick, D.D., was the founder of St. Charles Seminary in 1832. From humble beginnings it has grown to the magnificent institution it now is, with 146 students and a staff of twelve professors and a course of studies equal to that of any theological seminary of Europe.

We learn from this history that 477 priests have been ordained during the fifty-eight years of its existence. We have also a list of all the secular priests who have labored in the diocese during this period. Our author weaves into his narrative a short life of the bishops and archbishops of Philadelphia—Kenrick, Neumann, Wood and Ryan; of the various rectors of the seminary—Most Rev. Peter Richard Kenrick, Bishop Barron, Bishop Michael O'Connor, Bishop Amat, Fathers Maller and Tornatore, C.M., Bishop O'Hara, Bishop Shanahan, V. Rev. Maurice A. Walsh, V.G., Bishop James O'Connor, Monsignor Corcoran, V. Rev. Charles P. O'Connor, D.D., V. Rev. William Kiran, D.D., and the present rector, V. Rev. John E. Fitzmaurice, D.D. He tells us of some of its more distinguished professors; he speaks of its fine library and of a few of its more valuable treasures.

The book is most beautifully illustrated with phototypes of the different bishops and rectors and some of the professors, with views of the old seminary at Eighteenth and Race streets, the preparatory seminary at Glen Riddle and the present grand edifice at Overbrook. There are several views of this seminary, its front, its chapel, both choir and altars and organ gallery, one of its corridors and porches, and its library.

A book containing so many facts and dates could hardly be published without some mistakes, and the author would be thankful to the clergy if they would notify him of any such errors. We have noticed the ordination of Rev. Nevin F. Fisher is placed on July 19, 1886; it should be June 19th, the general ordination in St. John Laterans before Trinity Sunday. It would be inexcusable to conclude this notice without saying a word of commendation for the admirable style in which this historical sketch has been published. Paper, type, illustrations—all are admirable. The work has been published by order of His Grace, Archbishop Ryan, for private circulation, and as a manifestation of his gratitude to the two thousand and eighty-six solicitors for the seminary collection, each of whom will receive a copy. We are sure, however, that His Grace will be so importuned for copies, that he will be forced to allow another edition of the same which may be offered for sale.

THE LIFE OF ST. PATRICK, APOSTLE OF IRELAND. With a Preliminary Account of the Sources of the Saint's History. By *William Bullen Morris*, Priest of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri. Fourth Edition. London and New York: Burns & Oates. 1890.

The fact that this work has passed through four editions during the twelve years that have elapsed since it was first published, is a sufficient proof of the favor with which it is generally regarded. Many learned

critics have also highly commended it, though some of these have dissented from the opinions expressed by the author on a few disputed points of minor importance.

It is impossible for the reader who carefully peruses this work not to be impressed with the importance of the results already arrived at, and the still more important ones that it may be reasonably expected will be arrived at, through the exhumation of late years of ancient Celtic manuscripts, and the careful and laborious investigation of them by learned critical scholars in Ireland, England, and other European countries. It may, with truth, be said that it is only during the last few years that collections of ancient Irish manuscripts which were known to be in existence were considered worthy of study, or that it was thought important to search for others that might be in existence. They were regarded as interesting, curious relics of ages past and gone, but not as having any great importance or real historical value.

But of late years it has been discovered that just the opposite of this is the truth; and acute investigators and scholars are now industriously engaged in searching for the treasures, heretofore unsuspected, that lie hidden in the existing collections of ancient Celtic literary remains, and in hunting up and bringing to light other collections or scattered manuscripts, whose number is constantly found to be far greater than was supposed.

In this way much light has been shed, of late years, upon obscure and disputed points in ancient Irish history, and there is every reason to believe that still more light will soon be thrown upon them. The extensiveness of the field of research now open to scholars may be inferred from the fact that the two libraries of Trinity College, Dublin, and of the Royal Academy, contain 600 manuscript Gælic works, which, if printed, would make more than 30,000 large quarto pages. In addition to these there are similar unexplored and, until recently, almost forgotten and unknown literary treasures in the British Museum, the Bodleian, the Roman, the Burgundian, and other libraries in the British Islands and on the European Continent.

One of the results of this is that much more is now definitely known of details relating to St. Patrick's life and labors than in former years, and more also respecting the condition, habits and degree of civilization of the people of Ireland in ancient times.

The scholarly author of the work before us has availed himself of these newly-opened sources of information and of the labors of others in the same fields, and has used them to good advantage. Among the many merits of the work we only mention two, and they are of primary importance: First, the clearness with which he brings to view the supernatural character of St. Patrick's work, and, second, the Providential relation as regards time and circumstances which the conversion of the people of Ireland bears at that period and during the subsequent three centuries to the condition of the peoples on the Continent of Europe.

MONUMENTA GERMANIÆ PÆDAGOGICA. Schulordnungen Schulbücher and Pädagogische Miscellaneen aus den Landen Deutscher Zunge, von *Karl Kehrbach*.

RATIO STUDIORUM ET INSTITUTIONES SCHOLASTICAE SOCIETATIS JESU. Berlin: A. Hoffmann & Co. 1887–1890. Vols. I., II., III.

Truly, a wonderful work; and one which only Germany could produce. What heroic patience, zeal, labor, and perseverance, it must have required! The three volumes, on the plan of studies and scholastic regulations of the Jesuits, are the second, fifth, and ninth of the series,

and are the work of G. M. Pachtler, S.J. The first volume embraces the period from 1541 to 1586–1599; the second, from 1586, 1599 to 1832; the third volume is filled with the laws and regulations and order of studies laid down by the various Generals of the Society from the year 1600 to 1722. In these three volumes, Father Pachtler gives us a complete insight of Jesuit pædagogy, not only as far as the training of their own members, mentally and morally, is concerned, but also the education of the pupils entrusted to their care during the last three hundred years. We have here all the official regulations, whether of their Generals or of their general Congregations, or of the Superiors of provinces. We have the history of all their colleges, and the rules enforced in each. Incidentally, we are made acquainted with their greatest teachers and professors. In a word, everything which has placed the Jesuits in the front rank of instructors and educators of youth, is here gathered together from the archives of that great order in Germany and Rome, and the world can now understand the secret of their success. There is nothing in the whole three volumes except rules and regulations. These are all official. The work is well styled "Monumenta Germaniæ Pædagogica." It is truly monumental, and these three volumes, which are the first part of the Jesuit contribution, will be undoubtedly the grandest of the series. No library can be complete without them, and we need not add that every teacher and professor will find a mine of information in studying their contents. And yet they are restricted to the teaching-work of the Jesuits amongst the German-speaking nations. What a work it would be if it embraced their labors in the same sphere all over the world!

The first volume is enriched with fine portraits of St. Ignatius, Father Francis Coster, Father Gregory of Valentia, and Father John Buys (Busaeus).

Thus far, ten large octavo volumes of the series have appeared, and the publishers inform us that there will be still three volumes to complete the Jesuit series, and bring their portion of the work down to the present time. We learn from the last number of the *Historisches Jahrbuch* that the continuation of the "Monumenta Germaniæ Pædagogica" has now become the work of a distinct society established for that object in Berlin on the 14th of December, 1890. It will soon publish the plan of education laid down for the princes and princesses of the House of Hohenzollern. With the "Monumenta" the society will publish at the same time, as an appendix, dissertations on the subject by its members. Abundant material of that character is ready for the press.

Psychology. By *Michael Maher, S.J.* Benziger Bros. New York.

This is one of the admirable series of Catholic Manuals of Philosophy, published by the Jesuit Fathers of Stonyhurst, in English, for the benefit especially of the laity. We know of nothing in English Catholic literature that was so badly needed as a series of works on mental and moral philosophy adapted to meet the materialistic and infidel difficulties of the age. There are numerous scholarly and profound works on such subjects in all the native languages of Europe, but up to the present, we had scarcely anything in English on kindred topics, and what little we had, *e.g.*, Balme's "Fundamental Philosophy," did not treat of many of the burning questions of the present. Father Hill, S.J., did, indeed, publish some years ago, a compendium of philosophy in English, but as a class-book, comprising the whole course of logic, dialectics and critics, ontology, psychology, cosmology, and natural theology, it was necessarily

most concise. It was intended only as a text-book for colleges. The Stonyhurst series gives us satisfactory treatises on every branch of philosophy. They are truly Catholic manuals of philosophy. Father Michael Maher, S.J., is the author of the manual on psychology. In his preface he says "I venture to hope that an attempt at an English exposition of the psychology of Aristotle and St. Thomas, and an application of their principles to modern questions ought to be of interest, not only to the Catholic reader, but to every student of philosophy." He tells us he has followed Liberatore and Zigliara as his guides, giving special attention to those questions which have attracted most notice in the recent psychological literature of the country. After a general introduction on the scope of psychology, its method, and the classification of the mental faculties, our author treats of empirical psychology in Part I., and of rational life in Part II., of the first book; and in the second book of rational psychology. Here come up all the grand questions of the substantiality, simplicity, and spirituality of the soul; recent theories concerning the soul; its immortality; its individuality and unity; the union of soul and body; life; seat of the soul; its origin; evolution; animal psychology. This enumeration of chapters shows that the author has endeavored to make his book a complete manual. The question of free will is treated under Rational Life. The book is enriched with a valuable analytical index. We hope that our readers will appreciate these Catholic manuals of the Jesuit Fathers of Stonyhurst. They have done good service by the publication in English of works which heretofore existed mostly in Latin, and have furnished the antidote to the poisonous literature which is undermining and destroying the faith of so many. Both priests and people should support such Catholic literature. No intelligent Catholic who wishes to understand the foundations of knowledge should fail to study these Catholic manuals, and all should be thankful that at last they are able to do so in this the first edition given in an English dress.

Instructions For First Confession. From the German of *Rev. F. N. Jaegers*, by a Priest of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia. St. Louis, Mo.: Published by B. Herder, 17 South Broadway. Price 50 cents.

An excellent little work. We can recommend it to catechists and schoolteachers. Nay more, we feel that the reverend clergy also will thank us for calling their attention to it. It is not an easy task to explain the catechism to children, and it is exceedingly difficult to interest the very little ones and to adapt oneself to their powers of understanding.

This Father Jaegers has done for children of seven or eight years of age, but his instructions are just as serviceable for all. The author tells us that they are the fruit of twenty-four years' practical experience in instructing children for first confession. Every instruction is an object-lesson in the method of teaching, and shows a thorough understanding of a child's nature.

The author in his preface makes a special appeal, for the proper preparation of the young for their first confession, not only to priests and teachers, but also to parents. His words are timely: "Parents cannot divest themselves, before God, of the responsibility with regard to the Christian education of their children. By a Christian life, parents, at their own fireside, should prepare them for the reception of the graces the Church administers. They should guard and nourish the graces received, that they may bring forth abundant fruit. If a pious mother gently admonishes the child, kneeling at her side, to confess his sins in all

sincerity and humility to the priest, as God's representative; if she joins the child in making an act of heart-felt contrition—there is no doubt he will be impressed with a lively sense of the great importance of this holy act. Such impressions will sink deep into the heart of the child. Contact with the busy and distracting cares of the world in after life, may dim their lustre, but will never wholly efface them." Parents could not have a better book for their children or for their own use in instructing them for this most important of all solemnities after that of First Communion. Every Christian mother should have a copy.

THE LIFE OF CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS. By *Francesco Tarducci*, after the latest Documents. Translated from the Italian by Henry F. Brownson. Detroit: H. F. Brownson, Publisher. 1890.

It was a happy thought that led Mr. Brownson to translate this work of the learned and distinguished Italian scholar and writer. In view of the approaching four hundredth anniversary of the discovery of America by Columbus, the publication in English of a new and reliable Life of the great discoverer is most opportune. Most of the Lives of him that have been written are defective. They are commonly restricted to the main facts of the story, omitting matters of minor importance, or giving a scanty account of them. Few or none undertake to give all the details of his gloriously active life. Then, too, during the last half century many documents have been discovered which shed increased light upon the character, thoughts and actions of Columbus, clearing up many points that were obscure, and correcting erroneous impressions respecting others.

Of these discoveries Tarducci has availed himself, and turned them to excellent account. He has told the story of Columbus, his life, labors, discoveries and sufferings with great simplicity and evident truthfulness, and in a graceful, natural style. He has so carefully and completely studied the character and thoughts of Columbus, and so identified himself with him that, when not giving the very words of Columbus, he gives us what Columbus himself would have said. The result of this is a faithful picture of Columbus and an accurate account of his life and discoveries.

The translation of Tarducci's Italian text into English has been admirably well done by Mr. Brownson. It has none of the stiffness which commonly characterizes translations, but has all the ease and naturalness of an original production.

SERMONS AND LECTURES. By *Rev. J. F. Loughlin, D.D.* Philadelphia. 1890.

The sermons contained in this volume have as their respective subjects: "The Epiphany of Our Lord," "The Blessed Sacrament," "The Sacred Heart of Jesus," "Perseverence in Grace," "The Beauty of the Church," and "Forgiving Injuries." In addition to the sermons there is a lecture on "The Isle of Destiny"—Ireland—and a paper on "The Sixth Nicene Canon and the Papacy," which is reprinted from the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW, of April, 1880, in which it first appeared.

The sermons, as well as the other papers, are evidently the result of careful study on the part of their author. Each of them is comprehensive in scope, replete with edifying thoughts, instructive, earnest, devout. The lecture on "The Isle of Destiny" is one which we wish was in the hands of every thoughtful Catholic and of every thoughtful person.

Its careful perusal would sweep away many of the mistaken notions that are commonly entertained respecting the people and history of Ireland, and could not fail, it seems to us, to impress them with the fact that every chapter of that sad yet glorious history has a profound spiritual significance, and, in the counsels of Divine Providence, has been most closely interlinked with the history of the Church, with the history of civilization, and with the blessed work of which our Divine Lord has done and is ever doing in and through His Church.

The paper on the "Sixth Nicene Canon and the Papacy" is an acute, critical discussion of the meaning of the reference, in that Canon, to the Roman Pontiff. It shows clearly that the Canon incidentally, yet for that reason all the more powerfully, testifies to the belief of the Nicene Fathers in the primacy and universal supremacy of the Holy Roman See.

THE LIFE OF BLESSED MARGARET MARY: With Some Account of the Devotion to the Sacred Heart. By the *Rev. George Tickell, S. J.* Third edition: Burns & Oates, limited. 1890. New York Catholic Publication Society Company.

It is a good sign to see a third edition of the life of a Saint called for by the Catholic reader. The more so, as there have been several other lives of our Saint published. Father Tickell tells us that he has founded his history "upon the Memoirs of her own life written by Blessed Margaret Mary herself, at the wish of her director, Father Rolin, S. J., and on the life written by the Religious of Paray-le-Monial, her contemporaries." The Saint's life by Monsignor Languet is gathered from the same sources. Our author has made use of the various biographies of the Saint, written by Father Daniel, S. J., by Monsignor Bougaud, and the "Popular History of Blessed Margaret Mary," by Canon Cucherat. The result is a most serviceable though concise life of the foundress and promoter of Devotion to the Sacred Heart. The history of the devotion and an explanation of its distinctive character is given as the last chapter of the book. The only complaint we have to make is that it is so very brief; there is but the slightest mention of the opposition of Jansenism to the propagation of the devotion, and the simplest statement of the various stages of its presentation to the ecclesiastical authorities at Rome up to the time of its approval by the Holy See. In an appendix we have the decree of Pius IX., for the beatification of our Saint in 1864. All lovers of the Sacred Heart of Jesus will welcome the life of the favored servant of God who labored so faithfully whilst on earth in propagating this devotion which may well be styled the most prominent manifestation of the faith and piety of these latter times.

THE BLIND APOSTLE AND HEROINE OF CHARITY. Being the Third Series of "Bells of the Sanctuary." By *Kathleen O'Meara*, Author of "Queen by Right Divine," "Life of Bishop Grant," etc., etc. New York: Catholic Publication Society Co. London: Burns & Oates.

This volume is the last of the many beautiful and instructive writings, biographical and devotional of the cultivated and pious Kathleen O'Meara.

The "Blind Apostle" is the late Monseigneur Gaston de Segur, a saintly priest, whose name has become a household word in many lands, and whose life was one of heroic patience, zeal and piety under an affliction which would have crushed any soul that was not sustained by continual union with God.

He was of noble descent, began life in diplomacy, gave up all the

world to become a priest, was sent to Rome by Napoleon the Third in an office of great distinction, with a lofty career plainly open before him. One day, in a moment, one eye became absolutely sightless. The other began to fail, and soon he became totally blind. He had made an absolute submission of his will to God, and asked for nothing but patience. In the volume before us it is shown how he became the centre of immense spiritual influence, persevering in total blindness for twenty-six years, until he was called away by death, in preaching and hearing confessions of scholars, students, soldiers, working-men and the poor.

The Heroine of Charity described in this volume is Madame Legras, Foundress and first Novice Mistress of the Sisters of Charity, who was as heroic in devotion as she was wonderful in wisdom.

MARY IN THE EPISTLES; or, the Implicit Teachings of the Apostles Concerning the Blessed Virgin, Contained in their Writings. Illustrated from the Fathers and other Authors. With Introductory Chapters. By *Rev. Thomas Livius, C. S. S. R.* New York: Catholic Publication Society Co. London: Burns & Oates.

This work is truly multum in parvo. Within the compass of a small volume the author has collected an immense amount of indirect and inferential proofs in the Epistles, to the truth of the doctrine of the Church respecting the Blessed Virgin Mary, and the place which she occupies in Catholic worship. The author's own comments and inferences are also sustained by numerous quotations from Church Fathers and other ecclesiastical writers.

The author devotes six brief preliminary chapters, respectively, to the "Fallacy of the Argument of Silence in the Epistles," to the "Little that is said about the Blessed Virgin in the Gospels," to the "Oral Teachings of the Apostles in their General Preaching and Catechetical Instructions," the "Reasons for the Silence of the Apostles on the Blessed Virgin in their Epistles," the "Implicit Teaching of the Apostles on the Blessed Virgin in their Epistles," and to the "Catholic View of the Blessed Virgin as an Ideal of all Christian Perfection." He then takes up each Epistle in succession, quoting the different passages in them which contain implicit testimonies, commenting on them and sustaining his comments with references to and brief quotations from the writings of Church Fathers, saints and theologians.

The volume closes with a list of the authors quoted or referred to, followed by an analytical index of all the subjects discussed in the work.

HISTORY OF THE CHURCH FROM ITS FIRST ESTABLISHMENT TO OUR OWN TIMES. Designed for the use of Ecclesiastical Seminaries and Colleges. By *Rev. J. A. Birkhæuser*, formerly Professor of Church History and Canon Law in the Provincial Seminary of St. Francis de Sales, near Milwaukee, Wis. Second edition. Revised and enlarged. Fr. Pustet & Co.: New York and Cincinnati. 1891.

This work, as we learn from the author's statements, has grown out of a course of lectures which, for several years, he delivered to the students in the Provincial Seminary of St. Francis in the Archdiocese of Milwaukee. It has been composed and published for the use of students in colleges and theological seminaries, and is intended to serve as an introduction to a fuller and more comprehensive study of Church History.

The Most Rev. Michael Heiss, Archbishop of Milwaukee, recently deceased, highly commended the work, declaring that, "after a careful perusal of the proof-sheets," he was "convinced that, owing to the singularly full and precise statement of the subject, the work will fill a long-felt want in our Catholic literature, and will be used with great

advantage as a text-book in our ecclesiastical seminaries. The frequent references to Patristic literature, which are found in this volume, will make our students familiar with a branch of theological science, which . . . . has not received that attention which it rightly deserves." His Eminence, Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore, and the Most Rev. William Henry Elder, Archbishop of Cincinnati, unite with the late Most Rev. Archbishop of Milwaukee in this commendation.

THE SCIENCE OF THE SAINTS IN PRACTICE. By *John Baptist Pagani*, of the Institute of Charity. Second edition. New York: Catholic Publication Society Company; London, Burnes & Oates. 1891.

The design of this work is to set before its readers salutary reflections for every day in the year by placing before them some texts of Sacred Scripture or extracts from the writings of Saints, with suitable comments upon them. Each month is devoted to meditations on some particular Christian virtue. The two volumes which are before us (the whole work consists of three volumes) are arranged as follows: For January, the subject of "Union and Fraternal Charity" is selected; for February, that of "Humility;" for March, "Mortification;" for April, "Simplicity and Prudence; for May, "Poverty and Chastity;" for June, "Obedience"; for July, "Mildness and Firmness;" for August, "Diligence and Edification." The different aspects these virtues assume, the reasons for practicing them, the different circumstances which especially call for their exercise, the difficulties in the way of practicing them, and the rich spiritual fruit that may be reaped by carefully and diligently cultivating them, are made the subject of separate special meditations for each day of the month. The instructions and reflections are lucid, highly suggestive, practical and edifying.

LETTERS OF ST. ALPHONSUS MARIA DE LIGUORI, DOCTOR OF THE CHURCH.—Translated from the Italian. Edited by *Rev. Eugene Grimm, C.S.S.R.* The Centenary Edition. Part I., Vol. 1. Benziger Brothers. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago. 1891.

This is the eighteenth volume of the ascetical works of St. Alphonsus now being published by Benziger Brothers. In his letters, more than in anything else, a man reveals his true nature. It is in their letters especially we become acquainted with saintly souls. We have here the general correspondence of the saint with nuns and priests, novices and members of his own institute, people living in the world and superiors of his own religious houses, his relatives; in a word, with persons of every condition of life. There are 373 letters, beginning with the year 1730 and coming down to 1762, all written before the saint was consecrated bishop. This publication of all the works of St. Alphonsus in English has been a great and worthy memorial in honor of the great Doctor of the Church, and we hope the enterprising publishers have been rewarded by proper recognition for the immense outlay they must have incurred.

MONTH OF JUNE IN HONOR OF THE SACRED HEART OF JESUS. By *Rev. A. Van Sever.* Milwaukee: Hoffman Brothers.

This excellent little work consists of a number of short edifying readings and meditations arranged for every day of the month of June. Preceding them is a brief daily prayer to the Sacred Heart. An appendix contains a number of brief acts of devotion and ejaculatory petitions.

ACTS OF ENGLISH MARTYRS, HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED. By *John Hungerford Pollen, S. J.* With a Preface by John Morris, of the same Society. New York: Catholic Publication Society Co. London: Burns & Oates. 1891.

A full and detailed notice of this admirable book has been prepared, but the limited space remaining when the reviewer had finished his task would not permit its insertion. It will appear in the next number of the REVIEW.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE CROWN OF THORNS; Or, The Little Breviary of the Holy Face. A Complete Manual of Devotion and Reparation to the Holy Face of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. From Approved and Original Sources, by the Sisters of the Divine Compassion. With an Introductory Notice by the *Right Rev. Mgr. Preston, D.D., LL.D., V.G.* New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers.

ORDO DIVINI OFFICII, Recitandi Missæque celebrandæ Juxta Rubricas emendatas Breviarii Missalisque Romani cum Votivis Officiis ex indulto tam pro Clero Sæculari Statuum Fœderatorum Officiis Generalibus hic Concessis utente quam pro Iis Quibus Kalendarium Clero Romano Proprium concessum est. Pro Anno 1891. Fr. Pustet & Co.: New York and Cincinnati.

STARS IN ST. DOMINIC'S CROWN: Being Lives of some of the Saints and Blessed of the Order of Friar Preachers. By *Thomas Austin Dyson*, Priest of the same Order, Author of "The Life of St. Thomas Aquinas," "Lives of Some of the Sons of St. Dominic," and "The Life of St. Pius the Fifth." New York and Montreal: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1890.

THE INTERIOR OF JESUS AND MARY. Translated from the French of the Rev. J. Grou, of the Society of Jesus. Edited, with a Biographical Sketch and Preface, by *Rev. S. H. Frisbee, S. J.* New York: The Catholic Publication Society Co. London: Burns & Oates. 1891.

THE HEART OF ST. JANE FRANCES DE CHANTAL. Thoughts and Prayers Compiled from the French of the Sisters of the Divine Compassion. With a Preface by the *Rt. Rev. Mgr. Thomas S. Preston, D.D., V.G.* New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers. 1891.

THE LIFE OF OUR LORD. Prepared Chiefly in the Words of the Gospel, for Use in Schools. By *T. Murphy*, Master of the Practicing School, St. Mary's Training College. New York: Catholic Publication Society Co. London: Burns & Oates. 1890.

GOLDEN SANDS. Fifth Series. Little Counsels for the Sanctification and Happiness of Daily Life. Translated from the French, by *Miss Ella McMahon.* New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers.

THE GLORIOUS RESURRECTION AND ASCENSION OF JESUS CHRIST. Short Meditations from Easter to the Ascension. By *Richard F. Clarke, S.J.* New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers.

THE POWER OF THE MEMORARE. Illustrated by Examples. From the French of a Marist Father, by *Miss Ella McMahon.* New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers.

THE LITTLE MONTH OF MAY. Translated from the French of the author of "Golden Sands," by *Miss Ella McMahon.* New York, Cincinnati, St. Louis: Benziger Brothers.

MANUAL OF THE SODALITY OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN MARY. Permissu Superiorum. Thirty-eighth Revised Edition. Baltimore: Published by John Murphy & Co.

ECHOES OF THE PAST: Poems, by *Mrs. Clara L. McIlvain.* Edited by her Daughter, Lottie McIlvain Moore. Louisville, Ky.: John P. Morton & Co. 1890.

THE GREAT TRUTHS. Short Meditations for the Season of Advent. By *Richard F. Clarke, S. J.* New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers.

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